Litigation

Litigation Update: August 2025

Litigation Section Litigation Update

A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.

  • Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
  • Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
  • Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young

Our Updates:

Personal Jurisdiction in Class Action Under the FLSA. 

Plaintiffs are a group of current and former employees who sued their employer in a class action, alleging wage and hour violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. § 216(b); FLSA). The district court granted preliminary class certification and approved notice to a group of prospective opt-in plaintiffs. Reversing and remanding, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because the district court authorized nationwide notice on the mistaken assumption that it would not need to assess specific personal jurisdiction on a claim-by-claim basis, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . we vacate and remand for the district court to reassess its preliminary certification in light of our holding that Bristol-Myers [Squibb Company v. Superior Court (2017) 582 U.S. 255] applies to FLSA collective actions.” (Harrington v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. (9th Cir., July 1, 2025) 142 F.4th 678.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/01/24-1979.pdf

Different Summary Judgment Twist. 

One man was injured and another killed when a steel structure failed on a job site. Their families sued various defendants, including Wiseman + Rohy Structural Engineers (WRSE) and Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC (Balfour). Balfour then filed cross-claims against RND Contractors, Inc. (RND). When WRSE moved for summary judgment, plaintiffs responded by filing statements of non-opposition to the motion. RND and Balfour, however, opposed the motion, arguing that WRSE was at least partially liable for plaintiffs’ damages. The trial court refused to consider RND and Balfour’s oppositions, finding that they “lacked standing” to oppose WRSE’s motion for summary judgment because RND and Balfour had not filed cross-claims against WRSE. The trial court then granted WRSE’s effectively unopposed motion. When the matter reached the Court of Appeal, it noted this case raised an issue of first impression under California law: when a defendant moves for summary judgment, but the plaintiff does not oppose the motion, may another party oppose the motion? Issuing a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order granting WRSE’s motion for summary judgment and to reconsider the motion, the Court of Appeal held: “We hold that the party may do so if that party and the defendant are adverse to one another. We further hold that there need not be cross-claims between those parties for them to be adverse to one another.” (RND Contractors, Inc. v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, July 1, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 697.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E084508.PDF

School District Immune from Off-Campus Student Death. 

A mother hired Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) employee Tyler Martin-Brand to babysit her six-year-old son at Martin-Brand’s home during the winter break in 2019. When Martin-Brand brought the boy home, the boy was “expiring.” He died later that day from blunt trauma caused by physical beating. The mother sued LAUSD on the theory that it negligently hired and supervised Martin-Brand. A jury agreed and awarded the mother $30 million in damages. On review, the Court of Appeal noted that LAUSD policy prohibited LAUSD employees from interacting with students off campus except during school-sponsored activities. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude LAUSD is immune from liability for Dayvon’s off-campus death pursuant to Education Code section 44808.” (Taylor v. Los Angeles Unified School District (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, June 9, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 769.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B333718.PDF

If Extremely Good Cause Is Shown, District Attorneys May Be Ordered to Produce a PMQ. 

The district attorneys of four counties brought a civil enforcement action on behalf of the People, challenging a trial court discovery ruling by petition for writ of mandate. Specifically, they disputed that they may be required to designate a person most qualified (PMQ) and asked the Court of Appeal find as a matter of first impression to find that the People are not a person or entity subject to deposition under Code of Civil Procedure § 2025.010. Issuing extraordinary relief, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e reject the notion that the People (through PMQs) may never be deposed, but Credit One must first demonstrate ‘extremely’ good cause’ for the deposition. [Citation.] The trial court did not apply this standard. [¶] . . . ¶] Let a writ of mandate issue directing the respondent Superior Court of Riverside County to (1) vacate its order denying the People’s motion for a protective order and (2) reconsider the motion in accordance with this opinion.” (People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, July 3, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 804.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E084854.PDF

Car Manufacturer Not Entitled to Arbitration Based on Arbitration Clause in Contract Between Buyer and Dealership. 

Defendant Ford Motor Company claimed it was entitled to compel arbitration by relying on an arbitration clause in the sales contracts between the buyers and seller dealerships. Although acknowledging that arbitration agreements are creatures of contract, and that it was not a party to these sales contracts, Ford argued plaintiffs should be estopped from pursuing their remedies in court under an approach put forward in Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1717, and its progeny. Under that analysis, if a plaintiff sues a third party to assert a claim that is “intimately founded in and intertwined with” a contractual provision, that third party may move to compel arbitration of the claim even though that third party is a stranger to the contract. The California Supreme Court held: “Ford seeks to invoke an arbitration clause in a dispute flowing, not from the contract where the arbitration clause appears, but from obligations imposed by statute or conventional fraud duties. As plaintiffs’ claims are not intimately founded in or intertwined with the sales contracts, plaintiffs should not be estopped from pursuing their remedies against Ford in court.” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases (Cal., July 3, 2025) 17 Cal.5th 1122.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S279969.PDF

Attorney Disbarred. 

The Hearing Department of the State Bar Court found attorney Drexel Andrew Bradshaw culpable of three counts of misconduct: engaging in a scheme to defraud under Business & Professions Code § 6106; breach of fiduciary duty under § 6068, subdivision (a); and three willful and intentional misrepresentations under § 6106. Bradshaw was appointed by the court as an elderly woman’s conservator. The California Supreme Court listed the many actions Bradshaw undertook and ruled against Bradshaw, stating: “Based on an independent review of the record, we find Bradshaw culpable of multiple counts of misconduct involving moral turpitude and conclude that disbarment is necessary to protect the public and the integrity of the legal profession.” (In re Bradshaw (Cal., July 3, 2025) 17 Cal.5th 1095.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S282314.PDF

Attorney Sanctions Affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. 

Women who alleged they had been repeatedly sexually molested as young girls in the 1970s and 80s by Jehovah’s Witnesses officials sued two Jehovah’s Witnesses corporations. One of the defendant corporations, WTPA, moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The sole evidentiary basis for WTPA’s motion was an affidavit signed by attorney Philip Brumley. In the affidavit, Brumley identified himself as “General Counsel for defendant Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society of Pennsylvania” and stated that “[i]n this role, I have direct knowledge of the information contained in this Affidavit.” The majority of Brumley’s statements in the affidavit were made in the present tense. Plaintiffs produced evidence that raised questions as to whether Brumley’s present-tense statements in his affidavit would be true if applied to the relevant period, the 1970s and 80s. The district court ordered jurisdictional discovery. Plaintiffs served WTPA with a motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found the information collected by plaintiffs demonstrated “that in past decades WTPA played a more involved and pivotal role in the operation of Jehovah’s Witness congregations” than what Brumley had stated, and that “Brumley, as General Counsel for WTPA, should have been able to access the information at the time he made his sworn statements.” The court held that “Brumley’s actions demonstrate, at minimum, a reckless disregard for providing an accurate and truthful accounting of WTPA’s role” and that his conduct represented “a conscious decision to provide only a limited depiction of WTPA’s corporate activities” and “permitted WTPA to file its motion to dismiss that then multiplied the proceedings for 17 months through jurisdictional discovery and motions to compel.” The district court sanctioned Brumley under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and ordered him to personally satisfy $158,448.11 in excess costs, expenses, and fees incurred by plaintiffs as a result of his affidavit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. (Rowland v. Watchtower & Bible Tract Society (9th Cir., July 7, 2025) 142 F.4th 1169.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/07/24-5196.pdf

An Elected Official May Not Invoke Whistleblower Protections of Labor Code § 1102.5. 

Plaintiff was the elected treasurer of a city. She wrote to the city and several of its officials raising concerns about the city’s financial affairs, particularly the mayor’s approval of an overpayment to a contractor. Thereafter, she contended she was retaliated against and sued the city, its mayor, and its council members for retaliation under Labor Code § 1102.5. The trial court denied defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, and the Court of Appeal reversed. The California Supreme Court noted that Labor Code § 1102.5 provides whistleblower protections to employees, but does not define “employee.” The Supreme Court held: “We conclude such an elected official may not invoke the statute’s protections. Because the Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion, we affirm its judgment.” (Brown v. City of Inglewood (Cal., July 7, 2025) 17 Cal.5th 33.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S280773.PDF

The Court May Not Compel Prosecutor to Make an Extradition Decision. 

This case involves the authority of the trial court in a bail bond forfeiture proceeding under Penal Code § 1305, subdivision (g), where the surety located the defendant and filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture shortly before the expiration of the appearance period, but the prosecution had not made an extradition decision nor agreed to tolling. At issue is whether the trial court may compel the prosecution to make an extradition decision or whether it must continue the hearing on the motion as a matter of law to allow time for the prosecution to make an extradition decision. The California Supreme Court ruled: “We conclude that section 1305 does not authorize the trial court to compel the prosecution to make an extradition decision or require the court to continue the hearing date on the motion to vacate until the prosecution makes such a decision. The plain language and legislative history of section 1305 indicate that prosecuting agencies have exclusive control over the extradition decision. The trial court, thus, is not empowered to compel the prosecution to make an extradition decision. Further, the statute provides no basis to require the trial court to continue the hearing on the motion to vacate until the prosecution makes an extradition decision.” (People v. The North River Insurance Company (Cal., July 7, 2025) 18 Cal.5th 1.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S282020.PDF

“Headless” PAGA Claims Allowed to Proceed. 

This case analyzed whether this text of the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) authorized an aggrieved employee to bring a lawsuit that sought to recover civil penalties imposed for Labor Code violations suffered only by other employees. The Court of Appeal held: “This type of PAGA action is referred to as ‘headless’ because the employee prosecuting the action has abandoned the claims for civil penalties imposed for violations the employee suffered personally. The reason an employee would abandon the so-called ‘individual PAGA claims’ is to avoid arbitrating them under the Federal Arbitration Act [citation] as interpreted by Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639 . . . [¶] . . . [H]eadless PAGA actions were among the choices allowed the [Labor and Workforce Development Agency’s] representatives.” (CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 5th Dist., July 8, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F088569.PDF

No Attorney Fees for Whistleblower Plaintiff When Same-Decision Defense Prevails. 

Under Labor Code § 1102.51, an employee successful in a whistleblower action is entitled to attorney fees. The statute affords employers an affirmative defense, however, if they prove the alleged retaliatory action “would have occurred for legitimate, independent reasons” had the employee not been a whistleblower. This type of defense is commonly known as a “same-decision defense.” Here, plaintiff proved the elements of a whistleblower retaliation claim, but defendant employer established the affirmative defense and plaintiff obtained no relief. The trial court nevertheless awarded plaintiff his attorney’s fees. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We must decide if Lampkin has brought a ‘successful action’ under section 1102.5, and is therefore entitled to a fee award. We hold an employee’s action is not successful if the defendant employer has established the same-decision defense and the plaintiff obtains no relief.” (Lampkin v. County of Los Angeles (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 4, July 8, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 920.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B336806.PDF

Local Rule Contrary to Statute. 

Owners of land adjacent to airport property sought to impose an easement across the airport property. Trial was originally set for May 2, 2025. On November 14, 2024, petitioners reserved an April 1, 2025, hearing date for their motion for summary judgment (MSJ) through the Riverside Court Reservation System. Per statutory requirements, petitioners filed the motion and served it on the parties on January 10, 2025, 81 days before the hearing date and more than 30 days before trial. But the local rule required the moving papers to be filed no later than ten days after the party reserves the date, or the reservation would be cancelled. When petitioners failed to file the papers according to the requirements of the local rule, the court cancelled the hearing date. Later, the court denied petitioner’s motion to specially set. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ in the first instance, stating: “We are sympathetic to the difficulty trial courts face when trying to manage what is often an unwieldy calendar, and our decision should not be construed as a challenge to the validity of Local Rule 3310. Nonetheless, where the rule is applied in such a way that it prevents a timely filed MSJ from being heard, case law requires that the trial court make accommodations so the matter may be considered on its merits.” (CFP BDA, LLC v. Superior Court (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, May 2, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1006.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085583.PDF

Remember Summers v. Tice from Law School?

While driving his Ferrari on a street in Dana Point, plaintiff ran over and dragged with the underside of his vehicle one or more large rocks that had rolled onto the roadway from the adjacent slope, causing extensive damage to his car and unspecified personal injuries. Unable to determine the precise location from which the rocks fell, plaintiff elected to sue multiple parties, each of whom owned a portion of the slope, for negligence and premises liability. One defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on the opinion of an expert who stated that “the physical location of the rocks prior to the accident will never be known with certainty” and that the rocks “could have come from any number of properties.” Plaintiff opposed the motion with an expert declaration stating that “the subject rocks . . . likely came from one of the three Defendants’ properties.” The trial court granted summary judgment. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We affirm. Hutchinson met her initial burden pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2) of showing plaintiffs cannot prove the element of causation as to both of their causes of action. The burden then shifted to plaintiffs to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to (1) whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or, alternatively, (2) whether Hutchinson and the other owners of the adjacent hillside acted negligently in maintaining their slopes such that the burden of proof on the issue of causation would shift to defendants at trial under Summers [v. Tice (1948) 33 Cal.2d 80]. Because plaintiffs did neither, Hutchinson was entitled to summary judgment. (Mitchell v. Hutchinson (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 11, 2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1012.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063331.PDF

No Trademark Infringement. 

Nature’s Way Products (NWP) has long owned the U.S. trademark “Nature’s Way” for use on its well-known nutritional supplements. Competitor Doctor’s Best (DB) recently developed a new line of branded supplements, “Nature’s Day” and sought a U.S. trademark. In response to DB’s suit for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement, NWP asserted a counterclaim for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.). The district court granted summary judgment to DB. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e agree with the district court that no rational jury could find that DB’s domestic conduct infringed NWP’s protected trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act.” (Doctor’s Best, Inc. v. Nature’s Way Products, LLC (9th Cir., July 15, 2025) 143 F.4th 1101.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/15/24-2719.pdf

Partial Stay on “Remain in Mexico” Policy. 

This case questions whether the present presidential administration’s “Remain in Mexico” policy violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under this country’s asylum laws pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The district court issued a nationwide stay of the policy, and the federal government filed an immediate appeal of the stay, contending an emergency. Partially granting the government’s emergency motion for a stay pending appeal, the Ninth Circuit held: “At this stage in the litigation, we agree that limiting the district court’s order to ImmDef’s current and future clients is the more equitable approach ‘to preserve status [and] rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings,’ 5 U.S.C. § 705.” (Immigrant Defenders Law Center v. Noem (9th Cir., July 18, 2025) 2025 WL 2080742.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/18/25-2581.pdf

Forum Selection Clause Upheld. 

A corporation’s minority stockholder sued the corporation, its controlling stockholder, and associated individuals for various causes of action. Defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground of forum non conveniens. They relied on the corporation’s certificate of incorporation and bylaws, which contain mandatory forum selection clauses requiring most stockholder lawsuits against the corporation and related individuals to be brought in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The trial court denied defendants’ motion, and the Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of mandate. Both courts held that the forum selection clauses were unenforceable, reasoning that, if plaintiff’s claims were litigated in California, plaintiff would have a right to a jury trial, but the Delaware Court of Chancery does not recognize a similar right. Reversing, the California Supreme Court stated: “A forum selection clause is not unenforceable simply because it requires the parties to litigate in a jurisdiction that does not afford civil litigants the same right to trial by jury as litigants in California courts enjoy.” (EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Diego County (Cal., July 21, 2025) 2025 WL 2027272.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S282521.PDF

No Attorney Fees for Prevailing Party Married to Attorney Who Represented Both of Them. 

Where a litigant purports to retain his or her attorney-spouse to represent him or her on a claim or defense shared with the spouse, under what circumstances, if any, can the litigant recover prevailing party attorney fees for work on the case performed by the attorney-spouse? The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of prevailing party attorney fees to the spouse of an attorney, stating: “[T]he the critical question is whether ‘a true attorney-client relationship exists between spouses.’” Here, plaintiff “failed to present facts sufficient to establish the existence of a true attorney-client relationship.” (Gogal v. Deng (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, July 22, 2025) 2025 WL 2046177.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D084405.PDF

In a Pre-Dispute Agreement, the Parties Capped Prevailing Party Costs and Fees at $1,000. 

Code of Civil Procedure § 1032, subdivision (b), gives prevailing parties in lawsuits the right to recover from opposing parties’ certain litigation-related costs. Civil Code § 3513 states the general principle that anyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for their benefit. In a landlord-tenant dispute, the lease capped recoverable costs and fees at $1,000. The trial court awarded $14,000 in costs. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “The apparently novel question presented by this appeal is whether parties to a contract may, by agreement entered into before a contract dispute arises, waive in whole or in part their statutory right to recover litigation costs under section 1032(b). In part by analyzing the interplay between section 1032 and Civil Code section 3513, we conclude the answer is yes.” (Gogal v. Deng (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, July 22, 2025) 2025 WL 2046177.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D084405.PDF

Court of Appeal Reversed Trial Court’s 82.9 Percent Reduction of Fees and Costs. 

The parties reached a settlement concerning problems with an automobile, which included an award of attorney fees and costs, pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.). Plaintiff sought an award in the total amount of $82,719.33, consisting of $74,275 in attorney fees and $8,444.33 in costs. The trial court awarded plaintiff a total of $15,000 in fees and costs, a reduction of 82.9 percent. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude the court erred in applying hourly attorney rates prevailing in Fresno County and abused its discretion by failing to properly apply the lodestar method and to specify the amount of costs. We therefore reverse the court’s award of attorney fees and costs and remand with directions to recalculate Tidrick’s award.” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, June 26, 2025) 2025 WL 2048398.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063186.PDF

Prospective Adoptive Parent’s Request for Injunction of LGBTQ Policy to Be Granted. 

The Oregon Department of Human Services requires that prospective parents applying to adopt children from foster care must agree to “respect, accept, and support” the children’s sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. The state denied plaintiff’s application under this policy after plaintiff, based on her sincerely held religious beliefs, objected to using adopted children’s preferred pronouns or taking them to medical appointments for gender transitions. Plaintiff is now prohibited from adopting any child in the state’s care. Plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, to enjoin Oregon from applying its policy. The district court denied her request. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We hold that Oregon’s policy violates the First Amendment as applied to Bates. We reverse the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief and direct that a preliminary injunction be entered.” (Bates v. Pakseresht (9th Cir., July 24, 2025) 2025 WL 2079875.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/24/23-4169.pdf

Disturbing One’s Peace Can Support a Domestic Violence Restraining Order. 

X.K., a Chinese emigrant, and M.C., a United States citizen, married and had a child in November 2017 in California. The next year, they returned to China, but came back to California in 2022. When they previously lived in California and China, M.C. physically beat and attacked X.K. When they returned to California, there were no more physical beatings, but M.C. and his father verbally abused X.K. Sometimes things were thrown, but did not strike X.K. In 2023, X.K. took the child and went to a domestic violence shelter. X.K. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order, which the trial court denied. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Behaviors that can be enjoined under [Fam. Code] section 6320 include ‘molesting, attacking, striking, stalking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering . . . harassing, telephoning . . . or disturbing the peace of the other party.’ [] The last phrase, ‘disturbing the peace,’ is itself a broad category of abuse under the DVPA [Domestic Violence Prevention Act]. The term ‘refers to conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.’ ([Fam. Code] § 6320, subds. (a), (c).).” (X.K. v. M.C. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, June 25, 2025) 2025 WL 2079528.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170020M.PDF

Trial Court Erred in Denying Petition for Class Certification. 

The trial court denied a petition for class certification in an action alleging some insurance companies denied plaintiffs’ car accident claims and rescinded their automobile insurance policies. The trial court explained the petition was denied because plaintiffs did not present a palpable trial plan for resolving the issue of damages for the 1,032 insureds. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “In short, the court’s concerns about damages are not a sufficient basis for denying class certification, and the court did not properly consider the substantial benefit element.” (Cobos v. National General Insurance Company (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, July 25, 2025) 2025 WL 2080748.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063086.PDF

Even Solvent Insurance Companies Must Obtain the Consent of the California Insurance Commissioner Before Merging with Another Company. 

The trial court granted the California Insurance Commissioner’s application to be appointed the conservator for defendant insurance company after defendant attempted, without the commissioner’s consent, to merge with a newly formed New Mexico corporation to re-domesticate in that state in violation of Insurance Code § 1011. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We agree that this case appears to be the first decision dealing with a conservatorship involving an insurer not in financial distress. However, the absence of a precedent directly on point demonstrates only that before CIC, solvent insurers were careful to obtain the necessary approval before placing their business at risk of conservatorship. While the conservatorship system does replace the bankruptcy system for insurers, who are excluded from federal bankruptcy, that does not mean that only bankrupt or insolvent insurers can be placed under conservatorship.” (Lara v. California Insurance Company (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, July 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2058313.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170622.PDF

Case Under Lanham Act Dismissed Because Work Was Used “Soley in an [E]xpressive [M]anner.” 

Plaintiff sued, claiming that an animated version of her likeness appears in a single ten-second scene as well as the official teaser and still image promoting a streaming series, and that the unauthorized use of her image led viewers to believe she endorsed the series. She brought three causes of action for unfair competition and false endorsement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127), as well as state court claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding the depictions were expressive works entitled to First Amendment protection and that plaintiff failed to state a claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “In light of the Supreme Court’s narrow decision in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC, 599 U.S. 140 (2023), does the Rogers test [under Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989)] apply to a trademark infringement claim involving an animated television series where the allegedly infringing mark was not used to designate the source or origin of the show? . . . the answer is yes. . . . Here, Defendants used [plaintiff’’s] image and likeness solely in an expressive manner to lend reality to the setting where part of the series takes place, not to designate [plaintiff] as the source or origin of Q-Force.” (Hara v. Netflix, Inc. (9th Cir., July 28, 2025) 2025 WL 2102547.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/28/23-3768.pdf

Husband’s Suit Against His Wife’s Family Law Attorney Tossed Under the Anti-SLAPP Statute. 

The wife in marital dissolution proceedings hired the attorney who is the defendant in the instant case to represent her. The wife paid defendant by using a joint credit card that was in her name and her husband’s name. The husband is the plaintiff in the instant action. The husband initiated a charge back dispute and sued the attorney for libel, negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The attorney filed a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, which the trial court denied. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We agree with [the attorney] that the trial court incorrectly determined that [the husband’s] claims do not arise out of litigation activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute . . . .” (Michael K. v. Cho (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, July 28, 2025) 2025 WL 2102864.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169917.PDF

Previously we reported:

Exaction by a County in Exchange For Building a Home. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Sheetz v. County of El Dorado (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, stating: “George Sheetz applied to the County of El Dorado, California, for a permit to build a modest manufactured house on his property. Pursuant to legislation enacted by the County, and as the condition of obtaining the permit, Mr. Sheetz was required to pay a monetary exaction of $23,420 to help finance unrelated road improvements. The County demanded payment in spite of the fact that it made no individualized determination that the exaction—a substantial sum for Mr. Sheetz—bore an ‘essential nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ to the purported impacts associated with his modest project . . .. The question presented is whether a permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan [v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n (1987) 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)] and Dolan [v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374, 391] simply because it is authorized by legislation.” (Sheetz v. County of El Dorado (U.S., Sept. 29, 2023) 144 S.Ct. 477.)

Next:

County’s “Exaction” of Money in Exchange for a Building Permit Held Unconstitutional. To address traffic congestion, El Dorado County’s General Plan requires developers to pay a traffic impact fee as a condition of receiving a building permit. Here, plaintiff wanted to build a small, prefabricated home on his residential parcel of land. To obtain a permit, he had to pay a substantial fee to mitigate local traffic congestion. Plaintiff challenged the fee as an unlawful “exaction” of money under the Takings Clause. The California Court of Appeal 84 Cal.App.5th 394, herein vacated] rejected that argument because the traffic impact fee was imposed by legislation, and, according to the court, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, (U.S., 1987) 483 U. S. 825 and Dolan v. City of Tigard (U.S., 1994) 512 U. S. 374 apply only to permit conditions imposed on an ad hoc basis by administrators. Holding in favor of plaintiff, the U. S. Supreme Court stated: “That is incorrect. The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions.” (Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California (U.S., Apr. 12, 2024) 601 U.S. 267.)

The latest:

The case once again came before the California Court of Appeal. That court held: “Upon further analysis as directed by the Supreme Court, we now conclude that the challenged permit condition (TIM fee) does not constitute an unlawful monetary exaction under the Nollan/Dolan test. The legislatively formulated generally applicable impact fee is not an unconstitutional condition imposed on land use in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.” (Sheetz v. County of El Dorado (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., July 29, 2025) 2025 WL 2116363.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C093682A.PDF

Demographics of Federal Contractors’ Workforces Ordered Disclosed. 

Under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552; FOIA), the public has access to records of federal agencies. But FOIA allows agencies to withhold government records if they fall within one of nine statutory exemptions to protect information about various matters. Exemption 4 protects entities that are required to submit information to the federal government against the competitive disadvantages that could result from disclosure of their private business information. Plaintiffs requested several years’ worth of reports filed by federal contractors with the Department of Labor. The reports described the composition of the contractors’ workforces, including the job categories and demographics of their employees. The lead plaintiff, a nonprofit investigative news organization, hoped to use that information to report on contractors’ racial, sexual, and ethnic diversity (or lack thereof). The department withheld many of the requested reports under Exemption 4, claiming that they include confidential “commercial” information. After plaintiffs sued, the district court determined that the reports contain no “commercial” information and ordered the department to disclose the reports. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because the record before us does not show that workforce-composition information alone reveals contractors’ production details or resulting profits, we hold that the reports at issue do not contain ‘commercial’ information. We therefore affirm the district court’s order compelling the Department to disclose the reports.” (Center for Investigative Reporting v. United States Department of Labor (9th Cir., July 30, 2025) 2025 WL 2155687.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/30/24-880.pdf

Choice of Law and Forum Selection. 

This appeal arose from a motorhome warranty agreement between a company that manufactures motorhomes in Ohio and a California resident who purchased a motorhome from a third-party dealer in California. The warranty agreement contained an Ohio choice-of-law provision and an Ohio forum-selection clause. Plaintiff sued, alleging defendant manufacturer failed to comply with provisions of the Song-Beverly Consumers Warranty Act (Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.). The trial court severed the choice-of-law provision as illegal under the act’s waiver prohibition and then concluded whether plaintiff’s rights were diminished by the forum-selection clause, concluding they were not. The Court of Appeal affirmed the striking of the choice-of-law provision and instructed the trial court to conduct further proceedings. (Kim v. Airstream, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, July 30, 2025) 2025 WL 2157975.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B334720.PDF

“Roma are a disfavored group in Romania,” Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concluded that plaintiff had established neither past persecution nor a well-founded fear of future persecution in Romania. Granting plaintiff’s petition for review of the order of the BIA, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Ion’s testimony that he was shot in the back, together with his family’s credible testimony and the remaining record evidence, collectively compels a finding of serious harm that rises to the level of past persecution. This is especially so given the severe assaults, attempted kidnappings, threats, violence, and mistreatment that the Lapadats faced in Romania. . . . Eliding centuries of anti-Roma abuse in Romania, it swapped the European Union’s proposed reforms, designed to aid Europe’s Roma population, with the Romanian government’s own documented and persecutory conduct toward the Roma. In our view, the record unmistakably establishes that the Roma are a disfavored group in Romania.” (Lapadat v. Bondi (9th Cir., July 31, 2025) 2025 WL 2176149.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/31/23-1745.pdf

Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Claim Regarding Vaccination Policy Fails. 

The Los Angeles Unified School District’s (LAUSD) COVID-19 vaccination policy  essentially required all its employees to be fully vaccinated. As relevant here, plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the policy violated their Fourteenth Amendment substantive-due-process and equal-protection rights. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to LAUSD. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e hold that the Policy is subject to rational basis review because Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), is binding and controls. The Policy survives such review, as the LAUSD could have reasonably concluded that COVID-19 vaccines would protect the health and safety of its employees and students. For this reason, Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim also fails under rational basis review.” (Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho (9th Cir., July 31, 2025) 2025 WL 2167401.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/30/22-55908.pdf

The Real Battles in Video Games Are in the Courts. 

In 2018, videogame developer Epic Games released its immensely popular cross-platform game Fortnite as a smartphone app. For two years, Epic sought to distribute the game through direct mobile downloads from its website. In 2020, after Epic realized that Google Play was the only hope that Epic had for actually reaching users, Epic reluctantly decided to offer the Fortnite app on both the Google Play Store, which operates on the Android operating system, and the Apple App Store, which operates on the iOS operating system. Fortnite is offered as a free download; the game generates revenue for Epic via players’ purchase of special in-game features. Shortly after Fortnite’s launch on the Apple App Store and Google Play Store, Epic embedded secret code into the app’s software so that players making in-app purchases would bypass the required payment-processing systems by which Apple and Google then charged 30% commission. Almost immediately, Google and Apple removed Fortnite from their stores for noncompliance with their terms of service. Epic responded by filing antitrust suits against both Apple and Google. The two suits proceeded separately. The suit against Apple was resolved in Apple’s favor. Epic’s suit against Google followed. After a 15-day trial involving 45 witnesses, the jury found that Google had violated federal and state antitrust laws in the markets for Android app distribution and Android in-app billing services. The district court held extensive post-trial proceedings and then entered a permanent injunction against Google to restore market competition. Affirming the jury’s verdict, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The ultimate scope of an injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion and is based on the merits. . . . To the extent that Google challenges the district court’s exercise of discretion in crafting the injunction, we disagree.” (In re: Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation (9th Cir., July 31, 2025) 2025 WL 2167402.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/31/24-6256.pdf

MICRA’s Statute of Limitations Explained by the California Supreme Court. 

The California Supreme Court granted review in this matter to decide whether the statute of limitations for medical professional negligence claims within the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5; MICRA) applies to an action for negligence brought by the injured driver of a vehicle rear-ended by an ambulance transporting a patient. California’s highest court held: “MICRA’s statute of limitations does not apply under these circumstances. Our holding follows from principles articulated in our previous decisions concerning the scope of MICRA’s statute of limitations, as well as the general rule that the applicable limitations period depends on the nature of the right being sued upon. Where, as here, a plaintiff sues a health care provider for breach of a duty owed to the public generally, as opposed to a violation of professional obligations owed to patients, the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence claims (§ 335.1) applies. This conclusion is supported by MICRA’s text, purpose, and legislative history, as well as relevant public policy considerations.” (Gutierrez v. Tostado (Cal., July 31, 2025) 2025 WL 2169453.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S283128.PDF

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