Litigation
Litigation Update: October 2025
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates:
- Despite Plaintiffs’ Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs, Employer Could Not Accommodate Employees’ Requests to Be Exempted From Vaccine Mandate.
- Burden of Proof for Military Diversion Clarified.
- Pecuniary Harm to Investors Not Necessary for Court to Order Disgorgement for Securities Fraud.
- First Amendment Challenge to County Ordinance.
- Plaintiff Should Have Been Given Accommodation for His PTSD.
- A Limited Liability Company May Not Agree to Waive Its Right to Seek Judicial Dissolution.
- Cities’ Challenge of Law Permitting Construction of Up to Four Housing Units on Urban Lots Previously Zoned for One Single-family Residence Rejected.
- Sanctions and More Sanctions Against Attorney.
- Retailer Claims Labor Union’s Sales on Its Website Cause Consumer Confusion and Dilute Retailer’s Trademark.
- Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Permitted Remand of Case Back to State Court.
- Police Were Not in Hot Pursuit When Plaintiffs’ Dogs Were Shot While Police Came Into Their Backyard Searching for a Suspect.
- Insurance Company Has No Duty to Refund Premiums Paid During the Pandemic.
- Protecting Our Kids From Social Media Addiction Act.
- Elimination of Governmental Claim Requirement for Childhood Sexual Abuse Did Not Violate Gift Clause of California Constitution.
- Government Trail Immunity Does Not Apply to a Bike Lane.
- Employer Not Responsible for Coworker’s Conduct Toward Plaintiff Outside the Workplace but May Be Responsible for Other Feha Violations.
- Criminal Defendant Not Entitled to Discovery for Selective Enforcement.
- False Claims Action Dismissed Because Relator Was Not the Original Source of the Information Reversed.
- Charter Schools Are Not Violating Free Exercise Clause in Not Permitting Religious Study Programs.
- Judgment for Defendant in Vicarious Copyright Infringement Action Reversed.
- The City of Huntington Beach Claims Home Rule.
- Class Action Certification Denied Because Individual Questions Predominated.
- Sanctions Against Lawyer and Report to the State Bar for Citing Fake Cases.
- Highest Bidder at Trustee’s Sale Didn’t Get the Property.
- Under Penal Code § 1001.80, the Court Should Consider Whether a Defendant is Both Eligible and Suitable for Military Diversion.
- Having to Pay the Other Side’s Attorney Fees Can Be the Cost of Fighting Hard.
- Secretary of Homeland Security Arbitrary and Capricious in Terminating Temporary Protected Status of Venezuelans.
- Kaiser Failed to Meet Its Prima Facie Burden in Petition to Compel Arbitration.
- Stay Granted in Order to Reinstate Federal Trade Commissioner.
- Delayed Accrual of Realization of Injury and Statute of Limitations.
- Religious Discrimination Claim Over Employer’s Requirements During the Pandemic Tossed.
- Regents Not Strictly Liable for Breach of Confidential Patient Information.
- Denial of Alter Ego Finding Reversed and Remanded.
- No Subject Matter Jurisdiction for Federal Court.
- Attempted End Run Around Work Comp Laws by Doctor Convicted of Accepting Kickbacks Thwarted.
- Baby to Be Adopted Despite Opposition of Biological Father.
- Co-defendant With Adverse Interest Has Standing to Oppose Summary Judgment of Co-defendant.
- Right to Remain Polygraph Free.
- A Chemical Company and an Insurance Company Walk Into a Courtroom . . .
- Wage and Hour Labor Law Found Not to Apply to Charter Cities.
- Disruption of Proceedings and the Brown Act.
- The Faaaa’s Public Safety Exception Found Not to Apply.
Despite Plaintiffs’ Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs, Employer Could Not Accommodate Employees’ Requests to be Exempted from Vaccine Mandate. In August 2021, Washington State’s governor issued a proclamation requiring all healthcare providers to be vaccinated against COVID-19. In response, defendant Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (SRFR) issued a vaccine mandate to its firefighters but allowed them to request accommodations based on their sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs, eight SRFR firefighters, did just that. SRFR ultimately denied these requests because it was unable to identify a reasonable accommodation that would allow firefighters to remain in their roles without imposing an undue hardship on SRFR. Plaintiffs sued under both federal and state law, arguing that SRFR failed to accommodate their religious beliefs. The district court granted summary judgment for SRFR. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e conclude that SRFR could not ‘reasonably accommodate’ Plaintiffs’ proposed accommodation ‘without undue hardship on the conduct of’ its business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j).” (Petersen v. Snohomish Regional Fire and Rescue (9th Cir., Sept. 2, 2025) 150 F.4th 1211.)
Burden of Proof for Military Diversion Clarified. A criminal defendant, who is also a military veteran, was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence. He requested to be diverted from prosecution pursuant to the military diversion statute, Penal Code § 1001.80. The trial court denied his request and he sought extraordinary relief in the Court of Appeal. Issuing a writ of mandate, the appeals court stated: “[I]t appears the court erred by requiring Segura to show a relationship (a ‘nexus’) between his qualifying condition (‘alcohol abuse’) and the commission of the offenses (‘the incident’). Further, we are uncertain what burden of proof the trial court applied. [¶] . . . the person only has the burden to show that he or she ‘may be suffering from [a qualifying condition] as a result of their military service.’ . . . [¶] We hold that the Legislature’s choice of the word ‘may’ was intentional and means a defendant has the burden to show a reasonable possibility that he or she is suffering from a qualifying condition as a result of their military service.” (Segura v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Sept. 2, 2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1242.)
Pecuniary Harm to Investors Not necessary for Court to Order Disgorgement for Securities Fraud. In a civil enforcement action, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought, and the district court granted, a disgorgement award against defendant under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) and (d)(7). On appeal, defendant contended the lower court abused its discretion by ordering disgorgement because the SEC failed to show that the investors defrauded by his actions suffered pecuniary harm. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e hold that an award of disgorgement does not require a showing that investors experienced pecuniary harm.” (United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Sripetch (9th Cir., Sept. 3, 2025) 2025 WL 2525848.)
First Amendment Challenge to County Ordinance. Plaintiff is a reporter for a nonprofit journalism platform who covers road safety, transportation, and public health topics. He reports on sideshows, which are events where drivers take over city intersections with their cars as they skid in circles while performing stunts. He relies on photographs, as well as video and audio recordings, to gather news and information and keep the public informed. The County of Alameda adopted an ordinance prohibiting any person from knowingly spectating a sideshow event conducted on a public street or highway from within 200 feet of that event. Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting that the ordinance violates the First Amendment facially and as applied to his reporting activities. The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the First Amendment did not apply to his newsgathering and reporting activities. Reversing and ordering the lower court to enter a preliminary injunction in plaintiff’s favor, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The First Amendment protects Garcia’s newsgathering and reporting activities. And the County’s prohibition on knowingly spectating a sideshow is content based and fails strict scrutiny. [¶] . . . [¶] Garcia is likely to prevail on his as-applied challenge to the County’s prohibition on knowingly spectating sideshows.” (Garcia v. County of Alameda (9th Cir., Sept. 4, 2025) 150 F.4th 1224.)
Plaintiff Should Have Been Given Accommodation for His PTSD. Plaintiff worked as a civilian for a federal agency for 30 years. He alleged in his complaint that he developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) during his deployment in Iraq as a member of the National Guard. He alleged that his PTSD, among other impairments, made it difficult and burdensome for him to complete his work tasks without a reasonable accommodation, and that he is a handicapped person within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.). The district court concluded plaintiff’s claims were time-barred and entered judgment against him, concluding the claim had to be filed within 90 days of receipt of the final agency decision. Applying equitable tolling, the Ninth Circuit reversed. (Asuncion v. Hegseth (9th. Cir., Sept. 4, 2025) 150 F.4th 1252.)
A Limited Liability Company May Not Agree to Waive Its Right to Seek Judicial Dissolution. One owner of a business filed an action seeking to dissolve an LLC. The other owner filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. The cross-complaint was the subject of this appeal. The LLC’s operating agreement included a provision stating: “Each of the members hereby agrees not to take any other voluntary action that would cause the LLC to dissolve, notwithstanding any provision of the [Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Company Act] to the contrary.” The trial court granted plaintiff/cross-defendant’s special motion to strike the cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “A so-called SLAPP suit is subject to dismissal unless the plaintiff or cross-complainant can demonstrate there is probability it will prevail on the challenged claims; in this case, resolution of that issue depends on whether a limited liability company’s members may agree to waive their right to seek judicial dissolution in certain statutorily defined circumstances. We conclude they may not.” (Meads v. Driggers (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Sept. 4, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 28.)
Cities’ Challenge of Law Permitting Construction of Up to Four Housing Units on Urban Lots Previously Zoned for One Single-Family Residence Rejected. In 2021, the Legislature enacted, and the Governor approved Senate Bill No. 9 (Gov. Code, § 65852.21, subd. (a)), which statute allows the construction of up to four housing units on urban lots previously zoned for one single-family residence, and restricts the ability of local agencies to limit such development. Four cities challenged the constitutionality of S.B. 9, alleging it violates the California Constitution because it usurps a city’s authority over its own municipal affairs. The cities further alleged that S.B. 9 is not reasonably related to its stated goal of ensuring access to affordable housing, because it does not require the subdivided lots or additional housing units to meet any affordability standards. The trial court entered judgment for the State of California. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Our analysis begins and largely ends with appellants’ status as general law cities. . . . [E]ven when a general law city ‘regulates in an area over which it traditionally has exercised control, such as the location of particular land uses,’ any ‘local legislation that conflicts with state law is void.’” (City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. State (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 4, Sept. 4, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 13.)
Sanctions and More Sanctions Against Attorney. Plaintiff sued a city for injuries he suffered when he fell after a scooter he was riding struck a pothole. The city sought discovery about plaintiff’s level of intoxication during the incident. Ultimately, the trial court imposed two discovery sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel—$6,500 for the city’s motion to compel responses to form interrogatories, and $1,500 for conduct related to an independent medical examination. The parties settled the action, but plaintiff appealed the sanctions. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e conclude Morales’s appeal is objectively and subjectively frivolous. “We also grant the City’s motion for appellate sanctions against Morales’s counsel for filing a frivolous appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(1).)” (Morales v. City and County of San Francisco (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Sept. 4, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 43.)
Retailer Claims Labor Union’s Sales on Its Website Cause Consumer Confusion and Dilute Retailer’s Trademark. Trader Joe’s Company sued Trader Joe’s United (TJU), a labor union that represents some of its employees, alleging that TJU sells products that infringe on Trader Joe’s federally registered trademarks. TJU operates a website where it markets and sells apparel, mugs, buttons, and reusable tote bags. Some of TJU’s items allegedly use the Trader Joe’s trademark, including the distinctive typed word mark, unique red coloring, capitalized lettering, and similar style of font. Trader Joe’s contended that TJU’s items are likely to cause consumer confusion and dilute its trademarks. The district court granted TJU’s motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Trader Joe’s, the district court erred when applying the fact-specific likelihood-of-confusion test articulated in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).” (Trader Joe’s Company v. Trader Joe’s United (9th Cir., Sept. 8, 2025) 150 F.4th 1040.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Permitted Remand of Case Back to State Court. Plaintiff, acting through county counsel, alleged statutory and common law public nuisance causes of action relating to the opioid epidemic in Los Angeles County. Defendants removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), the federal officer removal statute, contending their business dealings with various United States agencies should enable removal. Plaintiff amended its complaint in federal court to add a comprehensive disclaimer, explicitly narrowing the claims to defendants’ conduct related to the non-federal market and only seeking relief for the same. After determining that the explicit disclaimer eliminated defendants’ ground for removal, the district court remanded the case. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The district court correctly determined that Plaintiff, as master of its complaint, validly eliminated all bases for federal jurisdiction through its disclaimer.” (California by and through Harrison v. Express Scripts, Inc. (9th Cir., Sept. 8, 2025) 2025 WL 2586648.)
Police Were Not in Hot Pursuit When Plaintiffs’ Dogs Were Shot While Police Came into Their Backyard Searching for a Suspect. A police officer saw a suspect flee from the back of a house into a neighboring backyard. Instead of directly following the suspect, the officer hurried to his car, called for backup, and drove two blocks south to establish a perimeter around the area. At least eighteen minutes passed before a K-9 unit alerted in the direction of plaintiffs’ backyard, several houses away from where the suspect had disappeared. An officer with a K-9 searched the yard, rousing plaintiffs’ three dogs. Two of the dogs attacked the police K-9 and an officer shot and the dogs. The dogs’ owners sued the police, and the district court judge granted summary judgment for the defendants. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We reverse, in part, holding that there is no hot pursuit where officers lose track of a suspect for eighteen minutes.” (Jones v. City of North Las Vegas (9th Cir., Sept. 8, 2025) 150 F.4th 1030.)
Insurance Company Has No Duty to Refund Premiums Paid During the Pandemic. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against defendant insurance exchange, claiming that automobile insurance rates became excessive during the COVID-19 pandemic when there was less driving and fewer traffic accidents. They alleged that defendant had a statutory obligation to refund premiums paid during that period, even though the premiums were collected under rates previously approved by the insurance commissioner. The trial court ruled that defendant had no such obligation, and it sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The central question in this appeal is whether [Insurance Code] section 1861.05(a) imposes an independent obligation on insurers to refund premiums that were collected under approved rates when those rates later become purportedly excessive. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]he plain language of section 1861.01(c), requiring that rates ‘be approved by the commissioner prior to their use,’ affirmatively permitted CSAA to charge approved rates.” (Davis v. CSAA Insurance Exchange (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 1, Sept. 8, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 121.)
Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act. NetChoice is an internet trade association. NetChoice brought this action, contending the Protecting Our Kids from Social Media Addiction Act (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 27000–27007), which addresses concerns youths are becoming addicted to the internet, is unconstitutional. Without parental consent, the act (1) restricts minors’ access to algorithmic feeds through its personalized-feeds provisions; and (2) restricts certain platform design features through its default-settings provisions. The district court preliminarily enjoined some provisions of the act, but largely left the law in place. Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because we conclude that NetChoice has shown a likelihood of success on the merits regarding this provision [the like-count default setting], and because the district court has already found for NetChoice on the remaining injunction factors, we direct the district court to modify its injunction. In all other respects, we affirm the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.” (NetChoice, LLC v. Bonta (9th Cir., Sept. 9, 2025) 2025 WL 2600007.)
Elimination of Governmental Claim Requirement for Childhood Sexual Abuse Did Not Violate Gift Clause of California Constitution. According to the complaint, “[f]rom approximately 1965 to 1969,” when Doe R.L. was “merely seven (7) to eleven (11) years old,” he “was continuously sexually assaulted by his principal” “throughout his elementary school years.” In 2019, the Legislature revived childhood sexual abuse claims for which the statute of limitations had run by amending Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1. Here, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s action against the school district for failure to comply with the Government Claims Act, specifically its claim presentation requirement set forth in Code of Civil Procedure §§ 905, 911.2 and 945.4. On appeal the school district contended that even if the Legislature waived the claim presentation requirement, that retroactive waiver violated article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution, more commonly known as the gift clause. Reversing, the Court of Appeal concluded there was no violation of the Government Claims Act and stated: “[W]aiver of the Government Claims Act’s claim presentation requirement for Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 claims does not violate the gift clause and reverse the judgment of dismissal.” (Doe R.L. v. Merced City School District (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Sept. 8, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 89.)
Government Trail Immunity Does Not Apply to a Bike Lane. Plaintiff crashed his bike while moving into the roadway to skirt debris and gravel obscuring the bike lane. He sued the city, alleging that a dangerous condition of public property caused his accident. Granting summary judgment for the city, the trial court discerned a triable issue of material fact on the existence of a dangerous condition in the bike lane, but reasoned that plaintiff’s claim failed as a matter of law because he entered the vehicle lane before he fell and could not say precisely why he fell. The court also ruled that Government Code § 831.4, subdivision (b) immunized the city from suit because its “trail immunity” applied to the bike lane. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e hold that section 831.4, subdivision (b) does not apply to a bike lane, or Class II bikeway (see Sts. & Hy. Code, § 890.4, subd. (b)), on a city street or highway.” (Hu v. City of San José (Cal. App. 6th Dist., Sept. 8, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 149.)
Employer Not Responsible for Coworker’s Conduct Toward Plaintiff Outside the Workplace BUT May Be Responsible for Other FEHA Violations. A coworker at plaintiff’s job allegedly subjected him to crude sexual advances at his home and via his personal cell phone away from defendant employer’s premises. When plaintiff reported the conduct to defendant’s acting program director and a human resources representative, he was told there was nothing that could be done, ostensibly because it occurred off property. The HR representative thereafter made a social media post plaintiff understood to be mocking him, and she made a sarcastic comment to him about the harassment. Plaintiff resigned a week later. He filed suit alleging several claims, including for harassment, discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA). The trial court dismissed plaintiff’s second amended complaint with prejudice and without leave to amend. Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Court of Appeal stated: “[A]lthough [the] alleged conduct was reprehensible, it was not sufficiently work related within the ambit of FEHA, and it did not recur inside the workplace. . . . Nevertheless, the sexual harassment hostile work environment claim is viable based on a theory that [the employer’s] response to plaintiff’s complaint about [the coworker’s] conduct altered plaintiff’s work environment in an objectively severe manner. Plaintiff’s claim for failure to prevent harassment, discrimination or retaliation under section 12940, subdivision (k) (§ 12940(k)) is dependent upon a viable claim for harassment, discrimination or retaliation; because plaintiff’s underlying claim for sexual harassment is viable, plaintiff’s section 12940(k) claim is also cognizable.” (Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc. (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Sept. 8, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 200.)
Criminal Defendant Not Entitled to Discovery for Selective Enforcement. A criminal defendant used Instagram to offer his services as a pimp to a person he believed to be a 16-year-old girl. In reality, he was communicating with an undercover officer. As a result of the online sting operation, defendant was arrested, charged, and convicted of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted sexual enticement of a minor pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a) and (b)(2) and 2422(b). Before trial, defendant, who is Black, unsuccessfully sought discovery to pursue a selective enforcement claim based on race discrimination. Affirming the lower court’s orders and the judgment, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Green’s discovery requests, given that he relied on an unreliably small sample size of past cases to claim selective enforcement.”(United States of America v. Green (9th Cir., Sept. 10, 2025) 2025 WL 2609721.)
False Claims Action Dismissed Because Relator Was Not the Original Source of the Information Reversed. A relator alleged violation of the False Claims Act pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 3729, arising from a three-way compensation arrangement involving the sale of implanted cardiac devices paid for by Medicare and other public health insurance programs. The complaint alleged that the manufacturer of cardiac rhythm devices, hired Brian Goodman as a sales representative because his brother, Dr. Jeffrey Goodman, was then implanting an extremely high volume of cardiac devices at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles. According to the complaint, Brian recommended Biotronik devices to his brother, who implanted the devices at Cedars-Sinai; Cedars-Sinai billed federal public health insurance programs for the devices; and Biotronik paid Brian a kickback/commission on each sale. The district court dismissed the action pursuant to the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar because the New York Times had already reported that Biotronik used various financial incentives to encourage physicians to use its cardiac rhythm management devices rather than devices sold by Biotronik’s competitors. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The New York Times article reported that Biotronik aggressively sought to sell more of its CRM devices by providing significant financial incentives to doctors who prescribe them, and to doctors who referred patients to other doctors who prescribed them, but the specific strategies the article described differ markedly from those alleged in the operative complaint.” (United States ex rel. Sam Jones Company, LLC v. Biotronik, Inc. (9th Cir., Sept. 10, 2025) 2025 WL 2609850.)
Charter Schools Are Not Violating Free Exercise Clause in Not Permitting Religious Study Programs. Plaintiffs in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action are parents and guardians of students enrolled in independent study programs at two California charter schools who requested that the schools purchase and permit the use of sectarian curricular materials for instruction in the programs. The schools rejected those requests because California law provides that “sectarian or denominational doctrine” shall not “be taught, or instruction thereon be permitted, directly or indirectly, in any of the common schools of this State,” (Cal. Const. art. IX, § 8), and that “a charter school shall be nonsectarian in its programs,” (Educ. Code, § 47605, subd. (e)(1)). Plaintiffs claimed that the rejection of their request pursuant to those laws violated the free exercise and free speech clauses of the First Amendment. The district court dismissed the operative complaint for failure to state a claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The extensive legal requirements applicable to the defendant charter schools’ independent study programs make the programs sufficiently public to defeat Plaintiffs’ free exercise claim.” (Woolard v. Thurmond (9th Cir., Sept. 11, 2025) 2025 WL 2619134.)
Judgment for Defendant in Vicarious Copyright Infringement Action Reversed. Plaintiff alleged that one of Disney’s visual effects contractors made unauthorized copies of its copyrighted software. A jury found Disney liable for vicarious copyright infringement, awarded plaintiff $250,638 in actual damages, and returned an advisory verdict that Disney’s profits attributable to infringement amounted to $345,098. The district court initially adopted the advisory verdict but later granted Disney’s motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), concluding that plaintiff had failed to introduce legally sufficient evidence at trial that Disney had the practical ability to supervise the contractor’s directly infringing conduct. Primarily reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “In sum, because we conclude that Rearden introduced sufficient evidence at trial from which the jury could find that Disney had ‘both a legal right to stop or limit [DD3’s] infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so,’ [citation], we reverse the district court’s grant of JMOL in favor of Disney.” (Rearden, LLC v. Walt Disney Pictures (9th Cir., Sept.11, 2025) 2025 WL 2619138.)
The City of Huntington Beach Claims Home Rule. Pursuant to Government Code § 65580, each city and county in California is required to adopt a housing element as a component to its general plan because of the lack of affordable housing. The City of Huntington Beach, a charter city, has refused to adopt a revised housing element based on its stated concern that a revised housing element would harm the environment because it would force the city to plan for the construction of an excessively high number of affordable housing units. The California Attorney General, a state housing agency, and the Kennedy Commission, a group that advocates for to increase the production of housing affordable to lower-income households and other vulnerable populations. sought writ relief in court to compel compliance. The trial court granted partial relief to the State and both sides appealed. On appeal, Huntington Beach contended that charter cities are specifically authorized by the state Constitution to govern themselves, free of state legislative intrusion, referring to that authority as home rule. In an opinion replete with dense Constitutional, statutory and court-order discussions, the Court of Appeal instructed the trial court to enter judgment for the State and to adjudicate the petition of the Kennedy Commission, which it had not yet done. (Kennedy Commission v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Sept. 11, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 385.)
Class Action Certification Denied Because Individual Questions Predominated. Plaintiffs are former customers of defendant automobile insurance company who made property damage claims for their totaled vehicles. Defendant calculated the “market value” of each vehicle by comparing it to similar vehicles that were for sale, or recently sold, in the insureds’ market area. Plaintiffs contended the method used by defendants resulted in lower-than-actual values of their losses. The district court found that individual questions predominated and declined to certify the proposed class. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the lower court that figuring out whether each individual putative class member was harmed would involve an inquiry specific to that person. (Ambrosio v. Progressive Preferred Insurance Company (9th Cir., Sept. 12, 2025) 2025 WL 2628179.)
Sanctions Against Lawyer and Report to the State Bar for Citing Fake Cases. This is what the Court of Appeal opinion states: “What sets this appeal apart—and the reason we have elected to publish this opinion—is that nearly all of the legal quotations in plaintiff’s opening brief, and many of the quotations in plaintiff’s reply brief, are fabricated. That is, the quotes plaintiff attributes to published cases do not appear in those cases or anywhere else. Further, many of the cases plaintiff cites do not discuss the topics for which they are cited, and a few of the cases do not exist at all. These fabricated legal authorities were created by generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools that plaintiff’s counsel used to draft his appellate briefs. The AI tools created fake legal authority—sometimes referred to as AI ‘hallucinations’—that were undetected by plaintiff’s counsel because he did not read the cases the AI tools cited.” This is what the Court of Appeal did: “Because plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct in this case violated a basic duty counsel owed to his client and the court, we impose a monetary sanction [of $10,000] on counsel, direct him to serve a copy of this opinion on his client, and direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of this opinion on the State Bar.” (Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Sept. 12, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426.)
Highest Bidder at Trustee’s Sale Didn’t Get the Property. After owners of a lot defaulted on their payment of HOA assessments in the amount of $37,763.21, a trustee’s sale of the property was held. Plaintiff made the highest bid of $60,000. Pursuant to Civil Code § 2924m, the trustee kept the bidding open. During the extended bidding period, defendant submitted the highest bid of $203,000. Plaintiff contended it was entitled to the property after it made the highest bid at the trustee’s nonjudicial foreclosure sale. The trial court disagreed and entered judgment for defendant. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “A trustee’s sale generally is deemed final when the auctioneer accepts the last and highest bid.” “Section 2924m was enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic, which ‘resulted in widespread job loss and financial distress’ that ‘raised the prospect that many California homeowners [would] soon default on their mortgage payments . . . .’ [¶] The way section 2924m works is to delay the finality of a trustee’s nonjudicial foreclosure sale to allow specified entities to submit bids equal to or greater than the highest bid made at the sale. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Widespread default in payment of HOA assessments could lead to the same consequences the statute was intended to mitigate. Although the Legislature might not have considered such defaults, interpreting section 2924m to apply to nonjudicial foreclosure sales based on such defaults furthers the legislative intent. Since that interpretation comports with the statutory language and purpose, we adopt it.” (Bird Rock Home Mortgage, LLC v. Breaking Ground, LP (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Sept. 16, 2025) 2025 WL 2648973.)
Under Penal Code § 1001.80, the Court Should Consider Whether a Defendant Is Both Eligible and Suitable for Military Diversion.
A criminal defendant was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence pursuant to Vehicle Code § 23152. As a former Marine, defendant requested military diversion under Penal Code § 1001.80. The trial court denied the request, finding that defendant had not served the threshold of active duty for one year or one day of combat to qualify for military diversion, as required in a memorandum of understanding between the district attorney and public defender. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court also found that defendant was not automatically eligible for diversion in that the trial court was also required to find him suitable for military diversion. The Court of Appeal noted that § 1001.80 does not include language that a defendant must be suitable for pretrial diversion even if found eligible, but grants discretionary authority to the trial court to deny pretrial diversion by using the term “may” in subdivision (d). The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate, stating, “The trial court should consider both whether a defendant is eligible for military diversion, and then evaluate the defendant’s suitability for diversion taking into account the rehabilitative purpose of Penal Code section 1001.80.” The appeals court further concluded the trial court erred by finding there was a minimum length of service requirement. (Angulo v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, Sept. 16, 2025) 2025 WL 2650050.)
Having to Pay the Other Side’s Attorney Fees Can Be the Cost of Fighting Hard. Plaintiff, who was diagnosed with fibromyalgia, sued defendant under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) for failure to accommodate, failure to engage in an interactive process, disability discrimination, and failure to prevent discrimination. Defendant fought the case hard from the start. The trial took six weeks, and a jury awarded plaintiff $3,324,262 in damages, five times more than plaintiff’s offer under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. The trial court awarded plaintiff’s counsel $4,889,786.03 in attorney fees. On appeal, defendant contended the trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “When the plaintiff files a case with the prospect of recovering attorney fees, the defense is fully entitled to fight hard. But the defense does so knowing it might end up paying for all the work for both sides. Filing a flood of unselective and fruitless motions can be counterproductive if the plaintiff ultimately prevails, for the bill for that flood will wash up on the defense doorstep. Then the court may look with a wary eye at defense complaints about a whopping plaintiff’s bill.” (Bronshteyn v. Department of Consumer Affairs (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Sept. 17, 2025) 2025 WL 2658416.)
Secretary of Homeland Security Arbitrary and Capricious in Terminating Temporary Protected Status of Venezuelans. In 1990, Congress amended the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) statute (8 U.S.C. § 1254a). That statute sets forth the criteria and process that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is to follow in deciding whether to designate a country for TPS, thus allowing residents of such country to remain temporarily in the United States. More than 600,000 Venezuelan citizens living in the United States rely on the protections provided by Venezuela’s TPS status. In 2025, the Secretary of DHS terminated the TPS status of Venezuelans. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs and against the government, stating the DHS Secretary acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Uncontradicted evidence established that the Secretary effectively decided to terminate Venezuela’s TPS status before consulting with any government agency and before reviewing any country conditions evidence.” (National TPS Alliance v. Noem (9th Cir., Sept. 17, 2025) 2025 WL 2661556.)
Kaiser Failed to Meet Its Prima Facie Burden in Petition to Compel Arbitration. In December 2004, plaintiff’s mother became a member of her union’s health care plan by signing a one-page enrollment form, which contained an arbitration disclosure statement. In January 2005, plaintiff’s mother signed another one-page enrollment form (change-of-beneficiary form), adding plaintiff as a dependent under her health insurance. This form also included an arbitration disclosure statement. The 2004 enrollment form stated that the “full” arbitration provision was contained in a separate document, and the 2005 form specifically referenced a separate document and “Health Plan policies.” In 2020, after plaintiff’s mother transferred to a nonunion position with Kaiser Hospitals, she used the online enrollment process to enroll herself and plaintiff as members of a self-insured (self-funded) health care plan—the Kaiser employee medical health plan—which also contained an arbitration disclosure statement in a separate document. In this medical malpractice action, the trial court denied defendants’ petition to compel arbitration, concluding that defendants had failed to satisfy their burden to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate the controversy. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[D]efendants did not submit a copy of any arbitration agreement containing the signature of plaintiff’s mother. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . None of those respective documents for the relevant years (2004, 2005, 2020) were provided to the trial court.” (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Sept. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 2701643.)
Stay Granted in Order to Reinstate Federal Trade Commissioner. The district court ordered the presidential administration to reinstate a commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission whom the President fired. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay of that order. Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, dissented: “He may now remove—so says the majority, though Congress said differently—any member he wishes, for any reason or no reason at all. And he may thereby extinguish the agencies’ bipartisanship and independence.” (Trump v. Slaughter (U.S., Sept. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 2692050.)
Delayed Accrual of Realization of Injury and Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff alleged she was coerced into sexual encounters by a deputy sheriff, who had knowledge of her drug addiction and criminal involvement, in exchange for his turning a blind eye to her illegal activity. While plaintiff alleged the deputy’s misconduct towards her began in 2014, she also alleged his inappropriate contact continued into 2020 and 2021. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s action. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Struggling with addiction, fearful of criminal liability, and coerced by Holloway into sexual acts, St. Clair sufficiently alleges evidence at the motion to dismiss stage that the delayed realization of her injuries justifies the delayed filing.” Regarding the Washington State law claims, the Court stated: “Because we reverse the dismissal of St. Clair’s federal claims, the district court can appropriately exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims, and the dismissal of those claims should likewise be reversed.” (St. Clair v. County of Okanogan (9th Cir., Sept. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2699996.)
Religious Discrimination Claim Over Employer’s Requirements During the Pandemic Tossed. During the Covid-19 pandemic, plaintiff requested to be excused from both the vaccine and weekly testing requirements due to her religious beliefs. Her employer granted her religious accommodation regarding the vaccine but denied regarding the weekly testing requirement. Plaintiff sued her employer. The district court dismissed the action. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “This appeal from the dismissal of a religious discrimination claim asks what is sufficient to plead a bona fide religious belief under Title VII and the parallel Oregon state statute. [¶] . . . [¶] Courts need not accept entirely conclusory assertions of religious belief. [¶] . . . [¶] A plaintiff seeking a religious exemption must plead a sufficient nexus between her religion and the specific belief in conflict with the work requirement.” (Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Medical Center (9th Cir., Sept. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2700000.)
Regents Not Strictly Liable for Breach of Confidential Patient Information. Defendant California Department of Public Health imposed a $75,000 penalty on plaintiff Regents of University of California doing business as Resnick Neuropsychiatric Hospital of UCLA after a Resnick employee photographed confidential patient information and posted the photograph to his Instagram account. The department imposed this penalty after finding that Resnick violated Health and Safety Code § 1280.15, which provides that a health facility “shall prevent unlawful or unauthorized access to, and use or disclosure of, patients’ medical information, as defined in Section 56.05 of the Civil Code and consistent with Section 1280.18.” The question before the Court of Appeal was: Does the “shall prevent” language denote a strict liability statute, such that any failure to prevent disclosure constituted a violation of section 1280.15? Or, as the trial court ruled, does the “consistent with Section 1280.18” language require that a violation of § 1280.15 must be supported by a concomitant violation of § 1280.18’s mandate that health facilities establish appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of patient medical information and reasonably safeguard confidential medical information, effectively importing a reasonableness standard from § 1280.18 into § 1280.15? An administrative law judge upheld the department’s findings and penalty. The trial court subsequently granted Resnick’s petition for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside that determination. The Court of Appeal held: “[W]e conclude that the plain language of section 1280.15, subdivision (a), makes clear that this law incorporates the requirements of section 1280.18 and the ‘appropriate’ and ‘reasonabl[e]’ standards in that section. This interpretation effectuates the legislative intent to protect patients’ medical information while not penalizing health facilities that have undertaken all reasonable steps within their power to safeguard that information.” (Regents of the University of California v. State Department of Public Health (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Sept. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2701640.)
Denial of Alter Ego Finding Reversed and Remanded.
Time 1: The trial court found defendant was not an alter ego of a real estate company. Time 2: Plaintiff obtained a $1,000,000 judgment against the real estate company.
Time 3: Plaintiff filed another motion to add defendant as an additional judgment debtor.
Time 4: The trial court denied the motion, finding it was barred by collateral estoppel because the court had already decided defendant was not the real estate company’s alter ego.
On appeal, plaintiff contended error because the second motion to add defendant as an alter ego was based on “new facts or changed circumstances [] since the prior decision.” The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether new facts or changed circumstances have occurred since the prior decision that change the alter ego analysis. (Angel Lynn Realty, Inc. v. George (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. Sept. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2701629.)
No Subject Matter Jurisdiction for Federal Court. Plaintiffs alleged that they purchased Kleenex Germ Removal Wet Wipes. They sued Kimberly-Clark, claiming that the wipes’ labels misled them into believing that the wipes contained germicides, not just soaps, and would kill germs, not just wipe them away. The district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiffs alleged no federal claims, so it considered only diversity jurisdiction, which requires plaintiffs to allege diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy of more than $75,000. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We apply these criteria to Plaintiffs’ operative SAC. Because the SAC says nothing about Kimberly-Clark’s citizenship, it does not allege diversity of citizenship. Even if it had, the SAC says nothing about the amount in controversy. Thus, standing alone, Plaintiffs’ SAC does not adequately allege subject-matter jurisdiction.” (Rosenwald v. Kimberly-Clark Corporation (9th Cir., Sept. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 2715322.)
Attempted End Run Around Work Comp Laws by Doctor Convicted of Accepting Kickbacks Thwarted. Plaintiff pled guilty to a misdemeanor violation of Business and Professions Code § 650, relating to illegal kickbacks for medical referrals. He was ordered to serve a term of probation, pay restitution, and pay fines. Later, he successfully moved to have the matter dismissed under Penal Code § 1385. Under Labor Code § 139.21, a medical provider who has been convicted of certain crimes relating to fraud of the workers’ compensation program shall be suspended from that program. Plaintiff ’s crime met this definition, so the Department of Industrial Relations suspended him from the workers’ compensation program. Plaintiff challenged that finding through an administrative proceeding, which upheld the suspension. He then challenged that ruling with a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court, where he argued that because his misdemeanor case had been dismissed, he did not meet the definition of “convicted” in Labor Code § 139.21. The trial court denied the petition. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The plain language of Labor Code section 139.21, subdivision (a)(4)(C) defines ‘convicted’ to include any circumstance in which a guilty plea has been accepted by a court. The statute does not include an exception for cases that are later dismissed. Ahn’s suspension was therefore supported by law.” (Ahn v. Parisotto (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 4, Sept. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 2717311.)
Baby to be Adopted Despite Opposition of Biological Father. A baby boy has lived with his prospective adoptive parents his entire life. His biological mother, Jessica, had placed him for adoption on the day he was born. Jessica had long suffered from physical and verbal abuse by the baby’s biological father, Raymon. Two weeks after learning they were expecting their second child, Raymon hit Jessica in the face, causing a bloody lip; this led her to leave Raymon and seek refuge at a domestic violence shelter with the couple’s then only child. Following a barrage of angry voicemails and threats, not the worst of which was: “Answer my f***ing phone calls. You selfish bitch. . . . I swear to God . . . I’m doing everything I can to hurt you, bruh.” Jessica cut off all communication with Raymon. She did not see him again until six months after the baby’s birth, at which point she told Raymon that the baby “is not here no more.” Raymon believed Jessica had miscarried. The prospective adoptive parents proceeded with adoption, and Raymon was notified of adoption proceedings and of the baby’s birth. He opposed the adoption in court filings and the trial court denied the adoption petition. Directing the adoption to proceed, the Court of Appeal directed stated: “[N]o reasonable trier of fact could find that ‘it is in the best interest of [the baby] that the biological father retain parental rights’ and that the adoption not be allowed to proceed.” (Adoption of X.D. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Sept. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 2753550.)
Co-Defendant With Adverse Interest Has Standing to Oppose Summary Judgment of Co-Defendant. When a defendant brings a motion for summary judgment, must a codefendant file a cross-complaint to obtain standing to oppose the motion? (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The Court of Appeal answered, “Here we hold that a codefendant with an adverse interest has standing to oppose a motion for summary judgment whether it has filed a cross-complaint or not.” (Bean v. City of Thousand Oaks (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, Sept. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 2753534.)
Right to Remain Polygraph Free. The first sentence of Labor Code § 432.2 reads: “No employer shall demand or require any employee. . . to submit to or take a polygraph, lie detector or similar test or examination as a condition of employment or continued employment.” Here, the employer required an employee to undergo a polygraph examination after a theft which was captured on surveillance video. The polygrapher determined the employee failed. The employee was thereupon terminated and he sued the employer. A jury awarded plaintiff $100,000 in noneconomic damages. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: ‘“[W]hen an employer’s discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action and recover damages traditionally available in such actions.’ (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 170, 177 . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] We conclude a violation of section 432.2 meets the policy requirements for a tortious discharge claim.” (McDoniel v. Kavry Management, LLC (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Sept. 30, 2025) 2025 WL 2787613.)
A Chemical Company and an Insurance Company Walk into a Courtroom . . . A chemical company sued its insurers for a declaratory judgment establishing the company’s right to coverage for environmental damage stemming from its operation of a DDT plant. The insurers denied coverage. The policy stated that coverage is not excluded “if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.” The chemical company was unsuccessful when it requested the trial court to permit extrinsic evidence to interpret what “sudden” meant in the policies. The Court of Appeal denied the chemical company’s petition for a writ of mandate and stated: “[T]he trial court correctly excluded the proffered extrinsic evidence. We reach this conclusion not because past appellate panels have found the disputed policy language to be unambiguous in the abstract, but because these past authorities have uniformly rejected the exact interpretation advanced by Montrose—namely, that ‘sudden’ could be reasonably construed to mean ‘gradual’ in the relevant insurance policy provisions.” (Montrose Chemical Corporation of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Cal. Ct. App., 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Sept. 30, 2025, No. B335073) 2025 WL 2778109.)
Wage and Hour Labor Law Found Not to Apply to Charter Cities. Labor Code § 512.1 extends the meal and rest breaks and premiums already enjoyed by private sector health care workers under § 512 to healthcare employees directly employed by specified public employers: “‘Employer’ means the state, political subdivisions of the state, counties, municipalities, and the Regents of the University of California.” Plaintiffs are nurses directly employed by defendant city. In its demurrer, the city argued that the Legislature failed to provide a clear intention that the law applies to charter cities, like the city. The trial court sustained the demurrer. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We are unpersuaded that the plain meaning of the statute’s definition of ‘Employer’ extends to the City.” (Levy v. City and County of San Francisco (Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div 4, Sept. 30, 2025) 2025 WL 2787868.)
Disruption of Proceedings and the Brown Act. The Ralph M. Brown Act states in part: “In the event that any meeting is willfully interrupted by a group or groups of persons so as to render the orderly conduct of such meeting unfeasible and order cannot be restored by the removal of individuals who are willfully interrupting the meeting, the members of the legislative body conducting the meeting may order the meeting room cleared and continue in session.” (Gov. Code § 54957.9). During three city council meetings, the mayor stated that the level of the disruption and number of people meant that the city council was unable to restore order by removing the disruptive people. The mayor did not order the meeting room cleared but instead recessed the meetings, which reconvened in a different room. The press was permitted to attend the reconvened meetings in person, and the public was permitted to attend by video. In its action, plaintiffs contend the city did not follow the statute. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “We conclude that the plain language of the statute requires reversal of the judgment.” (Berkeley People’s Alliance v. City of Berkeley (Cal. App., 1st Dist., Div. 4, Sept. 30, 2025) 2025 WL 2787867.)
The FAAAA’s Public Safety Exception Found Not to Apply. A woman was killed when a tractor trailer ran a stop sign and collided with her car. The woman’s family brought a negligence/wrongful death action. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on the grounds of federal preemption. Under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (Pub. L. No. 103-305; FAAAA), a state “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . , broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” On appeal, plaintiff contended the FAAAA’s safety exception exempts state law personal injury claims from preemption. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “These claims do not purport the tractor trailer itself was defective or other otherwise unsafe. Therefore, the FAAAA’s safety exception does not apply here.” (Casarez v. Irigoyen Farms, Inc. (Cal. App., 5th Dist., Sept. 10, 2025) 2025 WL 2778918.)