Family Law
Recent Family Law Cases
FAMILY LAW (Through 04/29/25)
By: Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. My comments are in italics.
In re Marriage of DeBenedetti and Ensberg
04/24/2025 CA 4/1: D082801 – Rubin, J.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D082801.PDF
In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the family court’s postjudgment orders that enforced a fiduciary breach judgment by assigning an ex-husband’s retirement accounts to his former wife through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs). The opinion provides an important clarification that enforcing reimbursement awards under Family Code section 1101(g) qualifies as enforcing a “marital property right” for purposes of ERISA’s QDRO exception.
The case arose out of Christina DeBenedetti’s dissolution from Morgan Ensberg. After an initial division of community property, including a division of some of Morgan’s Major League Baseball-related retirement accounts, significant issues remained. Following a seven-day trial in 2022, the court found that Morgan had breached his fiduciary duty by mismanaging and squandering approximately $3.6 million in community assets. Under Family Code section 1101(g), the court awarded Christina $1,831,250, representing her share of the missing community property. The court also awarded Christina $230,000 in attorney fees and found that Morgan had further complicated discovery by giving evasive interrogatory answers, resulting in an additional $130,000 in sanctions.
Months after judgment, Christina moved to enforce the judgment by requesting new QDROs assigning her 100% of Morgan’s interests in four retirement accounts: (1) the Houston Astros 401(k) Savings Plan, (2) the Major League Baseball Players Pension Plan, (3) the Houston Astros Non-Uniform Pension Plan, and (4) the Tampa Bay Rays 401(k) Plan. Notably, three of these accounts had previously been partially divided through earlier QDROs. Christina sought to use the remaining separate property interests in these accounts to satisfy her unreimbursed damages award and attorney fees.
The family court granted Christina’s request, executing four new QDROs that made her the sole alternate payee of Morgan’s retirement plan benefits. Morgan appealed, arguing that the new QDROs violated ERISA, improperly reassigned his separate property, and conflicted with California statutes governing property division after judgment.
The Court of Appeal rejected all of Morgan’s arguments and affirmed the orders. The Court of Appeal began by addressing Morgan’s core claim that QDROs could only be used to divide community interests in retirement plans—not to enforce damages awards for fiduciary breaches. The court disagreed, explaining that reimbursement under Family Code section 1101(g) is itself a marital property right. Under California law, fiduciary breaches that impair one spouse’s interest in community property trigger rights to recovery that are directly tied to the marital estate. The court drew a strong parallel between the reimbursement right at issue here and reimbursement rights under Family Code section 2640, which the California Supreme Court has recognized as creating vested property rights.
Turning to ERISA, the Court found that a QDRO must “relate to the provision of … marital property rights.” It explained that because Christina’s reimbursement award was intended to restore her rightful community property share, it met this standard. The court emphasized that there is no federal definition of “marital property rights” under ERISA and that the phrase must be interpreted by looking to state domestic relations law.
The court also rejected Morgan’s reliance on In re Marriage of Marshall (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1170, where a wife’s attempt to collect a tax indemnity obligation from her former husband’s pension was disallowed. The Court explained that Marshall was distinguishable because the wife’s claim there arose from an indemnity agreement about tax liabilities to a third party (the IRS), not from a fiduciary breach that impaired her own property interest.
As for Morgan’s broader arguments about ERISA’s purpose, the Court was not persuaded. It noted that while ERISA generally protects retirement assets, Congress expressly authorized QDROs to allow state courts to enforce family law obligations. Citing both Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court cases, the Court emphasized that the Retirement Equity Act (REA) was specifically intended to protect the financial security of former spouses, not just plan participants. Moreover, ERISA’s text permits a QDRO to assign “all or a portion of” retirement benefits, refuting Morgan’s claim that only partial assignments are allowed or that support obligations are the only permissible purpose for a QDRO.
The Court also rejected Morgan’s argument that California’s Family Code section 2610 and Code of Civil Procedure section 704.115 barred the QDROs. It held that to the extent those California statutes conflicted with ERISA’s QDRO provisions, they were preempted by federal law. State-law exemptions protecting retirement plans from creditors do not apply where ERISA authorizes recovery through a QDRO.
Finally, Morgan argued that the family court had improperly reassigned his separate property interests by issuing the new QDROs after final judgment. The Court rejected this as well, finding that the postjudgment QDROs did not redivide property or modify the earlier judgment. Rather, they simply enforced Christina’s preexisting right to reimbursement of her lost community interest. The Court observed that ERISA does not impose any time limit on issuing QDROs and noted that child and spousal support QDROs are often issued long after dissolution judgments.
The court also rebuffed Morgan’s late-raised claim that the retirement accounts had not been properly valued before being assigned to Christina. It held that Morgan had forfeited that argument by failing to raise it below, observing that at the trial court level, Morgan had never disputed Christina’s assertion that the retirement accounts were worth less than her judgment award.
04/18/2025 CA 2/1: B337874 – Bendix, J.
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B337874.PDF
In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to seal court records arising from a civil harassment restraining order proceeding.
The case arose after Lawrence Marino obtained an 18-month civil harassment restraining order against Mark Rayant without Rayant’s appearance. Rayant later challenged the order, arguing he had never been personally served. He testified he moved out of the address where service was purportedly made months before the attempted service. The trial court ultimately terminated the restraining order, finding in the interest of justice that it was unnecessary. The court specifically noted that Rayant had not had contact with Marino since an earlier incident where Marino appeared at Rayant’s apartment uninvited, and that Rayant himself had already obtained a restraining order against Marino. The court declined to issue sanctions but denied Rayant’s contemporaneous request to seal the restraining order proceedings, noting there was no ripe evidence of ongoing harm at that time.
Subsequently, Rayant filed a formal motion to seal the entire record, supported by a declaration stating that the restraining order record had caused him harm. He stated that he had difficulty obtaining employment after a background check, and he had been subjected to enhanced airport security screenings during international travel. In the alternative, Rayant asked the court to strike multiple documents from the file, arguing they contained falsehoods.
The trial court denied the sealing request. Citing California Rules of Court, rule 2.550, the court found the motion untimely because the restraining order record had been publicly available for over a year. The court also held that the request was not narrowly tailored, noting that Rayant sought to seal the entire file without showing specific prejudice or explaining why sealing particular documents (rather than everything) would be insufficient. As the court observed, Rayant’s motion and supporting declarations did not “provide facts that discuss specific harm or prejudice to the parties such that sealing documents, let alone the entire file, would be appropriate.”
On appeal, Rayant argued that civil harassment restraining order proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 are “special proceedings” not subject to the ordinary presumption of public access discussed in NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178. According to Rayant, because restraining order proceedings are statutory in nature and do not historically resemble ordinary civil trials, there should be no constitutional or procedural presumption of openness, and the trial court should have had discretion to seal the record without applying the standards of Rule 2.550.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. It explained that the California Rules of Court establish a broad statutory right of public access to superior court records, independent of constitutional considerations. “The language of rule 2.550 is unambiguous,” the Court said, and all superior court records are presumptively open unless a specific exception applies—such as a statute requiring confidentiality or circumstances involving discovery materials not used at trial. No such exception applied here.
The Court emphasized that even if no constitutional right of access existed, rule 2.550 and rule 2.551 governed, and Rayant had failed to meet the sealing standard. To seal court records, a party must show there is an overriding interest that overcomes the public’s right of access, that the sealing is narrowly tailored, and that no less restrictive means exist. Rayant’s concerns about employment and travel hardships were not supported by sufficient evidence of a substantial probability of harm. The Court explained that “accepting that having an active restraining order on one’s record could negatively impact a background check, the trial court already has mitigated that prejudice by terminating the restraining order.” It also found that concerns about increased airport screening did not override the public’s right of access, noting that Rayant failed to establish any causal link between the public court record and the government’s security actions.
Finally, the Court pointed out that Rayant’s sealing request sought to seal far more than necessary: he sought to remove not only Marino’s application for a restraining order but also the orders terminating it. The Court agreed with the trial judge that this approach was overbroad and did not meet the “narrow tailoring” requirement of Rule 2.550(d).
Odom v. Los Angeles Community College District
04/7/2025 CA 2/8: B327997 – Grimes, J.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B327997.PDF
In this case, the Court of Appeal reversed a $10 million jury verdict in favor of Professor Sabrena Odom, concluding that the trial was fundamentally unfair due to the trial judge’s admission of inflammatory evidence and his own improper conduct.
Odom, a tenured English professor and director of the Student Success Center at Los Angeles Southwest College, sued the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) and Dr. Howard Irvin for sexual harassment, retaliation, and negligent hiring and supervision. She testified that Dr. Irvin, who oversaw grant funds critical to her program, repeatedly made sexually explicit comments to her, suggested career benefits in exchange for sex, and retaliated when she refused his advances by undermining her authority and firing two of her long-time student workers.
At trial, however, the case expanded far beyond these allegations. Judge Robert S. Draper allowed the jury to hear about Dr. Irvin’s decades-old, expunged misdemeanor convictions for stalking, criminal threats, and disobeying court orders—despite clear California law forbidding employers from considering such dismissed convictions in employment decisions. The judge permitted the admission of two Los Angeles Times articles from 1997 and 1998 recounting these incidents, ostensibly not for their truth but to explain Odom’s fear. In reality, the articles were read aloud in court, and Odom was allowed to testify extensively about how terrified she was after receiving copies slid under her office door. Although undisputed evidence showed another employee had delivered the articles as a warning, not a threat, the court encouraged the jury to infer that Dr. Irvin himself had placed them there, further compounding the prejudice.
The judge also permitted inflammatory testimony from a student worker, Raquel Gonzalez, who alleged that a different administrator (not Dr. Irvin) had sexually harassed her. Gonzalez described crude and demeaning comments allegedly made in Dr. Irvin’s presence, though they were far removed from Odom’s claims. Even while admitting the evidence, Judge Draper acknowledged that Gonzalez was not “similarly situated” to Odom and that her allegations did not fit cleanly as “me-too” evidence. Nevertheless, he justified the testimony on the grounds that the jury deserved to know “what it’s like to be an innocent co-ed at the college” and speculated aloud about whether parents would want their daughters to attend.
During closing argument, Odom’s counsel repeatedly invoked both the newspaper articles and Gonzalez’s testimony, urging the jury to prevent Dr. Irvin from ever again being alone with female students. After deliberating less than one day, the jury awarded Odom $8.5 million in noneconomic damages against the District and $1.5 million against Irvin personally—despite awarding no punitive damages and no economic losses.
Post-trial, new defense counsel moved for a new trial or remittitur, citing the improperly admitted evidence and the excessive damages. At the hearing on the motions, Judge Draper made a series of bizarre and racially charged remarks unrelated to the case. Speaking to defense counsel, who was the only Black attorney in the courtroom, he digressed into stories about miscegenation laws, Black quarterbacks, and his personal pride in societal progress. He also repeated a crude saying from his early legal career: that female secretaries had to “fuck better than [they could] type.” His remarks prompted a successful motion to disqualify him for cause, with a neutral judge finding that his behavior would cause a reasonable observer to doubt his impartiality.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial had been infected by prejudicial error from the start. The justices criticized the trial court’s evidentiary rulings as motivated by “personal opinions untethered to the rules of evidence,” finding no meaningful Evidence Code section 352 balancing of probative value against prejudice. They condemned the admission of the newspaper articles and the decades-old convictions, emphasizing that they had “uniquely tend[ed] to evoke an emotional bias” and impermissibly encouraged the jury to punish Irvin based on character evidence. The Gonzalez testimony, too, was held inadmissible because it lacked the necessary connection to Odom’s claims and improperly suggested a general culture of harassment.
The Court of Appeal noted that the $10 million damages award—with no corresponding economic loss—reflected the cumulative impact of the improper evidence. The court observed that while the record contained substantial evidence of harassment and retaliation, the pervasive injection of inflammatory material deprived defendants of a fair trial. It reversed the judgment in full and ordered a new trial before a different judge.
Although the Court carefully refrained from formally attributing the trial judge’s rulings to bias, it made clear that his conduct—both during trial and in post-trial proceedings—undermined the appearance and reality of judicial neutrality. As the court summarized, “One thing we can say for sure is, the rulings were not motivated by a devotion to the law of evidence.”
04/4/2025 CA 4/3: G064552 – Moore, P.J.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064552.PDF
In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the family court’s ruling on spousal support and property division following the dissolution of a long-term domestic partnership and marriage between Rod Alan Freeman and Hub Alan Freeman. The opinion addresses spousal support calculation, valuation of a rental property under the Moore/Marsden formula, and claims of due process violations—ultimately rejecting all of Hub’s arguments and upholding the trial court’s decision.
Rod and Hub Freeman had been domestic partners and later spouses for over fifteen years before they separated in 2020. At the time of their separation, both were unemployed and had been living off income from a Los Angeles rental property owned by Hub, as well as Social Security and investment dividends. The rental property, located on Micheltorena Street, had been purchased by Hub years before the domestic partnership began but was paid off during their union. After separation, the parties agreed that the community had some interest in the property but disputed both the value of the property and the percentage belonging to the community.
Following a trial, the family court ordered Hub to pay Rod $2,100 per month in permanent spousal support. It found that while Rod had marketable skills and could reasonably be expected to earn about $5,400 per month, he had been unemployed for seven years, partly at Hub’s request, and was now 60 years old with health issues that impaired his ability to work. Applying the Family Code section 4320 factors, the court concluded that Rod’s need for support was substantial and ongoing, and that the modest $2,100 support order was reasonable given the parties’ circumstances.
The trial court also found that the community had a 60.2% pro tanto interest in the Micheltorena property, based on the principal reduction and improvements made during the marriage. It valued the property at $2.1 million as of February 2022, relying on the appraisal provided by Rod’s expert over conflicting, lower appraisals offered by Hub’s two experts.
On appeal, Hub attacked the judgment on three fronts: first, arguing that the spousal support amount improperly gave Rod more income than half the marital standard of living; second, arguing that the family court miscalculated the value of the Micheltorena property by valuing it closer to trial rather than at the time of separation; and third, claiming he was denied due process because his counsel was not given enough time to examine witnesses on the last day of trial.
The Court of Appeal rejected each contention. As to spousal support, the court explained that there is no rule requiring an equal division of the marital standard of living between spouses, and that the trial court has broad discretion to fashion support awards based on need, earning ability, and equitable factors. It observed that while Rod’s imputed earning capacity was $5,400 per month, he remained vulnerable due to age and health limitations, and the court was entitled to factor in that Hub had asked Rod to remain unemployed during their relationship.
The Court of Appeal also rejected the argument that the trial court solely relied on Xspouse, and not the 4320 factors, in making its spousal support order. The court emphasized that the use of an Xspouse report did not mean the judge mechanically calculated support based on software; rather, the Xspouse printout was attached only to illustrate the net spendable income of the support order.
Turning to the Micheltorena property, the Court of Appeal rejected Hub’s argument that the property had to be valued as of the separation date. Citing Family Code section 2552 and In re Marriage of Mohler (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 788, the Court reaffirmed that property is ordinarily valued “as near as practicable to the time of trial.” It concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding Rod’s expert more credible and in valuing the property at $2.1 million rather than at the lower figures proposed by Hub’s experts.
Finally, the Court of Appeal rejected Hub’s due process challenge as forfeited and unsubstantiated. Although Hub claimed his counsel was cut off and denied sufficient time to examine witnesses, the record showed that the parties had been instructed to manage their own time allocation on the final day of trial. Hub never alerted the court at the time that he lacked time to complete his examinations, and as the court noted, “[a] party must raise an issue in the trial court if they would like appellate review.”
Winter v. Menlo
04/2/2025 CA 2/8: B328474 – Viramontes, J.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B328474.PDF
In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed a probate court’s order disqualifying attorney Adam Streisand and his law firm, Sheppard Mullin, from representing Frank Menlo in trust litigation. This case offers a sharp reminder that preliminary consultations with prospective clients can trigger disqualification under California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.18—even when no formal attorney-client relationship is ultimately formed.
The dispute arose from litigation over family trusts established by Sam and Vera Menlo. Jeffrey Winter, one of the successor trustees, filed a petition against Frank Menlo alleging financial elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, and other claims. Before initiating litigation, Jeffrey had reached out to Streisand in March 2021 to explore retaining him as counsel. During their e-mail communications, Jeffrey disclosed confidential information about the potential claims, litigation strategy, documents relevant to proving undue influence, and his understanding of Vera’s declining health. Streisand initially assured Jeffrey there was no conflict of interest. However, once it became clear that Jeffrey intended to sue Frank—a former client of Streisand’s—Streisand conducted a belated conflicts check, realized he could not represent Jeffrey, and declined the engagement.
After litigation commenced, Frank hired Streisand and Sheppard Mullin to defend him. Jeffrey promptly moved to disqualify them, arguing that under Rule 1.18, Streisand had received confidential, material information during the March 2021 consultation that precluded him from representing a materially adverse client in the same matter. The probate court agreed and disqualified both Streisand and Sheppard Mullin, finding that Jeffrey had been a “prospective client” and had shared confidential information material to the case. The court emphasized that Streisand had not taken reasonable steps to limit the disclosure of confidential information during the initial consultation, and that disqualification was necessary to avoid any risk—intentional or inadvertent—of misuse.
On appeal, Frank Menlo argued that even if Jeffrey had initially disclosed confidential material information, the court should have evaluated whether that information was still “material” at the time of disqualification. He contended that subsequent public filings and disclosures had rendered the original communications harmless and immaterial.
The Court of Appeal agreed that Rule 1.18 requires courts to assess materiality at the time of disqualification, not just at the time of the original consultation. But it firmly rejected Frank’s argument that the information Jeffrey disclosed had lost its significance. The court explained that Jeffrey’s disclosures had included not just general allegations of undue influence, but also specific litigation theories, mental impressions about Vera’s health, and documentary evidence that had not been attached to the pleadings.
The Court also rejected Frank’s broader equitable arguments. While acknowledging a litigant’s right to counsel of choice, the Court held that the paramount concern was safeguarding the fairness and integrity of the proceedings. It emphasized that the case was still in early stages, and that Frank could readily find alternative counsel without undue hardship. The Court found no evidence that Jeffrey had engaged in tactical abuse by consulting Streisand and concluded that disqualification was necessary to prevent even the appearance of impropriety.
The ruling reinforces that under California law, a prospective client’s consultation—even if brief, informal, or ultimately fruitless—can create binding duties of confidentiality. It underscores that attorneys must exercise extreme caution at the intake stage, especially when faced with potential conflicts, and must not allow substantive information exchanges to occur before conflicts checks are completed.
3/28/2025 CA 3: C099438 – Hull, J.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C099438.PDF
In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed a family court judgment that enforced an unwritten traditional surrogacy agreement and found that the woman who gave birth to the child was not the child’s legal parent.
The dispute arose between Sarah Miles, a lesbian woman, and Jeffrey Gerstein, a single gay man who had long hoped to become a parent. After years of friendship, Miles volunteered in 2012 to act as a surrogate for Gerstein. Unlike gestational surrogacy, where the carrier has no genetic connection to the child, here Miles used her own ova and Gerstein’s sperm to conceive the child. They agreed that Gerstein would assume sole parental rights and responsibilities, while Miles would not act as the child’s mother. Both parties orally agreed that the child would live exclusively with Gerstein, that he would make all decisions regarding the child’s upbringing, and that Miles would not assume any parental role—terms they adhered to for more than seven years after the child’s birth.
The child, E., was born in December 2013. Although Miles’s name appeared on the birth certificate, Gerstein testified—and the trial court credited—that this was intended only to avoid leaving the mother’s name blank, not to recognize Miles as a parent. Gerstein raised E. entirely on his own, managing her education, medical care, and daily life. Miles occasionally attended birthday parties or had incidental contact but did not financially support E., make decisions about her upbringing, or assume any caretaking role. E. knew Miles only by her first name, “Sarah,” and consistently described her to others as a neighbor who had helped her father have a baby—not as a mother.
The parties’ amicable relationship deteriorated in 2020, after Miles began seeking more direct access to E. and claimed Gerstein was violating their original understanding. In 2021, when E. was seven years old, Miles filed a petition to establish a parental relationship, seeking joint legal and physical custody. Gerstein responded by asking the court to find that Miles had no parental rights under their surrogacy agreement.
After a multi-day trial, the family court ruled in Gerstein’s favor. Applying a clear and convincing evidence standard, the trial court found that Miles and Gerstein had formed an enforceable oral traditional surrogacy agreement in which Miles agreed she would not parent the child. The court emphasized the consistency of the parties’ conduct over the years with that agreement and found that allowing Miles to assert parental rights after so much time would not be in E.’s best interests.
On appeal, Miles argued that California law does not permit an oral surrogacy contract to divest a birth mother of her parental status. She contended that Family Code sections 7960 and 7962 require all surrogacy agreements to be written and that, because she gave birth to E., she must be recognized as the child’s mother under Family Code section 7610. She also asserted constitutional arguments, claiming a violation of her due process rights.
The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments. It held that the statutory requirements Miles relied on—governing assisted reproduction agreements for gestational carriers—did not apply to traditional surrogacy arrangements like the one here, where the surrogate uses her own ova. The court explained that traditional surrogacy agreements are not subject to the writing requirements of sections 7960 and 7962, and that Civil Code section 1622 allows contracts to be oral unless a statute expressly requires a writing.
Turning to section 7610, the court emphasized that the statute uses permissive language (“may be established by proof of having given birth”), not mandatory language (“shall”), and that parentage under the Uniform Parentage Act can be determined based on the parties’ intent when conception results from assisted reproduction. Citing Johnson v. Calvert (1993) 5 Cal.4th 84 and In re Marriage of Buzzanca (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1410, the Court reaffirmed that when a child’s conception and birth result from a deliberate, acted-on intention, that intention governs legal parentage. Here, the parties’ clear and lasting intent was that Gerstein would be E.’s sole parent.
The Court also rejected Miles’s constitutional claims. It explained that Miles never acted as E.’s parent, financially, emotionally, or otherwise, and thus could not claim a protected parental relationship. Due process principles were not implicated because Miles was not deprived of an existing fundamental right; she had never exercised parental rights in the first place.
The Court of Appeal endorsed the trial court’s public policy analysis as well. Quoting Johnson, it emphasized that honoring carefully made preconception agreements advances the best interests of children and respects the deliberate choices made by adults in assisted reproduction.
3/20/2025 CA 1/4: A171160 – Brown, P. J.
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A171160.PDF
This case involved a jurisdictional dispute under the UCCJEA. The Court of Appeal denied a writ petition filed by C.T., who sought to terminate California’s jurisdiction over an ongoing child custody proceeding after he relocated with his son from California to Denmark, and the child’s mother, K.W., had moved to Utah.
The litigation began in early 2019, when C.T. filed an action in San Francisco Superior Court seeking a domestic violence restraining order against K.W. and sole legal and physical custody of their child, who was born in November 2018. At that time, the court found that California was the child’s home state under the UCCJEA. Over the subsequent years, the parties engaged in protracted litigation. In October 2022, the court issued a five-year domestic violence restraining order against K.W. and awarded temporary sole custody to C.T., with visitation rights remaining unresolved.
In April 2024, C.T. requested court permission to move with the child to Denmark due to a job opportunity. After a hearing, the court granted the request in May 2024, explicitly noting it had not yet made a final custody determination but concluding that relocation with C.T. was in the child’s best interest. The court also ordered a full custody evaluation and set a hearing to consider visitation issues and K.W.’s request for joint legal custody and rebuttal of a Family Code section 3044 presumption related to domestic violence.
After C.T. relocated to Denmark with the child, he argued that the California court no longer had jurisdiction to make any custody or visitation determinations. In June 2024, he filed an ex parte application under Family Code section 3422(a)(2), asserting that neither the child nor either parent resided in California, thus divesting the court of continuing jurisdiction. Following a hearing, the trial court agreed as a factual matter that no party presently resided in California but concluded it nevertheless retained continuing jurisdiction to finalize the unresolved custody and visitation matters.
C.T. petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing that under the plain language of section 3422(a)(2), the trial court had lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction because the child and parents no longer resided in California. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. It concluded that the critical date for assessing continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is the date the custody proceeding commenced—not the date when the jurisdictional challenge arises or the parties later relocate out of state.
The Court of Appeal explained that the UCCJEA is intended to avoid jurisdictional conflicts, forum shopping, and the potential waste of judicial resources by establishing stable and predictable jurisdictional rules. Notably, the court relied heavily on the official commentary to the model UCCJEA and numerous out-of-state cases interpreting analogous provisions. These authorities held that once jurisdiction properly attaches at the commencement of a custody proceeding, subsequent relocation by the parties and child does not divest the court of jurisdiction to complete proceedings already underway.
The court specifically distinguished the California decision in A.M. v. Superior Court (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 343, which had held that jurisdiction was lost once all relevant parties relocated from the state. The Court of Appeal found A.M. unpersuasive because it failed to consider the timing issue clearly explained by out-of-state courts and the official commentary. Unlike the grandparents’ visitation proceeding at issue in A.M., the custody proceeding involving C.T. and K.W. remained unresolved, pending continuously from the initial filing in 2019, and the trial court had explicitly reserved final custody decisions.
The Court of Appeal emphasized policy concerns, noting that allowing jurisdiction to end simply because parents and children relocate during ongoing proceedings could encourage forum shopping, undermine the stability of custody decisions, and waste judicial resources by leaving disputes unresolved. Instead, it concluded that jurisdiction attaches at the commencement of the custody proceeding and continues until a final determination is made, regardless of later relocations.
The Court of Appeal therefore held that despite the trial court’s factual finding under section 3422(a)(2)—that no party presently resided in California—jurisdiction was not terminated. The trial court still had jurisdiction to finalize the unresolved custody and visitation issues raised at the beginning of the proceeding in 2019. Consequently, the Court of Appeal denied C.T.’s writ petition, affirming California’s continuing jurisdiction to bring the custody dispute to a final resolution.
DEPENDENCY (current through 4/16//25)
By: John Nieman
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Auther’s note is italicized.
In re L.W.
3/19/25, CA 1/5 A170656
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170656.PDF
Mother appealed jurisdictional findings under Welfare & Institutions (W&I) Code §300(b) and (g), and consequent dispositional orders.
Minor (whose age was unspecified in the opinion, but ~6 or more years old in any case) was removed after mother was hospitalized for mental health reasons. The family was staying at a Shelter at the time and, when the minor showed up without mother (or other designated guardian), the shelter called the police. The police wouldn’t release the minor to 2 ready, willing, and able adults, namely maternal grandmother and step father (who had helped care for the minor since she was 11 months old). The trial court erroneously focused on the facts at the time of police action at the Shelter instead of the time of the hearing to take jurisdiction. In short, the mother’s whereabouts were known and neither did she leave the child without appropriate adult supervision.
As to W&I §300(b), there was ample evidence that the mother suffered from mental health problems. There was no significant evidence that her mental health condition had created nor would create a risk to the minor. Mother had a history of substance abuse and was receiving some treatment for it, but there was no evidence that her addiction was ‘active’ during the incidents that gave rise to the dependency proceedings.
Finding no grounds for jurisdiction, the jurisdiction order was reversed and subsequent dispositional orders vacated as moot.
In re H.M.
3/24/25, CA 5 F088486
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/F088486.PDF
This is an Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) case. Mother appealed from a termination of her parental rights, claiming the Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to adequately investigate possible Native American ancestry.
The SSA appears to have asked about possible Native American ancestry of all relatives. If some were not asked, that information is not included in the opinion. Additionally, it contacted all of the potential tribes indicated by parents. All tribes responded, if imperfectly. Since substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that there was no reason to know the child qualified for the protections and procedures of the ICWA, impliedly that an adequate inquiry into that possibility was made, the decision was affirmed.
In re A.T.
4/14/25, CA 4/1 D085053
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D085053.PDF
Father appeals from dispositional order that found a substantial risk of detriment were the child placed with him. Father did not have custody at the time of the events that brought A.T. before the Juvenile Court. The essential dispute is whether W&I §361(c) and (d) are applicable or only §361.2(a) as to father. Father raises this question because W&I §361(d), unlike §361.2(a), requires a finding that there are no reasonable means to prevent a removal.
To be clear, W&I §361(d) findings were made specifically as to father by the trial court, as were §361.2(a) findings. The dispute therefore only pertains to the detriment finding for both, and the question of reasonable means analysis would only be necessary were W&I §361(d) found applicable.
Notably, to remove from a custodial parent and then not place with a prior non-custodial parent both require a court to find by clear and convincing evidence that leaving the child with the custodial parent, or placing with a noncustodial parent, would create a substantial risk to the safety and wellbeing of the child. Both detriment findings were made in this case, the former as to the mother and latter as to the father.
The appellate court found substantial evidence supported the detriment finding. It also found that father was a prior noncustodial parent and therefore only W&I §361.2(a) applied to him. This determination was based on the plain and legal meanings of “physical custody”. Importantly, these parents have 2 older children together, but father was unaware he was the parent of A.T. prior to commencement of the dependency proceedings. Affirmed.