Litigation
Litigation Update March 2026
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates
- Arbitration Agreement in Tiny, Blurry, and Unreadable Print.
- Concerns About Safety of Our Roads Protects Those Who Report Unsafe Drivers to the DMV
- Limited Jurisdiction Requirement Concerning Trial Witnesses Statute Violated.
- Jury Verdict Reversed After Defendant Car Manufacturer Committed Discovery Abuse.
- Federal Court Erred in Concluding What Was Central to a Prisoner’s Religious Beliefs.
- No Showing of Injury Required to Demonstrate Injury Under the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act.
- Immigration Officials Played Hard Ball.
- Statutory Violation of the Automated License Plate Violation Law Sufficient to Constitute Harm.
- Summary Judgment for University That Suspended In-Person Classes During Pandemic Affirmed.
- Court-Appointed Receiver Enjoys Quasi-Judicial Immunity Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute.
- Waiving or Forgiving Child Support Precluded, Even After Child Reaches Age of Majority.
- Medical Provider Defendants in Wrongful Death Action Who Practice on the Border of Two States Are Subject to Personal Jurisdiction.
- Court’s Denial of Preliminary Injunction in First Amendment Case Reversed.
- Forum Selection Clause Unenforceable in Song-Beverly Action.
- Gun Violence Restraining Order Issued Against a Father Who Did Not Adequately Secure His Firearms and Ammunition.
- Plaintiff Sat on and Lost Right to Attorney Fees.
- Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations, Not the Statute of Limitations for Ordinary Negligence, Applies in Action Against Doctor.
- Mental Health Diversion.
- Separation of Powers . . . the President Lacks the Power to Bypass Congress and Impose Tariffs.
- Civil Liability Statute Held to Apply Retroactively.
- Civil Code § 1945’s Presumption Overcome in Commercial Lease Dispute.
- Common Carrier Protection.
- The United States Enjoys Sovereign Immunity When Postal Workers Intentionally Fail to Deliver Mail.
- Diversity Jurisdiction in Federal Court.
- Economic Damages Reduced.
- What’s Going on in Those Immigration Detention Centers?
- No Retaliatory Animus on the Face of Executive Order.
- Deadly Sibling Rivalry.
- Attorney Found to Be a Vexatious Litigant.
Arbitration Agreement in Tiny, Blurry, and Unreadable Print. To establish that a contract is unenforceable because it is unconscionable, the party opposing enforcement must show unfairness both in the procedure by which the contract was formed and the substance of its terms. Here, the California Supreme Court was asked to decide whether an arbitration agreement in tiny, blurry, and unreadable print should be subject to a procedural or substantive analysis. California’s high court held: “We hold that a contract’s format generally is irrelevant to the substantive unconscionability analysis, which focuses on the fairness of the contract’s terms, but that courts must closely scrutinize the terms of difficult-to-read contracts for unfairness or one-sidedness.” (Fuentes v. Empire Nissan, Inc. (Cal., Feb. 2, 2026) 341 Cal.Rptr.3d 186.)
Concerns About Safety of Our Roads Protects Those Who Report Unsafe Drivers to the DMV. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) sent plaintiff a letter stating, “it is necessary for the [D]epartment to review your driving qualifications. . . . After a review of your medical information, you may be required to complete a written, vision, or driving test and/or you may be required to appear virtually by video or by telephone or in-person.” The letter also warned plaintiff his license would be suspended if he did not have a medical form completed by a physician and returned by July 20, 2024. The record on appeal reflected that someone called “DS 699” filled out a request for driver reexamination, which prompted the DMV’s letter to plaintiff. After the reexamination, the DMV suspended plaintiff’s driver’s license. Plaintiff filed a writ of mandate in the trial court demanding the DMV reveal the identity of “DS 699,” which the trial court denied. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The Department’s employee’s declaration filed in support of the opposition to the petition for writ of mandate stated confidentiality for reporters promotes ‘safety of our roads’ by protecting reporters from punitive action from drivers that could deter future reports of unsafe drivers.” (Brown v. Department of Motor Vehicles (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Jan. 30, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 206.)
Limited Jurisdiction Requirement Concerning Trial Witnesses Statute Violated. Plaintiff acquired a credit account in defendant’s name and sued defendant to collect the debt. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 96, defendant requested the names and addresses of witnesses plaintiff would call at trial. Plaintiff responded it intended to call a custodian of records, but had not yet decided which custodian it would call, although the most likely person would be Kyle Collins. Defendant moved in limine to prohibit plaintiff from calling any witnesses other than Collins at trial. The trial court denied the motion and permitted Veronica Russell to testify in lieu of Collins as custodian of records because plaintiff contended Collins was unavailable. Reversing, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court held: “On this record, we conclude that [plaintiff’s] response to [defendant’s] section 96 request did not adequately notify [defendant] that Russell would be called to testify at trial.” (Spring Oaks Capital SPV, LLC v. Fowler (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div., Dec. 8, 2025) 118 Cal.App.5th Supp. 19.)
Jury Verdict Reversed After Defendant Car Manufacturer Committed Discovery Abuse. Plaintiff sued defendant car manufacturer for fraud and violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.) and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (Civ. Code, § 1750 et seq.) in connection with defects in the engine of his 2013 Kia Soul. During discovery, plaintiff asked defendant to produce documents regarding internal investigations and communications with government agencies concerning alleged engine defects. After the court ordered defendant to respond, defendant served verified supplemental responses attesting that responsive documents “never existed.” Plaintiff suspected defendant’s responses were false because his counsel had seen a letter from the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) asking defendant to produce certain documents regarding alleged engine defects. Plaintiff showed this letter to the trial court and requested an order compelling defendant to comply with the court’s earlier discovery order. The trial court denied the motion. On the eve of trial, plaintiff’s counsel found a letter from defendant agreeing to produce records in response to NHTSA’s investigation on NHTSA’s public website. Defendant never produced the documents in this case. Upon making this discovery, plaintiff moved for terminating sanctions, which the trial court denied. A jury found for defendant. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Because [defendant’s] unremedied discovery misuse deprived [plaintiff] of a fair trial, we reverse the judgment with directions that the trial court grant [plaintiff] a new trial and impose discovery sanctions on [defendant] in an amount sufficient to compensate [plaintiff] for the costs and attorney fees he incurred in connection with the first trial and this appeal.” (Higginson v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Feb. 3, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 316.)
Federal Court Erred in Concluding What Was Central to a Prisoner’s Religious Beliefs. Plaintiff, a prisoner in the California prison system, is a Nichiren Buddhist and asserts a sincere religious belief in the need to eat cleanly. He enrolled in the halal prison diet as the option he believed most closely aligned with his religious needs. The prison disenrolled plaintiff from the religious diet program after he purchased non-halal items from the prison commissary. He challenged that decision in federal court, alleging violations of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.; RLUIPA). The district court denied plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction, concluding that plaintiff had no likelihood of success under RLUIPA because a halal diet was not central to his religious beliefs. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Under a proper analysis, [plaintiff] could demonstrate a substantial burden of his religious exercise. And if so, then the government must show that its regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest.” (Harris v. Muhammad (9th Cir., Feb. 4, 2026) 165 F.4th 1345.)
No Showing of Injury Required to Demonstrate Injury Under the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act. An investigative consumer report under the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (Civ. Code, § 1786.2, subd. (c); ICRAA) contains information on a consumer’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living obtained through any means. An employer may not obtain such a report for employment purposes without complying with ICRAA’s disclosure and consent requirements. Employers who violate the ICRAA are liable for actual damages or $10,000, whichever sum is greater. The issue here was whether consumers may recover under ICRAA without showing any injury other than a statutory violation. The Court of Appeal held: “We hold ICRAA, by its plain language, authorizes consumers to recover the statutory sum as a remedy for a violation of their statutory rights, without any further showing of injury. We thus conclude the trial court erred when it required a consumer to demonstrate a concrete injury, such as an adverse employment decision, to establish ICRAA standing . . . .” (Parsonage v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Feb. 4, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 399.)
Previously, we reported: Immigration Officials Played Hard Ball. Petitioner and her two minor children were on their way to an initial hearing before an immigration judge (IJ) in Seattle, Washington, when they encountered two major car accidents and were late for the hearing. The IJ ordered them removed in absentia. Petitioners promptly moved to reopen, explaining that exceptional circumstances justified their late arrival to court. The IJ and Board of Immigration Appeals denied the motion on the ground that ordinary traffic alone is not an exceptional circumstance. Granting the petition for review, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We hold that the facts of this case amount to exceptional circumstances, which warrant reopening.” (Montejo-Gonzalez v. Garland (9th Cir., Oct. 17, 2024) 119 F.4th 651.)
The latest: The Ninth Circuit took this case en banc to clarify what constitutes exceptional circumstances beyond a petitioner’s control. It held: “We hold that the IJ and BIA abused their discretion by applying a per se rule, and we remand to the BIA to consider the totality of the circumstances.” (Montejo-Gonzalez v. Bondi (9th Cir., Feb. 5, 2026) 166 F.4th 851.)
Statutory Violation of the Automated License Plate Violation Law Sufficient to Constitute Harm. Plaintiff alleged that defendant automatically collected his license plate information when he parked his vehicle in its parking garage. Plaintiff claimed defendant violated the Automated License Plate Recognition statute (Civ. Code, §§ 1798.90.5–1798.90.55; ALPR), which governs automated license plate recognition systems, by failing to implement and make publicly available a policy governing the collection and use of this data. Under the ALPR, a court may award “[a]ctual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) . . . .” The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend because plaintiff failed to allege harm within the meaning of ALPR. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We hold that the collection and use of license plate information, without implementing the statutorily required policy governing this collection and use, constitutes such harm.” (Bartholomew v. Parking Concepts, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Feb. 5, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 438.)
Summary Judgment for University That Suspended In-Person Classes During Pandemic Affirmed. The trial court granted summary judgment for a university that was sued for breach of contract after it suspended in-person classes during the pandemic. Plaintiffs contended the university breached an implied contract to provide in-person education because it listed class locations, touted on-campus facilities, and promised “face-to-face contact” with faculty. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “California case law already provides that an implied promise by a university is enforceable only if it is ‘specific’ and does not merely represent a ‘general expectation.’ . . . [¶] . . . [¶] We conclude the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Chapman because in-person education was not part of the parties’ bargain.” (Grant v. Chapman University (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Feb. 5, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 453.)
Court-Appointed Receiver Enjoys Quasi-Judicial Immunity Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute. Plaintiffs appealed from the trial court’s order granting the special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16). Plaintiffs alleged that a court-appointed receiver had breached fiduciary duties owed to plaintiffs by not complying with a court order to liquidate certain investment accounts. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We hold that a court-appointed receiver is protected by quasi-judicial immunity for the receiver’s discretionary acts and decisions. Because Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of Mosier’s discretionary decisions made in his capacity as court-appointed receiver, Plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proving their claims have the minimal merit necessary to survive an anti-SLAPP motion. As an antecedent to that holding, we conclude Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants arose out of constitutionally protected activity under section 425.16[, subd.] (e)(4), and Plaintiffs have forfeited any argument to the contrary.” (Semaan v. Mosier (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Feb. 5, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 460.)
Waiving or Forgiving Child Support Precluded, Even After Child Reaches Age of Majority. In In re Marriage of Sabine & Toshio M. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1203, the court held that parents are precluded from contractually waiving child support arrearages. In the present case, the child has reached the age of majority. The Court of Appeal held: “Here, we hold that parents are precluded from contractually waiving or forgiving past due child support arrearages even after the child has reached the age of majority and there is no longer a current support order in place.” (In re Marriage of Allen (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, Feb. 6, 2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 476.)
Medical Provider Defendants in Wrongful Death Action Who Practice on the Border of Two States Are Subject to Personal Jurisdiction.In a wrongful death action, plaintiffs are the husband and estate of a decedent who allegedly died of a fatal overdose of medicine prescribed by a doctor at a medical center, the defendants here. Plaintiffs and decedent live/lived in Washington near the Idaho border, and defendant is incorporated in Idaho. The decedent’s prescriptions were sent to Washington pharmacies. Defendants advertised in Washington. The district court in Washington denied jurisdictional discovery and dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Based on Washington’s long-arm statute, the Ninth Circuit found that both defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Washington. “Because we conclude that Defendants are subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Washington, Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the denial of jurisdictional discovery as to general jurisdiction. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Because Plaintiffs allege that Susan ingested her prescriptions, overdosed, and died near her home in Albion, Washington, the record establishes that a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims occurred in the Eastern District of Washington and that venue therein is proper.” (Cox v. Gritman Medical Center (9th Cir., Feb. 11, 2026) 166 F.4th 1171.)
Court’s Denial of Preliminary Injunction in First Amendment Case Reversed.Idaho enacted a statute that forbids schools and public libraries from making certain “harmful” content available to minors. Plaintiffs—an association of independent private schools and some of its members—brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the statute’s constitutionality under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On, plaintiffs challenged the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction on their First Amendment overbreadth theories, maintaining the statute exceeds the bounds of federal obscenity law. The Ninth Circuit reversed and stated: “[W]e conclude that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their overbreadth theory related to H.B. 710’s ‘context clause.’ We further conclude that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favor Plaintiffs. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ motion. However, because our reversal is limited to the statute’s context clause, we remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the appropriate scope of a narrow preliminary injunction in this case.” (Northwest Association of Independent Schools v. Labrador (9th Cir., Feb. 12, 2026) 166 F.4th 1148.)
Forum Selection Clause Unenforceable in Song-Beverly Action. Plaintiffs purchased a motor coach from a California dealer. The warranties issued designated Indiana as the exclusive forum for any disputes relating to the warranties. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.), and the trial court stayed the action and enforced the forum selection clause. The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “We agree with two recent published decisions—Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 808, review granted January 15, 2025, S287893 (Lathrop) and Hardy v. Forest River, Inc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 450, review granted April 30, 2025, S289309 (Hardy)—that held forum selection clauses like the one included in Thor’s warranties are unenforceable.” (Diaz v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Feb. 13, 2026) 2026 WL 417481.)
Gun Violence Restraining Order Issued Against a Father Who Did Not Adequately Secure His Firearms and Ammunition. The trial court granted a Gun Violence Restraining Order (Pen. Code, § 18175; GVRO) against the father whose son sent text messages threatening a mass shooting at a local high school for failure to adequately secure his firearms and ammunition. The son is an adult who lives with his father. The GVRO statute requires the government to prove, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that “[t]he subject of the petition . . . poses a significant danger of causing personal injury to themselves or another by having in the subject’s or person’s custody or control, owning, purchasing, possessing, or receiving a firearm, ammunition, or magazine.” The father argued the trial court erred in interpreting the word “causing” to include conduct that does no more than pose a significant danger of causing personal injury to another person. The Court of Appeal affirmed and stated: “Crockett’s failure to adequately prevent his son Tyler, who was subject to a lifetime ban and had credibly threatened violence against a school, from accessing and using his guns, could reasonably ‘cause’ injury.” (Anaheim Police Department v. Crockett (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Jan[CC1] . 16, 2026) 2026 WL 442005.)
Plaintiff Sat on and Lost Right to Attorney Fees. A case settled. In the settlement agreement, defendant agreed plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees in an amount to be determined by the court upon noticed motion. Here is the timeline:
June 2, 2023—Plaintiff’s counsel notified the court the case settled at a trial readiness conference.
July 12, 2023—The clerk mailed notice to the parties that the case would be deemed dismissed without prejudice on August 15, 2023 “unless a judgment or dismissal was filed or a party appeared ex parte and showed good cause why the case should not be dismissed.”
August 15, 2023—The trial court dismissed the action.
August 31, 2023—Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees.
April 4, 2024—Plaintiff served the motion on defendant.
April 26, 2024—The attorney fee motion was heard and denied.
The Court of Appeal noted that rule 3.1702 of the California Rules of Court governs motions for attorney fees in civil cases, and that a motion for fees must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rule 8.104. Affirming, the appeals court stated: “Our conclusion the case was voluntarily dismissed on August 15, 2023, compels the conclusion the motion for attorney fees was untimely. Hatlevig had at most 180 days after the dismissal to serve and file his motion. One hundred eighty days after the dismissal was February 11, 2024.” (Hatlevig v. General Motors LLC (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Feb. 17, 2026) 2026 WL 445030.)
Medical Malpractice Statute of Limitations, Not the Statute of Limitations for Ordinary Negligence, Applies in Action Against Doctor. Plaintiffs sued a doctor for professional negligence and elder abuse, contending the doctor lacked staff privileges to treat a patient, plaintiffs’ mother, at a hospital. They alleged the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure § 340.5, the statute usually applied in medical malpractice actions, did not apply, but the two-year statute of limitations for ordinary negligence, set forth in section § 335.1, applied. The trial court sustained the doctor’s demurrer on the grounds that plaintiffs’ negligence causes of action were time-barred and their complaint failed to allege conduct that qualified as elder abuse. Affirming dismissal of the action, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he fifth amended complaint does not specify which staff privileges [defendant] allegedly lacked, or how he may have run afoul of any restriction . . . . [W]e cannot say the allegation that [defendant] lacked staff privileges raises an inference that he rendered services to [the patient]falling within ‘a limitation on the scope of a provider’s practice beyond simply the obligation to adhere to standards of professional conduct.’” “The fifth amended complaint does not say that [defendant] rendered services to [the patient] outside the scope of services he was licensed to provide.” (Nichols v. Alghannam (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Feb. 18, 2026) 2026 WL 456491.)
Mental Health Diversion. Despite finding that a criminal defendant was eligible for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code § 1001.36, the trial court nonetheless denied the request. Exercising its residual discretion regarding suitability, the trial court denied diversion primarily because it found the man’s behavior had to do with his sister’s threats to “out” his homosexuality, rather than with concerns about his committing crimes, so he did not fall within the spirit of the mental health diversion program. Reversing and finding the trial court abused its discretion, the Court of Appeal noted the Legislature intended the mental health diversion statute to apply as broadly as possible, and stated: “But section 1001.36 provides that a defendant is eligible for diversion, and thus should be granted diversion, if suitable, so long as the defendant’s qualifying mental disorder was a ‘motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor.’ Here, there is no dispute that [defendant’s] mental health disorder was such a factor. Yet, the trial court found [defendant’s] case did not ‘fall under what was intended by [section] 1001.36’ because there was another factor (his sister’s threats) that was more of a motivating, causal, or contributing factor.” (Flareau v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, Feb. 18, 2026) 2026 WL 456845 (citations omitted).)
Separation of Powers . . . the President Lacks the Power to Bypass Congress and Impose Tariffs. After the President declared a national emergency as to both drug trafficking and trade deficits, he imposed tariffs to deal with each threat. Holding the President lacks the power to impose those tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.; IEEPA), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution sets forth the powers of the Legislative Branch. The first Clause of that provision specifies that ‘The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.’ [¶] . . . [¶] Recognizing the taxing power’s unique importance, and having just fought a revolution motivated in large part by ‘taxation without representation,’ the Framers gave Congress ‘alone . . . access to the pockets of the people.’” (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump (U.S., Feb. 20, 2026) 2026 WL 477534.)
Civil Liability Statute Held to Apply Retroactively. Plaintiffs are villagers from rural Cambodia who were allegedly forced to work at seafood factories in Thailand. They brought a civil action under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) against defendant Rubicon Resources. Plaintiffs alleged that Rubicon marketed its seafood products in the United States from those factories, thereby participating in a venture that benefited from human trafficking. The district court entered summary judgment for Rubicon, holding that Rubicon only attempted to benefit from plaintiffs’ forced labor. Several courts had held that the civil remedy in § 1595(a) did not encompass “attempt” liability. Shortly after the grant of summary judgment in this case, Congress passed a bill clarifying that defendants are civilly liable when they attempt to benefit, but do not succeed in benefitting, from human trafficking. Plaintiffs quickly moved for relief from the summary judgment entered in Rubicon’s favor. The district court denied the motion, holding Congress did not intend for attempt liability to apply retroactively. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We hold that Congress intended its clarifying amendment to have retroactive effect and that the district court legally erred.” (Ratha v. Rubicon Resources, LLC (9th Cir., Feb. 20, 2026) 2026 WL 480006.)
Civil Code § 1945’s Presumption Overcome in Commercial Lease Dispute. At the end of a commercial lease, the lessees paid the equivalent of one month’s rent one day before the lease formally expired. Three months later, they paid an additional $2,100. The lessor and lessees never discussed whether the tenancy would continue on a month-to-month basis. When the lessees returned the keys months later, the lessor demanded unpaid rent, asserting that under Civil Code § 1945, their payment the day before the lease expired created a month-to-month tenancy. After a bench trial, the court concluded the lessees had rebutted § 1945’s presumption that the parties agreed to continue the terms of their expired lease. As a result, the court found there was no contract between the parties after their lease expired. Judgment was entered in favor of the lessees. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Proof of a new or different agreement is one way that a defendant can rebut section 1945’s presumption despite the payment and acceptance of ‘rent.’ But a new or different agreement is not the only way to rebut the presumption; all that is needed to overcome it is an objective showing that the parties did not agree to continue the lease.” (Ashirwad, LLC v. Bradbury (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Feb. 23, 2026) 2026 WL 497721 (citations omitted).)
Common Carrier Protection. From 1922 to 1990, BNSF Railway Company was required by federal law to transport asbestos-containing vermiculite from the world’s largest vermiculite mine to its railyard in Libby, Montana, and from there to destinations nationwide. Plaintiffs are estates that contended two decedents were former residents of Libby who developed mesothelioma from asbestos exposure. They sued BNSF for negligence and strict liability. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs on their strict liability claims but in favor of BNSF on the negligence claims. On appeal, plaintiffs contended that BNSF was not acting as a common carrier when it allowed vermiculite that contained asbestos to accumulate in its railyard. Reversing the judgment entered after the jury’s verdict, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We conclude that BNSF is protected from strict liability by the common carrier exception. Plaintiffs’ claims arose from activities BNSF engaged in while pursuing its statutorily imposed duty as a common carrier.” (Wells v. BNSF Railway Company (9th Cir., Feb. 24, 2026) 2026 WL 504705.)
The United States Enjoys Sovereign Immunity When Postal Workers Intentionally Fail to Deliver Mail.A dispute between a recipient of mail and her local post office ended up in the U.S. Supreme Court. The high court held: “The United States enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued without its consent. By means of the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress waived that sovereign immunity for certain tort suits based on the conduct of Government employees. But, in the provision at issue in this case, Congress retained sovereign immunity for a wide range of claims about mail. Specifically, the FTCA’s postal exception retains sovereign immunity for all claims ‘arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.’ This case concerns whether this exception applies when postal workers intentionally fail to deliver the mail. We hold that it does.” (United States Postal Service v. Konan (U.S., Feb. 24, 2026) 2026 WL 501765 (citations omitted).)
Diversity Jurisdiction in Federal Court. Regarding diversity jurisdiction in a federal court, the U.S. Supreme Court ’s words explained the situation and holding: “This case asks whether a district court’s erroneous dismissal of a nondiverse party before final judgment can cure a jurisdictional defect that existed when the case was removed to federal court. The Fifth Circuit held that it cannot, and this Court agrees. In these circumstances, the district court’s final judgment must be vacated for lack of jurisdiction.” (Hain Celestial Group, Inc. v. Palmquist (U.S., Feb. 24, 2026) 2026 WL 501733.)
Economic Damages Reduced. Plaintiffs were awarded $6.85 billion in a dispute over rights under a partnership. Reversing one portion of the decision, the Court of Appeal stated: “We agree with Defendants that the court abused its discretion in not excluding testimony about an opinion from Shashi’s damages expert that was not disclosed prior to trial. That opinion concerned alleged lost profits from investments that the real estate partnership sold during the 2008 housing/financial crisis. Shashi’s expert testified those investments (the nature of which are unknown) would have appreciated to $1.98 billion if the partnership had continued to hold them instead of Haresh having imprudently “panicked” in 2008 and sold them at a $445 million loss. We thus conditionally affirm the judgment and order through remittitur a reduction of economic damages relating to the real estate partnership for this purported $1.98 billion in lost investment profit in amounts proportionate to [each plaintiff’s] respective shares of that partnership. If any of them does not agree to the reduction, we reverse and remand for a new trial as to that individual regarding his economic damages arising out of the real estate partnership and his punitive damages. We otherwise affirm.” (Jogani v. Jogani (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Feb. 24, 2026) 2026 WL 508478.)
What’s Going on in Those Immigration Detention Centers? GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under a contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). A detainee, citing various constitutional and statutory violations, filed a class action challenging two policies GEO has, allegedly to reduce its labor costs. First, the so-called Sanitation Policy requires detainees to clean, without any pay, all the facility’s common areas. A detainee’s failure to perform his assigned tasks leads to escalating sanctions, up to 72 hours in solitary confinement. Second, the so-called Voluntary Work Program offers $1 per day to detainees for other kinds of needed work, such as preparing food and doing laundry. In Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Company (1940) 309 U.S. 18, 20, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct that the government has lawfully “authorized and directed” the contractor to perform. According to GEO Group, its contract with ICE authorized and directed it to institute the two policies. But the district court found the government contract did not contain those requirements and that GEO independently developed them. The district court ruled that a trial would be necessary, and declined to dismiss the action under Yearsley. The U.S. Supreme Court held that appellate review was premature, stating: “The question here is whether a contractor may take an immediate appeal of a district court’s pretrial order denying Yearsley protection. The answer is no. Because Yearsley provides a defense to liability, not an immunity from suit, an order denying its protection can be effectively reviewed after a final judgment.” (GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal (U.S., Feb. 25, 2026) 2026 WL 513536.)
No Retaliatory Animus on the Face of Executive Order. On March 27, 2025, the President signed Executive Order 14,251, invoking his authority under 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1) to exclude various federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements based on national security considerations. A district court preliminarily enjoined the executive order after concluding that the President issued it to retaliate against federal employee unions, in violation of the First Amendment. Vacating the injunction, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Executive Order 14,251 discloses no retaliatory animus on its face and instead expresses that the President’s primary concern with union activity was its interference with national security. Accordingly, because Executive Order 14,251 has a legitimate grounding in national security concerns, apart from any retaliatory animus, the government on the existing record has shown that the President would have taken the same actions in the absence of the asserted retaliatory intent.” (American Federation of Government Employees v. Trump (9th Cir., Feb. 26, 2026) 2026 WL 534591.)
Deadly Sibling Rivalry. Four siblings had a dispute over money, two siblings on each side. Amid their dispute, two of them falsely reported to the police that their dead mother was missing. The police contacted the sibling named Wade, and Wade told them their mother was dead. But the phone call greatly upset Wade. A week later, he relapsed into long-ago-rejected substance abuse and drove his motorcycle drunk with marijuana in his system and without a helmet. He crashed and died. A psychologist testified that the phone call caused Wade’s relapse. The other sibling, Todd, who was on Wade’s “side” sued the two siblings who made the false police report for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). A jury awarded about $5.1 million to Wade’s estate and $4.3 million to Todd, including $80,000 in punitive damages against each defendant. Affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e find that Wade’s death was within the scope of liability for wrongful death based on the IIED verdict.” (Fisher v. Fisher (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Feb. 26, 2026) 2026 WL 538717.)
Attorney Found to Be a Vexatious Litigant. The first paragraph of the opinion is self-explanatory: “The trial court ruled Benjamin Woodhouse is a vexatious litigant. We affirm this finding. We hold that, as a matter of law, Woodhouse’s complaint in this case asserts facts that are delusional: his suit has no possibility of success. We likewise affirm the trial court orders barring Woodhouse from future self-represented suits that lack pre-filing approval and posted security.” (Woodhouse v. State Bar of California (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Feb. 27, 2026) 2026 WL 554571.)