Litigation Update: July 2024

Family Code § 2013 states: “(a) If a written agreement is entered into by the parties, the  parties may utilize a collaborative law process to resolve any matter governed by this code over which the court is granted jurisdiction pursuant to Section 2000. [¶] (b) ‘Collaborative law process’ means the process in which the parties and any professionals engaged by the parties to assist them agree in writing to use their best efforts and to make a good faith attempt to resolve disputes related to the family law matters as referenced in subdivision (a) on an agreed basis without resorting to adversary judicial intervention.” A couple going through a marital dissolution agreed to a collaborative law agreement that contained a confidentiality clause. One of them later pursued the matter in court and called witnesses to testify about the collaborative process. The other claimed all communications were confidential. The trial court found the confidentiality agreement was unenforceable. The Court of Appeal agreed, stating: “Ling Mueller asks us to enforce a confidentiality clause in an agreement that explicitly states that the entire agreement is legally unenforceable. We agree with the family court that the confidentiality clause is unenforceable. The court therefore properly admitted testimony about statements she made in a collaborative law negotiation initiated by the agreement to dissolve her marriage.” (Mueller v. Mueller (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, June 3, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 593.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A166577.PDF

In an antitrust class action representing individuals and businesses in Northern California who paid health insurance premiums to several health plans, the district court entered judgment for the defendants following a jury trial. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[T]he district court erred in failing to instruct the jury to consider Sutter’s anticompetitive purpose and in excluding highly relevant pre-2006 evidence.” (Sidibe v. Sutter Health (9th Cir., June 4, 2024) 103 F.4th 675.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/04/22-15634.pdf

The real party was injured while working as an electrician on a construction project owned and managed by petitioners. The real party was an employee of a subcontractor. Petitioners moved for summary judgment based on the Privette doctrine, which generally protects entities that hire independent contractors from liability for injuries sustained by employees of the independent contractor while working on a project. (Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689.) Granting a writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal found the undisputed facts establish no exception to the Privette doctrine applied. (CBRE v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, June 4, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 639.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D083130.PDF

One neighbor sued another for violating a municipal code regarding trees and shrubbery. The aggrieved neighbor sued the alleged offending neighbor for several causes of action, including violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. Government Code § 36900, subdivision (a) provides: “The violation of a city ordinance may be prosecuted by city authorities in the name of the people of the State of California, or redressed by civil action.” In Riley v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 599, the Court of Appeal concluded that anyone can sue to redress violations of municipal ordinances. In the instant case, the Court of Appeal overruled Riley, holding that § 36900 does not authorize private parties to bring civil suits to enforce local ordinances. (Cohen v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, June 5, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 706.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B330202.PDF

After the trial court issued a domestic violence restraining order, the restrained person appealed, contending the trial court violated his due process rights in permitting the protected person to testify about an incident of sexual assault not contained in the petition, admonishing his counsel about his method of questioning, and depriving him of the opportunity to respond to other evidence. Affirming the protective order, the Court of Appeal stated: “There was no procedural due process error.” (Bailey v. Murray (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, June 5, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E081558.PDF

The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U. S. C. § 5301 et seq.; ISDA) enables an Indian tribe to enter contracts with the Indian Health Service (IHS) to assume responsibility for administering the healthcare programs that IHS would otherwise operate for the tribe. The question presented was whether ISDA requires IHS to pay contract support costs to support tribal programs funded by such third-party payments. The U.S. Supreme Court held: “The self-determination contracts of the San Carlos Apache Tribe and Northern Arapaho Tribe require them to collect and spend program income to further the functions, services, activities, and programs transferred to them from IHS. When the Tribes do so and incur administrative costs, ISDA requires IHS to pay those support costs.” (Becerra v. San Carlos Apache Tribe (U.S., June 6, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1428.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-250_2dp3.pdf

Congress has long imposed a tax “on the transfer of the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States.” (26 U.S.C. §2001(a).) Imposing the estate tax thus requires calculating the value of the property in the decedent’s estate. Michael and Thomas Connelly owned a building supply corporation. The brothers entered into an agreement to ensure that the company would stay in the family if either brother died. Under that agreement, the corporation could be required to purchase the deceased brother’s shares. To fund the possible share redemption, the corporation obtained life insurance on each brother. After Michael died, a narrow dispute arose over how to value his shares for calculating the estate tax. The question presented was whether the corporation’s obligation to purchase Michael’s shares was a liability that decreased the value of those shares. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the obligation to purchase Michael’s shares did not diminish the value of those shares. (Connelly v. United States (U.S., June 6, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1406.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-146_i42j.pdf

The Bankruptcy Code allows any “party in interest” to “raise” and “be heard on any issue” in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. (11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).) The question presented was whether an insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is a “party in interest” under this provision. Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) is the primary insurer for companies that manufactured and sold products containing asbestos. Those companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after facing thousands of asbestos-related lawsuits. Truck was obligated to pay up to $500,000 per asbestos claim covered under its insurance contracts with the companies. Truck sought to object to the companies’ bankruptcy reorganization plan primarily because the plan lacked disclosure requirements that Truck thought could save it from paying millions of dollars in fraudulent claims. The U.S. Supreme Court held: “An insurer with financial responsibility for a bankruptcy claim is sufficiently concerned with, or affected by, the proceedings to be a ‘party in interest’ that can raise objections to a reorganization plan. Section 1109(b) grants insurers neither a vote nor a veto; it simply provides them a voice in the proceedings.” (Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Gypsum Company, Inc. (U.S., June 6, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1414.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-1079new_6536.pdf

Plaintiff contended the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for proposed student housing failed to consider potential noise impacts from loud student parties in residential neighborhoods near the campus. The Court of Appeal found the EIR to be faulty, and the California Supreme Court granted review. Thereafter, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 1307, stating the effects of noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not a significant effect on the environment. The California Supreme Court held: “We conclude that, based on the new law, none of Good Neighbor’s claims has merit and we accordingly reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.” (Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of the University of California (Cal., June 6, 2024) 16 Cal.5th 43.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S279242.PDF

Plaintiff prevailed before a jury, although the jury found he was 50 percent responsible for the damages he incurred in a car accident. On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he would have Medicare medical insurance at the age of 65. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “we conclude the trial court in the present case acted well within the bounds of its discretion when it permitted the defense to question Audish’s life-care planner briefly about his future eligibility for Medicare and the anticipated costs of his recommended medical treatments if he were to obtain Medicare coverage. These evidentiary rulings did not violate the collateral source rule or amount to an abuse of discretion. . . . Audish has not identified any deductions for specific Medicare payments, nor has he demonstrated that the jury reduced his award for future medical expenses to reflect the future Medicare payments that might ultimately be made on his behalf. Thus, Audish has not carried his burden of establishing that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings constituted reversible error.” (Audish v. Macias (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, June 6, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D081689.PDF

Plaintiff is a religious university that prohibits employees from engaging in same-sex intercourse and marriage. After receiving a slew of complaints, the Washington Attorney General sent the university a letter alerting it to an investigation under the Washington Law Against Discrimination and requesting documents related to employment policies, employee complaints, and employee job descriptions. In response, the university filed suit against the Attorney General to enjoin the investigation and future enforcement of the anti-discrimination law. Under Younger v. Harris (1971) 401 U.S. 37, federal courts should abstain from hearing cases that are pending in state proceedings. The district court dismissed the suit on the basis of lack of redressability and Younger abstention. Affirming in part, the Ninth Circuit held that the university failed to allege a cognizable injury in fact for its retrospective claims alleging that the Attorney General’s investigation and request for documents chilled its religious exercise. Reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit held that Younger abstention is not warranted because there were no ongoing enforcement actions or any court judgment. (Seattle Pacific University v. Ferguson (9th Cir., June 7, 2024) 104 F.4th 50.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/07/22-35986.pdf

Plaintiffs, former professors at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), brought petitions for writ of mandate in the trial court to prevent UCLA’s release of documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.). The documents related to an investigation and settlement after the investigation. The trial court denied the requests for writs of mandate and a preliminary injunction. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Plaintiffs have not established a possibility they will ultimately prevail in their effort to prevent disclosure and are not entitled to injunctive relief.” (Doe v. Regents of the University of California (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, June 7, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 766.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B324717.PDF

Plaintiffs, consisting of companies who want to classify their workers as independent contractors rather than as employees, brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a law enacted by the California Legislature. The district court dismissed the action. On appeal the Ninth Circuit had to “determine whether it was rational for the California legislature to apply one test to determine the classification of Uber drivers and a different test to determine the classification of dogwalkers who provide services through Wag!, the ‘Uber for dogs’” when it enacted A.B. 5 (Lab. Code, § 2750.3). Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Plaintiffs have failed to carry that burden here. There are plausible reasons for treating transportation and delivery referral companies differently from other types of referral companies, particularly where the legislature perceived transportation and delivery companies as the most significant perpetrators of the problem it sought to address—worker misclassification.” (Olson v. California (9th Cir., June 10, 2024) 104 F.4th 66.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/10/21-55757.pdf

Bringing suit against state officeholders tasked with enforcing various California statutes that bar the sale of guns on state property, plaintiffs contended the challenged statutes restrict protected speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and infringe on the right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment. The Ninth Circuit held: “We conclude that the Challenged Statutes do not infringe on B&L’s constitutional rights. Because the statutes solely restrict nonexpressive conduct—contracting for the sale of firearms—they are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny.” (B&L Productions, Inc. v. Newsom (9th Cir., June 11, 2024) 104 F.4th 108.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/11/23-55431.pdf

The trial court denied an employer’s petition to order a class action brought by former employees into arbitration because the employer failed to demonstrate the existence of an executed arbitration contract. On appeal, the employer contended the employee’s statements he did not recall being presented with or signing an arbitration agreement were insufficient to rebut its initial showing. Reversing and remanding for further proceedings below, the Court of Appeal stated: “Here, Ramirez’s declaration asserts he does not recall ever being presented with or signing an arbitration agreement. The declaration, however, omits several significant facts. First, the declaration fails to state whether Ramirez even reviewed the arbitration agreement, the related handbook acknowledgement, or any other documents purportedly signed by him and included in the employer’s moving papers. A review of those documents, the handwritten signatures, and the handwritten initials might have improved Ramirez’s recollection. Second, the declaration does not address whether Ramirez recalled signing the handbook acknowledgement, which is the document relied upon by the employer to show his consent to arbitration. The acknowledgement included a bolded, underlined sentence stating he agreed to the terms of the arbitration agreement in the employee handbook. Third, Ramirez’s declaration does not state, one way or the other, whether the handwritten signature on the handbook acknowledgement is his. Based on these omissions, we conclude Ramirez did not rebut the employer’s initial showing that an arbitration agreement existed.” (Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Company, LLC (Cal. App. 5th Dist., June 11, 2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F086371.PDF

A man sought to register the trademark “Trump too small.” But the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused to register the mark because the Lanham Act prohibits registration of a trademark that “[c]onsists of or comprises a name . . . identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent.” (15 U.S.C. § 1052(c).) Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the man contended the prohibition violates his First Amendment rights to free speech. Finding for the PTO, the nation’s highest court stated: “We conclude that the names clause is of a piece with a common-law tradition regarding the trademarking of names. We see no reason to disturb this longstanding tradition, which supports the restriction of the use of another’s name in a trademark.” (Vidal v. Elster (U.S., June 13, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1507.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/602us1r33_7lio.pdf

The Regents of the University of California approved the construction of a new hospital at the University of California, San Francisco, Parnassus Heights campus; the hospital will allegedly exceed local building height and bulk restrictions. Parnassus Neighborhood Coalition, a group of property owners residing near the proposed hospital, sued to enjoin the construction, a “threatened nuisance per se.” Demurring, the Regents argued they are a state entity immune from complying with local building and zoning regulations when engaging in a governmental activity such as constructing university buildings. The trial court disagreed, concluding the Regents’ immunity hinged on a question of fact—whether the proposed construction constituted a governmental or proprietary activity—that could not be resolved on a demurrer, so the trial court overruled the Regents’ demurrer. The Regents petitioned for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial court’s order. Issuing a writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e conclude the proposed hospital would facilitate the provision of clinical services, thereby advancing UCSF’s academic mission and the Regents’ educational purpose — i.e., governmental activity. Because the project falls within the Regents’ broad public purpose, we hold the Regents are exempt from the local regulations at issue, and the demurrer should have been sustained. (Bame v. City of Del Mar 86 (2001) Cal.App.4th 1346, 1358 (Bame).) Accordingly, we issue the writ of mandate.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, June 13, 2024) 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 114.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169318M.PDF

Six Starbucks employees in Memphis announced plans to unionize the store and form an organizing committee. Some members of the organizing committee invited a news crew to visit the store after hours to promote their unionizing efforts. The next day, several employees involved with the media event were fired for violating company policy. The National Labor Relations Board filed an administrative complaint against Starbucks alleging that it had engaged in unfair labor practices. The district court granted a preliminary injunction after finding there was reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice had occurred. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Remanding for further proceedings, the U.S. Supreme Court held the lower court should have applied the traditional four factors articulated in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) 555 U.S. 7, a higher standard for the employees and one that is more beneficial to employers. (Starbucks Corporation v. McKinney (U.S., June 13, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1570.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-367_f3b7.pdf

In 2016 and 2021, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) relaxed its regulatory requirements for mifepristone, an abortion drug. Those changes made it easier for doctors to prescribe and pregnant women to obtain mifepristone. Several pro-life doctors and associations sued FDA, arguing that FDA’s actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court enjoined FDA’s approval of the drug. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the high court found the doctors had no standing, stating: “But the plaintiffs do not prescribe or use mifepristone. And FDA is not requiring them to do or refrain from doing anything. Rather, the plaintiffs want FDA to make mifepristone more difficult for other doctors to prescribe and for pregnant women to obtain. Under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff ’s desire to make a drug less available for others does not establish standing to sue.” (Food and Drug Administration v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (U.S., June 13, 2024) 602 U.S. 367.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/602us1r35_bqmd.pdf

Congress has long restricted access to “‘machinegun[s],’” a category of firearms defined by the ability to “shoot, automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.” (26 U. S. C. § 5845(b); see also 18 U. S. C. § 922(o).) Semiautomatic firearms, which require shooters to reengage the trigger for every shot, are not machineguns. This case asked the U.S. Supreme Court whether a bump stock—an accessory for a semiautomatic rifle that allows the shooter to rapidly reengage the trigger (and therefore achieve a high rate of fire)—converts the rifle into a “machinegun.” Holding that a bump stock does not do so, the nation’s highest court stated: “Congress could have linked the definition of ‘machinegun’ to a weapon’s rate of fire, as the dissent would prefer. But, it instead enacted a statute that turns on whether a weapon can fire more than one shot ‘automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger.’  §5845(b). And, ‘it is never our job to rewrite . . . statutory text under the banner of speculation about what Congress might have done.’” (Garland v. Cargill (U.S., June 14, 2024) 602 U.S. 406.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/602us1r36_o7kq.pdf

Plaintiff worked as a railroad conductor for defendant. After failing defendant’s routine color-vision testing, he was routed into defendant’s employee health screening system, the fitness-for-duty program. In 2018, plaintiff was removed from his job and struggled to obtain a new position at the company. At that time, a putative class action had already been filed by a group of other employees, not including plaintiff, alleging that defendant administered its fitness-for-duty program in ways that violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; ADA). The parties agree that plaintiff  qualified as a putative class member under the class definition alleged in the original class action complaint, but the class definition was narrowed in the class certification motion. The new narrowed definition presented plaintiff with a statute of limitations issue. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant and against plaintiff on that issue. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We conclude that ambiguity about the scope of a putative or certified class should be resolved in favor of tolling so that bystander members of the class need not rush to file separate actions to protect their rights.” (DeFries v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (9th Cir., June 14, 2024) 104 F.4th 1091.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/14/23-35119.pdf

Plaintiff has never used Facebook. He sued Facebook—now Meta Platforms—for alleged violations of the Illinois Biometrics Information Privacy Act (740 ILCS 14) after his friends uploaded photographs of him to Facebook. He alleged that Facebook collected or captured his biometric identifiers when it created what Facebook calls a “face signature” from those uploaded photos. The district court granted summary judgment for Facebook on that claim. Plaintiff also alleged that Facebook failed to publish a written policy establishing its retention schedule for collected biometric data. The lower court dismissed that claim for lack of standing. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit  stated: “Because face signatures are neither biometric identifiers nor information, Zellmer is no more harmed by Meta’s failure to have a retention schedule or guidelines related to the destruction of biometric identifiers or information than anyone else in Illinois.” (Zellmer v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir., June 17, 2024) 104 F.4th 1117.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/17/22-16925.pdf

In Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v. Superior Court (2020) 9 Cal.5th 215 (Montrose III), the California Supreme Court addressed the sequence in which an insured could access its excess insurance policies for continuous environmental damage that had occurred over two decades. Here, California’s high court was called upon to resolve a question it left open in Montrose III: Can an insured access a first-level excess insurance policy upon exhaustion of underlying primary insurance obtained for the same policy period (vertical exhaustion), or is the insured required to exhaust all primary policies issued during the continuous period of damage (horizontal exhaustion)? The court held: “[F]irst-level excess policies only require vertical exhaustion.” (Truck Insurance Exchange v. Kaiser Cement (Cal., June 17, 2024) 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 761.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S273179.PDF

Plaintiff alleged her husband died of COVID-19 complications after contracting the disease while working for defendant. Plaintiff contended the court erred in finding her second amended complaint failed to plead sufficient facts under the fraudulent concealment exception to the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Construing the pleadings liberally as Foster [v. Xerox Corporation (1985) 40 Cal.3d 306,] did, plaintiff’s [second amended complaint] fairly apprised Alco of the action’s basis—namely, that Alco knew decedent had contracted COVID-19 from his employment and concealed that knowledge from him, thereby aggravating his illness . . . . [¶] Construing the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as a final judgment, we will reverse and remand with instructions to (1) vacate the order granting Alco’s demurrer and (2) enter a new order overruling that demurrer.” (Chavez v. Alco Harvesting, LLC (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, June 17, 2024) 2024 WL 3022563.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B329282.PDF

Washington state’s governor, by proclamation, required workers for state agencies to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19. Plaintiffs are a group of firefighters who sued the mayor of Spokane and the city. The district court granted defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. While this appeal was pending, the Governor terminated the proclamation. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: ‘“[E]ven in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.’ [(Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo (2020) 592 U.S. 14, 18.)] Because the firefighters plausibly allege that Spokane applied the Proclamation in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, we reverse the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings to defendants for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” (Bacon v. Woodward (9th Cir., June 18, 2024) 2024 WL 3041850.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/18/22-35611.pdf

In a Private Attorney General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) action, the employer argued the plaintiff/employee’s prelitigation notice was deficient because it did not clearly identify “aggrieved employees.” The trial court granted the employers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed plaintiff’s PAGA action for failure to comply with PAGA’s prefiling notice requirements. The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “To comply with PAGA’s prefiling notice requirement, the notice must include ‘the facts and theories’ to support the alleged Labor Code violations. [] The notice must also include nonfrivolous allegations that other aggrieved employees exist. [] So long as these requirements are met, we hold a prelitigation notice need not further define ‘aggrieved employees.’” (Ibarra v. Chuy & Sons Labor, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, June 18, 2024) 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 125.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B329899.PDF

A temporary staffing agency hires and places temporary workers at businesses in California, including at defendant’s business. Plaintiff signed the Spanish version of an electronic agreement with the temporary staffing agency. The agreement included an arbitration provision. At some point, plaintiff was placed with defendant’s business to work. Plaintiff thereafter filed a class action against defendant, alleging various Labor Code violations. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, relying on the arbitration provision in the agreement between the temporary staffing agency and plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude that the trial court correctly denied Precise’s motion because it was not a party to the arbitration agreement between Soltero and Real Time, and it cannot compel arbitration based on theories of equitable estoppel, third-party beneficiary, or agency.” (Soltero v. Precise Distribution, Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, June 18, 2024) 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 133.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D083308.PDF

Public Contract Code § 10339 prohibits a state agency from drafting a request for proposal on a public contract for services to be rendered to the state in a way that directly or indirectly limits bidding to any one bidder. Plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction against defendant, a state agency, after defendant issued a request for proposal for a carnival operator for the Orange County Fair. Plaintiff contended the bid was not competitive because only one carnival operator in the United States could qualify. The trial court denied the injunction request. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e hold that section 10339 does not apply to the contract at issue here because it is not a contract for services to be rendered to the state.” (Talley Amusements, Inc. v. 32nd District Agricultural Association (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 18, 2024) 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 143.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G062646.PDF

Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) prohibits expert witnesses from stating opinions “about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.” A criminal defendant in a drug trafficking prosecution argued she lacked the mental state required to convict because she was unaware that drugs were concealed in her car when she drove it across the United States-Mexico border. The district court as well as the Ninth Circuit held that 704(b) prohibits only testimony explicitly about the defendant’s mental state, not testimony about the mental state of a class of person that includes her. At trial, the government’s expert witness opined that most drug couriers know that they are transporting drugs. Affirming, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “Because the expert witness did not state an opinion about whether petitioner herself had a particular mental state, we conclude that the testimony did not violate Rule 704(b). We therefore affirm.” (Diaz v. United States (U.S., June 20, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1727.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-14_d1o2.pdf

A jewelry store owner bought a ring from a petty thief for $45. The ring’s rightful owners found out about the sale and asked for return of their property. The jewelry store owner refused. The police charged him with receiving stolen property, dealing in precious metals without a license and felony money laundering. Prosecutors did not proceed, and the charges were later dismissed. The jewelry store owner sued the police under the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution because he had been held in jail for three days. To succeed on a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show that a government official charged the plaintiff without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure of the plaintiff’s person. The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was when the official brings multiple charges, only one of which lacks probable cause, do the valid charges insulate the official from a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim relating to the invalid charge? The nation’s highest court answered “No,” adding “The valid charges do not create a categorical bar. We leave for another day the follow-on question of how to determine in those circumstances whether the baseless charge caused the requisite seizure.” (Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio (U.S., June 20, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1745.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-50diff_d18f.pdf

In 2017, Congress enacted the Mandatory Repatriation Tax (MRT), which attributes more income, including active business income, of American-controlled foreign corporations to their American shareholders and then taxes those shareholders on that income. Plaintiffs invested in the American-controlled foreign corporation KisanKraft. From 2006 to 2017, KisanKraft generated a great deal of income but did not distribute that income to its American shareholders. At the end of the 2017 tax year, application of the new MRT resulted in a tax bill of $14,729 on plaintiffs’ pro rata share of KisanKraft’s accumulated income from 2006 to 2017. Plaintiffs paid the tax and then sued for a refund, claiming, among other things, that the MRT violated the direct tax clause of the Constitution because, in their view, the MRT was an unapportioned direct tax on their shares of KisanKraft stock. The district court dismissed the suit, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether that 2017 MRT tax is constitutional under Article I, §§ 8 and 9 and the Sixteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court held the answer is yes, stating: “In short, before and after ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress has often taxed the shareholders or partners of a business entity on the entity’s undistributed income. . . . And nothing in this opinion should be read to authorize any hypothetical congressional effort to tax both an entity and its shareholders or partners on the same undistributed income realized by the entity. In such a scenario, the entity would not simply be a traditional pass-through.” (Moore v. United States (U.S., June 20, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 1680.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-800_jg6o.pdf

Approximately 2,000 payees received structured settlement annuities to resolve personal injury claims. The plaintiffs later cashed out their annuities in individualized “factoring” arrangements, giving up the right to periodic payments in return for discounted lump sums. The factoring transactions were permitted by federal and state law, and they were approved by state courts, which found that factoring was in the annuitants’ best interests. In this class action, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants wrongfully induced the factoring agreements through misrepresentations, unfair business practices, and a concealed conflict of interest. The district court certified two nationwide classes. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because individual issues predominate over common ones, we reverse.” (White v. Symetra Assigned Benefits Service Company (9th Cir., June 20, 2024) 104 F.4th 1182.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/20/22-35748.pdf

Plaintiffs sued a medical device company alleging misbranding and failure to warn about certain risks of its electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) device. The district court granted summary judgment for the device manufacturer on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to establish causation due to an absence of evidence that stronger warnings would have affected their physicians’ decision to prescribe ECT. The Ninth Circuit certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: “Under California law, in a claim against a manufacturer of a medical product for a failure to warn of a risk, is the plaintiff required to show that a stronger risk warning would have altered the physician’s decision to prescribe the product? Or may the plaintiff establish causation by showing that the physician would have communicated the stronger risk warnings to the plaintiff, either in their patient consent disclosures or otherwise, and a prudent person in the patient’s position would have declined the treatment after receiving the stronger risk warning?” (Himes v. Somatics, LLC (9th Cir., Apr. 1, 2022) 29 F.4th 1125.)

The latest:

The California Supreme Court held: “A plaintiff is not required to show that a stronger warning would have altered the physician’s decision to prescribe the product to establish causation. Instead, a plaintiff may establish causation by showing that the physician would have communicated the stronger warning to the patient and an objectively prudent person in the patient’s position would have thereafter declined the treatment. The causation analysis, however, must take into consideration whether the physician would still recommend the prescription drug or medical device for the patient, even in the face of a more adequate warning. In other words, where the evidence shows that the physician would have continued to recommend the treatment notwithstanding the stronger warning, the plaintiff must prove that an objectively prudent person in the patient’s position would have declined treatment despite the physician’s assessment that the benefits of the treatment for the patient would still outweigh any risks disclosed by a stronger warning. As in the informed consent context, the test is what an objectively prudent person in the patient’s position would have done in light of all the information presented and is not determined by the plaintiff’s subjective belief as to what he or she might have done with the benefit of hindsight.” (Himes v. Somatics, LLC (Cal., June 20, 2024) 322 Cal.Rptr.3d 1.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S273887.PDF

A couple married for 30 years kept their property separate. The wife worked as an independent agent for the husband’s real estate brokerage. Under their agreement, the wife was entitled to 100 percent of her commissions, after deductions for business expenses and income taxes. As the wife earned her commissions, the husband deducted amounts for business expenses and estimated taxes. As he was paying for her support, he also deducted amounts he believed the wife owed for personal expenses exceeding reasonable support. During dissolution proceedings, the wife sued the husband for breach of fiduciary duties. As it was discovered during the dissolution proceedings, the husband deducted far more for taxes than was actually due. The trial court entered judgment of $1.3 million to the wife. Family Code § 1101, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: “A spouse has a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in the community estate, . . . .” Reversing in part and affirming in part, the Court of Appeal concluded that § 1101 encompasses only breaches involving community property. (In re Marriage of Wiese (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 20, 2024) 2024 WL 3063228.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G060819.PDF

Plaintiff sued defendants for sexual assault, battery, and retaliation relating to an incident that occurred in Miami, Florida in March 2022. The individual defendant moved to quash service of summons, arguing that, as a nonresident he had insufficient contacts with California for the trial court to exercise either specific or general jurisdiction over him. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to quash. On appeal, plaintiff argued the trial court erred in finding that defendant was not domiciled or continuously and systematically present in California in March 2022, and otherwise that he had insufficient suit-related contacts with California. She also contended the trial court should have granted her request for jurisdictional discovery. Reversing in part and affirming in part, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude that the connection between Hardell’s claims against Vanzyl and his contacts with California is too attenuated to support specific jurisdiction. We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in failing to consider whether it could exercise general jurisdiction over Vanzyl notwithstanding its finding that he was not domiciled in California in March 2022, and that it abused its discretion in denying Hardell’s request for discovery. On remand, Hardell must be allowed to conduct limited discovery addressing whether the trial court may exercise general jurisdiction over Vanzyl.” (Hardell v. Vanzyl (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, June 20, 2024) 2024 WL 3064170.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A168113.PDF

While a man was shoving his girlfriend’s head onto a dashboard, he realized a bystander was watching. He retrieved a gun from under the passenger seat. The girlfriend took advantage of the distraction and escaped. The man fired the gun, although it is not clear if he aimed toward the girlfriend or the bystander. The man telephoned the girlfriend and advised her he would shoot her if she reported the incident. Undeterred, the girlfriend went to court and secured a restraining order against the man. The order suspended the man’s gun license for two years. Later, the man violated the order by approaching the girlfriend’s home at night. He also threatened a different woman with a gun and was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon. Texas police identified him as a suspect in at least five additional shootings. He was indicted for possessing a firearm while subject to a domestic violence restraining order. The man moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the charge violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. A federal statute prohibits an individual subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing a firearm if that order includes a finding that he “represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [an] intimate partner,” or a child of the partner or individual. (18 U. S. C. § 922(g)(8).) The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether this provision may be enforced against him consistent with the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court held: “When a restraining order contains a finding that an individual poses a credible threat to the physical safety of an intimate partner, that individual may—consistent with the Second Amendment—be banned from possessing firearms while the order is in effect. Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms. As applied to the facts of this case, Section 922(g)(8) fits comfortably within this tradition.” (United States v. Rahimi (U.S., June 21, 2024) 2024 WL 3074728.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-915new_ihdk.pdf

A criminal defendant was charged with possessing dangerous drugs for sale. The Arizona Department of Public Safety tested the alleged drugs and prepared a report concluding that they were a usable amount of methamphetamine, a usable amount of marijuana, and a usable amount of cannabis. But, three weeks before trial, the scientist who performed the tests stopped working for the state, so the prosecutor called a different scientist from the department. Relying on the first expert’s report, the second expert came to the same conclusions. After he was convicted, the criminal defendant contended on appeal that the state’s use of a “substitute expert”—who had not participated in any of the relevant testing—violated his confrontation clause rights. That issue ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court. The highest court explained that the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. The clause bars the admission at trial of “testimonial statements” of an absent witness unless she is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant has had a prior opportunity” to cross-examine her. As such, a prosecutor cannot introduce an absent laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-court statements to prove the results of forensic testing. The court went on to say that the question before it concerns a situation in which an expert witness restates an absent lab analyst’s factual assertions to support his own opinion testimony. Finding in favor of the criminal defendant, the Supreme Court stated: “This Court has held that the Confrontation Clause’s requirements apply only when the prosecution uses out-of-court statements for ‘the truth of the matter asserted.’ Crawford [v. Washington (2004) 541 U. S. 36,] 60, n. 9. Some state courts, including the court below, have held that this condition is not met when an expert recites another analyst’s statements as the basis for his opinion. Today, we reject that view. When an expert conveys an absent analyst’s statements in support of his opinion, and the statements provide that support only if true, then the statements come into evidence for their truth. As this dispute illustrates, that will generally be the case when an expert relays an absent lab analyst’s statements as part of offering his opinion. And if those statements are testimonial too—an issue we briefly address but do not resolve as to this case—the Confrontation Clause will bar their admission. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . To address the additional issue of whether [the first scientist’s] records were testimonial (including whether that issue was forfeited), we remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.” (Smith v. Arizona (U.S., June 21, 2024) 2024 WL 3074423.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-899_97be.pdf

A man sought to enter the United States to live with his wife, Sandra Muñoz. To obtain the necessary visa, he applied at the U.S. consulate in San Salvador. The consular officer denied the visa because the man was affiliated with a transnational criminal gang. Because of national security concerns, the officer did not disclose the basis for his decision. As a noncitizen, the man had no constitutional right to enter the United States or to elicit the reason for denial. Muñoz, on the other hand, is a citizen and she claimed her due process rights have been violated. Ruling against Muñoz, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “Muñoz’s argument fails at the threshold. Her argument is built on the premise that the right to bring her noncitizen spouse to the United States is an unenumerated constitutional right. To establish this premise, she must show that the asserted right is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–721 (1997). She cannot make that showing. In fact, Congress’s longstanding regulation of spousal immigration—including through bars on admissibility—cuts the other way.” (Department of State v. Munoz (U.S., June 21, 2024) 2024 WL 3074425.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-334new_hfci.pdf

A jury awarded $120 million against Chevron in an oil remediation dispute. The trial court granted Chevron’s motion for new trial based on juror misconduct. The juror did not disclose a 40-year-old out-of-state criminal conviction or his status as a party to a personal injury lawsuit nine years earlier. Reversing grant of new trial, the Court of Appeal stated: “We interpret the juror eligibility statute to mean that Juror No. 10’s out-of-state conviction did not make him ineligible. Also, on the question of prejudice to Chevron, we conclude the trial court used an improper definition of bias in determining prejudice was established. To remedy this legal error, we conduct a de novo review of the record and apply the appropriate definition of bias. Under the circumstances, we conclude Juror No. 10’s failure to disclose the prior court cases in which he was involved did not show bias against Chevron or for TRC or bias as to any issue presented to the jury. Alternatively, assuming he was statutorily ineligible, we also would conclude his concealment of information was not prejudicial to Chevron.” (TRC Operating Company, Inc. v. Chevron USA, Inc. (Cal. App. 5th Dist., June 21, 2024) 2024 WL 3078113.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F083724.PDF

In the height of the pandemic, plaintiff became ill. When he wanted to return to work, pursuant to company policy, defendant employer asked him to take a COVID-19 test. Plaintiff refused. He was given another opportunity and refused again. He was terminated. Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging violation of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.; CMIA). The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer, finding plaintiff failed to state a claim under the CMIA. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated that, while an employee shall not be discriminated against in terms or conditions of employment due to the employee’s refusal to sign an authorization about medical disclosure, nothing prohibits an employer from taking such action as is necessary in the absence of medical information. (Frayo v. Martin (Cal. App. 6th Dist., June 21, 2024) 2024 WL 3085085.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H050689.PDF

The California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) compiles driving records and provides them to prospective or current employers, insurance companies, and a variety of other requesters. License suspensions imposed by the DMV, including those related to alcohol-impaired driving, are included in these records, even when no criminal conviction has resulted. These suspensions remain on the driving record for three years after the suspension itself ends. The question before the Court of Appeal was whether the DMV may also include on this publicly disclosed driving record the reason for such a suspension—for example, that the driver had an excessive blood-alcohol level—when the driver has not been convicted. The plaintiffs argued this practice effectively discloses information about a nonconviction arrest and, therefore, violates constitutional and statutory privacy prohibitions. Finding against plaintiffs, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he disclosure of the reason for a DMV suspension issued for alcohol-impaired driving does not constitute the disclosure of information about a nonconviction arrest within the meaning of these privacy provisions.” (Doe v. California Department of Motor Vehicles (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, June 21, 2024) 2024 WL 3084007.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A164843.PDF

Petitioner, a native of El Salvador, first came to the United States in 2003 and stayed for about eight years. During his time in the U.S., he became a Jehovah’s Witness and was baptized in 2008. He joined the organization to find meaning in life. He regularly preached in the streets and went door to door talking to people about his beliefs. He explained that preaching “is [his] life” and it is what he “must do” as a Jehovah’s Witness. He voluntarily returned to El Salvador in November 2011. There, he joined a Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation and continued preaching in the streets to the youth of his hometown to convince them to embrace religion instead of joining gangs. The gangs did not like this. They attacked him, threatened him, and even tried to kill him. He fled to the United States. An immigration judge denied asylum, finding that his religion was “a reason” for his persecution but not “one central reason” sufficient for asylum eligibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. Granting petitioner’s petition for review, the Ninth Circuit stated: “In sum, we hold that the record compels the conclusion that Alfaro Manzano’s religion would be a central reason for his persecution.” (Manzano v. Garland (9th Cir., June 25, 2024) 2024 WL 3154327.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/25/22-704.pdf

Hundreds of cases involving allegations of sexual assault by Uber drivers were coordinated before one judge in San Francisco Superior Court. Uber moved to stay the cases on the ground of forum non conveniens, and in a comprehensive 21-page order the trial court granted the motions. The trial court subsequently entered the parties’ agreed-upon order applying the ruling to a vast number of “non-California cases,” where the alleged incident took place outside California, the alleged assailant resided outside California, and the plaintiffs either were not California residents or became California residents only after the alleged incident. The agreed-upon order stayed the non-California cases and provided for tolling of the statute of limitations. Affirming the lower court’s order, the Court of Appeal noted that plaintiffs agreed from the outset of this coordinated proceeding to litigate the issue of forum non conveniens by selecting a small number of cases, and also stipulated to the application of the order to the remainder of the non-California cases. (Doe WHBE 3 v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 2, June 25, 2024) 2024 WL 3101588.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A167458.PDF

The mayor of a city in Indiana—a city that does not prohibit local officials from obtaining outside employment—accepted $13,000 from a trucking company that was awarded the city’s trash contract. The mayor said he had agreed to be a consultant for the company and the money was his compensation. The federal government charged, and a federal jury convicted, the mayor of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). It is a crime for state and local officials to “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept “anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded” for an official act. (18 U.S.C. §666(a).) That law prohibits state and local officials from accepting bribes that are promised or given before the official act. Those bribes are punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court in this case was whether § 666 also makes it a crime for state and local officials to accept gratuities—for example, gift cards, lunches, plaques, books, framed photos, or the like—that may be given as a token of appreciation after the official act. The nation’s highest court answered: “State and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept. Section 666 does not supplement those state and local rules by subjecting 19 million state and local officials to up to 10 years in federal prison for accepting even commonplace gratuities. Rather, §666 leaves it to state and local governments to regulate gratuities to state and local officials.” (Snyder v. United States (U.S., June 26, 2024) 2024 WL 3165518.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf

Two states and five individual social media users sued various federal officials and agencies alleging the federal government pressured social media platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment. They contended that conservative-leaning speech was being censored. The district granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a nationwide injunction prohibiting the federal government from meeting with social media companies or otherwise seeking to influence their content moderation policies. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating: “To establish standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate a substantial risk that, in the near future, they will suffer an injury that is traceable to a Government defendant and redressable by the injunction they seek. Because no plaintiff has carried that burden, none has standing to seek a preliminary injunction.” (Murthy v. Missouri (U.S., June 26, 2024) 2024 WL 3165801.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-411new_7mio.pdf

Parties agreed to arbitrate any disputes involving plaintiff’s employment by defendant. But defendant did not timely pay its arbitration fees and the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order submitting the dispute to arbitration. The Court of Appeal affirmed, rejecting all three of defendant’s arguments on appeal: (1) Defendant contended the arbitration agreement delegated issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator, and the appeals court stated: “In this case, the parties’ arbitration agreement contains no express language delegating arbitrability issues to the arbitrator.” (2) Defendant also contended that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) preempts Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.98 and the appeals court stated: “Section 1281.98 does not outright invalidate arbitration agreements, and it is not ‘a provision designed to limit the rights of parties who choose to arbitrate or otherwise to discourage the use of arbitration.’” (3) Lastly, to defendant’s argument that § 1281.98 constitutes an unconstitutional impairment of the arbitration agreement, the appeals court analyzed it under both the U.S. and California constitutions and rebuffed it. (Keeton v. Tesla, Inc. (Cal. App., June 26, 2024) 2024 WL 3175244.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A166690.PDF

Plaintiff was attacked by pit bulls. She lost the lower half of her leg at the knee, sustained extensive damage to the other leg, and was bitten on her right hand. As a result of the incident, she reportedly suffered from wound infections, posttraumatic stress disorder, and emotional distress. She sued the owner of the dogs and the County of Humboldt. Plaintiff alleged the county had been called out to the owner’s property several times because the dogs were loose and found that one or more was unvaccinated. The trial court sustained the county’s demurrer without leave to amend. Affirming, the Court of Appeal held that the duties of the county plaintiff identified were not mandatory within the meaning of Government Code § 815.6.  (Danielson v. County of Humboldt (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 1, June 26, 2024) 2024 WL 3175244.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A166787.PDF

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiated an enforcement action against defendants, seeking civil penalties for alleged securities fraud. The SEC chose to adjudicate the matter in-house before one of its administrative law judges, rather than in federal court where defendants could have proceeded before a jury. The U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the Seventh Amendment permits the SEC to compel defendants to defend themselves before the agency rather than before a jury in federal court, concluding: “A defendant facing a fraud suit has the right to be tried by a jury of his peers before a neutral adjudicator.” (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy (U.S., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3187811.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-859new_kjfm.pdf

Under bankruptcy laws, a debtor can win a discharge of its debts if it proceeds with honesty and places virtually all its assets on the table for its creditors. The debtor in this case, Purdue Pharma L. P., filed for bankruptcy after facing a wave of litigation for its role in the opioid epidemic. Purdue’s long-time owners, members of the Sackler family, confronted a growing number of suits too. But instead of declaring bankruptcy, they chose a different path. From the court overseeing Purdue’s bankruptcy, they sought and won an order extinguishing vast numbers of existing and potential claims against them. They obtained all this without securing the consent of those affected or placing anything approaching their total assets on the table for their creditors. The question faced by the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the bankruptcy code authorizes a court to issue such an order. The nation’s highest court noted: “Every bankruptcy law the parties and their amici have pointed us to, from 1800 until 1978, generally reserved the benefits of discharge to the debtor who offered a ‘fair and full surrender of [its] property,’” concluding: “[W]e hold only that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seeks to discharge claims against a nondebtor without the consent of affected claimants.” (Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P. (U.S., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3187799.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-124new_nkp1.pdf

A layer of ozone in the atmosphere shields the world from the sun’s radiation. But closer to earth, ozone can hurt more than it helps. Forming when sunlight interacts with a wide range of precursor pollutants, ground-level ozone can trigger and exacerbate health problems and damage vegetation. To mitigate those and other problems, in 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) revised its air-quality standards for ozone from 75 to 70 parts per billion. That change triggered a requirement for states to submit new State Implementation Plan (SIP). Several states challenged the new requirements to implement the new standards. The U.S. Supreme Court stayed enforcement of the new standards while various states proceed in court. (Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3187768.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23a349new_h3ci.pdf

The district court granted an injunction holding that the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (42 U.S.C. § 1395dd; EMTALA) preempts Idaho’s Defense of Life Act (Idaho Code, § 18-622). Idaho’s Defense of Life Act imposes penalties on physicians who perform prohibited abortions unless “[t]he physician determined, in his good faith medical judgment and based on the facts known to the physician at the time, that the abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman.” EMTALA requires hospitals to provide stabilizing care to emergency room patients but is silent on abortion and actually requires stabilizing treatment for the unborn children of pregnant women. Idaho requested the U.S. Supreme Court grant a stay of the injunction or in the alternative to grant certiorari. The nation’s highest court granted both the stay and a writ of certiorari on January 5, 2024. On June 27, 2024, the high court stated: “PER CURIAM. [¶] The writs of certiorari before judgment are dismissed as improvidently granted, and the stays entered by the Court on January 5, 2024, are vacated.  [¶] It is so ordered.” (Moyle v. United States (U.S., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3187605.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-726_6jgm.pdf

Plaintiff is a naturalized U.S. citizen and an information technology professional with experience managing software development projects. On several occasions between 2020 and 2022, he unsuccessfully applied to work at Meta Platforms, Inc., which operates Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp, among other online services. He alleged that Meta refused to hire him because it prefers to hire noncitizens holding H-1B visas to whom it can pay lower wages. The H-1B program allows employers to hire qualified foreign workers for specialty occupations when there is a shortage of skilled workers authorized to work in the United States. (8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(1)(ii)(B).) Plaintiff brought this putative class action asserting a single claim: that Meta violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by discriminating against U.S. citizens in hiring. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that § 1981 “does not bar discrimination based on U.S. citizenship.” Reversing, the Ninth Circuit held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits discrimination in hiring against U.S. citizens based on their citizenship. (Rajaram v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (9th Cir., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3192178.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/27/22-16870.pdf

Plaintiff sued her employer alleging she experienced harassment, discrimination, and retaliation after she informed her manager she would be undergoing egg retrieval procedures to both donate and freeze eggs for herself to use at some point in the future to become pregnant. The superior court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on its finding that the egg retrieval and freezing procedures did not qualify as a pregnancy-related medical condition or disability and were, therefore, not protected by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Appellant was not pregnant, nor disabled by pregnancy.” (Paleny v. Fireplace Products, Inc. (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3197646.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C097584.PDF

Plaintiffs are drivers whose licenses were suspended by the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) after they were arrested for driving under the influence. The drivers invoked their right to an “administrative per se” (APS) hearing before the DMV to challenge the suspension. Before the APS hearings, they requested continuances based on their counsel’s conflicting court appearances. The DMV denied the requests, went forward with the hearings, and issued administrative decisions reinstating the suspension of their licenses. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ petitions for writs of mandate. Reversing, the Court of Appeal held there were structural due process violations involved in the continuance requests. (Cisneros v. Department of Motor Vehicles (Cal. App. 5th Dist., June 27, 2024) 2024 WL 3197706.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F081373.PDF

In Chevron U.S. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984) 467 U.S. 837, the U.S. Supreme Court required courts to defer to permissible agency interpretations of statutes the agencies administer, even when reviewing courts read the statutes differently. In the present case, the nation’s highest court clarified when deference to agencies’ interpretations should be given: “If, and only if, congressional intent is ‘clear,’ that is the end of the inquiry. [Citation.] But if the court determines that ‘the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue’ at hand, the court must, at Chevron’s second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it ‘is based on a permissible construction of the statute.’” (Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (U.S., June 28, 2024) 2024 WL 3208360.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-451_7m58.pdf

The U.S. Supreme Court considered the argument of a man convicted of obstructing an official proceeding on January 6, 2021. This is how the high court framed the issue before it: “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposes criminal liability on anyone who corruptly ‘alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.’ 18 U. S. C. §1512(c)(1). The next subsection extends that prohibition to anyone who ‘otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so.’ §1512(c)(2). We consider whether this ‘otherwise’ clause should be read in light of the limited reach of the specific provision that precedes it.” Vacating the conviction, the Supreme Court stated: “To prove a violation of Section 1512(c)(2), the Government must establish that the defendant impaired the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or as we earlier explained, other things used in the proceeding, or attempted to do so.” (Fischer v. United States (U.S., June 28, 2024) 2024 WL 3208034.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf

The Ninth Circuit affirmed a class-wide injunction against the City of Grants Pass, Oregon’s enforcement of its ordinance prohibiting camping on public property in 2022. The city petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court with the question: “Does the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment?” The nation’s highest court granted certiorari. (City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson (U.S., Jan. 12, 2024) 144 S.Ct. 679.)

The latest:

After the Ninth Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause barred the city’s restrictions against encampments, states and cities across the country urged the U.S. Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the nation’s highest court held: “The Constitution’s Eighth Amendment serves many important functions, but it does not authorize federal judges to wrest those rights and responsibilities from the American people and in their place dictate this Nation’s homelessness policy.” (City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson (U.S., June 28, 2024) 2024 WL 3208072.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf

An employee allegedly faked a work injury to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D); FMLA). The employer terminated his employment. The former employee thereafter sued the employer, contending wrongful interference with his rights under the FMLA. A jury found for the employer. On appeal, the former employee argued the lower court erred in not instructing the jury that only contrary medical evidence can defeat a doctor’s certification of a serious health condition under the FMLA. Affirming judgment for the employer, the Ninth Circuit held: “Because the FMLA does not require an employer to present contrary medical evidence before contesting a doctor’s FMLA certification, we affirm.” (Perez v. Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. (9th Cir., June 28, 2024) 2024 WL 3212334.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2024/06/28/23-15043.pdf

Plaintiff taught for the Susanville Elementary School District for several years before resigning to teach at another school district. She later returned to the Susanville District. When deciding plaintiff’s placement on the salary schedule upon her return, the Susanville District did not credit her for the years of experience she gained at the other school district following her resignation. Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate arguing the Susanville District violated the uniformity requirement of Education Code § 45028 and independently violated the restoration requirement of Education Code § 44931 when placing her on the salary schedule without accounting for the years of experience she gained while outside the district after her resignation. The trial court disagreed, finding the district complied with the Education Code. Reversing, the Court of Appeal found that plaintiff was not treated uniformly to other teachers hired by the Susanville District and ordered the district to credit her for her out-of-district experience. (George v. Susanville Elementary School District (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., June 28, 2024) 2024 WL 3218405.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C098772.PDF

Plaintiffs sued their title insurance company for breach of a title insurance policy and alleged it failed to pay the full amount by which their property’s value was diminished due to an undisclosed easement. The trial court granted the insurance company’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the policy required it to compensate plaintiffs only for the value of their actual use of the property as a vacant residential lot suitable for only one home rather than its highest and best use as a subdividable lot. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We agree with the Taits that the policy entitles them to reimbursement for the diminution in value of their property based on its highest and best use. As a result, the Taits’ evidence of the likelihood of subdivision and the value of a subdividable lot created a triable issue of fact regarding the amount of the Taits’ loss under the policy, thereby precluding summary judgment.” (Tait v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, June 28, 2024) 2024 WL 3218873.)

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A166676.PDF

This case concerns the federal indictment of a former President of the United States for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office. From January 2017 until January 2021, Donald J. Trump served as President of the United States. On August 1, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts for conduct that occurred during his presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether and, if so, to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office. The nation’s highest court held: “We conclude that under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is also entitled to immunity. At the current stage of proceedings in this case, however, we need not and do not decide whether that immunity must be absolute, or instead whether a presumptive immunity is sufficient.” Regarding what the high court meant by presumptive immunity, the opinion stated: “we conclude that the separation of powers principles explicated in our precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for a President’s acts within the outer perimeter of his official responsibility. Such an immunity is required to safeguard the independence and effective functioning of the Executive Branch, and to enable the President to carry out his constitutional duties without undue caution.” (Trump v. United States (U.S., July 1, 2024) 2024 WL 3237603.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-939_e2pg.pdf

The U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to consider whether two state laws regulating social media platforms and other websites facially violated the First Amendment. Laws in Florida and Texas limited social media platforms’ capacity to engage in content moderation—to filter, prioritize, and label the varied messages, videos, and other content their users wish to post. The laws required a platform to provide an individualized explanation to a user if it removed or altered her posts. An internet trade association challenged both laws on their face, and district courts issued preliminary injunctions preventing enforcement of the laws. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the injunction in Florida, but the Fifth Circuit reversed the injunction in Texas. The Supreme Court noted that “to succeed on its First Amendment claim, NetChoice must show that the law at issue (whether from Texas or from Florida) ‘prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech relative to its plainly legitimate sweep.’” The high court vacated the judgments of both the Eleventh and Fifth Circuit Courts and remanded the matters with these instructions: “So on remand, each court must evaluate the full scope of the law’s coverage. It must then decide which of the law’s applications are constitutionally permissible and which are not, and finally weigh the one against the other. The need for NetChoice to carry its burden on those issues is the price of its decision to challenge the laws as a whole.” (Moody v. NetChoice, LLC (U.S., July 1, 2024) 2024 WL 3237685.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-277_d18f.pdf

Plaintiff is a truckstop and convenience store in North Dakota. While convenient for customers, debit cards are costly for merchants: Every transaction requires merchants to pay an “interchange fee” to the bank that issued the card. Since it opened, plaintiff has paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees—which has meant higher prices for its customers. On the other hand, plaintiff would lose customers if it stopped accepting debit cards. Plaintiff joined a lawsuit against the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board; the suit contends the Board permits higher fees than the statute (15 U. S. C. § 1693o– 2(a)(3)(A)) allows. The district court dismissed the action as time barred under 28 U. S. C. § 2401(a), the default six-year statute of limitations applicable to suits against the United States. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The default statute of limitations for suits against the United States requires ‘the complaint [to be] filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.’ 28 U. S. C. §2401(a). We must decide when a claim brought under the Administrative Procedure Act ‘accrues’ for purposes of this provision. The answer is straightforward. A claim accrues when the plaintiff has the right to assert it in court—and in the case of the APA, that is when the plaintiff is injured by final agency action.” (Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System (U.S., July 1, 2024) 2024 WL 3237691.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-1008new_8n5a.pdf