Litigation

Litigation Update: April 2025

Litigation Section Litigation Update

A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.

  • Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
  • Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
  • Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Jennifer Hansen, Ryan Wu

Our Updates:

Excessive Force Case Against Police to Go to Trial.

Almost four weeks after a woman called the police to report a man was being abusive, she again called 911, telling the operator that the man was threatening to kill both himself and her with a knife. She said, “Please get him out. I’ve been trying to get him to leave and he won’t leave.” She said she was bolted in the bathroom and that the man said there was blood everywhere.  She said the man was using his fingernails to scrape on the bathroom door. Four police officers responded. There was confusion regarding whether the man was following commands. Police shot and killed the man. The man’s family sued the police and the city. The district court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “At trial, a reasonable jury could perhaps conclude that Officers Myers and Beecroft were justified in using deadly force. But a reasonable jury could equally well conclude that they acted unconstitutionally in using deadly force without warning less than six seconds after kicking down the apartment door, when Smith was standing still in his own hallway and raising his right hand in compliance with the officers’ command to raise his hands.” (Johnson v. Myers (9th Cir., Mar. 3, 2025) 129 F.4th 1189.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/03/24-349.pdf

Strings Attached to Clean Water Act Requirements Held Not Authorized Under the Statute.

Under the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq.; CWA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized state agencies may issue permits that impose requirements on entities that wish to discharge “pollutants” into the waters of the United States. In this case, the EPA did not spell out what a permittee must do or refrain from doing; rather, it made the permittee responsible for the quality of water in the body of water into which the permittee discharged pollutants. The U.S. Supreme Court held: “We hold that the two challenged provisions exceed the EPA’s authority. The text and structure of the CWA, as well as the history of federal water pollution legislation, make this clear. And resorting to such requirements is not necessary to protect water quality. The EPA may itself determine what a facility should do to protect water quality, and the Agency has ample tools to obtain whatever information it needs to make that determination. If the EPA does its work, our holding should have no adverse effect on water quality.” (City and County of San Francisco, California v. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S., Mar. 4, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 704.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-753_f2bh.pdf

Financial Elder Abuse by Lawyer.

In 2023, doctors determined an octogenarian lacked the capacity to make financial and medical decisions. In 2024, a lawyer, defendant here, met with the octogenarian and secured his agreement to pay the lawyer a $100,000 retainer. A few days later, pursuant to the Elder Abuse Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.03), the trustee for the octogenarian sought an order prohibiting the lawyer from financially abusing the octogenarian. The trial court issued a protective order against the lawyer. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e reject Herren’s contentions that a restraining order could not be sought or issued under the Elder Abuse Act without the trial court first adjudicating George’s competence. We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that Herren committed financial abuse of an elder.” (Herren v. George S. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 3, 2025) 330 Cal.Rptr.3d 458.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A171257A.PDF

Benefit-of-the-Doubt Standard of Proof for Veterans. 

Plaintiffs are veterans who applied for service-connected PTSD disability benefits and were dissatisfied with the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (VA) resolution of their claims. When evaluating a veteran’s claim for service-related disability benefits, the VA applies a unique standard of proof known as the “benefit-of-the-doubt rule,” which requires the VA to give the benefit of the doubt to the veteran whenever there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence on any issue material to the claim. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the high court described the issue before it: “The question before us is what the Veterans Court must do to comply with that statutory command.” The U.S. Supreme Court held: “We hold that the Veterans Court must review the VA’s application of the rule the same way it would any other determination—by reviewing legal issues de novo and factual issues for clear error. And, we hold that the VA’s determination that the evidence is in approximate balance is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.” (Bufkin v. Collins (U.S., Mar. 5, 2025) 145 S.Ct. 728.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-713_jifl.pdf

Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Granting Permanent Injunctions. 

Plaintiffs are Catholic charities that solicit cash donations to support worldwide help to the poor. Government Code § 12591.1, subdivision (b), provides that the Attorney General may issue a cease-and-desist order before an act or omission constituting fraud has occurred. Here, the Attorney General determined plaintiffs overvalued the in-kind donations they received and that they made false or misleading statements in donor solicitations and their filings. The trial court entered two permanent injunctions prohibiting the Attorney General from enforcing certain relevant statutory provisions. The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by granting the injunctions. Permanent injunctions are not issued as a matter of course, even in cases implicating the First Amendment. Rather, plaintiffs seeking a permanent injunction must plead and prove they are entitled to such extraordinary relief. Accordingly, we vacate the injunctions and remand to have the trial court determine whether plaintiffs should be granted leave to amend to plead for injunctive relief and, if so, whether they can prove they are entitled to a permanent injunction.” (Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc. v. Bonta (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 7, Mar. 5, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 432.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B315409M.PDF

Amount in Controversy Requirement for Diversity Jurisdiction Satisfied.

Two persons sued Farmers Direct’s insured, Perez, in state court. The trial court entered default against Perez. Thereafter, Farmers Direct filed the instant declaratory relief action in federal court seeking a declaration that Perez breached the policy’s provision relating to the duties of an insured to communicate with the insurance company, and that it no longer had a duty to defend or indemnify him. The district court entered judgment for Farmers Direct. When plaintiffs in the underlying action became aware of the federal judgment, they moved to set aside and vacate that judgment. The district court granted their motion, finding that Farmers Direct had failed to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction in the declaratory relief action. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating: “Because Farmers Direct’s ‘claim in excess of the requisite amount’ of anticipated future defense fees and costs was ‘made in good faith’ in its Complaint and was supported as described here, the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied also on this basis.” (Farmers Direct Property and Casualty Insurance Company v. Perez (9th Cir., Mar. 6, 2025) 130 F.4th 748.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/06/23-3320.pdf

Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Challenge Washington’s Law Requiring Insurance Coverage.

A Washington statute requires insurance carriers to provide coverage for all federally approved contraceptives and, if maternity care is covered, for abortions. Plaintiff provides health insurance to its employees, but plaintiff is a church, and it objects to abortion and some forms of contraceptives. Here, plaintiff contended the Washington statute violates the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and the church’s right to religious autonomy. The district court entered judgment for the Washington governor and insurance commissioner. Dismissing the action for lack of standing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[E]ven were we to accept the basic premise of Plaintiff’s theory, which we do not, Plaintiff still would lack standing because its claimed injury is premised entirely on speculation.” (Cedar Park Assembly of God of Kirkland, Washington v. Kreidler (9th Cir., Mar. 6, 2025) 130 F.4th 757.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/06/23-35560.pdf

Action Dismissed Because Opposing Party Did Not File a Separate Statement to Oppose Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in a Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) case. Plaintiff did not file an opposition. The trial court entered judgment for defendant. On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court erroneously granted the motion without first deciding whether defendants had met their initial burden. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Separate statements are ‘required, not discretionary, on the part of each party, and the statutory language makes the failure to comply with this requirement sufficient grounds to grant the motion.’ (Whitehead v. Habig (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 896, 902.).” (Mandell-Brown v. Novo Nordisk Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 5, Mar. 6, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 478.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B326147.PDF

Not an Appealable Order.

Defendants filed a notice of appeal from an order overruling various objections to a discovery referee’s report and recommendations. On appeal, they assert the order is appealable under Code of Civil Procedure § 904.1, subdivision (a)(12), i.e., an order “directing payment of monetary sanctions” in excess of $5,000. Dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal stated: “It is enough to state that this referee fee allocation order is not, at this time, final and dispositive of the parties’ rights. Immediate challenges to discovery referee references and orders pertaining to the payment of such referees should be made by writ petition.” (Glickman v. Krolikowski (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 7, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 527.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064853.PDF

Attorney Lost License to Practice Law and Now Faces Possibility of Losing His Real Estate License as Well. 

In 2021, the California State Bar suspended plaintiff’s law license for misconduct. Shortly thereafter, the California Department of Real Estate (DRE) initiated a disciplinary action against him regarding his real estate license under Business and Professions Code § 10050. Plaintiff sued the DRE for alleged constitutional violations. The district court dismissed the action, holding it had to abstain from hearing the matter while the DRE disciplinary action is pending. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Roshan has not made out a ‘showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate.’” (Roshan v. McCauley (9th Cir., Mar. 11, 2025) 130 F.4th 780.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/11/24-659.pdf

After Qualified Immunity Denied, Jury Awarded $10 Million Against County and Police for Excessive Force.

A police sergeant shot at Clemente Najera-Aguirre six times without warning and killed him. The officer fired when Najera-Aguirre was turned away from him, and the fatal shots struck Najera-Aguirre in the back. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity in a previous appeal. Thereafter, the jury awarded decedent’s family $10 million in compensatory damages. After the award, defendants, the county and the officer, moved for judgment as a matter of law, again arguing the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held: “We recognize that law enforcement must make quick decisions regarding threats and act in volatile situations. But they are also trained to make ongoing threat assessments and are on clear notice that deadly force is not permitted where there is no immediate threat.” (Estate of Aguirre v. County of Riverside (9th Cir., Mar. 11, 2025) 131 F.4th 702.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/11/23-55718.pdf

County Immune for Sexual Abuse While Plaintiff Was in Foster Care Decades Ago. 

Plaintiff alleged sexual abuse while in foster care during the 1970s. Plaintiff sued the county and its social services agency. Plaintiff contended that he reported the abuse to social workers, and they failed to take corrective action. Defendants demurred, contending they have discretionary immunity under Government Code §§ 820.2 and 815.2. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Because we conclude that Government Code section 820.2 applies in the instant case, County is immune by virtue of Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (b). (See Jacqueline [T. v. Alameda County Child Protective Services (2007)] 155 Cal.App.4th [456], 468–469; Kemmerer [v. County of Fresno (1988)] 200 Cal.App.3d [1426], 1435.).” (K.C. v. County of Merced (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Feb. 18, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 606.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F087088.PDF

A Jury Will Determine Whether the California Highway Patrol Violated Man’s Civil Rights.

A man was involved in a serious single vehicle accident, his car destroyed. The highway patrol officer who arrived at the crash found the man disoriented and in physical distress. But the officer never called for medical assistance. Instead, roughly 45 minutes after arriving on the scene, she arrested the man after deciding he was on drugs. It turned out the man had suffered a stroke. The officer did not take the man to the hospital until hours later, and his family alleged that the delay in securing medical treatment led to his suffering permanent injuries. Through his family, the man sued the California Highway Patrol under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]hether a certain situation (here, a serious car crash) coupled with certain symptoms (here, physical and mental disorientation and distress) created a medical emergency is a question of factual impression, not one answered by case law.” (D’Braunstein v. California Highway Patrol (9th Cir., Mar. 12, 2025) 131 F.4th 764.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/12/22-55237.pdf

Army Ordered to Use the Appropriate Standard Vis-à-Vis Discharge Status of Soldier With PTSD. 

Plaintiff was in the Army in 2008. His commanders viewed him as an “extraordinary” soldier, who would “run through a brick wall for” his platoon. In 2009, he deployed to Afghanistan, where he was extensively involved in combat and witnessed severe human suffering. After returning from his deployment, he suffered from then-undiagnosed PTSD. His drinking increased, and although he had no prior history of wrongdoing, military police cited him for larceny, assault while under the influence of alcohol, and possession of drug paraphernalia. After months of deteriorating, a married civilian woman accused him of sexual assault. Following a night of dancing, the two went to plaintiff’s barracks. After she declined his request to “cuddle,” she said he picked her up, took her to the bed, and began removing her clothing. She said she repeatedly told him to stop and that she did not want to have sex with him, but he forcibly held her down and penetrated her. 

The Army charged plaintiff with rape, adultery, aggravated sexual assault, and wrongful sexual contact under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). A court-martial jury returned a guilty verdict for wrongful sexual contact and adultery and a not guilty verdict for rape and aggravated sexual assault. He was sentenced to six months of confinement, required to register as a sex offender, and received a Dishonorable Discharge, which was later modified to a Bad Conduct Discharge. Following his confinement and discharge, plaintiff endured debilitating symptoms of PTSD, including anxiety, depression, suicidal and homicidal ideation, and severe agitation and reactivity. He was later permanently paralyzed, requiring a wheelchair, by a high-speed motorcycle accident. At times homeless, he lived out of his truck and bathed in a river. He thereafter petitioned the Army Board to upgrade his discharge to Honorable so he could obtain education and medical benefits through the Department of Veteran Affairs (VA). The Army opposed the upgrade, and the board denied the petition. Plaintiff sought review in federal court, which granted summary judgment for the Army. Reversing and remanding, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The Board failed to consider the full aperture of ‘circumstances resulting in’ Bussey’s ‘discharge,’ and failed to give ‘liberal consideration’ to Bussey’s claim that his PTSD ‘contributed to’ those circumstances. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(h)(2)(B). We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand this case to the Board to reconsider Bussey’s upgrade request under the appropriate standard.” (Bussey v. Driscoll (9th Cir., Mar. 12, 2025) 131 F.4th 756.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/12/23-35588.pdf

Policy Not Discriminatory Against Hindus. 

The California State University (CSU) issued a discrimination policy that contained the following language: “CSU prohibits the following conduct, as defined in Article VII. Discrimination based on any Protected Status: i.e., Age, Disability (physical and mental), Gender (or sex, including sex stereotyping), Gender Identity (including transgender), Gender Expression, Genetic Information, Marital Status, Medical Condition, Nationality Race or Ethnicity (including color, caste, or ancestry), Religion (or religious creed), Sexual Orientation, and Veteran or Military Status.” The policy does not define the word “caste.” Plaintiffs, who are CSU professors of Indian descent and adherents of the Hindu religion, filed an action alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and equivalent claims under the California Constitution. They contended that inclusion of the word “caste” in the policy is unconstitutional. The district court entered judgment for CSU. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that the professors lacked Article III standing, stating: “After a fully developed record, the district court made a factual finding that the Policy had no hostility toward religion. It based that finding on (1) the fact that the Policy does not mention Hinduism; (2) dictionary definitions show ‘caste’ is ‘readily defined without reference to Hinduism’ as a ‘distinct class or rank in any society’; and (3) the absence of evidence that [CSU] or the Policy’s stakeholders expressed ‘anti-Hindu sentiments.’” (Kumar v. Koester (9th Cir., Mar. 12, 2025) 131 F.4th 746.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/12/23-4363.pdf

A Fatal Injury Is “Any Injury” Under Labor Code § 3364.5. 

A woman volunteered at a school event to help distribute fresh food during the COVID-19 pandemic. As she was loading food into the rear of a vehicle, another vehicle drove forward and crushed the woman to death. Her family members and estate sued the school district. The trial court granted summary judgment for the school district based on Labor Code § 3364.5, which provides that school volunteers may be deemed employees entitled to workers’ compensation benefits as their sole remedy for “any injury.” On appeal, plaintiffs contended that § 3364.5 did not apply because death is not “any injury.” Affirming, the Court of Appeal concluded that “fatal injuries unambiguously fall into the category of ‘any injury’ according to [the statute’s] plain meaning.” (Kuo v. Dublin Unified School District (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Mar. 12, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 662.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169912.PDF

Gun Laws Found to be Too Stringent.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief preventing the Attorney General of Hawaii from enforcing two provisions of Hawaii’s firearms laws. One provision provides only 30 days within which to actually acquire a handgun after obtaining the requisite permit, and the other provision requires a gun owner to physically bring the gun to a police station for inspection within five days after acquiring it. The district court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “Hawaii’s imposition of a very short time limitation on the validity of an acquisition permit is impermissibly ‘abusive.’” As to the inspection requirement, the appeals court stated: “Hawaii points to a set of colonial-era militia laws. These militia laws generally required all male citizens of fighting age to serve in the militia; required militiamen to keep and maintain fighting weapons suitable for militia service; and in particular, often required militiamen to allow their weapons to be inspected in order to ensure their continued suitability for combat. [¶] . . . [W]e conclude that the colonial militia inspection laws are not ‘relevantly similar’. . . .” (Yukutake v. Lopez (9th Cir., Mar. 14, 2025) 130 F.4th 1077.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/14/21-16756.pdf

Class Action Fairness Act Permits Defendants to Make Reasonable Assumptions About the Amount in Controversy.

Plaintiff filed a class action in state court for wage and hour violations of California’s labor laws. Defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4; CAFA). The district court remanded the matter to state court. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated that CAFA “permits defendants in certain class actions to remove the actions from state court to federal court if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million. In calculating the amount in controversy, a removing defendant may make reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint. In this case, however, the district court imposed a more demanding evidentiary burden.” (Perez v. Rose Hills Company (9th Cir., Mar. 14, 2025) 131 F.4th 804.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/14/25-68.pdf

Sanctions Against “Of Counsel” Attorney.

Plaintiff Kari Lake sued members of the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors alleging that the electronic elements of Arizona’s voting system insufficiently protects voters and must be replaced by a system of hand-counted paper ballots. Of counsel attorney Alan Dershowitz signed the amended complaint as “Of Counsel for Plaintiffs Kari Lake and Mark Finchem.” The district court awarded sanctions against Dershowitz under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which authorizes sanctions when a pleading is filed for an improper purpose. Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit concluded “that ‘of counsel’ attorneys may be held liable for sanctions under Rule 11 for signing a frivolous complaint. But because this case poses a question of first impression, we decline to give this rule retroactive effect, but will apply this rule to all attorney ‘of counsel’ designations made after publication of this opinion.” (Lake v. Gates (9th Cir., Mar. 14, 2025) 130 F.4th 1054.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/14/23-16023.pdf

No Duty to Report Someone Posing as One of Defendant’s Financial Advisors.

An imposter posing as an investment advisor for defendant investment company stole more than $300,000 from plaintiff. Defendant had previously received several inquiries from other individuals about a potential imposter who was posing as one of its investment advisors and asking for funds. Defendant did not post a warning about the imposter on its website or take any other significant action. After realizing he was scammed, plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that as a professional investment company, defendant had a duty to post a warning about the imposter on its website and report the complaints to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Plaintiff contended that had defendant done so, plaintiff would not have transferred his funds to the imposter. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “In the absence of any existing authority creating a duty for these Defendants to report this imposter, we decline the invitation to create such a duty in this case.” (Harding v. Lifetime Financial, Inc. et al. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 14, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 753.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063109.PDF

Plaintiff’s Lawyer Disqualified for Using Email Protected by the Attorney Client Privilege Belonging to Defendant.

Plaintiff sued his employer over employment-related issues. The employer’s lawyer sent an email about the litigation to plaintiff’s supervisor, who shared the email with plaintiff. Plaintiff gave the email to his lawyer, who later sent the email to plaintiff’s experts. The trial court subsequently entered a protective order, limiting use of the email. At some point, the employer moved to disqualify plaintiff’s lawyer for violating the order, and the trial court granted the motion. Affirming, the Court of Appeal concluded that “the trial court acted well within its discretion in determining that this conduct, and the resulting risk of harm to [the employer] and the integrity of the proceedings, warranted disqualification.” (Johnson v. Department of Transportation (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Mar. 17, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 917.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C099319.PDF

Default Should Have Been Set Aside.

Defendant filed a motion to set aside a default taken against him under Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (b), contending his failure to file a responsive pleading was the result of counsel’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect. The trial court denied the motion, finding counsel’s decision not to file a pleading was strategic. Reversing, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant was entitled to relief under the mandatory provision of subdivision (b). The court explained, “we follow Solv-All v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1008 [citation], where the court held a defendant may be entitled to relief under the mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b), even where the attorney makes a bad strategic decision, rather than Jerry’s Shell v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1058 [citation] , where the court held such relief may not be available in that situation.” (Talbott v. Ghadimi (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 7, Mar. 18, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 967.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B329889.PDF

Court’s Power When There Was Inadvertent Disclosure of Information to Newspaper. 

Plaintiffs sued defendant in a class action asserting gender discrimination and hostile workplace claims. A collection of internal workplace complaints, both by class members and non-class members, were under a protective order. Some media outlets wanted access to the complaints, and the district court permitted them to intervene and have access to the complaints of the class members. But plaintiffs’ lawyer inadvertently gave a newspaper the complaints of the non-class members as well. Plaintiffs’ counsel demanded that the newspaper return or destroy the documents, but it refused. Plaintiffs’ counsel then moved for the return or destruction of the documents. The magistrate judge initially granted the motion and entered an order restraining the newspaper from publishing any information obtained from the disclosed documents and ordering it to return or destroy those documents. The question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the federal court had the authority to issue such an order. The appeals court held: “We conclude that a district court’s inherent powers provide the authority to issue such an order.” (Cahill v. Insider Inc. (9th Cir., Mar. 18, 2025) 131 F.4th 933.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/18/24-2199.pdf

Workers Compensation Lawyer in Serious Trouble. 

The criminal defendant here was a lawyer who specialized in workers’ compensation law. Another man owned a copy service business which, among other things, provided subpoena services and had agreements with certain doctors in a scheme to sign up clients for the lawyer. The copy service billed the employer’s insurance company for the services and, in exchange, the copy service paid for some of the lawyer’s business expenses and sent clients to the lawyer. The man who owned the copy services company was convicted of fraud and sentenced to prison and agreed to testify against the lawyer . A jury convicted the lawyer of 37 counts of fraud in what was described as a kickback scheme. The lawyer was sentenced to four years in prison and ordered to pay restitution of $701,452. The primary issue was whether the In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, holding applied in this case. The Williamson rule states that where the Legislature has defined a specific crime with a lesser punishment, the conduct described by that crime may not be charged as a more general crime with a harsher punishment. The Court of Appeal reversed many of the felony convictions based on the Williamson rule. (People v. Woods (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 18, 2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 985.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G061948.PDF

Passport Fraud. 

A woman gave birth to her daughter, and three months later, the state of Texas admitted the child to foster care and later terminated the woman’s parental rights. The state also permanently restrained the woman from having contact with the child. Thereafter, the woman applied for a passport for the child, making false claims on the application that she had parental rights, and that the child could not be present because of a medical condition. Claiming the child had a medical condition that prevented her from being present, the woman submitted a false letter allegedly from a real nurse practitioner who was not actually treating the child. The woman was convicted of violating several crimes, including fraud and identity theft, and sentenced to over three years in prison. On appeal, the woman contended she should not have been convicted of identity theft for submitting the phony letter from a nurse practitioner. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that the evidence in this case was sufficient for a rational jury to find the woman fraudulently misused the nurse’s identity in the letter. (United States of America v. Parviz (9th Cir., Mar. 19, 2025) 131 F.4th 966.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/19/22-50160.pdf

Mental Health of California Prisoners. 

In 1990, a group of California state prisoners filed a lawsuit alleging that the state had violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide constitutionally adequate mental health care in its prisons. The prisoners, who later achieved certification as a class, prevailed following a bench trial in 1995. The state was adjudged to be in violation of its Eighth Amendment obligations, and plans were developed to bring it into compliance. Over three decades later, however, efforts stalled, and critical problems have endured. The district court initiated enforcement proceedings. In 2017, it gave California one more year to come into compliance with a core component of the court’s remedial program—the requirement that the state bulk up staffing by bringing vacancies among designated health care providers down to fixed levels. But by 2023, the state remained far from compliant with the court’s orders. In response, the lower court established a schedule of prospective, conditional fines that would begin accumulating every month that the state failed to achieve its staffing obligations. By 2024, the fines amounted to $110 million. California appealed, arguing the fines were foreclosed by its substantial compliance. The Ninth Circuit noted: “The combination of inadequate mental health care and spiking patient populations has produced predictably grave results: delays in access to life-saving care, inadequate medication management, and a heightened risk of deaths by suicide.” The appeals court remanded the matter for the lower court to explain its reasons for the exact amount in fines that it decides to impose. (Coleman v. Newsom (9th Cir., Mar. 19, 2025) 131 F.4th 948.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/19/24-4023.pdf

The Second Amendment Protects the Right to Bear “Arms,” Not “Arms and Accoutrements.” 

Murderers who use large-capacity magazines need not pause between shots until they have fired 20, 30, or even 100 rounds. These pauses are crucial. Victims and law enforcement personnel take advantage of short pauses in firing to flee, take cover, and fight back. A mass shooter’s use of large-capacity magazines limits those precious opportunities. In 2016, the California legislature and California’s voters banned the possession of large-capacity magazines in order to address mass shootings. Earlier, lesser measures, such as banning the sale of those magazines, had proved both ineffective and difficult to enforce. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of that ban. The Ninth Circuit concluded that California law comports with the Second Amendment, for two independent reasons: “First, the Founders protected the right to keep and bear ‘Arms,’ not a right to keep and bear ‘Arms and Accoutrements.’ . . . Second, even assuming that the text of the Second Amendment encompasses the possession of an optional accessory like a large-capacity magazine, California’s law falls neatly within the Nation’s traditions of protecting innocent persons by prohibiting especially dangerous uses of weapons and by regulating components necessary to the firing of a firearm.” (Duncan v. Bonta (9th Cir., Mar. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 867583.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/20/23-55805.pdf

Federal Court Did Not Err in Denying Request to Enjoin Transgender Bathroom Statute. 

Idaho enacted a statute that requires all public-school students to use only the restroom and changing facility corresponding to their “biological sex.” Plaintiffs are a transgender student in an Idaho public school and a transgender organization who contended the statute violates the equal protection clause and federal statutes. The district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Affirming the order, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Plaintiffs did not show that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their facial claims.” (Roe by and through Roe v. Critchfield (9th Cir., Mar. 20, 2025) 131 F.4th 975.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/20/23-2807.pdf

Procedural Issues in a Limited-Jurisdiction Action. 

In a limited-jurisdiction action, judgment was entered for plaintiff. On appeal, defendant contended the court erred in denying his motion to bar a witness from testifying because when he requested the names and addresses of witnesses under Code of Civil Procedure § 96, plaintiff responded “Custodian of Records.” Reversing, the appellate division of the superior court stated: “Based on noncompliance with section 96, the court was required to prohibit the witness from testifying at trial. (§ 97, subd. (a)).” With regard to plaintiff’s argument that defendant’s request for witness information was untimely in that § 96, subdivision (b) requires the request for such information to be made ”no more than 45 days or less than 30 days prior to the first date set for trial,” the appellate division held: “[T]he request was sent to plaintiff within the specified period prior to the date first set for trial following the court having granted defendant’s motion for a new trial in a prior trial between the parties in the case.” (Cavalry SPV I, LLC v. Poalston (L.A. Super. Ct., App. Div., Feb. 14, 2025) 2025 WL 869221.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/JAD25-03.PDF

Statute of Limitations for Malicious Prosecution Case Against Lawyers. 

The first paragraph of this California Supreme Court opinion clearly states its holding: “Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 sets out a two-year statute of limitations for a variety of tort suits, including malicious prosecution. However, section 340.6 provides a one-year limitations period for certain suits brought against attorneys. Here, we decide which is the appropriate statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution action against an attorney. Based on the statutory text, purpose, and legislative history, we hold that section 340.6 does not apply to claims against attorneys brought by parties who were never their clients or the intended beneficiaries of their clients. Because the malicious prosecution claims here are brought by formerly adverse parties and not by an attorney’s own clients, they are not subject to the one-year limitations period in section 340.6.” (Escamilla v. Vannucci (Cal., Mar. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 943692.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S282866.PDF

Narrow Issue Regarding Offers Made Under CCP § 998. 

The issue before the California Supreme Court was whether a plaintiff who rejected an offer made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 998, but later agreed to settle before trial, necessarily avoids the cost-shifting effects of § 998. California’s high court held: “We hold that a plaintiff does not necessarily avoid section 998’s reach in this scenario. Rather, section 998 sets out the default rule, imposing cost shifting whenever its terms are met. However, the parties remain free to agree to their own allocation of costs and fees as part of the settlement agreement.” (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (Cal., Mar. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 943693.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S280598.PDF

Statement to FDIC Had to Be False, Not Just Misleading. 

Petitioner took out three loans totaling $219,000 from the same bank. Later, he told the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) that he had “borrowed . . . $110,000” from the bank. Petitioner was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 for making “false statement[s]” to the FDIC. He argued that his statements were not false because he had in fact taken out a loan for $110,000 just as he said. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit held that they did not need to consider that argument because the prohibition in § 1014 against “false statement[s]” extends to misleading ones as well, and petitioner’s statements were at least misleading in failing to mention the additional loans. The question presented to the U.S. Supreme Court was whether § 1014 criminalizes statements that are misleading but not false. The nation’s highest court held: “Section 1014 does not criminalize statements that are misleading but true. Under the statute, it is not enough that a statement is misleading. It must be ‘false.’” (Thompson v. United States (U.S., Mar. 21, 2025) 145 S. Ct. 821.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-1095_8mjp.pdf

Duty of Landlord to Off-Property Individuals. 

A motorcyclist struck a 300-pound pig on a rural road and then died from an ensuing collision with another vehicle. The motorcyclist’s wife sued not only the tenants living on a nearby parcel of property who were raising pigs, but also the tenants’ landlords. This appeal presented the question: When does a landlord who owns but is not in possession of property owe a duty of care to protect off-property individuals from injury due to unsecured livestock? The Court of Appeal held: “We hold that a landlord owes a duty if (1) during the period of the tenancy, the landlord (a) actually knows that the property is in a dangerous condition (that is, that the property houses livestock and the livestock is not secured), and (b) has the right to enter the property to secure the livestock; or (2) at the time the tenancy begins or is renewed, the landlord (a) has some reason to believe the livestock might be unsecured, and (b) conducts a reasonable inspection that would reveal that the livestock is unsecured. Because the undisputed evidence in this case does not trigger the duty of care under either rule, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the landlords.” (Estate of St. John v. Schaeffler (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 5, Mar. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 879814.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B329625.PDF

Negligence Per Se Jury Instruction. 

Cars in two lanes stopped and waved defendant to cross in front of them to make a left turn into a shopping area, but a car in the third lane neither waved nor saw defendant making her turn and crashed into her. California Vehicle Code § 21801, subdivision (a) requires drivers turning left to “yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which are close enough to constitute a hazard at any time during the turning movement . . . .” Accordingly, plaintiff requested a negligence per se instruction, but the trial court refused to so instruct the jury. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Negligence per se instructions in appropriate cases are essential because, without them, the jury lacks a complete understanding of the law. It is insufficient to instruct the jury on a statute or law providing a standard of care without also explaining its significance or how the statute applies to the case the jury must decide. Because the failure to instruct here was prejudicial, we reverse and remand for a new trial.” (Drury v. Ryan (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 879693.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063080.PDF

Burden Shifting Instruction Must Be Given in Medical Malpractice Case.  

In a hospital, defendant doctor allegedly observed signs that plaintiff patient had a stroke, which she was in fact experiencing, but he failed to call a “code stroke.” As a result, a CT scan was not taken of her brain until several hours later. Due to her stroke, plaintiff is presently severely disabled. Petitioning for a writ of mandate, plaintiff claimed her damages would have been significantly less severe had a code stroke been called immediately, which would have resulted in a CT scan that revealed the ongoing stroke, and which would have led doctors to perform a thrombectomy to mitigate the damage. The question before the Court of Appeal involved a request for a burden-shifting jury instruction, which the trial court denied. Plaintiff contended it is impossible to determine how much damage was done before a thrombectomy should have been performed. The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate, stating: “If [plaintiff] can present evidence (1) [defendant] was negligent in failing to order a CT scan, (2) there is a reasonable possibility that a CT scan followed by a thrombectomy would have mitigated her damages, and (3) that a CT scan was critical to establish causation, then public policy requires that the burden shift to [defendant] to show that his negligence did not cause her damages. Where the absence of critical evidence of causation is a direct result of a tortfeasor’s negligence, the tortfeasor cannot be permitted to benefit from that negligence.” (Montoya v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 880304.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064459.PDF

Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Pursue UCL Claim. 

Plaintiffs are two parents and a student who paid tuition to defendant school. They alleged the school employed three people who engaged in sexually abusive or inappropriate behavior with other students—neither the plaintiffs nor their children—and defendant did not disclose that conduct to them. Defendant’s omissions, according to plaintiffs, amounted to unfair business practices under the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.; UCL). The named plaintiffs sought to pursue this action on behalf of a class of those who paid tuition to the school. The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer without leave to amend. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e conclude named plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the UCL claim because their students received the education for which plaintiffs paid, unaffected by the alleged misconduct directed at others.” (Suchard v. Sonoma Academy (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 880065.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169841.PDF

No ADA Violation in Not Providing American Sign Language Interpreter During Traffic Stop. 

Plaintiff, who is deaf and communicates primarily through American Sign Language (ASL), asserted she was denied a reasonable accommodation for her disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12131; ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794; RA) because the police did not provide her with an ASL interpreter at a traffic stop and at a subsequent blood-drawing procedure. The district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Officer Hall had assertedly observed [plaintiff] ‘weaving’ as she drove. Officer Hall thus reasonably suspected that [plaintiff] might be under the influence of an intoxicant, and delay in conducting sobriety tests could have ‘jeopardize[d]’ Officer Hall’s ‘ability to act in time to obtain an accurate measure of’ [plaintiff’s] potential inebriation and to protect the public.” (Mayfield v. City of Mesa (9th Cir., Mar. 24, 2025) 131 F.4th 1100.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/24/23-3222.pdf

A Nonsignatory to Arbitration Contract Must Make a “Clear Showing” That Inequity Would Result if Matter Is Not Arbitrated. 

In a lemon law case brought under Civil Code § 1790 et seq. (the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act), the trial court granted defendant car dealership’s motion to compel arbitration, but denied defendant manufacturer’s motion. On appeal, the manufacturer contended the issues against both defendants were so intertwined, the entire matter should be arbitrated. Affirming the trial court’s order, the Court of Appeal stated: “[W]e conclude that [plaintiff’s] statutory claims against [the car manufacturer] are based on warranties that fall outside the four corners of [plaintiff’s] contract with [the dealership] . . . . We add that our conclusion is supported—if not necessitated—by important, broader equitable concerns. Under well-established California contract law, arbitration cannot be imposed on a signatory plaintiff’s claims against a nonsignatory without a clear showing by the nonsignatory that inequity would otherwise result. Ford does not come close to making that showing here.” (Ballesteros v. Ford Motor Company (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Mar. 25, 2025) 2025 WL 900014.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A172271.PDF

Gun Kits Found to Come Under Federal Gun Control Act. 

The question before the U.S. Supreme Court here was whether the Gun Control Act (8 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.) applies to those who make and sell gun parts and gun kits. The genesis of the issue was a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) regulation of so-called ghost guns, i.e., privately made firearms built from kits or collections of unfinished parts. ATF redefined firearm, frame and receiver without any change to the statute. Under subsection (B) of § 921(a)(3), “the frame or receiver of any such weapon” covered by subsection (A) is itself treated as a “firearm.” The nation’s highest court held: “This case requires us to answer only whether subsection (B) reaches some incomplete frames or receivers. Saying that it does is enough to resolve the dispute before us.” (Bondi v. Vanderstok (U.S., Mar. 26, 2025) 2025 WL 906503.)

https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/23-852_o7jp.pdf

Validity of a Registered Judgment.

TIME ONE: Judgment registered in the Central District of California.

TIME TWO: The judgment was vacated in bankruptcy court.

HOLDING: “The question on appeal is whether the registered judgment is valid if the underlying judgment was set aside. We hold that it is not.” (SDVF, LLC v. Cozzia USA LLC (9th Cir., Mar. 26, 2025) 2025 WL 911200.)

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/03/26/24-2141.pdf

Oral Surrogacy Agreement Upheld. 

Defendant is a single gay man. Plaintiff is a single lesbian. They were next door neighbors. The two orally agreed she would carry a child for him, using her ova and his sperm. The parties agreed that soon after the baby was born, the child would live with defendant permanently. The parties agreed defendant would be the sole parent to the child, and plaintiff would not be the child’s mother. The parties agreed to remain transparent with the child regarding how it was conceived. A couple of times over the years, plaintiff babysat the child. The child lived with defendant, and he paid all her expenses. When the child was seven years old, plaintiff brought a legal action to determine her parental relationship, asking for joint legal and physical custody. The trial court found it was not in the child’s best interest for plaintiff to enter the child’s life and plaintiff appealed. Affirming, the Court of Appeal held: “. . . traditional surrogacy agreements are not required to be in writing. . . . For seven years, the parties’ conduct was consistent with the terms of the oral agreement . . . . We find under the facts of this case the oral agreement is enforceable and affirm the judgment.” (Miles v. Gerstein (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Mar. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 942514.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C099438.PDF

Summary Judgment for Owner and General Contractor of Construction Project Reversed. 

Plaintiffs sued defendants, the owner, general contractor, and excavation contractor for a construction project, for wrongful death after a subcontractor’s employee driving a dump truck from his home to a staging area struck and killed plaintiffs’ two minor daughters. Plaintiffs’ theory of liability was that defendants’ decision to hold a staging area and direct 90 dump trucks to that area, without a permit, was negligent, and that’s what led to the death of the two girls. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “[D]efendants’ decision to establish an unpermitted dump truck staging area, without the City assessing the site and the streets approaching it for safety or implementing additional safety measures, foreseeably created a risk a truck driving to the unpermitted area would strike a pedestrian.” (Lorenzo v. Calex Engineering, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Mar. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 942564.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B331177.PDF

Summary Judgment for Insurer in Bad Faith Case Reversed. 

While a building owned by plaintiff homeowners’ association (HOA) was being reroofed, two rainstorms penetrated the partially constructed roof and caused extensive interior damage. The HOA made a claim under its condominium policy, which was underwritten by defendant insurance company. Defendant denied the claim, concluding that the HOA’s losses resulted from nonaccidental faulty workmanship, which the policy did not cover. The HOA then brought the present action, alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment, concluding there was no coverage under the condominium policy as a matter of law. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he condominium policy was an ‘all-risks’ policy, which covered all damage to the HOA’s property unless specifically excluded. There are triable issues of material fact as to whether the exclusions relied on by Farmers—the water damage exclusion and the faulty workmanship exclusion— preclude coverage in the present case. We thus reverse the summary judgment.” (11640 Woodbridge Condominium Homeowners’ Association v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Mar. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 942515.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B333848.PDF

Plaintiff’s Uninsured/Underinsured Motion to Compel Arbitration Denied.

March 2016: Auto accident.

May 2018: Defendant agreed to uninsured/underinsured arbitration.

November 2022: Arbitration continued due to plaintiff’s unavailability

August 2023: Plaintiff’s counsel contacted insurer about rescheduling; defendant refused.

The trial court denied plaintiff’s petition to compel arbitration pursuant to Insurance Code § 11580.2, subdivision (i), which sets forth a five-year deadline to complete an arbitration. Affirming, the Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court that the Judicial Council’s emergency rule extending deadlines during the pandemic did not apply, and stating: “Prahl lost the right to compel arbitration by failing to conclude it within five years of initiation.” (Prahl v. Allstate Northbrook Indemnity Company (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Mar. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 942513.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C099904.PDF

Employer Entitled to Rely on Authoritative Views Regarding Workplace Safety.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, defendant film studio offered plaintiff actor a film role on the condition he get vaccinated. Plaintiff refused vaccination and sued defendant when it withdrew its offer and cast a different actor. The trial court erroneously denied defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Apple’s evidence negated Sexton’s lawsuit. Sexton had no privacy claim because Apple was entitled to rely on authoritative views about sensible ways to protect its workplace. Sexton’s discrimination claims failed because he was unqualified for the work. Safety was a job requirement Sexton could not satisfy.” (Sexton v. Apple Studios LLC (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Mar. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 942942.)

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B333481.PDF

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