Litigation

Litigation Update: July 2025

Litigation Section Litigation Update

A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.

  • Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
  • Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
  • Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young

Our Updates:

Excessive Force.

A police officer shot and killed a man after he ignored her repeated commands to stop moving and drop his knife. The officer fired six shots, in volleys of two, over the course of six seconds. Shots five and six occurred after the man had already collapsed on the ground and was on his back with his knees curled up to his chest, rolling away from her. The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “It has been clearly established for more than a decade that when an officer shoots and wounds a suspect, and he falls to the ground, the officer cannot continue to shoot him, absent some indication that he presents a continuing threat, without first reassessing the need for lethal force.” (Estate of Hernandez by and through Hernandez v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir., June 2, 2025) 139 F.4th 790.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/02/21-55994.pdf

Restitution for Cryptocurrency Theft.

These petitions stem from a cryptocurrency theft and extortion scheme. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to correct erroneous restitution orders arising from three criminal defendants’ theft of petitioners’ cryptocurrency. The primary issue presented was whether there was a right to full restitution after the district court had entered judgment. Granting the requested relief, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), provides a procedural mechanism for relief under these circumstances, and . . . the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), permits us to review the district court’s denial of such relief on petition for a writ of mandamus. Because the district court ordered incorrect restitution amounts and erred in denying Petitioners’ motions to reopen, we grant the petitions for a writ of mandamus.” (In re Davis (9th Cir., June 2, 2025) 139 F.4th 744.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/02/24-3090.pdf

Standing to Bring Partition Action.

Decedent and defendant co-owned property. After decedent passed, the property became the subject of both probate and partition proceedings. In the partition action, the court entered judgment identifying the property owners as defendant and decedent’s surviving siblings. On appeal, defendant contended the siblings lacked the necessary standing to sue for partition. Ruling for defendant, the Court of Appeal agreed, explaining that “the uncertainty concerning ownership of the property means the siblings lacked standing to bring their partition claim.” (Admundson v. Catello (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, June 3, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 817.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D082158A.PDF

Puppy Mill Protests.

Plaintiffs, all volunteers, held signs and passed out flyers near a pet store in a shopping mall, protesting against the store’s alleged acquisition of its dogs from “puppy mills.” A deputy sheriff threatened plaintiffs with arrest if they did not leave the premises. They left. Over a year later, plaintiffs filed this action against the county and the deputy. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrers without leave to amend to some causes of action and granted summary judgment as to the remaining ones. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The question becomes whether [the deputy’s] alleged stated intention to arrest [a volunteer] constitutes an expression of intent to injure her. We conclude it does not. . . . The court found that [the deputy] never told [a volunteer] that she would be booked into jail, or that she would be arrested, or that she was in violation of any law.” (Animal Protection and Rescue League, Inc. v. County of Riverside (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, June 3, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 914.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D085176.PDF

Teaching Yoga Is Protected Speech.

A city prohibits teaching yoga to four or more people at any of the city’s shoreline parks or beaches. Two yoga teachers who offer free classes in shoreline parks challenged the city’s prohibition. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction, finding the First Amendment does not protect the teaching of yoga. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We disagree with the district court’s conclusions. Teaching yoga is protected speech. The City’s prohibition on teaching yoga in shoreline parks is content based and fails strict scrutiny. [Plaintiffs] have clearly demonstrated that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied challenge, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” (Hubbard v. City of San Diego (9th Cir., June 4, 2025) 139 F.4th 843.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/04/24-4613.pdf

Timing of Motion for Contribution.

Plaintiff and defendant were found to be jointly and severally liable for a judgment. Plaintiff appealed. Defendant paid the entire judgment and then sued plaintiff for contribution. Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction while the matter was pending on appeal, the trial court stayed the motion for contribution. After plaintiff lost on appeal, defendant refiled the motion for contribution, which the trial court granted, and plaintiff was ordered to pay defendant half the amount of the underlying judgment. In a second appeal, plaintiff argued that the contribution motion did not comply with the 30-day filing deadline under Code of Civil Procedure § 883. Affirming  the trial court’s order that plaintiff contribute half of the underlying judgment, the Court of Appeal explained: “Nothing in section 883 suggests a contribution motion taken off calendar pending appeal must be restored to calendar within any particular time. [Plaintiff’s] laches argument is forfeited for failure to raise it below.” (R & J Sheet Metal, Inc. v. W.E. O’Neil Construction Co. of California (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, June 4, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 878.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B336394.PDF

Interest on Judgments in Federal Court. 

Following a jury trial, plaintiff received an award of compensatory damages for his state and federal claims, without any distinction between the claims. The district court, which exercised both federal question and diversity jurisdiction, calculated prejudgment interest based on a fluctuating federal rate. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the higher rate under state law should have applied. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that “when, as here, the judgment is based equally on federal and state claims, the district court has discretion to decide which rate applies. Because the district court did not err in applying the federal rate, we affirm.” (Mooney v. Roller Bearing Company of America Inc. (9th Cir., June 5, 2025) 138 F.4th 1349.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/05/23-3552.pdf

U.S. Supreme Court Permits Plaintiffs to Amend Complaint Against Bank that Allegedly Aided and Abetted Terrorism.

Plaintiffs are victims and the families of victims of terrorist attacks carried out by Hamas between December 2001 and August 2003. On January 1, 2019, plaintiffs sued petitioner, an international bank, under the Anti-Terrorism Act (18 U.S.C. § 2333) for aiding and abetting Hamas’s commission of the terrorist attacks by providing financial services to customers who were allegedly affiliated with Hamas and who had helped further Hamas’s goals. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the Second Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) includes a catchall provision that allows federal courts to relieve a party from a final judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” The nation’s highest court reversed, stating: “The question presented is whether this rigorous standard applies when a Rule 60(b)(6) movant seeks to reopen a case for the purpose of filing an amended complaint. We hold that it does.” (Blom Bank SAL v. Honickman (U.S., June 5, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1612.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1259_9p6b.pdf

Ninth Circuit’s Finding of Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Reversed by U.S. Supreme Court.

After the parties to an international agreement received an arbitration award, the district court confirmed the award. The Ninth Circuit reversed after finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C. § 1330; FSIA), which provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. The Ninth Circuit held that § 1330(b) also requires that a plaintiff must prove that the foreign state has made minimal contacts with the United States sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, and its progeny, and that plaintiff had not done so here. Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “Personal jurisdiction exists under §1330(b) of the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. Because the Ninth Circuit required more, we reverse the judgment below.” (CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. (U.S., June 5, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1572.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1201_8759.pdf

Wisconsin’s Statute Against Catholic Charities Does Not Survive the Strict Scrutiny Test.

Like many other states, Wisconsin exempts certain religious organizations from paying taxes into the state’s unemployment compensation system. One such exemption covers nonprofits “operated primarily for religious purposes” and controlled, supervised, or principally supported by a church. (Wis. Stat. § 108.02(15)(h)(2) (2023–2024).) Petitioners, Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc., and four entities that it operates, claimed that they qualify for the exemption as religious organizations controlled by the Roman Catholic Diocese of Superior, Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed, holding that petitioners are not “operated primarily for religious purposes” because they neither engage in proselytization nor serve only Catholics in their charitable work. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the Wisconsin statute, as applied to petitioners by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, violated the First Amendment. The nation’s highest court held: “The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between religions and subjects any state-sponsored denominational preference to strict scrutiny. The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s application of § 108.02(15)(h)(2) imposed a denominational preference by differentiating between religions based on theological lines. Because the law’s application does not survive strict scrutiny, it cannot stand.” (Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission (U.S., June 5, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1583.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-154new2_4gdj.pdf

Mexico’s Complaint Against American Gun Manufacturers Not Permitted to Proceed.

The Government of Mexico brought suit against seven American gun manufacturers. Mexico sought to show that the defendant companies participated in the unlawful sale or marketing of firearms. (See 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii).) Mexico alleged that the companies aided and abetted unlawful sales by routing guns to Mexican drug cartels. Concluding that Mexico’s complaint did not plausibly plead the American gun manufacturers engaged in such conduct, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (15 U. S. C. §7902(a); PLCAA) and concluded: “Mexico’s complaint . . . does not plausibly allege such aiding and abetting. So this suit remains subject to PLCAA’s general bar: An action cannot be brought against a manufacturer if, like Mexico’s, it is founded on a third-party’s criminal use of the company’s product.” (Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (U.S., June 5, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1556.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1141_lkgn.pdf

Plaintiff May Proceed with Title VII Claim Even Though She Is Not a Member of a Minority Group.

Plaintiff filed suit against a public agency in Ohio under Title VII, alleging that she was denied a management promotion and demoted because of her sexual orientation; that is, she is heterosexual. She contended she was discriminated against because she is not a lesbian. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a plaintiff, a member of a majority group, must show background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant employer discriminated against the majority. The nation’s highest court held: “We conclude that Title VII does not impose such a heightened standard on majority group plaintiffs.” “By establishing the same protections for every ‘individual’—without regard to that individual’s membership in a minority or majority group—Congress left no room for courts to impose special requirements on majority-group plaintiffs alone.”  (Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services (U.S., June 5, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1540.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1039_c0n2.pdf

HR Manager’s False Representations to New Employee About Meaning of Arbitration Agreement Amounted to Substantive Unconscionability.

Plaintiff’s former employer terminated her, and she sued. The trial court denied defendant’s petition to compel arbitration. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “There was extensive evidence of procedural unconscionability, . . . . Most problematically, in response to [plaintiff’s] statements that she was uncomfortable signing the arbitration agreement as she did not understand it, false representations were made by [defendant’s] HR manager to [plaintiff] about the nature and terms of the agreement. These representations, which specifically and directly contradicted the written terms of the agreement, rendered aspects of the agreement substantively unconscionable. These procedural and substantively unconscionable aspects, taken together, render the agreement unenforceable.” (Velarde v. Monroe Operations, LLC (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 6, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1009.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063626.PDF

City Has to Produce More Recordings Under Public Records Act.

This action involved a request by a television station to obtain public records concerning a police shooting pursuant to the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.). The main issue was how much of the audio and video recordings before and after the incident had to be disclosed. Dissatisfied with the trial court’s ruling, the television station sought extraordinary relief. Granting relief, the Court of Appeal stated the trial court must “determine the extent of additional disclosure required after conducting further proceedings, including an in camera review of the City’s recordings.” (Sacramento Television Stations Inc. v. Superior Court of Placer County (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., June 26, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 984.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C102316M.PDF

Plaintiff May Pursue Action for Negligence Against the National Park Service.

Plaintiff was injured walking across grass in a National Park, allegedly by a dangerous hole that went unrepaired. Plaintiff sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680; FTCA). The district court dismissed the action. Under the FTCA, the government is not liable for the negligent acts of its employees based upon the exercise or performance of a discretionary function or duty. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e hold that the FTCA’s discretionary function exception does not apply because the NPS’s maintenance of a recreational grass lawn was not susceptible to public policy analysis.” (Chang v. United States (9th Cir., Jun. 9, 2025) 139 F.4th 1087.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/09/24-1799.pdf

Standard of Proof Required of Disabled Public School Students to Establish Discrimination.

Plaintiff is a teenage girl who was attending a public school in Minnesota and who has a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning. She requires assistance with everyday tasks like walking and toileting and has seizures throughout the day. School administrators denied her certain educational accommodations and her parents sued on her behalf. The lower courts held plaintiff had not shown school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment” and dismissed the suit. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the lower courts, holding that the standard required of the disabled plaintiff was too high, stating: “We hold today that those challenges do not include having to satisfy a more stringent standard of proof than other plaintiffs to establish discrimination under Title II of the A[mericans with Disabilities Act] and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” (A. J. T. by and through A. T. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279 (U.S., June 12, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1647.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-249_a86c.pdf

Class Action by Disabled Veterans to Proceed in Court.

Plaintiff served honorably in the U.S. Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006. During the first of his two tours of duty in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Soto served in Mortuary Affairs. In that role, Soto “was assigned to ‘search for, recover, and process the remains’ of war casualties.” He struggled to adjust to civilian life following deployment and eventually received a diagnosis for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which his physicians attributed to his combat experiences, finding him 100 percent disabled. He later sought disability compensation, which the Secretary of the Navy approved, but only for six years. Plaintiff filed a class action against the government. The district court granted summary judgment for the class and the Federal Circuit Court reversed. Reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held: “Title 31 U. S. C. §3702, known as the Barring Act, establishes a default settlement regime for certain claims brought against the Government. The Barring Act subjects most claims to a 6-year limitations period. §3702(b)(1). But, the Act includes an exception: If ‘another law’ confers authority to settle a claim against the Government, then that law displaces the Barring Act’s settlement mechanism—including its limitations period—as to that claim. §3702(a). The question before us is whether a law providing ‘[c]ombat-related special compensation’ (CRSC) to qualifying veterans confers authority to settle CRSC claims. 10 U. S. C. §1413a. We hold that it does, and thus that the settlement procedures and limitations established under the Barring Act do not apply to claims for CRSC payments.” (Soto v. United States (U.S., June 12, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1677.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-320_m648.pdf

In Federal Court, a Notice of Appeal Filed Before Reopening Relates Forward.

In federal court civil litigation, filing a notice of appeal too late deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction over the appeal. Litigants who miss the appeal deadline because they do not timely receive the district court’s decision, however, are not without recourse. In such circumstances, Congress has authorized courts to reopen the time to appeal. The question in this case is whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal before the court grants reopening must file a second notice after reopening. The U.S. Supreme Court held: “The answer is no. A notice of appeal filed after the original deadline but before reopening is late with respect to the original appeal period, but merely early with respect to the reopened one. Precedent teaches that a premature notice of appeal, if otherwise adequate, relates forward to the date of the order making the appeal possible. So a notice filed before reopening relates forward to the date reopening is granted, making a second notice unnecessary. Because the Fourth Circuit held otherwise, this Court now reverses.” (Parrish v. United States (U.S., June 12, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1664.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-275_k6gc.pdf

Wrong House Raided.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation raided the wrong house in suburban Atlanta. Officers meant to execute search and arrest warrants at a suspected gang hideout. The house raided was occupied by two adults and a seven-year-old boy. Once inside, after they threw the man onto the ground and the half-naked woman had fallen, officers saw some mail that had a different address than the one they intended to raid. They realized their GPS had taken them to the wrong place. The family sued the government for personal injuries and property damage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court answered several questions regarding sovereign immunity and governmental defenses and then reversed and remanded for the lower courts to reconsider the case in light of the high court’s analysis. (Martin v. United States (U.S., June 12, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1689.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-362_mjn0.pdf

You Can’t Win with the IRS! 

While a taxpayer’s appeal was pending before the tax court, she overpaid her taxes—and the IRS applied those overpayments against her alleged tax liability, thereby eliminating any justification for a levy. Yet the taxpayer wanted the appeal to continue. She still disputed the debt that prompted the levy, and she hoped that a victory before the tax court would force the IRS to refund her overpayments. The U.S. Supreme Court stated about the case: “We must decide whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction to hear Zuch’s appeal once the possibility of a levy was off the table. It did not.” The high court ruled: “Because there was no longer a proposed levy, the Tax Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve questions about Zuch’s disputed tax liability.” (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Zuch (U.S., June 12, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1707.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-416_l5gm.pdf

Indefensible End-Run Around Holdings in Arbitration Cases.

As a class, present and former employees sued employer for various wage and hour claims. At the time plaintiffs started their employment with defendant, each signed the same two contracts—namely, (1) an “Arbitration Agreement”; and (2) an “Employment Agreement.” The Employment Agreement provided that certain actions of special concern to the employer would be filed in federal or state court, that the employee waived objections to venue or jurisdiction, that the employer would be entitled to costs and attorney fees if successful, and other pro-employer provisions. The trial court denied defendant employer’s petition to compel arbitration. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Can an employer (as the stronger party) sidestep this precedent by requiring its employees (as the weaker party) to simultaneously execute two contracts—one that purports to require arbitration of all claims on equal terms, and a second that supersedes the first contract and has terms favoring the employer—if those two contracts, when read together, render the first contract unconscionable? . . . We . . . reject the further defenses raised by the employer in this case to what we view as an indefensible end-run around precedent.” (Silva v. Cross Country Healthcare, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 5, June 13, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1311.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B337435.PDF

School’s Permitting Continued Bullying Cost School District $1,000,000.

Plaintiff was a middle school girl who was bullied. Both the child and her parents repeatedly reported the situation to the school counselor and the principal to no avail. Eventually, they sued, and a jury awarded $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages to plaintiff. The Court of Appeal found that defendant had either waived or failed to develop most of its arguments, and affirmed, stating that “school officials owe a duty to students to supervise their conduct and protect them from harm while on school grounds.” (E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School District (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, June 13, 2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1267.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B325733.PDF

Plaintiffs Allegedly Fired for Disagreeing with School District’s Transgender Policies.

Plaintiffs sued a school district in Oregon and individuals, contending they were terminated for engaging in protected speech and discriminated against on the basis of their religion and viewpoint. Before they were terminated, the school district circulated a gender identity memorandum and guidance on creating a safe and supportive school environment for transgender students that included these words: “Absent circumstances that pose a risk to the safety of students, the District will not prohibit students from accessing restrooms, locker rooms or other facilities which may be separated by gender, that are associated with the student’s preferred gender identity.” The memo also cautioned teachers to be careful and to balance the safety of the student with the district’s obligation to maintain accurate educational records when the student’s parents are not aware of the student’s gender identity preferences. On their own time, plaintiffs created a website that detailed views contrary to the district’s policies and contained proposed legislation contrary to the policies. A few weeks later, plaintiffs used the school’s email to send the website address to others. Two weeks later, plaintiffs were terminated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the district. In a lengthy holding, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and granted in part. (Damiano v. Grants Pass School District (9th Cir., June 17, 2025) 140 F.4th 1117.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/16/23-35288.pdf

Alleged Sexual Assault of Prisoner. 

Plaintiff is in prison in Michigan. He alleged that he was sexually abused by defendant, a prison employee. He also alleged that when he tried to file grievance forms about the abuse, defendant destroyed them and threatened to kill him if he filed more. Plaintiff sued defendant for violating his constitutional rights, including his First Amendment right to file grievances. Defendant responded that plaintiff had failed to exhaust available grievance procedures. The parties agreed that the exhaustion and First Amendment issues were intertwined, because both depended on whether defendant did in fact destroy plaintiff’s grievances and retaliate against him. The question presented was whether a party has a right to a jury trial when that dispute is intertwined with the merits of the underlying suit. The Sixth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial. Affirming the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “[T]he usual practice of the federal courts in cases of intertwinement is to send common issues to the jury. Because nothing in the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act; 42 U. S. C. §1997e(a)] suggests Congress intended to depart from that practice here, we hold that parties are entitled to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim protected by the Seventh Amendment.” (Perttu v. Richards (U.S., June 18, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1793.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1324_2c83.pdf

Law Restricting Sex Transition Treatments for Minors Does Not Violate the Equal Protection Clause. 

An estimated 1.6 million Americans over the age of 13 identify as transgender, meaning that their gender identity does not align with their biological sex. The standards set by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health in 1979 addressed two treatments in particular: hormonal sex reassignment (the use of hormones to induce the development of physical characteristics of the opposite sex); and surgical sex reassignment. In March 2023, Tennessee joined the growing number of states restricting sex transition treatments for minors by enacting the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity (Tenn. Code Ann. § 68–33–101 et seq.). Plaintiffs, three transgender minors, their parents, and a doctor, challenged Tennessee’s law, contending it violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The U.S. Attorney General intervened, arguing the issue is of general public importance. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Tennessee law is not subject to heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause. The high court thereafter held that Tennessee’s law does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. (United States v. Skrmetti (U.S., June 18, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 1816.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-477_2cp3.pdf

No Liability for Dangerous Condition of Public Property Due to a Weather Condition.

Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging the county’s icy parking lot was a dangerous condition of public property within the meaning of Government Code §§ 830 and 835. The trial court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment, ruling it was entitled to the “weather immunity” defense set forth in § 831, which provides in part that a public entity is not liable for “an injury caused by the effect [of weather conditions] on the use of streets and highways.” Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “As it is undisputed that the patch of ice in the parking lot where [plaintiff] slipped and fell was an effect of weather conditions, the County is not liable for [plaintiff’s] injury.” (Tindall v. County of Nevada (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., June 18, 2025) 2025 WL 1702999.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/nonpub/C099205.PDF

Due Process Under the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act in 2019.

Congress passed the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act in 2019. (18 U.S.C. §§ 2333, 2334; PSJVTA.) The act deems the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA)—if they engage in specified conduct—to have consented to personal jurisdiction in civil suits brought in the United States under the Antiterrorism Act. The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether this personal jurisdiction provision violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The nation’s highest court held: “The PSJVTA reasonably ties the assertion of federal jurisdiction over the PLO and PA to conduct that involves the United States and implicates sensitive foreign policy matters within the prerogative of the political branches. We hold that the statute’s provision for personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” (Fuld v. Palestine Liberation Organization (U.S., June 20, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 2090.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-20_f2bh.pdf

ADA Requires a Plaintiff to Show Ability to Perform Job at the Time of an Employer’s Disability-Based Discrimination.

When plaintiff began working as a firefighter, the city offered health insurance until age 65 to anyone who worked in the job for 25 years and to those who retired due to disability. But a few years into the job, the city reduced the promise of health insurance for those who retired due to a disability to only 24 months. Plaintiff retired due to a disability. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act bars employers from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to compensation and other matters. (42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).) The statute defines a “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” (§ 12111(8).) The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a retired employee who does not hold or seek a job is a “qualified individual.” The high court explained: “To sum up, we hold that, to prevail under §12112(a), a plaintiff must plead and prove that she held or desired a job, and could perform its essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, at the time of an employer’s alleged act of disability-based discrimination. A variety of suits involving retirement benefits might well proceed under that rule. But, given how this particular case comes to us, we cannot say that the court of appeals erred in upholding the dismissal of [plaintiff’s] complaint. The judgment of the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed.” (Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida (U.S., June 20, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 2058.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-997_6579.pdf

Fuel Producers Have Standing to Sue the EPA for Approving California’s Regulations Vis-à-Vis Electric Cars.

Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.), the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved California regulations requiring automakers to alter their fleets of new vehicles. Under those California regulations, automakers must manufacture more electric vehicles and fewer gasoline-powered vehicles. The goal is to decrease emissions from the use of gasoline and other liquid fuels. Producers of gasoline and other liquid fuels sued EPA, arguing that EPA’s approval of the California regulations violated the Clean Air Act. The sole issue before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether the fuel producers have standing to maintain their suit. The nation’s highest court held that the fuel producers do have standing to sue. (Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S., June 20, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 2121.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-7_8m58.pdf

Text of Statute Trumps Agency Interpretation. 

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (U. S. C. §227(b)(3)(B); TCPA) provides a private right of action to sue the sender of an unlawful fax for damages or injunctive relief in federal or state court. The TCPA sets a floor of $500 for each unlawful fax. A court may order treble damages if it finds a violation willful or knowing. Defendant is, among other things, a healthcare company. In 2009 and 2010, in an effort to promote its products, defendant’s subsidiary sent unsolicited fax advertisements to various medical practices. Plaintiff received some of those faxes. Plaintiff sued in a class action, requesting damages and an injunction. Meanwhile, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) enacted a regulation interpreting the term “telephone facsimile machine” to exclude online fax services. Under that interpretation, plaintiffs were left with only 12 unsolicited faxes that plaintiffs received on a traditional fax machine. So, the class obtained a damages award of only $6,000. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the lower court was “bound” by the FCC’s interpretation. Reversing and remanding, the U.S. Supreme Court looked at the text of the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and found that there is “no good rationale” for requiring “absolute deference to the agency.” (McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (U.S., June 20, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 2006.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1226_1a72.pdf

President Permitted to Call Up California’s National Guard Pending Appeal. 

In 10 U.S.C. § 12406, Congress authorized the President of the United States to “call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any State” whenever one or more of three conditions are satisfied. In response to disturbances in Los Angeles stemming from federal enforcement of immigration laws, the President invoked § 12406—and only that statute—to order 4,000 members of the National Guard into federal service for 60 days to protect federal personnel performing federal functions and to protect federal property. The State of California and its Governor, Gavin Newsom, sued the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Defense in federal court, alleging defendants’ actions were ultra vires and violated the Tenth Amendment. The district court had issued a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants’ actions. Granting defendants’ stay of the lower court’s action pending appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e are persuaded that, under longstanding precedent interpreting the statutory predecessor to § 12406, our review of that decision must be highly deferential. Affording the President that deference, we conclude that it is likely that the President lawfully exercised his statutory authority under § 12406(3), which authorizes federalization of the National Guard when ‘the President is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.’ . . . Our conclusion that it is likely that the President’s order federalizing members of the California National Guard was authorized under § 12406(3) also resolves the Tenth Amendment claim.” (Newsom v. Trump (9th Cir., June 19, 2025) 2025 WL 1712930.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/19/25-3727.pdf

California’s One-Gun-a-Month Law Held Unconstitutional.

Plaintiffs wanted to buy more than one gun a month in California, but California has a “one-gun-a-month” law that prohibits most people from buying more than one firearm in a 30-day period. The district court held that this law violates the Second Amendment. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “California’s law is facially unconstitutional because possession of multiple firearms and the ability to acquire firearms through purchase without meaningful constraints are protected by the Second Amendment and California’s law is not supported by our nation’s tradition of firearms regulation.” (Nguyen v. Bonta (9th Cir., June 20, 2025) 2025 WL 1718079.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/20/24-2036.pdf

Lawyers Don’t Like Admission Rule Within Ninth Circuit. 

Each of the federal district courts within the Ninth Circuit has adopted local rules requiring an attorney seeking general admission to the district court to be a member of the bar of the state in which the district court is located. Plaintiffs, Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions, sued the United States, the U.S. Attorney General, and certain federal circuit and district judges in the Ninth Circuit, challenging the admission rules on various constitutional, statutory, and procedural grounds. The district court dismissed the challenge.  Affirming, the Ninth Circuit found the rules constitutional. (Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admission v. United States (9th Cir., June 20, 2025) 2025 WL 1717992.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/20/24-2213.pdf

Trial Court Erred in Enforcing Settlement. 

A year after the parties entered into a settlement agreement, one party filed a motion to set aside the settlement, and the other side filed a motion to enforce the settlement. The trial court granted the motion to enforce. The Court of Appeal found that the judge who mediated the settlement did not approve the terms of the settlement; rather those terms were only memorialized before him. It also found the judge who approved the settlement a year later performed an inadequate analysis. Reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeal stated: “In sum, derivative claim settlements require judicial review and approval, evaluating factors similar to those considered in class action settlements. No evidence has been presented that [the trial court judges] undertook such a review.” (Norman v. Strateman (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, June 20, 2025) 2025 WL 1718303.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170356.PDF

Under Federal Law, Husband Must Support Immigrant Wife After Divorce Because He Sponsored Her When She Entered the U.S. 

An American citizen, who married a Nigerian citizen, signed an I-864 affidavit “to ensure than an immigrant does not become a public charge.” Thus, the American became the immigrant’s sponsor. The affidavit signed by the sponsor included these words: “. . . Provide the intending immigrant any support necessary to maintain him or her at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines for his or her household size . . . .” The I-864 affidavit also noted a sponsor’s obligations do not terminate upon divorce. In ordering the husband to support the wife, the family court did not consider the immigrant’s income. Reversing and remanding, the Court of Appeal stated: “[The wife]’s income is relevant in determining the amount [the husband] must pay to satisfy his I-864 obligation.” (In re Marriage of Adeyeye & Faramaye (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 20, 2025) 2025 WL 1720669.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064553.PDF

Plaintiff’s Action Against Seller of Dietary Supplement to Continue in Court. 

Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act), a food’s label must display certain nutritional information, including the amounts of carbohydrates and calories in the food. This information appears in what consumers know as the “Nutrition Facts” panel. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) specifies testing methods for determining the amount of carbohydrates and calories in a food. Generally, a food, including a dietary supplement, is “misbranded” in violation of the Act if its label differs by a specified margin from the results of these tests. The FDA also allows foods containing up to 0.5 grams of carbohydrates to be labeled as zero-carbohydrate, and foods containing up to 5 calories to be labeled as zero-calorie. The Act preempts state laws imposing labeling requirements that are not identical to those of the Act. So consumers can bring claims under state law alleging that foods are mislabeled, but those claims cannot impose liability beyond what the Act requires. Here, plaintiff bought defendant’s dietary supplement and tested it himself to determine the truth of the labeling on the product. His preliminary testing found that the supplement contained significantly more carbohydrates and calories than the label stated. Plaintiff sued defendant for mislabeling. Defendant contended plaintiff did not use the FDA’s testing methods, and the district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Act preempted his claims because he did not plead that he tested the supplement according to the FDA’s sampling process. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We reverse because, even without these sampling allegations, Scheibe’s complaint still allows a court to draw a reasonable inference that ProSupps misbranded the supplement under the Act. Scheibe has not pleaded his state-law claims into preemption.” (Scheibe v. ProSupps USA, LLC (9th Cir., June 23, 2025) 2025 WL 1730272.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/23/23-3300.pdf

Reprehensible Conduct by Attorney Toward Trial Judge Resulted in Court of Appeal Referring Her to the State Bar for Potential Discipline. 

In the midst of trial, plaintiff and plaintiff’s attorney failed to appear, allegedly due to plaintiff’s counsel’s medical condition. Due to a lack of evidence of the medical condition, along with evidence plaintiff’s attorney continued to work on other cases, the trial court dismissed the action. But prior to dismissal, attorney #2 specially appeared on plaintiff’s attorney’s behalf. During these appearances, she made numerous uncivil and disrespectful attacks on the court, including accusing the court of misrepresenting and ignoring evidence, and demonstrating bias. At one point, attorney #2 ordered the court to “stop making any rulings right now,” and also interrupted the court and demanded the court “let me finish.” The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal and also stated about attorney #2, which the trial court had already referred to the State Bar: “Such conduct is reprehensible and untenable, and accordingly, we are referring Mkrtchyan to the State Bar of California for potential disciplinary action.” (Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co., Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 24, 2025) 2025 WL 1742874.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064325.PDF

Prisoner Can Sue Local Prosecutor to Force DNA Testing. 

For nearly 15 years, petitioner has sought DNA testing of evidence that, he says, will help him prove he was never at the scene of the murder he was convicted of committing. When the local prosecutor refused to test the evidence in his custody, petitioner filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that Texas’s procedures for obtaining DNA testing violated his rights under the due process clause. The district court agreed and granted a declaratory judgment to that effect. The Fifth Circuit, however, held that petitioner lacked standing to bring his § 1983 suit, reasoning that, even if a federal court declared Texas’s procedures unconstitutional, the local prosecutor would be unlikely to turn over the physical evidence for DNA testing. Reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court held the holding of the Fifth Circuit “contravenes Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), where this Court decided on analogous facts that another Texas prisoner had standing to sue the local prosecutor who denied him access to DNA testing.” (Gutierrez v. Saenz (U.S., June 26, 2025) 2025 WL 1758506.) https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-7809_3e04.pdf

Individuals May Not Sue State for Violating Medicaid Provision. 

Citing a state law prohibiting the use of its own public funds for abortion, South Carolina announced in July 2018 that Planned Parenthood could no longer participate in the state’s Medicaid program. In response to the South Carolina’s announcement, Planned Parenthood and one of its patients sued the director of the state’s Department of Health and Human Services. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether individual Medicaid beneficiaries may sue state officials for failing to comply with one funding condition spelled out in 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(23)(A). The nation’s highest court held: “Section 1983 permits private plaintiffs to sue for violations of federal spending-power statutes only in ‘atypical’ situations . . . Section 1396a(a)(23)(A) is not such a statute.” (Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic (U.S., June 26, 2025) 2025 WL 1758505.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1275_e2pg.pdf

Websites Publishing Sexually Explicit Material Must Verify the Ages of Its Visitors. 

Texas law prohibits the distribution of sexually explicit content to children. (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 43.24(b).) Although that prohibition may be effective against brick-and-mortar stores, it has proved challenging to enforce against online content. To address this problem, Texas enacted H.B. 1181 (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §129B.001 et seq.), which requires certain commercial websites that publish sexually explicit content to verify the ages of their visitors. This requirement furthers the lawful end of preventing children from accessing sexually explicit content. But it also burdens adult visitors of these websites, who have a First Amendment right to access at least some of the content that the websites publish. Holding the restrictions in H.B. 1181 do not conflict with the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The power to require age verification is within a State’s authority to prevent children from accessing sexually explicit content. H. B. 1181 is a constitutionally permissible exercise of that authority.” (Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton (U.S., June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1773625.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1122_3e04.pdf

Prince & Knight Cannot Be Taught in Elementary School. 

The County Board of Education of Montgomery in Maryland introduced a variety of “LGBTQ+- inclusive” storybooks into the elementary school curriculum. One of the stories in the curriculum is about a prince whose parents want to match him with a bride, but the prince falls into the embrace of a knight, after the two finish battling a fearsome dragon. The board told parents that it will not give them notice when the books are going to be used and that their children’s attendance during those periods is mandatory. A group of parents from diverse religious backgrounds sued to enjoin those policies, asserting the new curriculum, combined with the board’s decision to deny opt outs, impermissibly burdens their religious exercise. Agreeing with the parents/plaintiffs, the U.S. Supreme Court held: “Today, we hold that the parents have shown that they are entitled to a preliminary injunction. A government burdens the religious exercise of parents when it requires them to submit their children to instruction that poses ‘a very real threat of undermining’ the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill. [] And a government cannot condition the benefit of free public education on parents’ acceptance of such instruction. Based on these principles, we conclude that the parents are likely to succeed in their challenge to the Board’s policies.” (Mahmoud v. Taylor (U.S., June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1773627.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-297_4f14.pdf

The FCC Retained Decision-Making Authority When It Hired a Private Company, So Nondelegation Clause Is Not Violated. 

A consumer research company contended the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) violated the nondelegation doctrine found in Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Nearly a century ago, Congress charged the then-new FCC with making communications services available, at affordable prices, to all Americans. That objective became known as “universal service.” To carry out a mandate from Congress, the FCC enlisted a private corporation to help it manage the mandate. Ruling for the FCC, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “Congress sufficiently guided and constrained the discretion that it lodged with the FCC to implement the universal-service contribution scheme. And the FCC, in its turn, has retained all decision-making authority within that sphere, relying on the [private corporation] only for non-binding advice. Nothing in those arrangements, either separately or together, violates the Constitution.” (Federal Communications Commission v. Consumers’ Research (U.S., June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1773630.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-354_0861.pdf

Appointments Clause Not Violated. 

This case concerns the Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution. The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, an entity within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues public recommendations about preventive healthcare services—for example, cancer and diabetes screenings. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether appointment of task force members by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the appointments clause in Article II. Deciding the task force members are removable at will by the Secretary of HHS, the high court held: “Task Force members are supervised and directed by the Secretary, who in turn answers to the President, preserving the chain of command in Article II. []As a result, appointment of Task Force members by the Secretary of HHS is consistent with the Appointments Clause.” (Kennedy v. Braidwood Management, Inc. (U.S., June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1773628.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-316_869d.pdf

No More Nationwide (Universal) Injunctions by Federal District Courts. 

The President issued Executive Order No. 14160, that identifies circumstances in which a person born in the United States is not “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” as stated in the Fourteenth Amendment in section 1: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The executive order sets forth the “policy of the United States” to no longer issue or accept documentation of citizenship in two scenarios: “(1) when [a] person’s mother was unlawfully present in the United States and the person’s father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth, or (2) when [a] person’s mother’s presence in the United States was lawful but temporary, and the person’s father was not a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident at the time of said person’s birth.” Three district courts (Maryland, Massachusetts, and Washington) enjoined implementation of the executive order. Ruling for the President, not on the citizenship issue but on the issue of nationwide injunctions, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The Government’s applications to partially stay the preliminary injunctions are granted, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.” “When a court concludes the Executive Branch has acted unlawfully, the answer is not for the court to exceed its power, too.” (Trump v. CASA, Inc. (U.S., July 2, 2025) 2025 WL 1773631.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a884diff2_hgdj.pdf

Award of Attorney Fees Against Client Abandoned by Her Attorney Reversed. 

At the time a business case was set to go to trial, unbeknownst to the plaintiff, her lawyer had been rendered inactive and ineligible to practice law by the State Bar of California while disciplinary proceedings against him were pending. Defendants’ attorneys and the trial court were aware of the situation when they requested and secured more than $70,000 in attorney fees against plaintiff. Reversing the award of fees, the Court of Appeal noted that a client abandoned by her attorney is not the same as a self-represented litigant and stated: “[A]n attorney whom the State Bar of California has made involuntarily inactive and ineligible to practice law meets the definition of an attorney who has been ‘removed or suspended’ for purposes of [Code of Civil Procedure] section 286. And any party who becomes aware that an opponent’s attorney has been made involuntarily inactive and ineligible to practice law by the State Bar must promptly give notice to his or her opponent under section 286. We also hold that trial courts, when notified of an attorney’s involuntarily inactive status, are encouraged to order counsel to issue section 286 notice to the affected party before further proceedings may be taken against him or her.” (Prato v. Gioia (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1777269.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064139.PDF

Prejudgment Interest Adds Up. 

In 2018, a jury found for plaintiff International Current Technologies on its cause of action for conversion against defendant and awarded International $550,000 in damages. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the award was not supported by the evidence. The trial court denied the motion as to the conversion claim but ordered a new trial on other issues. Litigation continued over the next six years. Then, in 2024, plaintiff moved for prejudgment interest on its damages award from the date of the 2018 jury verdict. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment for plaintiff with $222,893.08 in prejudgment interest. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) the $550,000 damages award was not supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court erred in concluding otherwise when it denied defendant’s motion for a new trial on the cause of action and (2) the trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest from the date of the jury verdict on that claim. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Here, we see no basis for International to bear the loss of use of its $550,000 damages award during the six-year period before judgment was entered.” (International Currency Technologies v. ICT, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 2, June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1776555.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170714.PDF

Truck Manufacturer’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issues of Causation and Duty Should Not Have Been Granted. 

In a wrongful death action involving a traffic collision in which both the driver of a commercial truck and the truck’s manufacturer are defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendants on the issues of proximate cause and duty. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “[P]laintiffs do not dispute that the truck driver was a proximate cause of their mother’s death. But they allege that the truck’s defective design was a proximate cause too. And considering their evidence . . . we conclude that proximate cause should have remained a question for the jury, as is ordinarily the case. . . . That is not to say that commercial truck manufacturers have a duty to install collision avoidance systems in every case, as Daimler Trucks fears. It is to say only that they must exercise due care when choosing whether to install these systems.” (Ortiz v. Daimler Truck North America LLC (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., June 24, 2025) 2025 WL 1778776.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C100034.PDF

What Does It Mean When Police Officers Bend Their Badges? 

In 2020, allegations surfaced that certain officers within the Vallejo Police Department were bending a point of their star-shaped badge after using potentially lethal fire power during a police action. The department promptly retained an independent third party to investigate the alleged practice, but did not make the results of the investigation public. The American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU) filed a request for records related to the investigation, including the written report prepared by the investigator, under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 7921.000 et seq.). The department released some records but maintained the bulk of the materials sought—including the investigative report—are confidential peace-officer personnel records statutorily exempt from public disclosure. The ACLU filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court challenging the sufficiency of the department’s response. The trial court ordered disclosure of portions of the investigative report and related materials with identifying information regarding officers and witnesses, and their families, redacted. Neither party was satisfied with the superior court’s ruling, and both sought writ review in the Court of Appeal, which held: “We conclude the documents sought are not confidential personnel records, but instead personnel records that are now subject to public disclosure under [Penal Code]) section 832.7, subdivision (b). We further conclude the redaction of officer names cannot be sustained on the grounds relied on by the superior court. However, given the magnitude of the potentially disclosable materials in these proceedings, and the minimal briefing by the parties on issues of redaction, we shall remand for further proceedings in this regard.” (City of Vallejo v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 1, June 27, 2025) 2025 WL 1779193.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A171451.PDF

Once Again, the Court Declines to Extend Bivens. 

This case began when prison officials at the U.S. Penitentiary in Lee County, Virginia, ordered that plaintiff Andrew Fields be placed in solitary confinement. Prison officials monitored Fields while he was isolated. Fields alleged that during their periodic checks, officials would “physically abuse” him. Plaintiff sued the Bureau of Prisons, the prison warden, and several prison officials in federal court for damages, claiming that certain prison officials used excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the action, and the Fourth Circuit reversed. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents (1971) 403 U. S. 388, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages against federal officers for certain alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. The Court subsequently recognized two additional contexts where implied Bivens causes of action were permitted, neither of which was an Eighth Amendment excessive-force claim. Since 1980, Bivens cases have made clear that, in all but the most unusual circumstances, prescribing a cause of action is a job for Congress, not the courts. Reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court stated: “For the past 45 years, this Court has consistently declined to extend Bivens to new contexts. . . . We do the same here.” (Goldey v. Fields (U.S., June 30, 2025) 2025 WL 1787625.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24-809_9o6b.pdf

Federal Court Held to Lack Jurisdiction Under the Military Commissions Act. 

Plaintiff was captured in Pakistan in March 2002. At the time, United States intelligence officials suspected he was a leader of Al Qaeda, the terrorist network that killed nearly 3,000 people in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Plaintiff was transferred to a secret prison or “black site” run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) where, he alleges, he endured an experimental program of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” that amounted to torture. Defendants contracted with the CIA to design that program. They allegedly subjected plaintiff to these enhanced interrogation techniques over seventeen days. Plaintiff sued defendants under the Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C. § 1350) seeking damages for the injuries he suffered during his detention and interrogations. A federal court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss for several reasons, including that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act of 2006. (28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2); MCA), which Act denies federal courts jurisdiction over certain actions relating to the detention and treatment of enemy combatants by the United States and its agents. Affirming dismissal of the action, the Ninth Circuit stated: “It is undisputed that Zubaydah’s claims relate to his detention and treatment by Defendants and that he has been designated an enemy combatant. We hold that the complaint also establishes that Defendants were agents of the United States for Zubaydah’s claims. Therefore, the MCA denied the district court jurisdiction over this case.” (Husayn v. Mitchell (9th Cir., June 30, 2025) 2025 WL 1789956.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/06/30/24-1468.pdf

Denial of Petition to Arbitrate Prop 65 Claim Affirmed. 

Plaintiff filed two actions under Proposition 65, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Health and Saf. Code, § 25249.5 et seq). Both actions related to consumer products purchased online from defendant. The trial court denied defendant’s petitions to arbitrate the matters under the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1; FAA), based on an arbitration provision to which consumers must agree as part of the online purchase process. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We hold that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate a Proposition 65 claim against a seller of consumer products simply because an agent of the plaintiff previously agreed to arbitrate disputes with the seller when purchasing the products online. The plaintiff’s agent was not acting on behalf of the state, the real party in interest, when purchasing the products, and thus the agent could not bind the state to arbitration. Accordingly, arbitration was properly denied here on the basis that no agreement to arbitrate the Proposition 65 claims was formed.” (Consumer Advocacy Group, Inc. v. Walmart, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 1, June 30, 2025) 2025 WL 1792692.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169022.PDF

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