Family Law

Recent Family Law Cases

FAMILY LAW (Through 10/20/24)
By Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s notes are italicized.

Katayama v. Continental Investment Group et. al.
10/09/2024 CA 4/3: G063872 – P.J. O’Leary
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063872.PDF

Background

In 2018, Katayama filed a lawsuit against the defendants, alleging fraud and violations of Civil Code section 1102 et seq.

During discovery, defendants served Katayama with 20 Requests for Admission (RFAs) in April 2020. Katayama failed to respond within the statutory deadline. Defendants then moved to have the RFAs deemed admitted under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(b).

Ten days before the hearing on the motion, Katayama served a proposed response, providing substantive answers—either “Admit” or “Deny”—to all but one of the RFAs. However, he included general objections based on “attorney-client privilege, attorney work product, relevance, and admissibility as evidence.” These objections had been waived due to his untimely response per Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(a).

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(c), the trial court is required to deem requests admitted “unless it finds that the party to whom the requests for admission have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.” In relevant part, Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 requires that each “answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.”

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion, concluding that Katayama’s responses did not “substantially comply with Section 2033.220,” as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(c), merely because Katayama included waived objections in his response. As a result, the RFAs were deemed admitted.

At trial, Katayama was precluded from presenting any evidence inconsistent with the deemed admissions. Without the ability to introduce critical evidence, Katayama’s attorney informed the court that she could not proceed. The trial court granted a nonsuit in favor of the defendants.

Katayama appealed, arguing that his proposed responses substantially complied with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 and that the inclusion of waived objections should not have prevented him from avoiding the deemed admissions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(c). He contended that his substantive answers were “complete and straightforward,” as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220(a), and that the presence of waived objections did not negate this compliance.

The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed with directions to retry the case. Central to its analysis was the meaning of “substantial compliance with Section 2033.220” under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.280(c). The court noted that Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220 requires each answer to be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” It held “that the presence of waived objections in a proposed response governed by section 2033.280(c) does not necessarily prevent ‘substantial compliance with Section 2033.220.’ Compliance analysis should prioritize the nature of the substantive answers in the proposed response.” Put another way, “if Katayama’s objections are ignored, it is clear his substantive answers were far more ‘complete and straightforward’ than not.”

The Court of Appeal underscored the legislative intent which favors substance over form and the resolution of cases on their merits. It referenced the California Supreme Court’s guidance in Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, which emphasized a “graduated system of enforcement” that fits “the punishment of the nonresponding party to the offense.”

E.G. v. M.L.

9/9/2024; Certified for Publication 10/3/2024, CA 6: H051526– J. Danner

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H051526.PDF

Background

E.G. sought a restraining order against 17-year-old M.L., the daughter of her former romantic partner, after she posted videos on social media platforms TikTok and Instagram, alleging that E.G. was supporting M.L.’s mother in abusive conduct against M.L. and her younger brother, S.L.

M.L. and S.L.’s parents were engaged in contentious family law proceedings regarding the children’s custody. The family court found in October 2022 that the allegations by M.L. and her brother were not credible, that M.L.’s mother did not sexually abuse the children, and that she was a “safe parent.” The family court awarded custody to M.L.’s and S.L.’s mother. M.L. and S.L., however, ran away and began making posts about E.G. online.

In the videos, M.L. accused E.G. of “support[ing] [her mother’s] sexual abuse of both [her] and [her] brother,” and claimed that E.G. was using her resources to “spy on” them and report back to their mother. M.L. also displayed E.G.’s personal and professional contact information, including her office address, phone number, and email, and urged viewers to “please pressure” E.G. and “make her stop” supporting their mother.

E.G. testified that as a result of M.L.’s posts, she received threats and harassment from unknown third parties, including disturbing voicemails and false reviews on her professional listings. One message threatened to “tie [her] to a hotel bed,” while others accused her of “raping children” and warned that she should be paranoid because they were “watching [her].”

M.L. argued that her posts were legitimate expressions of fear for her and her brother’s safety, asserting that she believed E.G. was aiding their mother in attempting to “recapture” them and send them back to a “reunification camp.” She stated that she had removed the posts and had not posted anything further about E.G. M.L. contended that her actions were protected by her First Amendment right to free speech and that there was no basis for a restraining order.

On August 31, 2023, the trial court issued a detailed ruling, granting a three-year civil harassment restraining order against M.L. The court found that M.L. had engaged in “doxxing” by posting E.G.’s personal information alongside defamatory accusations, which constituted a course of conduct causing E.G. to be threatened and harassed. The court concluded that E.G. had met her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence under section 527.6.

M.L. appealed the restraining order, arguing that there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment under section 527.6. She contended that her actions did not constitute a “course of conduct” as defined by the statute, that her posts served a legitimate purpose, and that the trial court failed to consider circumstances making it unlikely that the alleged harassment would continue or recur, especially after she turned 18.

Substantial Evidence Supported a Finding of a “Course of Conduct”

Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (b)(3) defines “harassment” as “a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose.”

M.L. had posted at least two videos on separate dates to both TikTok and Instagram, which included E.G.’s photos and personal contact information, and accused E.G. of supporting sexual abuse and child abuse. The Court of Appeal found that this constituted a “course of conduct” under section 527.6, which is defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” The Court of Appeal rejected M.L.’s argument that her actions were a single incident, instead concluding that “the trial court’s finding of a course of conduct within the meaning of the statute was properly informed by all the online content posted by M.L. in which she shared E.G.’s photos and information and portrayed her as someone who supports pedophilia, kidnapping, and child abuse.”

M.L.’s Postings Served No Legitimate Purpose and Were Not Protected by the First Amendment

M.L. argued that her posts served a legitimate purpose and were protected free speech, as she believed she and her brother were in danger. The Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that the posts were not constitutionally protected because they were defamatory and served “no legitimate purpose” as defined by Civil Procedure section 527.6. The Court of Appeal further noted that M.L.’s accusations had been previously adjudicated as not credible in family court proceedings.

Evidence of Emotional Distress

Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 requires a harassing course of conduct to “be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.”

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence that E.G. suffered substantial emotional distress as a result of M.L.’s conduct. E.G. testified about the impact on her professional reputation, the threats she received, and the distress caused by the false accusations.

Likelihood of Future Harassment

M.L. contended that there was insufficient evidence that the harassment was likely to recur, especially since she had removed the posts and would soon turn 18. The Court of Appeal agreed in part, finding that while substantial evidence supported the issuance of the restraining order, the evidence did not support extending the order beyond M.L.’s 18th birthday.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that the circumstances leading to M.L.’s conduct were closely tied to her status as a minor involved in a custody dispute in her mother’s family court case. Once she turned 18, those circumstances would no longer exist because she would then “have the right and responsibility to make her own decisions.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal therefore modified the injunction to expire on M.L.’s 18th birthday.

In re Marriage of Cady and Gamick

9/25/2024, CA 2/1: B326716 – J. Weingart

https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B326716.PDF

This case involves the interpretation and harmonization of Family Code section 3910 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350.

Family Code section 3910 imposes an obligation on parents to support an adult child “who is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means,” to the extent of the parents’ abilities. Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 states that “no relative shall be held legally liable to support or to contribute to the support of any applicant for or recipient of” certain government aid. In this case, that aid was the State Supplementary Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSP).

The central question before the court was whether Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 bars one parent from seeking an order of child support from the other parent under Family Code section 3910 when the adult disabled child is receiving government assistance.

The trial court agreed with Father, holding that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 precluded any order for support under Family Code section 3910. Consequently, the court denied Mother’s RFO for child support and awarded her only $20,000 in attorney’s fees, despite acknowledging Father’s substantial income and ability to pay.

Mother appealed, contending that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 does not absolve Father of his duty under Family Code section 3910 to support Schuyler. She argued that the trial court erred in interpreting the statutes and that public policy considerations support the obligation of financially able parents to support their incapacitated adult children, even when those children receive government aid. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother and reversed.

The Court of Appeal emphasized that the purpose of Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 was to prevent government entities from seeking reimbursement from relatives for aid provided to recipients, not to absolve relatives of their support obligations to each other. Therefore, the court concluded that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 only prevents government actors from seeking reimbursement from relatives, not from barring one parent from seeking child support from the other under Family Code section 3910. Parents retain their obligation under Family Code section 3910 to support their incapacitated adult children “to the extent of their ability,” regardless of the child’s receipt of government aid.

The Court of Appeal also addressed public policy considerations, noting that accepting Father’s interpretation would lead to the illogical outcome of parents being relieved of support obligations precisely because their child receives minimal government aid, shifting the burden to the public. Such an interpretation would contradict the legislative intent of Family Code section 3910, which aims to prevent incapacitated adults from becoming public charges when their parents are able to support them.

Further, the court observed that a recent amendment to Family Code section 3910 allows for child support payments to be made into a special needs trust, which can improve the beneficiary’s quality of life without disqualifying them from SSI and other benefits. This amendment demonstrates the Legislature’s expectation that adult children with significant disabilities may be entitled to both government aid and court-ordered child support.

DEPENDENCY (current through 10/21/24)

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