Dependency (Current Through 11/16/2024)

November 2024

By: John Nieman

The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Auther’s note is italicized.

In re G.R.

10/25/24, CA 2/8 B332699

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B332699.PDF

This case involves the standing of an alleged father. Alleged father appealed the trial court’s exit order that his visits be monitored. Appellant was granted alleged father status but never raised his status to legal/biological or presumed. Alleged fathers are granted party-like status to allow them an opportunity to elevate their parentage status. Since father never did -and so never achieved actual party status- he had no standing to appeal the visitation order. Appeal dismissed for lack of standing.

In re H.B. et al.

10/29/24, CA ½ A169493

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169493.PDF

Father appeals a disposition order removing the children from his care with (continued) placement (Family Maintenance) with the mother. There is an initial dispute about whether or not the Juvenile Court removed the children from the father, who shared physical custody of the children before the dependency petition was filed. It seems that the Social Services Agency and mother persuaded the trial court to conflate the legal procedures for removal under Welfare and Institutions Code (W&I) §361(c) (with the statutory result of placing children in foster care under W&I §361.5(a)) and an order made pursuant to W&I §362(c) (which does not require that reunification services be provided because there is no placement in foster care). In any case, the trial court (apparently in an abundance of caution) made removal findings as to father properly under W&I §361(c), rendering its erroneous reliance on W&I §362(c) moot.

Father challenged the adequacy of the evidence to support the removal finding. This was denied ostensibly because father struggled to maintain boundaries with his children and had not yet fully benefitted from his parenting class. Secondly, he asserted that there were reasonable means to prevent the need for removal. But for the same reasons that justified removal, and with services in full swing, the appellate court reasoned that reasonable means did not exist (i.e. presumptively, everything reasonable was already being done and as yet it was insufficient).

Finally, the appellate court agreed with father that reasonable efforts were not made to prevent the need for removal as required by W&I §361(e).^[1] The social worker failed to properly assess father’s progress and prognosis for substance abuse recovery. The Social Worker apparently delayed in making a parenting class referral and then failed to assess father’s progress in it.^[2] The Social Worker also did not report progress the father might have made in therapy. The appellate court opined that the social worker did not assist father “in any meaningful way to avoid the children’s removal from his custody”.

Remanded for a new dispositional hearing to comply with W&I §361.

In re BABY GIRL R

11/8/24, CA 6 H051362

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H051362.PDF

Minor’s counsel appeals from a decision to grant reunification services to the mother whose whereabouts were unknown. There was a sufficiently diligent search for the mother after removal and she was not found. Subsequent to the ordering of reunification services to the absent mother, services were terminated, rendering the appeal moot. The appellate panel decided to exercise its discretion to decide the question of the trial court’s authority to order reunification services in such a situation.

The homeless and substance-abusing mother, who perhaps needless to say suffered significant mental health issues, gave birth in a homeless encampment. She was then hospitalized for mental health issues. After mother’s exit from that hospital, she was not located.

The appellate court points out that W&I §361.5(b), which outlines the exceptions to the normal requirement to provide parents with reunification services upon removal (bypass), opens with “Reunification Services need not be provided…”. Then W&I §361.5(c) proscribes conditions when bypass is required. Since the legislature puts forth no conditions under which a bypass is required under W&I §361.5(b)(1), the question is in the discretion of the judicial officer. Since the record contained various facts which might justify the trial court’s decision to provide services, it was not found to be an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.

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[1] Author’s note: The 2 questions initially addressed are from W&I §361(c) and are the requirements for removal. The primary focus for the question of removal is the safety of the minor(s). Consequently even when, as here, there was a failure to make reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal, the minor(s) cannot be left in an unsafe situation.

[2] Author’s note: Delay of the parenting class referral (and in any event, the father’s progress in it was delayed) is the most impactful on the substantive question of risk -namely from his parenting deficits- pointed up as key to the question of removal.