In Pair of Recent Criminal Cases, California Appellate Courts Outline Parameters of Racial Justice Act

By Paul Myslin

Two recent appellate opinions show that California courts are beginning to explore the scope of the state’s Racial Justice Act, a law that took effect in 2021 aiming to help eliminate the influence of racial discrimination in criminal convictions. The very different outcomes in the two cases show that bringing a successful claim under the RJA is straightforward in some cases, but far more complex in others.

The California Racial Justice Act (RJA) specifically forbids the state from seeking a criminal conviction or sentence “on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (See Pen. Code, § 745.) The Act authorized filing of a motion in trial court, or a writ of habeas corpus for those wronged by a violation, as well as new discovery procedures to mandate disclosure of prosecution evidence relevant to a potential violation. Since 2021, the Legislature has made several modifications to the RJA, including allowing claims to be raised on direct appeal if preserved in the trial record. (Pen. Code, § 745(b). See also People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804.)

If a defendant makes a prima facie showing of a violation, the trial court must hold a hearing, at which evidence may be presented by either party. This may include statistical evidence, aggregate data, expert testimony, and the sworn testimony of witnesses. The court may also appoint an independent expert. Trustworthy and reliable hearsay, statistical evidence, and aggregated data are admissible for the limited purpose of determining whether a violation has occurred. (Pen. Code, § 745, subd. (c)(1)-(3).) At the hearing, the defendant’s burden is to prove the claimed violation by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant does not need to prove intentional discrimination.

California courts have begun exploring the function and parameters of the RJA, as demonstrated by the two recent appellate cases interpreting the Act — one in the Sixth District Court of Appeal, and the other in the First District.

In People v. Stubblefield (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 896, the Sixth District was presented with an unusual racially charged question. It was alleged that defendant Dana Stubblefield, a former player for the San Francisco 49ers, had been afforded an unfair advantage due to his race. In a July 2020 trial, the prosecution asserted during closing arguments that the defendant’s race was a factor in law enforcement’s decision not to search his house, implying that the house might have been searched and a gun found had the defendant not been Black. (107 Cal.App.5th at 903.) Further, a search would have generated a “storm of controversy,” according to the prosecutor — a statement the court found implicitly referenced the then-recent killing of George Floyd.

In an opinion authored by Presiding Justice Mary J. Greenwood, the Sixth District found an RJA violation, and reversed Stubblefield’s convictions for forcible rape and oral copulation (with firearms enhancements) and his conviction for false imprisonment. The court concluded that the prosecution’s statements constituted “racially discriminatory language” about the defendant’s race within the meaning of Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(2), and that the defendant’s conviction was sought or obtained in violation of section 745, subdivision (a). As the court explained, a violation occurs at any point in court proceedings when an attorney in the case “use[s] racially discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, or otherwise exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, whether or not purposeful.”

The court further explained how language may be racially discriminatory in a number of ways, as outlined in the statute:

“Racially discriminatory language’ means language that, to an objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not limited to, racially charged or racially coded language … or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance, culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745, subd. (h)(4).)

But a similar argument about racially discriminatory language failed to persuade the court in People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060. There, the First District was called upon to decide whether calling the defendants “predators” and “monsters” during the prosecutor’s closing argument was racially-coded language suggestive of a primitive animal, constituting a racial slur as applied. The defendants argued that these terms were dehumanizing when used in reference to Latinos and other non-English speakers.

In an opinion authored by Presiding Justice Teri L. Jackson, the court recognized that the exclusive or disproportionate use of particular words or images where the defendant is of a particular race, ethnicity, or national origin is relevant to whether the language is discriminatory under Penal Code, section 745, subdivision (h)(4). (107 Cal.App.5th at 1076.) In particular, the court noted that

[s]uch language may explicitly or implicitly appeal to racial biases and inject racism and unfairness into a defendant’s trial. We agree that in certain contexts the term “monster” may be suggestive of an animal or beast and that prosecutors should refrain from describing defendants as “monsters.”

(Id. at 1077.)

Still, the court was not persuaded, finding that the term “monster” itself is race-neutral, and the way it was used merely called attention to the extreme cruelty of the crime itself. In a similar vein, the use of “predator” to refer to a defendant was found to be a race-neutral term, and the court pointed out other contexts in the criminal law where the term appears in common usage. (Id.)

The takeaway from these two cases is that raising a claim under the RJA is straightforward when there is a direct reference to race — even if the alleged violation is that race got the defendant an unfair advantage — but is far more nuanced when racially coded language must be evaluated in context for its potential appeal to subtle, implicit bias.

For more on the Racial Justice Act, see California Criminal Law Procedure and Practice (Cal. CEB) chapter 11.

This article was originally published by the legal news service of Continuing Education of the Bar (CEB). To read more news and analysis from CEB, register for a free account at research.ceb.com/news.