Recent Family Law Cases

FAMILY LAW (Through 11/20/2024)

By:  Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS

The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Auther’s note is italicized.

Blauser v. Dubin

11/19/2024 CA 4/3: G063715 – Goethals J., Sanchez J., and Motoike, J.

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063715.PDF

In this case, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from a minute order that dismissed the trial court case because that minute order was not appealable. A separate judgment was required. The Court of Appeal did, however, indicate that they would hear the appeal once the judgment was entered. It noted that parties “and attorneys deserve clarity when it comes to entry of judgment” because a “timely notice of appeal is…a ‘jurisdictional’ prerequisite for litigants and the date of entry of judgment must be known to calculate the deadline.”

The Court of Appeal “published this case to enhance systemic efficiency.” Parties and attorneys should not fear “that they are required to appeal immediately from an order granting a motion for nonsuit rather than a subsequent, signed, separately filed document labeled as a judgment or order of dismissal.”

The Court of Appeal urged trial courts that have made dispositive rulings in civil cases to enter a separate, signed document clearly labeled as a “judgment” or “order of dismissal.” Parties should submit appropriate proposed judgments and advocate for a separate appealable judgment to avoid uncertainty. Such judgments should not be combined with minutes from an ongoing trial, an order ruling on a motion, or a statement of decision and should avoid including “a lengthy recital of the history of the case, preliminary findings already made in a statement of decision, or other extraneous matter.”

I include this case because I see a lot of statements of decision that are issued without accompanying orders and judgments. A statement of decision is not an appealable judgment or order. Although this case does not mention it, the Court of Appeal traditionally has had the discretion to allow an appeal from an order that appears dispositive if no subsequent formal order or judgment is entered. But, judging by the dismissal of the appeal here, I would not rely too much on tradition. When the trial court asks me to prepare a statement of decision, I will have it accompanied by a proposed judgment or order, a requirement of Rule 3.1590. The judgment is always barebones. It includes only the orders and no factual findings, though I will include a line like “The factual findings are contained in the Court’s Final Statement of Decision.”

California Capital Insurance Company v. Hoehn

11/18/2024, S277510– Jenkins J.

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S277510.PDF

The California Supreme Court departed from a long line of appellate cases that imposed a two-year limit to set aside a judgment due to improper service of process. The Supreme Court concluded there is no such time limit. It noted that some courts require defendants seeking to vacate a default judgment to act with reasonable diligence after learning of that judgment, while other courts have not. It did not resolve this question in this case.

LCPFV, LLC v. Somatdary Incorporated

11/13/2024, CA 2/8: B325599 – Wiley J.

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B325599.PDF

This case is perhaps best summed up by its introductory paragraph: “Plaintiffs, do not try to turn your default judgment into a windfall.  This trial court properly served as the watchful gatekeeper.”

Background

LCPFV, LLC owned a warehouse that experienced significant plumbing issues due to an old, rusty sewer pipe. When the toilets in the warehouse began backing up, LCPFV sought Rapid Plumbing, owned by Somatdary Incorporated, and paid them $47,883.40 to fix the problem. Rapid Plumbing’s work was substandard and LCPFV sued for fraud and breach of contract.

Rapid Plumbing initially appeared in the case, represented by counsel, and filed an answer. However, they subsequently defaulted, and had their answer stricken by failing to respond or participate further in the case.

After Rapid Plumbing’s default, LCPFV submitted a default judgment package to the trial court, seeking a total of $1,081,263.80. This amount included the initial $47,883.40 paid to Rapid Plumbing, the cost of hiring the second plumber, an attorney fee request of $308,376.75, punitive damages amounting to $500,000, and additional costs and damages.

The trial court reviewed LCPFV’s submission but found the requested amount to be excessively disproportionate to the actual damages suffered. Emphasizing its role as a gatekeeper in default judgment proceedings, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of LCPFV for $120,319.22. This amount included the original payment to Rapid Plumbing, the cost of hiring the second plumber, reasonable attorney fees, and other appropriate costs.

Analysis

LCPFV appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that:

            1.         The trial court erred in rejecting the deemed admissions obtained through requests for admissions that LCPFV had propounded to Rapid Plumbing after they ceased participating in the case.

            2.         The attorney fees awarded were unreasonably low compared to the fees incurred.

            3.         The sanctions awarded against Rapid Plumbing were insufficient.

Requests for Admissions

The Court of Appeal noted that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 585, “it is incumbent upon the trial court carefully to inspect the plaintiff’s default package…Courts must not passively accept whatever the plaintiff requests.” “When determining if the evidence at the prove-up hearing supports the requested damages, the court’s role is serious, substantive, and often complicated.” The “gatekeeper doctrine demands the full powers of the trial judge at the default judgment stage.”

LCPFV had propounded 97 requests for admissions to Rapid Plumbing after being informed that Rapid would no longer participate in the litigation. Rapid did not respond, and LCPFV moved to have these requests deemed admitted. The trial court found this tactic inappropriate. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court. It emphasized that requests for admissions are intended to eliminate undisputed issues and should not be used as a means to manufacture evidence, especially in default situations. The Court of Appeal held that using the deemed admissions to establish ultimate facts and obtain punitive damages was improper. The trial court, acting as a gatekeeper, correctly found no evidentiary value in the admissions obtained under such circumstances.

Attorney Fees

LCPFV sought $308,376.75 in attorney fees, which the trial court reduced to $4,948.46. The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, noting several factors:

            •           Nature of the Case: The case was a straightforward breach of contract matter concerning plumbing services.

            •           Defendants’ Participation: Rapid Plumbing did not participate in the litigation for most of the case, and there was no opposition to many of LCPFV’s motions. The “effort needed to defeat a no-show is slight.”

            •           Reasonableness of Fees: The attorney fees requested were excessive and unreasonable given the simplicity of the case and the lack of active litigation. The Court of Appeal noted that “[a]n unreasonably inflated fee request permits the trial court to reduce the award or deny one altogether.”

            •           Overstaffing and Overlitigation: LCPFV employed three attorneys and a paralegal, resulting in duplicative work and unnecessary motions, including eight reply briefs when no opposition was filed. The Court of Appeal noted that in some respects LCPFV’s attorneys lacked candor.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining a reasonable attorney fee award based on the circumstances.

Sanctions

LCPFV argued that the trial court should have awarded more than $11,852.90 in sanctions against Rapid Plumbing. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The purpose of discovery sanctions is to compel compliance, not to punish. Since Rapid Plumbing had ceased participating in the litigation, additional sanctions would not serve their intended purpose and would amount to punitive measures, which are inappropriate in this context.

In re Marriage of Diamond

11/5/2024, CA 2/7 B321833 – Feuer J.

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B321833.PDF

In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order denying Wife’s request to set aside the judgment based on mental incapacity, duress, and the “equitable considerations” language in Family Code section 2125. The Court of Appeal first pointed out that when a party seeks relief from a judgment after more than six months have passed since its entry, they are confined to the specific grounds enumerated in Family Code section 2122. Before the six months runs, the party can seek set-aside relief under Family Code section 473(b). The moving party bears the burden of proving entitlement to such relief.

Mental Incapacity Under Section 2122

The Family Code does not define “mental incapacity” for the purposes of section 2122 or any other provision. The Court of Appeal looked to the Due Process in Competence Determinations Act (Probate Code sections 810 et seq.) for guidance. This Act provides a foundational framework for assessing mental capacity and addresses the capacity of individuals with mental or physical disorders to perform various acts, such as contracting, conveying property, marrying, making medical decisions, executing wills or trusts, and other significant actions (Prob. Code, § 810, subd. (b)). Probate Code section 811, subdivision (a), lists 18 mental functions relevant to determining capacity, including orientation to time, place, person, and situation; ability to attend and concentrate; short- and long-term memory; ability to understand and communicate with others; ability to plan, organize, and carry out actions in one’s own rational self-interest; ability to reason logically; and the presence of pervasive and persistent psychological states such as anxiety, depression, or hopelessness. Even if a deficit is found in one or more of these functions, it must significantly impair the person’s ability to understand and appreciate the consequences of their actions regarding the specific decision or act in question (Prob. Code, § 811, subd. (b)).

Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 372, which governs the appointment of guardians ad litem, defines “a person who lacks legal capacity to make decisions” as one who lacks the capacity to understand the nature or consequences of the action or proceeding or to assist their attorney in preparing the case (Code Civ. Proc., § 372, subd. (a)(4)(A)).

Application to Family Law Proceedings

In the context of family law, determining whether a person had the mental capacity to participate in and make decisions regarding a dissolution proceeding involves assessing their ability to understand the nature and consequences of the proceeding, respond to discovery requests, attend scheduled hearings, communicate effectively with their attorney, and seek accommodations from the court if necessary. These decisions do not require the complex decision-making involved in entering into contracts but do demand a basic level of cognitive function and comprehension.

While the court acknowledged that Wife “was likely depressed and anxious,” it observed that during the relevant period, she engaged in several activities requiring planning, organization, and communication. She sold her home and used the proceeds to pay property taxes, obtained a cashier’s check to pay her daughter’s tuition, wrote and cashed checks, and sold two cars, antique firearms, and personal items. Wife did not argue that she was unable to understand these transactions or their consequences. She also attended her daughter’s graduation and went shopping, indicating her ability to leave her home and interact coherently with others.

Wife testified that she was aware the dissolution action was proceeding but believed it was for finalizing a settlement, not a trial. She admitted receiving a copy of the judgment in early 2016 but chose not to read it until months later, despite being within the six-month period to contest it under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b). The trial court did not find Wife’s claims of being entirely unable to function credible, especially given her background as a practicing attorney. Her assertion of having no memory of the two-year period was undermined by her specific statements about events during that time.

Regarding expert testimony, Dr. Unger opined that Wife could not have appeared in court due to an inability to sustain attention but did not address her capacity to communicate with her attorney or understand the proceedings. Dr. Halote stated that Wife had severe deficits in “activities of daily living” but did not testify that she was unable to participate in or comprehend the dissolution proceeding. The Court of Appeal found his definition of mental incapacity insufficient under section 2122, as he equated incapacity solely with disruptions in daily activities. Applying the standards from the Probate and Civil Codes, the Court of Appeal concluded that Wife did not suffer from a mental deficit that significantly impaired herbligey to understand and appreciate the nature or consequences of her actions or the family law proceeding. Therefore, she did not meet the criteria for mental incapacity under section 2122.

Duress Under Section 2122

The Family Code does not define “duress,” but courts have interpreted it to encompass situations where one’s free will is destroyed through threats, pressure, or mental coercion. Duress involves intentional actions that induce the coerced party to act against their will, leaving them with no reasonable alternative. Wife argued that the trial court erred in not finding duress based on “unrefuted evidence of domestic violence” by Husband. However, the evidence presented was not unrefuted. Wife mentioned one incident of physical violence in 1997, which Husband denied. There was no corroborating evidence for her claims, and the Court of Appeal noted that Wife did not establish that Husband engaged in stalking or coercive control, which could arguably lead to a duress finding. Given the lack of substantial evidence supporting claims of duress, the Court of Appeal determined that Wife did not demonstrate that her failure to participate in the dissolution proceeding was due to duress as defined under section 2122.

Equitable Considerations Under Section 2125 Only Come Into Play When The Court Has Set Aside The Judgment Under Section 2122

Family Code section 2125 states that when ruling on an action or motion to set aside a judgment, the court shall set aside only those provisions materially affected by the circumstances leading to the court’s decision to grant relief. However, the court has discretion to set aside the entire judgment if necessary for equitable considerations. Wife interpreted this provision as allowing the court to set aside a judgment solely based on equitable considerations. The court clarified that section 2125 allows for setting aside only the portions of a judgment materially affected by circumstances warranting relief under section 2122. Equitable considerations come into play only after a ground for relief under section 2122 has been established.

In re Marriage of Saraye

10/30/2024, CA 2/8 B331257 – Stratton P.J.

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B331257.PDF

In this case, the Court of Appeal addressed whether an obligor parent is entitled to reimbursement for overpaid child support when the request is made years after the child support obligation has terminated. The Court of Appeal examined the application of Family Code section 4007 and the equitable defense of laches, ultimately affirming the trial court’s denial of the obligor’s request due to unreasonable delay and prejudice to the blige.

Background

Husband and Wife divorced, and their dissolution judgment included an order for Husband to pay child support for their daughter. The judgment specified that child support would continue until the child died, married, reached the age of majority, became otherwise emancipated, or until further order of the court. Importantly, the judgment did not require Wife to notify Husband upon the occurrence of any contingency that would terminate child support.

The child reached the age of majority and graduated from high school, which terminated Husband’s child support obligation as a matter of law. Despite this, Husband’s wages continued to be garnished for child support for years. He did not take any action to terminate the wage assignment or seek reimbursement until he filed a Request for Order (RFO) in November 2021—approximately 13 years after the garnishment ceased and 17 years after his child support obligation legally ended.

In his RFO, Husband sought reimbursement of the overpaid child support from Wife. The trial court denied his request, citing his unreasonable delay and the resulting prejudice to Wife, who had relied on the funds during that time. The court found that Wife had “unclean hands” because she likely knew she was receiving overpayments but continued to accept them. Despite this finding, the court applied the defense of laches to deny Husband’s claim for reimbursement.

Analysis

Husband appealed, contending that statutory and case law mandate the repayment of overpaid child support and arguing that the trial court improperly relied on the equitable defense of laches. Specifically, he asserted that under Family Code section 4007, Wife was required to refund the overpayments because she continued to accept child support payments after the obligation had terminated. He also argued that laches should not apply to the overpayment of child support and that there is no provision in the Family Code allowing for laches to bar reimbursement.

Wife countered that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the reimbursement due to Husband’s significant delay and the prejudice she would suffer if required to repay the overpayments.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial court’s application of laches for abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals noted that laches is an equitable defense that requires a delay in asserting a right or claim, an unreasonable or inexcusable delay, and prejudice to the party against whom laches is asserted. Regardless, however, the Court of Appeal noted that a party seeking equitable relief must come to court with clean hands.

The trial court found that Wife had unclean hands, as she likely knew about the overpayments but continued to accept them. Due to Wife’s unclean hands, she could not avail herself of the laches defense. However, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision on other grounds, concluding that laches did not apply but that Husband was still not entitled to reimbursement.

Husband relied on Family Code section 4007, subdivision (b), which states that if the custodial parent fails to notify the obligor of the happening of the contingency that terminates support and continues to accept payments, the custodial parent shall refund all moneys received after the contingency. However, subdivision (a) provides that the court may, in the original order for support, require the custodial parent to notify the obligor of the contingency.

In this case, the original support order did not require Wife to notify Husband of any terminating contingencies. Therefore, section 4007, subdivision (b), did not obligate Wife to refund the overpayments. Furthermore, Husband was aware or should have been aware that the child had reached the age of majority and graduated from high school. Despite this, he did not act to terminate the wage assignment.

Under Family Code sections 5235 and 5240, it was Husband’s responsibility to file a motion or request ex parte relief to terminate the wage assignment when his support obligations had ended. The employer is required to continue withholding and forwarding support as required by the assignment order until served with notice terminating the order. Husband failed to take the necessary steps to terminate the wage assignment, resulting in continued garnishment of his wages. The court emphasized that it was his responsibility to act, and his failure to do so precluded his claim for reimbursement.

Child support proceedings are equitable in nature, granting trial courts broad discretion to achieve fairness and equity. Although no statute sets a specific time limit for seeking reimbursement of overpaid child support, the trial court appropriately considered factors similar to those in Family Code section 3653, subdivision (d), which addresses reimbursement when a support order is retroactively decreased or terminated. These factors include the amount to be repaid, the duration of overpayment, the financial impact on the blige, and any other relevant circumstances, such as Husband’s significant delay in seeking reimbursement.

Given these considerations, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband’s request for reimbursement.

North American Title Company v. Superior Court

10/28/2024, S280752– Guerrero C.J.

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S280752.PDF

This case, from our Supreme Court, involves the interpretation of statutes governing the disqualification of judges, specifically the “timeliness requirement” set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision I(1) (section 170.3I(1)), and the “nonwaiver provision” in section 170.3, subdivision (b)(2) (section 170.3(b)(2)).

Section 170.3I(1) mandates that a party seeking to disqualify a judge by filing a verified statement of disqualification must do so “at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification.” In contrast, section 170.3(b)(2) provides that, notwithstanding a party’s general ability to waive a disqualification, “[t]here shall be no waiver of disqualification if the basis therefor” falls into one of two categories, including when “[t]he judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”

The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the nonwaiver provision precludes application of the timeliness requirement when a party alleges that a judge is disqualified due to bias or prejudice concerning a party. The Court of Appeal had held that it does, stating that the nonwaiver provision must be read “to prohibit all forms of waiver, including implied waiver due to untimeliness.” Under the Court of Appeal’s interpretation, a party alleging bias or prejudice cannot “waive[] its right to seek judicial disqualification,” even if the claim is asserted long after discovering the grounds for disqualification.

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s Interpretation, stating that it “conflates the concepts of waiver and forfeiture, and it extends the statute’s prohibition on waiver to scenarios where forfeiture based on failure to comply with the timeliness requirement may properly be found.” The Court clarified that the nonwaiver provision applies only when “a judge [has] determine[d] himself or herself to be disqualified” and, absent an explicit waiver by the parties, would recuse themselves from the proceedings. Therefore, the nonwaiver provision “is inapplicable when a party seeks disqualification by filing a written verified statement of disqualification.”

When a party seeks disqualification, “the statute’s timeliness requirement contemplates that the litigant may forfeit the right to seek disqualification by failing to file a statement of disqualification ‘at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification.’” The nonwaiver provision “has no effect on the separate issue of forfeiture in this context.”