Litigation
Litigation Update: September 2025
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates:
- No Stay of TRO Enjoining Illegal Seizures of Persons.
- State Laws Regulating Account Fees Have No Application to Federal Credit Unions.
- Despite § 230 Immunity, Twitter Can Still Be Sued.
- Police Use of Force Held Reasonable Under the Circumstances.
- Only a Portion of ERISA Claim to Go to Arbitration.
- Religious Organization Did Not Violate Title VII by Refusing to Hire Person in a Same-Sex Marriage Because the Person Would Be Performing Key Religious Functions.
- Discrimination Based on Immigration Status.
- Petition Challenging SEC Rule Denied.
- California Supreme Court Held the Highly Deferential Standard Enjoyed by the PUC Is No Longer Valid.
- Floodwater on Defaulted Land Was Not Previous Owner’s Personal Property.
- Physician’s Negligent Care of Elder Found Not to Violate Elder Abuse Act.
- Suit Against Opposing Counsel Tossed.
- Life Settlements are Security Interests Subject to Registration with the SEC.
- Satanic Temple Has No Standing in This Case.
- Provision in California Arbitration Act that the Drafting Party Must Make Timely Payment of Arbitration Fees Is Not Preempted by the FAA.
- Settlements Are Favored.
- Payment for Nonproductive Time in Wage/Hour Case.
- Conundrum in Pleading a Trade Secrets Case.
- Expert Testimony Based on a Differential Etiology Excluded.
- Refusal to Resentence Veteran Found to Be an Abuse of Discretion.
- Anti-SLAPP Protections Available to Defendant Who Discussed Gender Identity Issues with Children at Camp.
- Civil Code § 798.30.5 Found Not Facially Unconstitutional.
- Cost of Proof Attorney Fees (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420) Can Be Harmonized with Unilateral Elder Abuse Attorney Fees (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30).
- Some Wrongful Death Cases Against Skilled Nursing Facilities Need Not Be Arbitrated, Despite the Fact the Deceased Signed an Agreement to Arbitrate.
- Internet Service Provider Could Not Be Subpoenaed to Reveal Identities of Subscribers.
- Defendant Consumer Reporting Agency Did Not Violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act Negligently or Willfully.
- Trial Court’s Denial of Criminal Defendant’s Request for Mental Health Diversion Vacated by Writ.
- The Age Act Does Not Apply to University of California San Francisco’s Refusal to Admit Medical Doctor into a Residency Program.
- 1977 Contract Concerning Song Royalties Not Terminable at Will.
- Tongue and Done Slogan Does Not Amount to Securities Fraud.
- No Birthright Citizenship.
- Elderly Plaintiff Accused Retirement Home of Illegally Recovering Attorney Fees by Raising Fees to Live in a Retirement Community.
- Permanent Injunction Over Keeping Dogs on Property Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part.
- Federal Research Grants to Continue.
- California Supreme Court Clarified Two Wage/Hour Issues.
- Judge Not Eligible to Be Public Defender.
- Grandparents Lose Petition for Visitation.
- Manufacturer Prevailed in Asbestos Case.
- University Revoked Graduate’s Bachelor’s Degree.
- Alleged Copyright Infringement Involving a Music Composition.
- Defendant Did Not Call Attention to Online Arbitration Agreement.
- Elimination of Governmental Claim Requirement for Childhood Sexual Abuse Did Not Violate Gift Clause of the California Constitution.
- Class Action Plaintiff Waived Damages to Try to Avoid Removal to Federal Court.
- No Federal Enclave Jurisdiction in Class Action Over Military Housing.
- “He Who Represents Himself Has a Fool For a Client,” Abraham Lincoln.
- Coastal Program Not Unconstitutional.
- Former Military Housing Still Subject to Rent Control.
- Summary Judgment in Favor of School District For Alleged Sexual Assault at Camp Reversed.
No Stay of TRO Enjoining Illegal Seizures of Persons. Plaintiffs filed an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against federal officers. The district court determined that plaintiffs had shown they were likely to succeed in proving that certain seizures of persons are illegal. The TRO provided:
a. As required by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Defendants shall be enjoined from conducting detentive stops in this District unless the agent or officer has reasonable suspicion that the person to be stopped is within the United States in violation of U.S. immigration law.
b. In connection with paragraph [a], Defendants may not rely solely on the factors below, alone or in combination, to form reasonable suspicion for a detentive stop, except as permitted by law: [emphasis added.]
i. Apparent race or ethnicity;
ii. Speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent;
iii. Presence at a particular location (e.g., bus stop, car wash, tow yard, day laborer pick up site, agricultural site, etc.); or
iv. The type of work one does.
The government filed an application for an emergency motion to stay the TRO pending their appeal. Denying the request to stay the TRO, except for a single issue, the Ninth Circuit stated: “In sum, we conclude that Defendants are likely to succeed only on their objection that the TRO is rendered impermissibly vague by the phrase “except as permitted by law.” Defendants have not shown that they are likely to prevail as to any other arguments aimed at the substance of the TRO.” (Vasquez Perdomo v. Noem (9th Cir., Aug. 1, 2025) 2025 WL 2181709.)
State Laws Regulating Account Fees Have No Application to Federal Credit Unions. Plaintiff is a customer of the Navy Federal Credit Union (NFCU). He attempted to deposit a large check into his account, but it did not go through. Even though the failure was not his fault, NFCU assessed him a $15 fee pursuant to its “bounced” check policy.” Plaintiff’s attempts to resolve this dispute telephonically failed. Litigation ensued. Plaintiff filed suit in state court, contending that charging a $15 returned-check fee when the customer was not at fault was an “unfair” and “unlawful” business practice that violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200, et seq.; UCL). A federal court dismissed the action, holding that “state law claims regarding a federal credit union’s failure to disclose certain fee practices or any perceived unfairness in the fee practices themselves are preempted.” Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Although King offers an Olympic level of verbal gymnastics to argue that the UCL transcends [12 C.F.R.] § 701.35(c)’s preemption clause, we agree with the district court—and every other court to confront this issue—that all state laws that regulate account fees—general, specific, or otherwise— have no application to federal credit unions.” (King v. Navy Federal Credit Union (9th Cir., Aug. 1, 2025) 2025 WL 2178532.)
Despite § 230 Immunity, Twitter Can Still Be Sued. A trafficker coerced two minor boys into producing pornographic content that the trafficker then posted on Twitter. The boys later sued Twitter after it slow-walked its response to reports about this content and did not immediately take it off the platform. In their lawsuit, plaintiffs advanced numerous claims, all of which the district court dismissed, primarily based on immunity provided under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-104 (Tit. V)). Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Though expansive, there is nuance to § 230 immunity. Here, we conclude that Twitter is immune from liability on Plaintiffs’ claim that it knowingly benefitted from sex trafficking and on their product-defect claim based on Twitter’s failure to remove posts under review as being child pornography and its creation of search features that amplify child-pornography posts. These claims hinge on Twitter’s role as a publisher of third-party content, which triggers § 230. But Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence per se and their product-liability theory based on defective reporting infrastructure design are not barred by § 230 immunity because they do not arise from Twitter’s role as a publisher.” (Doe 1 v. Twitter, Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 1, 2025) 2025 WL 2178534.)
Police Use of Force Held Reasonable Under the Circumstances. In June 2020, a crowd gathered in Seattle to protest the killing of George Floyd. The police ordered the crowd to disperse, and an officer threw several less-lethal munitions toward the crowd. One of the munitions was a blast ball grenade, a diversionary device that creates a flash of light and emits a loud sound and a chemical irritant two seconds after it is activated. The blast ball hit the pavement near the curb where plaintiff was standing, bounced, and exploded as it struck him in the groin, and he was seriously injured. Plaintiff sued the City of Seattle, the Seattle Police Department (SPD), and several unnamed police officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the officer who threw the blast ball that injured him used excessive force and retaliated against him for filming the protest. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants, concluding that the city and SPD did not violate plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because he was not seized, and did not violate his First Amendment rights because there was no evidence that SPD acted in retaliation for plaintiff’s filming the protest. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “Though a reasonable fact finder could conclude that Cheairs was seized when an SPD officer struck him with a blast ball, the officer’s use of force was reasonable under the circumstances.” (Cheairs v. City of Seattle (9th Cir., Aug. 1, 2025) 145 F.4th 1233.)
Only a Portion of ERISA Claim to Go to Arbitration. Plaintiff sued his employer, claiming that a monthly tobacco surcharge on his employee health insurance premiums violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; ERISA). He brought claims on behalf of himself and other plan participants to recover losses under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3), and a breach of fiduciary duty claim on behalf of the employer-sponsored health insurance plan for losses. Defendant sought to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration provision that it unilaterally inserted into the plan after plaintiff joined the plan. The district court denied defendant’s motion. Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e agree that an employer does not create a valid arbitration agreement by unilaterally modifying an ERISA-governed plan to add an arbitration provision. Instead, the employer must obtain consent from the relevant party to form a valid arbitration agreement. Thus, we start by asking: (1) who is the relevant consenting party, and (2) did that party consent to the arbitration agreement? First, we hold that Platt is the relevant consenting party for claims under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) and § 502(a)(3) in which he seeks to recover losses by plan participants. Platt did not consent to arbitration because he did not receive sufficient notice of the addition of the arbitration provision or that his continued participation in the Plan would constitute consent to arbitration. Second, we hold that the Plan is the relevant consenting party for the breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(2) in which Platt seeks redress for losses by the Plan. The Plan consented to arbitration because its terms cede broad authority to Sodexo to amend the Plan’s terms. . . .” (Platt v. Sodexo, S.A. (9th Cir., Aug. 4, 2025) 2025 WL 2203415.)
Religious Organization Did Not Violate Title VII by Refusing to Hire Person in a Same-Sex Marriage Because the Person Would Be Performing Key Religious Functions. Plaintiff was hired as a remote customer service representative (CSR) by a Christian organization that is not a church. After learning that plaintiff was in a same-sex marriage, defendant revoked its job offer. Plaintiff sued in federal court, alleging discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and marital status under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The district court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for plaintiff. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We now hold that the ministerial exception bars McMahon’s employment discrimination claims because the record shows that CSRs perform key religious functions central to World Vision’s mission.” (McMahon v. World Vision Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 5, 2025) 147 F.4th 959.)
Discrimination Based on Immigration Status. Plaintiffs challenged the employment policy of the Regents of the University of California that prohibits it from employing undocumented students who do not have federal work authorization in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA). They argued § 11028, subdivision (f)(3) of title 2 of the California Code of Regulations, which provides that it is “an unlawful practice for an employer or other covered entity to discriminate against an employee because of the employee’s or applicant’s immigration status, unless the employer has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it is required to do so in order to comply with federal immigration law.” The trial court granted summary judgment for the regents. Issuing extraordinary relief, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude that the University’s employment policy facially discriminates based on immigration status and that, in light of applicable state law, the discriminatory policy cannot be justified by the University’s proffered reason. As a result, the University abused its discretion when it relied on improper criteria in deciding to continue using its policy. Accordingly, we will issue a writ of mandate directing the University to reconsider its policy based on proper criteria.” (Muñoz v. Regents of University of California (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Aug. 5, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 466.)
Petition Challenging SEC Rule Denied. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) denied petitioners’ request to amend SEC Rule 202.5(e), which reflects SEC policy since 1972 that the agency will not settle a civil enforcement action unless the defendant agrees not to publicly deny the allegations against him. If a defendant violates this provision of a settlement agreement, the SEC’s remedy is to go back to the court that entered the consent judgment and ask that the case be reopened. Petitioners sought review of SEC’s denial of their request to amend Rule 202.5(e), claiming that the rule violates the First Amendment. Denying the petition, the Ninth Circuit held: “[T]hese concerns are properly addressed in as-applied challenges with defined records, whether during court approval of settlements, in a pre-enforcement posture, or in response to the SEC seeking to reopen a closed enforcement proceeding for an alleged breach of a settlement agreement.” (Powell v. United States Securities and Exchange Commission (9th Cir., Aug. 6, 2025) 2025 WL 2233792.)
California Supreme Court Held the Highly Deferential Standard Enjoyed by the PUC Is No Longer Valid. This case concerned a tariff imposed by the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) on customers with renewable energy systems. The California Supreme Court granted review to consider the degree of deference that courts should afford to the PUC’s interpretation of the Public Utilities Code. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeal erred by relying on the highly deferential approach set forth in Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission (1968) 68 Cal.2d 406, holding: “[W]e leave this question for the Court of Appeal to address in the first instance, consistent with our usual practice and with appropriate ‘regard for the structure of appellate decision-making.’” (Center for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission (Cal., Aug. 7, 2025) 18 Cal.5th 293.)
Floodwater on Defaulted Land Was Not Previous Owner’s Personal Property. Defendant pledged land as security for a loan on which it defaulted. When the lender foreclosed, defendant contended that floodwater on the land was defendant’s personal property. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that the water and all rights thereto were part of the real estate and not personal property. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[Defendant] argues floodwater is a special class of water that becomes the personal property of anyone who exercises dominion and control over it, without any requirement of severance from the land. [Defendant] asserts this position with ostensible confidence, but without any supportive authority. The entire appeal is staked upon dictum in an obscure appellate court decision from 1913.” (Sandton Agriculture Investments III, LLC v. 4-S Ranch Partners, LLC (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Aug. 8, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 519.)
Physician’s Negligent Care of Elder Found Not to Violate Elder Abuse Act. The Elder Abuse Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610 et seq.) explicitly excludes from its reach an elder’s claim “for injury or damage against a health care provider . . . based on th[at] provider’s alleged professional negligence.” The Court of Appeal held that “a physician’s conduct in providing negligent medical services to an elder residing at a skilled nursing facility does not—without more—constitute ‘neglect’ because that physician lacks the requisite ‘robust caretaking or custodial relationship’ with the elder.” (Frankland v. Etehad (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 5, Aug. 8, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 503.)
Suit Against Opposing Counsel Tossed. Plaintiff was previously engaged in litigation with third parties. In the present litigation, plaintiff sued opposing counsel who represented the third parties in the prior action. Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion. In opposition, plaintiff offered only an argumentative declaration by her attorney and no actual evidence. The trial court denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “If you are a party in litigation, your tactic of suing opposing counsel is apt to trigger swift retaliation: an anti-SLAPP motion. If opposing counsel are helping their clients petition for legal relief, your motion may fall within anti-SLAPP’s prong one as an attack on petitioning activity. If so, then prong two will require you to produce evidence your claims have minimal merit. If you cannot show minimal merit, you may have to pay your opponent for the trouble you have caused. This case fits this pattern.” (Ramirez v. McCormack (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Aug. 8, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 493.)
Life Settlements are Security Interests Subject to Registration with the SEC. A life settlement is a transaction in which a person who owns a life insurance policy on his or her own life sells that policy to investors for a negotiated price. Thereafter, the investors pay the premiums on the policy until the insured dies, at which point those investors receive the policy’s death benefit. Here, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that sales agents for Pacific West Capital Group (PWCG) violated federal securities laws by promoting and selling fractional interests in life settlements. The question presented was whether life settlements are securities subject to registration with the SEC. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the fractional interests in the life settlements sold by PWCG were ‘investment contracts’ and thus securities subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . because the purchasers of the fractional interests sold by PWCG depended on the efforts of PWCG to profit through PWCG’s selection of policies, its determination of prices to be paid for those policies, and its premium reserve system to maintain investors’ fractional interests.” (United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Barry (9th Cir., Aug. 11, 2025) 146 F.4th 1242.)
Satanic Temple Has No Standing in This Case. Plaintiff, a religious group that supports abortion as an exercise of personal sovereignty and bodily autonomy, challenged Idaho’s laws criminalizing abortion. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[Plaintiff], whose sole clinic is in New Mexico, has no patients in Idaho, no clinic in Idaho, no doctors who are licensed to treat Idaho patients, and has identified no Idaho citizen who seeks an abortion from the organization. Because [plaintiff] has not established standing, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of its claims.” (The Satanic Temple v. Labrador (9th Cir., Aug. 11, 2025) 2025 WL 2524437.)
Provision in California Arbitration Act that the Drafting Party Must Make Timely Payment of Arbitration Fees Is Not Preempted by the FAA. The question before the California Supreme Court was whether the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; FAA) preempts California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.98, a provision of the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.),] which governs the payment of fees in employment and consumer arbitrations. Section 1281.98 establishes a default rule that when the party who drafted an arbitration agreement is responsible for paying fees and costs to an arbitrator, that party must pay an arbitrator’s invoice “within 30 days after the due date.” The parties may contract around the default rule. If the drafting party fails to make timely payment, it waives its right to compel the employee or consumer to proceed with that arbitration, and the employee or consumer may choose to withdraw the claim from arbitration and proceed in court. The Supreme Court held: “We hold that section 1281.98, properly construed, is not preempted by the FAA.” (Hohenshelt v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Cal., Aug. 11, 2025) 18 Cal.5th 310.)
Settlements Are Favored. After a car accident, plaintiffs’ lawyer sent defendant’s insurer a $100,000 demand letter stating the deadline to accept was 31 days later at 3:00 p.m., by which time the insurer had to send the attorney three items: “(1) a ‘standard . . . bodily injury release’ to be executed by ‘Gary Birdsall and Pamela Birdsall,’ (2) a settlement draft and check payable to ‘Gary Birdsall and Pamela Birdsall’ and their attorney, and (3) evidence confirming the policy limits.” The insurer sent the three items days ahead of time. Then, four days before the deadline, the insurer faxed another letter to plaintiffs’ lawyer stating the belief that all three conditions had been met, and asking the attorney to contact him if anything else was required. Meanwhile, the insurer learned that the release enclosed in the acceptance letter had a mistake and sent the attorney a corrected version of the release that was received by the attorney 65 minutes after the 3:00 p.m. deadline. The next day, plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to the insurance company complaining that the original release was not satisfactory—and the corrected release too late. Plaintiffs’ attorney thereafter filed a lawsuit. The case proceeded to a jury verdict that awarded Gary $4,642,190 and Pamela $550,000. Reversing and remanding for a new trial, the Court of Appeal stated: “We find support for our conclusion in ‘well-established public policy’ that settlements are favored and should be encouraged. (Birdsall v. Helfet (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 2, Aug. 11, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 558.)
Payment for Nonproductive Time in Wage/Hour Case. Labor Code § 226.2 mandates that when employees are paid on a piece-rate basis, they must also be compensated for nonproductive time. The statute carves out an exception for hybrid compensation plans, referred to as the safe harbor provision. Here, the employer paid its employees an hourly wage for “all hours” and supplemented that pay with a piece-rate-based bonus. The Ninth Circuit held the compensation plan at issue qualified as a statutory exception. (Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 12, 2025) 2025 WL 2315897.)
Conundrum in Pleading a Trade Secrets Case. How can plaintiffs plead, discover, and prove whether a trade secret has been misappropriated without giving away the trade secret? The district court struck plaintiff’s trade secrets pleading for lack of specificity. The Ninth Circuit reversed, stating: “By its terms and unlike CUTSA [California Uniform Trade Secret Act, Civ. Code § 3426 et seq.], the federal DTSA [Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836] does not require a plaintiff to identify with particularity its alleged trade secrets from the start. CUTSA’s ‘reasonable particularity’ disclosure rule is similar to the ‘sufficient particularity’ showing we require to establish ownership of a trade secret under DTSA. But whether a DTSA plaintiff has identified information that is sufficiently particular to constitute a trade secret—information that is kept secret and derives value from not being generally known—is a question of fact. So whether a plaintiff has sufficiently particularized a trade secret under DTSA is usually a matter for summary judgment or trial.” (Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech, Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 12, 2025) 2025 WL 2315671.)
Expert Testimony Based on a Differential Etiology Excluded. The district court excluded the testimony of plaintiffs’ expert in a case wherein plaintiffs alleged the herbicide Roundup caused one plaintiff’s blood cancer. To establish causation, the expert conducted a differential etiology. A differential etiology is an established scientific technique for ascertaining the cause of a medical condition. This technique is generally accomplished by first determining (ruling in) all the potential hypotheses that might explain a patient’s symptoms, and then eliminating (ruling out) potential hypotheses on the basis of a continuing examination of the evidence to reach a conclusion as to the most likely cause in that particular case. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “To meet the threshold of reliability, the expert need not purport to conclusively identify the sole cause of a medical condition. But where an expert rules out a potential cause, the expert must provide scientifically sound reasons for doing so. Here, Dr. Schneider did not assert that he was unable to rule out obesity or other possible causes. Nor did Dr. Schneider opine that he could not determine which of multiple risk factors caused the condition at issue. Instead, Dr. Schneider rejected obesity as a possible cause, but inadequately explained his reasons for doing so. Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Engilis failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Schneider’s conclusion was based on sufficient facts or data. In doing so, the court properly exercised its gatekeeping function.” (Citations omitted.) (Engilis v. Monsanto Company (9th Cir., Aug. 12, 2025) 2025 WL 2315898.)
Refusal to Resentence Veteran Found to Be an Abuse of Discretion. A military veteran suffered severe childhood abuse.Later, he began suffering flashbacks to that abuse while participating in live-fire training in the military, and tried to mask the recurring traumatic memories with drugs and alcohol. He had been sentenced to 20 years in prison for possessing a weapon and a large amount of ammunition and for being a felon in possession of both. He returned to court and requested resentencing under Penal Code § 1170.91, which the trial court denied. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he trial court’s reliance on the lack of a demonstrated nexus between Hayde’s mental disorders and his commitment offense was error. [¶] The trial court compounded this error by refusing to consider another factor that was highly relevant to the suitability question: Hayde’s exemplary rehabilitation efforts during his lengthy incarceration. [¶] . . . [¶] We conclude that, by basing its decision in part on an irrelevant factor and refusing to consider a highly relevant factor, the trial court abused its discretion by denying resentencing for Hayde.” (Citations omitted.) (People v. Hayde (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Aug. 12, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 587.)
Anti-SLAPP Protections Available to Defendant Who Discussed Gender Identity Issues with Children at Camp. After returning home from a multiday overnight science camp run by defendant and organized by their public school district, plaintiffs sued defendant and the school district for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress based, in part, on their exposure to gender identity related discussions while at the camp. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute )Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16). The Court of Appeal reversed in part, holding the trial court erred in denying the motion in its entirety, stating: “With gender identity being a topic of widespread public interest, one that even the United States Supreme Court has deemed to be ‘of profound value and concern to the public’ [ ], we conclude the activity on which some of plaintiffs’ claims are based falls within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections.” (Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Aug. 13, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616.)
Civil Code § 798.30.5 Found Not Facially Unconstitutional. Plaintiff mobilehome park owner contended Civil Code § 798.30.5, which generally limits the amount that certain mobilehome park owners may increase the gross rental rate for a tenancy annually, is facially unconstitutional. The trial court granted plaintiff’s judgment on the pleadings. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “AME has not shown that section 798.30.5 is confiscatory in all cases or in the majority of cases.” (Anaheim Mobile Estates, LLC v. State of California (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Aug. 13, 2025) 2025 WL 2335871.)
Cost of Proof Attorney Fees (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.420) Can Be Harmonized with Unilateral Elder Abuse Attorney Fees (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30). Plaintiff purchased a car from defendant sellers and later sued defendant for elder abuse (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15610.30) and violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.). The sellers prevailed on all claims at trial and then filed a motion for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 2033.420, and for cost-of-proof fees under Civil Code § 1780, subdivision(e) because plaintiff had denied requests for admissions which had to be proven at trial. The trial court held the sellers’ fee request was barred as a matter of law by Welfare and Institutions Code § 15657.5, subdivision (a), which awards fees to prevailing plaintiffs on financial elder abuse claims but not to prevailing defendants. On appeal, the sellers contend the trial court erred by finding they were precluded from obtaining cost-of-proof fees as a matter of law. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Since these statutes can be harmonized, the court erred by finding cost-of-proof fees were barred as a matter of law.” (Gamo v. Merrell (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Aug. 14, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 656.)
Some Wrongful Death Cases Against Skilled Nursing Facilities Need Not Be Arbitrated, Despite the Fact the Deceased Signed an Agreement to Arbitrate. Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, held that if a patient agreed to arbitrate medical malpractice disputes in compliance with the arbitration provision of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1295), the patient-provider agreement may bind the patient’s heirs in a wrongful death action, even if the heirs themselves never agreed to arbitration. The California Supreme Court held that Ruiz did not extend to every wrongful death claim brought a decedent’s heirs, stating: “Ruiz does not require plaintiffs to arbitrate their disputes about a facility’s neglect of a resident’s basic welfare and safety needs.” (Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. (Cal., Aug 14, 2025) 18 Cal.5th 364.)
Internet Service Provider Could Not Be Subpoenaed to Reveal Identities of Subscribers. A copyright holder successfully petitioned a federal district court clerk to issue a subpoena pursuant to § 512(h) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 512) to an internet service provider (ISP) to obtain the identities of 29 subscribers whose Internet Protocol (IP) addresses appeared to be sharing pirated copies of a movie. Upon review, the district court concluded that the ISP qualified for one of § 512’s four safe harbors—§ 512(a)—because it merely provided its users with an internet connection and played no other role in the alleged infringement. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because [the ISP’s] role in the alleged infringement was limited to that of a § 512(a) ISP, and because a § 512(h) subpoena cannot issue as a matter of law to a § 512(a), [the copyright holder’s] subpoena was invalid and the district court did not abuse its discretion when it quashed the subpoena.” (In re Subpoena of Internet Subscribers of Cox Communications, LLC (9th Cir., Aug. 15, 2025) 2025 WL 2371947.)
Defendant Consumer Reporting Agency Did Not Violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act Negligently or Willfully. Plaintiff appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant on her Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. § 168; FCRA) claim, alleging that defendant violated the FCRA by disclosing, as part of a background check, that: (1) she is excluded from participating in federally funded health care programs; and (2) the reason for her exclusion is that her nursing license was revoked in 2011. She alleged that defendant’s disclosure of both pieces of information violated a catchall provision of the FCRA that prohibits a “consumer reporting agency” from disclosing in a “consumer report . . . [a]ny . . . adverse item of information, other than records of convictions of crimes[,] which antedates the report by more than seven years. The district court granted summary judgment for defendant, concluding that defendant did not violate the FCRA and alternatively, if it did, it did not do so negligently or willfully and therefore was not liable. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We conclude that [defendant] violated the FCRA, but we affirm the district court’s decision because [defendant] did not do so negligently or willfully.” (Grijalva v. ADP Screening & Selection Services Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 15, 2025) 2025 WL 2371946.)
Trial Court’s Denial of Criminal Defendant’s Request for Mental Health Diversion Vacated by Writ. The trial court denied a criminal defendant’s request to enter mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code § 1001.36 on three grounds. First, the court found defendant ineligible for diversion because the prosecution rebutted the presumption that her mental health disorders were a significant factor in the commission of the robbery. Second, the court found defendant unsuitable for diversion because she posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community. Finally, the court exercised its residual discretion to deny the motion, even assuming defendant satisfied the eligibility and suitability criteria, based on the nature of the offense and the injuries sustained by the victim. Concluding the trial court abused its discretion, the Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ, finding that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s findings, and the trial court’s exercise of its residual discretion to deny the diversion request was inconsistent with the principles and purposes of the diversion statute. (Gomez v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Aug. 15, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671.)
The Age Act Does Not Apply to University of California San Francisco’s Refusal to Admit Medical Doctor into a Residency Program. The sole claim at issue on appeal asserted violations of the Age Act. The Age Act states that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” (42 U.S.C. § 6102; 42 U.S.C. § 6104(e)(1).) Plaintiff graduated from UCSF’s medical school in 2021. At the time of his graduation, plaintiff was 36 years old. While plaintiff was in medical school, plaintiff was purportedly subject to two instances of harassment based upon his age. Plaintiff reported both incidents to the school, but it declined to investigate. Later, Plaintiff was not accepted into any medical residency program, either at UCSF or elsewhere. In this action, plaintiff contended that UCSF’s refusal to accept him into its neurological surgery residency program was the product of age-based discrimination and retaliation. The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment in its entirety. Noting that defendants offered evidence establishing non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for this independent conduct that plaintiff failed to refute, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating: “[T]he Age Act does not apply to UCSF’s refusal to admit plaintiff to its medical residency program.” (Spatz v. Regents of University of California (9th Cir., Aug. 18, 2025) 2025 WL 2384062.)
1977 Contract Concerning Song Royalties Not Terminable at Will. Former members of the rock band Supertramp brought this breach of contract action against their former bandmates over royalties under a 1977 agreement. After a jury trial, the district court ruled defendants were legally entitled to unilaterally terminate the agreement after a “reasonable time” because the contract contains no express duration nor was there evidence of an implied duration. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We thus conclude that the parties’ predispute, postcontracting behavior is, when considered along with the nature and circumstances of the contract, consistent with a mutual understanding that the 1977 Agreement was not terminable at will.” (Thomson v. Hodgson (9th Cir., Aug. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 2406526.)
Tongue and Done Slogan Does Not Amount to Securities Fraud. Defendant pharmaceutical company marketed its under-the-tongue opioid with the slogan “Tongue and Done” in advertisement displays and in a speech at an investor conference. Several shareholders sued alleging that the slogan misled investors because administering the opioid drug is more complex than just “Tongue and Done” and thus its potential market would be more limited. The district court dismissed this securities fraud lawsuit because plaintiffs failed to adequately plead falsity under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “A reasonable investor would not blindly accept a slogan without considering other information—in the advertising and the speech as well as in SEC disclosures— that clarified the context of “Tongue and Done.” (Sneed v. Talphera, Inc. (9th Cir., Aug. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 2406424.)
No Birthright Citizenship. Plaintiff was born in New York City in 1950, while his father, a native of Nicaragua, worked for Nicaragua’s permanent mission to the United Nations. Five times plaintiff subscribed the oath of allegiance, and five times the government issued him a passport. Recently, a federal district court found the U.S. government was wrong all along because plaintiff’s father served as an attaché, not a consul, when plaintiff was born. Unlike a consul, an attaché and his family possess full diplomatic immunity. So, the government asserted, plaintiff was not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. Therefore, he was not a birthright citizen. The government revoked plaintiff’s passport and told him he “did not acquire U.S. citizenship by virtue of [his] birth here.” The district court entered judgment denying plaintiff birthright citizenship. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit Court stated: “Formality is a virtue of birthright citizenship. It requires no inquiry into lineage but is ‘restricted only by place and jurisdiction.’ [ ] Yet when circumstances leave a person immune from the jurisdiction of the United States at birth, this same formality requires a court to ‘give full effect’ to that restriction.” (Moncada v. Rubio (9th Cir., Aug. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 2406425.)
Elderly Plaintiff Accused Retirement Home of Illegally Recovering Attorney Fees by Raising Fees to Live in a Retirement Community. The bottom line in this complicated case is that the owners of a retirement community have been sued in a class action. Plaintiff contended that in violation of several statutes, primarily the Elder Abuse Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.), which prohibits prevailing party attorney fees to prevailing defendants, but not to prevailing plaintiffs, the owners raised fees for the elderly residents to cover its anticipated defense fees in defending lawsuits against the owners. In the trial court, plaintiff successfully moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the increases to the extent they included the owner’s defense costs in this litigation. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude that the increases do not constitute a recovery of attorneys’ fees in violation of the litigation fee-shifting statutes on which Johnson relies.” (Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC LLC (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Aug. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 2399559.)
Permanent Injunction Over Keeping Dogs on Property Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part. Plaintiff is a local Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA). Plaintiff sued defendant for various matters, including having too many dogs on her premises, and several other violations of the Vallejo Municipal Code. The trial court granted judgment for plaintiff and also ordered a permanent injunction against defendant. On appeal, defendant challenged the permanent injunction as overbroad and unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal affirmed most of the injunction, but reversed with regard to the humane surrender provision. That provision enjoined defendant from “refusing to humanely surrender any dogs in excess of four that [d]efendant owns, drives, keeps, possesses, or has charge or custody over in violation of this injunction.” As to that provision, the appeals court stated: “[W]e conclude defendant is constitutionally entitled to receive notice and some form of hearing before being deprived of her canine property.” (Caru Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Anthony (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Aug. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 2407062.)
Federal Research Grants to Continue. Plaintiffs are six researchers at the University of California who applied for and received multi-year federal research grants from three agencies: the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Science Foundation, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. The agencies terminated the grants pursuant to certain executive orders. The district court issued a class-wide preliminary injunction ordering the three agencies to reinstate the research grants. The government appealed and moved for a partial stay pending appeal of the preliminary injunction. Finding the government failed to meet its burden, the Ninth Circuit denied its motion for a partial stay of the injunction. (Thakur v. Trump (9th Cir., Aug. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 1734471.)
California Supreme Court Clarified Two Wage/Hour Issues. This case addresses two issues concerning the rights of California workers whose employers fail to pay them the minimum wage or provide them paid sick leave benefits. The first issue relates to the good faith defense to the default rule that employees who prove minimum wage violations are entitled to liquidated damages under Labor Code § 1194.2. California’s high court held: “We hold that to establish the good faith defense, an employer must show that it made a reasonable attempt to determine the requirements of the law governing minimum wages; proof that the employer was ignorant of the law is insufficient.” The second issue relates to the process for raising claims under the Healthy Workplaces, Healthy Families Act of 2014 (Lab. Code, § 245 et seq.). The high court held: “Specifically, we must determine whether a court may consider a Paid Sick Leave law claim that an employee raises in the context of their employer’s appeal to the superior court of a Labor Commissioner ruling. (§ 98.2, subd. (a).) We hold that a court may do so.” (Iloff v. LaPaille (Cal., Aug.21, 2025) 2025 WL 2414467.)
Judge Not Eligible to Be Public Defender. In 2023, while a sitting judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, plaintiff applied to be appointed as the next public defender. He also filed this action asking for declaratory relief concerning a statute he contended is ambiguous. Government Code § 27701 provides: “A person is not eligible to the office of public defender unless he has been a practicing attorney in all of the courts of the State for at least the year preceding the date of his election or appointment.” The trial court held the statute was unambiguous. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “In sum, the trial court did not err in determining section 27701 restricts eligibility for the office of public defender to those who have been a practicing attorney in all courts of the State for at least the one year immediately before their election or appointment to the office.” (Washington v. County of San Diego (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Aug. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 2416450.)
Grandparents Lose Petition for Visitation. The father of two small children died during the pandemic. The father’s parents (the children’s grandparents) filed a petition requesting regular visitation with the children pursuant to Family Code § 3102. The family court filed its statement of decision granting grandparents’ petition. The Court of Appeal discussed the holding in Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57: “The Troxel court established three key constitutional requirements that apply when courts consider overriding a fit parent’s visitation decisions: First, courts must presume fit parents act in their children’s best interests. Second, courts must give ‘special weight’ to the surviving parent’s determination of the child’s best interests rather than placing the burden on the parent to justify his or her decisions. And third, courts must consider whether the parent has offered ‘meaningful visitation’ rather than denying contact altogether.” Reversing, the appeals court stated: “The record contains no substantial evidence from which the trial court could reasonably infer that, in the absence of a court order, Felicia would deny Grandparents reasonable visitation to the detriment of the children.” (Citations omitted.) (Balandran v. Balandran (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Aug. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 2416708.)
Manufacturer Prevailed in Asbestos Case. After being diagnosed with lung cancer, plaintiff and his wife sued defendant, alleging that his cancer was caused by dust created when he cut defendant’s asbestos cement pipe with a power saw in the 1980s. A jury found for defendant. The jury specifically found for the manufacturer on its sophisticated user defense. With regard to plaintiff’s argument on appeal that the trial court erred in permitting defendant to offer evidence of the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal-OSHA) regulations in place during the time plaintiff was working with the pipe, the appeals court held plaintiff waived this claim by failing to provide the appropriate legal standard of review and cogent argument explaining how he was prejudiced by this evidence. (Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Aug. 25, 2025) 2025 WL 2437402.)
University Revoked Graduate’s Bachelor’s Degree. Boise State University revoked plaintiff’s bachelor’s degree in social work after the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, which hosted plaintiff for an internship, informed the university that she used a state database to view a third party’s confidential information without permission. Plaintiff sued the university and others for violating her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. She sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and money damages. Finding plaintiff was afforded due process and that she lacked a property interest in her degree, the district court dismissed the action. The Ninth Circuit Court held: “We hold that Dudley’s BSU-issued college degree is a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and that BSU failed to afford Dudley adequate process before depriving her of that interest. However, because it was not clearly established that Dudley had a property interest in her college degree or any entitlement to certain procedural protections, we hold that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Dudley’s substantive due process claim seeking monetary damages. Finally, we dismiss Dudley’s appeal of the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.” (Dudley v. Boise State University (9th Cir., Aug. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 2462966.)
Alleged Copyright Infringement Involving a Music Composition. In a copyright infringement case, Plaintiff alleged that defendant copied his liturgical work, “Emmanuel,” in her own Christian music composition, “Christ Be Our Light.” The district court granted summary judgment for defendant and her publisher on the basis that plaintiff could show neither access nor striking similarity. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e hold that the district court erred by granting summary judgment to Defendants because there are triable issues of fact as to whether there is a reasonable possibility [defendant] had access to ‘Emmanuel’ before she wrote ‘Christ Be Our Light’ and whether the works are substantially or strikingly similar.” (Ambrosetti v. Oregon Catholic Press (9th Cir., Aug. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 2460952.)
Defendant Did Not Call Attention to Online Arbitration Agreement. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff had purchased items online. There was a hyperlink in gray font below the button plaintiff clicked to complete her transaction that stated: “BY CLICKING SUBMIT YOUR ORDER, YOU ARE AGREEING TO OUR TERMS OF USE AND PRIVACY POLICY.” The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that defendant failed to call plaintiff’s attention to an arbitration agreement. (Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Aug. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 2462710.)
Elimination of Governmental Claim Requirement for Childhood Sexual Abuse Did Not Violate Gift Clause of the California Constitution. The complaint, filed in 2021, alleged that while plaintiff was an eighth grader starting in 2003, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a teacher. The school district’s motion for summary judgment was granted because plaintiff did not timely file a governmental claim. Reversing, the Court of Appeal held that when A.B. 218 amended Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 to eliminate the requirement for a governmental claim for childhood sexual abuse, it did not violate the gift clause of the California Constitution. (O.B. v. Los Angeles Unified School District (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Aug. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 2462706.)
Class Action Plaintiff Waived Damages to Try to Avoid Removal to Federal Court. To avoid removal of his putative class action to federal court, plaintiff sought only equitable relief, specifically equitable restitution, but not the legal remedy of damages. When defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d) and 1453), plaintiff moved to remand based on the federal court’s lack of “equitable jurisdiction,” a doctrine that precludes federal courts from granting equitable relief when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. The district court granted plaintiff’s motion to remand back to state court. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We vacate the district court’s order remanding this case to state court and remand to the district court to permit the defendant to waive the adequate-remedy-at-law objection, as it sought to do below.” (Ruiz v. The Bradford Exchange, Ltd. (9th Cir., Aug. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 2473007.)
No Federal Enclave Jurisdiction in Class Action Over Military Housing. Plaintiffs rented military housing within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado. During their lease, they dealt with water-intrusion and mold contamination issues that allegedly damaged their personal property and impacted their health. According to plaintiffs, defendants San Diego Family Housing, a public-private venture created by federal statute, and Lincoln Military Property Management, the property manager, were aware of these issues and did not adequately remediate the problem. Plaintiffs filed the instant action in state court asserting negligence and other state law claims. Defendants removed the action to federal court on the basis of federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. After assessing each of these grounds for removal, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the action and remanded to state court. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Federal enclave jurisdiction is dependent on the federal government’s exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he district court correctly determined that Defendants have not carried their burden in demonstrating federal enclave jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or federal officer or agency jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).” (Childs v. San Diego Family Housing, LLC (9th Cir., Aug. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 2473003.)
“He Who Represents Himself Has a Fool for a Client,” Abraham Lincoln. A default judgment was entered against defendant as a termination sanction based on his noncompliance with his obligations under the discovery statutes. Defendant represented himself in the trial court, and, as his appellate counsel admits, “[d]uring discovery this often meant he was his own worst enemy.” Plaintiff filed a total of nine motions to compel discovery responses and for discovery sanctions. The trial court, in a series of orders initially declined to impose sanctions and gave defendant multiple extensions of time to respond; then issued several orders imposing monetary sanctions and setting compliance deadlines; then, finding that defendant’s continued noncompliance was willful, imposed issue sanctions, and finally terminating sanctions. Defendant appealed from the default judgment resulting from the terminating sanction. He argued that imposing this “doomsday” sanction was an abuse of discretion because his written discovery responses—while imperfect—were in substantial compliance, and that he had made “substantially justified” objections to deposition questions and interrogatories. He argued that the trial court used an incorrect legal standard in imposing sanctions. Defendant also contended that, prior to the default prove-up hearing, he did not have proper notice of potential damages because plaintiff did not provide a statement of damages under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.11; that the trial court erred in disregarding his payment of back taxes and allowing plaintiff to stay in the property in calculating damages; and erred in awarding emotional distress damages. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We find no merit in defendant’s claims and affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.” (Atlas v. Davidyan (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Aug. 29, 225) 2025 WL 2490272.)
Coastal Program Not Unconstitutional. Plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s judgment denying their petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. They challenged a new provision in the County of Marin’s amended local coastal program that allows owners of certain farm lands to build additional residential units so long as the property owner records a restrictive covenant in favor of the county that states the owner of the new units will be actively and directly engaged in agriculture, which is defined as being directly engaged in commercial agriculture or leasing the property to a commercial agricultural producer. Plaintiffs contended this provision is facially unconstitutional because it does not satisfy the nexus and proportionality requirements of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) 483 U.S. 825, and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, and violates their substantive due process rights under the state and federal constitutions not to work in a specific occupation. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude, contrary to the trial court, that the Benedettis may raise a facial Nollan/Dolan claim. But we agree with the trial court that they have failed to show the provision is unconstitutional, so we affirm the judgment.” (Benedetti v. County of Marin (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Aug. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 2490638.)
Former Military Housing Still Subject to Rent Control. A developer purchased property in Alameda known as Admirals Cove from the United States Navy, and improved it by rehabilitating 150 residential units on the property that previously had been used as housing for military personnel and their families. At issue here was whether the renovated residential units are subject to the City of Alameda’s Rent Control Ordinance (Alameda Mun. Code, ch. VI, art. XV, § 6-58.10 et seq.). The developer and now landlord argued the units are exempt from local rent control under the Costa-Hawkins Rental Housing Act (Civ. Code, § 1954.50 et seq.). The City of Alameda and its rent program director disagreed that the residential units at issue here were exempt, pointing to the fact the units had been used as living accommodations for military personnel before the current certificate of occupancy issued. The rent program director determined that the units had only been converted from one form of residential use to another and did not represent an expansion of the housing stock. An administrative hearing officer upheld the director’s determination. The trial court, however, granted the developer/landlord’s petition for writ relief, finding that the exemption from local rent control applied and that the improved units “effectively qualifie[d] as new residential housing stock.” Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude that, under NCR Properties, LLC v. City of Berkeley (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 39 (NCR Properties) and Burien, LLC v. Wiley (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1039 (Burien), the exemption from local rent control set forth in section 1954.52, subdivision (a)(1) (section 1954.52(a)(1)) does not apply here in light of the prior residential use of the Admirals Cove property.” (CP VI Admirals Cove, LLC v. City of Alameda (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Aug. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 2490645.)
Summary Judgment in Favor of School District for Alleged Sexual Assault at Camp Reversed. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted when she was a fifth grader at a camp at which the school district provided direct overnight supervision and helped run the program. The trial court granted summary judgment for the school district. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “As a general rule, this liability for student welfare does not extend beyond the school grounds. But when the district undertakes certain activities off school grounds or specifically assumes responsibility, it may be liable or responsible for student safety if the student ‘is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision’ of a district employee.” (Citation omitted.) (Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School District (Cal. App. 6th Dist., Aug. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 2491064.)