Newly-Published Labor and Employment Law Cases

August 2025

Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho (9th Cir. 22-55908 7/31/25) COVID-19 Vaccinations

The en banc court affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) in an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that LAUSD’s COVID-19 vaccination policy, which required all employees to be fully vaccinated, violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection rights. Consistent with all other circuits that have decided the issue, the court held that LAUSD’s policy was subject to rational basis review under Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The court found plaintiffs’ claims failed under this standard because LAUSD reasonably concluded that COVID-19 vaccines would protect the health and safety of its employee and students, even if the vaccine did not provide immunity to or prevent transmission of the disease.

Burch v. City of Chubbuck (9th Cir. 24-3646 7/26/25) First Amendment | Retaliation

Burch was the Public Works Director for the City of Chubbuck, Idaho. He sued the city and its mayor for violations of the First Amendment and corresponding Idaho state law. The court held that Burch’s criticism of the mayor’s policies and performance, and his advocacy for creation of a city administrator position, were made pursuant to his official duties and thus were unprotected. The court held that Burch’s display of a yard sign supporting the mayor’s electoral opponent was protected, and that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the yard sign was a substantial or motivating factor in at least one of the adverse actions alleged by Burch. The court went on to hold, however, that defendants would have asked Burch to resign, transfer his duties, and reduce his workload even if he had never erected the yard sign.

Egelston v. State Personnel Bd. (CA2/6 B337182 7/15/25) State Personnel Board | State Employee Dismissal

Egelston was dismissed from his position as a youth correctional officer after he assaulted and harassed his girlfriend (J.G.) and then lied about it to investigators. The State Personnel Board upheld the dismissal. The trial court denied Egelston’s petition for writ of mandate. The court of appeal affirmed. On appeal, Egelston argued for the first time that the SPB decision was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the family court’s dismissal of J.G.’s application for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). The court of appeal rejected Egelston’s argument, finding the causes of action in each proceeding were different, the proceedings did not involve the same parties, and there was no decision on the merits because the DVRO request was dismissed without prejudice.

Columbia Legal Services v. Stemilt AG Services, LLC (9th Cir. 23-3548 7/10/25) Protective Order | Settled Agricultural Workers Class Action

Columbia Legal Services represented a class of temporary agricultural workers employed by Stemilt. In resolving a discovery dispute over Stemilt’s financial and employment records, the district court entered a protective order prohibiting Columbia from using Stemilt’s information outside of the class action lawsuit without the court’s prior approval. The appellate court held that Columbia had Article III standing to challenge the order because it was “aggrieved” by the protective order. On the merits, the court reiterated that information produced in discovery is presumptively public and that a party seeking a protective order must show prejudice for each document it seeks to protect. The court found the district court abused its discretion because the order did not identify any particularized harm that would result from Columbia’s use of the information and did not balance the relevant interests against any potential harm.

Allos v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. (CA4/1 D084062, filed 6/24/25, ord. pub. 7/7/25) Gov. Code section 855.4 Defense | FEHA, Labor Code, and COVID-19

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Allos sought an accommodation of 100% telework because of her inability to receive the COVID-19 vaccine and her need to care for her disabled mother. When the District declined to grant her requested accommodation, Allos filed suit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the Labor Code. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, finding that Allos’s claims were barred by Government Code section 855.4, and even if they weren’t Allos failed to establish triable issues of material fact. The court of appeal affirmed the District’s immunity under Government Code section 855.4, which bars liability based on a public entity’s discretionary decision aimed at preventing or controlling the communication of disease within the community. The court also affirmed that Allos established no triable issues of material fact on her disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, associational discrimination, retaliation, and Labor Code causes of action.

Brown v. City of Inglewood (SC S280773 per curiam 7/7/25) Elected Officials | Labor Code section 1102.5 Whistleblower Retaliation

Brown, the elected treasurer of the City of Inglewood, wrote to city officials alleging the mayor had misappropriated city funds by approving a $77,000 overpayment to a city contractor. Brown alleged the City then took various retaliatory actions against her. Brown sued the City, the mayor, and the city council for whistleblower retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. The California Supreme Court held that Brown was not an “employee” covered by section 1102.5 because that section was intended to prevent retaliation by supervisors and managers, and as an elected official Brown reported to the electorate, not city management.

Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Pub. Employment Relations Bd. (CA1/5 A171007 7/2/25) Educational Employment Relations Act

Teachers represented by the Oakland Education Association (OEA) engaged in a one-day strike during a dispute over school closures approved by the District. The District filed an unfair practice charge with PERB alleging the one-day strike violated the Educational Employment Relations Act (EERA) because it occurred when the parties were not at an impasse in collective bargaining. The court affirmed PERB’s ruling that OEA did not violate EERA because its strike was in response to the District’s unfair practices. The court further held that neither EERA nor constitutional due process prohibits pre-impasse strikes conducted before PERB has determined that the public school employer has, in fact, committed an unfair practice. The court also found PERB erred by excluding evidence of educational harm but that this error was harmless.

Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (9th Cir. 23-15650 24-1979 7/1/25) FLSA

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) allows employees alleging violations of minimum-wage and overtime-compensation requirements to litigate their claims collectively with other “similarly situated” plaintiffs. Here, a group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., alleged that Cracker Barrel violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in connection with its wages for tipped workers. The district court granted these plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to a group of prospective opt-in plaintiffs, which included employees who may have entered into arbitration agreements with Cracker Barrel as well as out-of-state employees with no apparent ties to Cracker Barrel’s operations in the forum state of Arizona. Joining the majority of other circuits, the court held that Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 582 U.S. 255 (2017), applies in actions under the FLSA in federal court. Consequently, where the basis for personal jurisdiction in a collective action is specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff’s claim bears a sufficient connection to the defendant’s activities in the forum state. Because the district court authorized nationwide notice on the mistaken assumption that it would not need to assess specific personal jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.