Recent Family Law Cases

Bijan Boutiques, LLC v. Rosamari Isong
8/13/2024 CA 4/3: G063288 – P.J. Goethals
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063288.PDF

In this appeal, Bijan Boutiques, LLC (“Bijan”) challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Rosamari Isong, as part of Bijan’s effort to enforce a judgment against Isong’s former husband, Richard Milam Akubiro. Bijan sought to void the property distribution in the marital dissolution judgment between Isong and Akubiro, asserting that the judgment was fraudulent under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”). The dissolution judgment, procured by default without an agreement, awarded Isong the couple’s only U.S.-based asset—their home in Chino, California—while Akubiro received foreign assets and was assigned the Bijan debt. The court ruled that Family Code section 916 barred Bijan’s claim, and the judgment was affirmed on appeal.

Facts

Isong and Akubiro married in 1997 and lived in Equatorial Guinea. In 2012, they purchased a home in Chino, California, where Isong lived with their children, while Akubiro remained abroad. In 2014, Akubiro incurred a debt of over $327,000 by purchasing men’s clothing from Bijan, a designer clothier, and only partially paid it off.

In 2017, Isong discovered Akubiro had taken additional wives, leading her to file for dissolution of their marriage in August 2018. A month earlier, Bijan filed a lawsuit against Akubiro for the unpaid debt. Bijan obtained a default judgment against Akubiro in January 2019. In July of 2019,  the Court in the marital dissolution action entered a default judgment (without agreement) at Isong’s request. The judgment awarded Isong the Chino home as her separate property while assigning Akubiro’s substantial foreign assets, collectively valued at over $4 million. The judgment also assigned the Bijan debt solely to Akubiro, noting that the debt was not incurred for the benefit of the community.

Bijan’s Claims

In September 2020, Bijan filed a lawsuit against Isong and Akubiro, alleging that the dissolution judgment qualified as a voidable transfer under the UVTA. Bijan claimed that the judgment was structured to prevent Bijan from collecting on its judgment by insulating the Chino property, the couple’s only U.S.-based asset, from enforcement. Bijan sought to have the judgment voided as a fraudulent transfer, arguing that the allocation of foreign assets to Akubiro effectively shielded him from creditors like Bijan.

The trial court grants Isong’s request for summary judgment, relying on Family Code section 916

Isong moved for summary judgment, relying on Family Code section 916, subdivision (a)(2), which protects property received by a spouse in a dissolution from liability for the other spouse’s debts unless the debt was explicitly assigned to the receiving spouse. The trial court agreed with Isong, finding that the Bijan debt had been assigned to Akubiro alone, and under section 916, Isong’s property could not be used to satisfy Akubiro’s debt.

The trial court also emphasized that the marital dissolution judgment was not the product of a negotiated marital settlement agreement but was instead a court-adjudicated division of property. This distinction was key because the California Supreme Court’s decision in Mejia v. Reed (2003) 31 Cal.4th 657 allows Uniform Voidable Transaction Act claims against marital settlement agreements, but not against court-determined divisions of property. The court concluded that since the judgment resulted from judicial deliberation rather than private negotiation, the UVTA did not apply.

The Court of Appeal affirms and holds that the UVTA can trump Family Code section 916 only where the property division is based on an agreement between the parties.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling, holding that Family Code section 916 protects property awarded in a marital dissolution from liability for the other spouse’s debts unless the court assigns the debt to the receiving spouse. Here, the Bijan debt was explicitly assigned to Akubiro, barring Bijan from seeking enforcement against Isong’s Chino property.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the exception in Mejia v. Reed only applies when the marital property division is based on a negotiated settlement agreement. In this case, the property division was not a settlement but was “the product of its own evaluation of the evidence and the law” and thus it did not fall within the scope of the UVTA. In other words, The Court of Appeal lso rejected Bijan’s attempt to liken the trial court’s default judgment to a marital settlement agreement. Family Code section 2336 “expressly prohibits the court from basing its judgment on a party’s default,” requiring its judgment be supported by evidence and judicial deliberation.

The Court of Appeal also rejected Bijan’s declaratory relief causes of action (such as unjust enrichment) because they, again, conflicted with Family Code section 916.

Author’s Note – A default with an agreement would almost certainly be treated as a negotiated marital settlement agreement rather than a court-adjudicated division of property.  (See Litke O’Farrell, LLC v. Tipton (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184 [Parties can “divide community property pursuant to a written agreement” and such agreement “is enforceable without court approval.”)

Greisman v. FCA US, LLC
8/5/2024 CA 1/2: A166919 – J. Richman
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A166919.PDF

In this partially published case, the Court of Appeal held that, following the 2021 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6, the entry of judgment under this section no longer requires the client’s explicit consent. That consent can be given by either a party or that party’s attorney.

Although the appellant tried to argue otherwise, the legislative history was clear. The Senate Judiciary Committee analysis of the bill provides that it “eliminates the requirement that parties themselves must personally sign or orally stipulate to [settlements under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6] and instead allows counsel for the parties to so stipulate on their behalf.”

Author’s Note – Just because you can bind your client to an agreement under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 without their explicit consent does not mean you should. Frankly, in the family law context, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where doing so would be prudent.

In re A.P.
6/28/2024, Certified for Publication on 7/26/24 CA 2/1: B327857 – J. Weingart
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B327857.PDF

In this case, the Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court’s denial of a mother’s request for a restraining order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5.

Welfare and Institutions Code section 213.5 grants juvenile courts exclusive authority to issue restraining orders protecting a parent of a dependent child from harassment, molestation, or abuse by another parent during ongoing dependency proceedings. Notably, section 213.5 explicitly incorporates the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), stating that the juvenile court “may issue a restraining order . . . in the manner provided by Section 6300 of the Family Code.” This incorporation of the DVPA aligns the issuance of restraining orders in juvenile court with the issuance of such orders in family law court, ensuring that the same protective standards apply. A restraining order under section 213.5 does not require a reasonable apprehension of future abuse and may be issued based solely on evidence of past domestic violence. Additionally, these orders must be entered into the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), making them immediately enforceable by law enforcement officers.

Here, the juvenile court found that the father had committed several acts of domestic violence against the mother and her children, including grabbing the mother by the neck, pushing her to the ground, and striking one of the children, A.P., hard enough to fracture his skull. Despite these findings and the father’s admission of many of the acts during dependency proceedings, the juvenile court denied the mother’s request for a restraining order. Instead, the court issued a mutual stay-away order that was not entered into CLETS and was thus unenforceable by law enforcement.

On appeal, the mother argued that the juvenile court erred by denying her request for a restraining order, despite the court’s findings of domestic violence. The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying the restraining order based on the parents no longer living together. Citing the DVPA, the appellate court emphasized that physical separation is not a valid reason to deny a restraining order, particularly when the parents still have ongoing co-parenting responsibilities that require regular contact. Domestic violence survivors, the court noted, must not be deprived of the legal protection offered by a restraining order simply because they have successfully separated from their abuser.

The Court of Appeal also found that the mutual stay-away order issued by the juvenile court was an inadequate substitute for the requested restraining order and that the error was not harmless. Because it was not entered into CLETS, the order lacked the enforcement mechanisms necessary for immediate protection. The Court of Appeal expressed concern that by issuing a non-CLETS order, the juvenile court had recognized the need for protection but failed to provide the full legal remedies available under section 213.5.

Ultimately, the Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the restraining order. It declined, however, to direct the juvenile court to issue a restraining order on remand. Since the juvenile court used an incorrect legal standard, it failed to make material factual findings regarding the restraining order beyond acknowledging the past abuse. Courts have discretion to issue restraining orders based solely on past abuse, and that discretion should generally favor protecting survivors. In this case, the juvenile court expressed concerns about the mother’s credibility, citing her failure to take her medication, paranoid delusions, and disruptive behavior during a hearing. Since factual disputes beyond the finding of past abuse remain unresolved, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the juvenile court for a new hearing.