Litigation
Litigation Update: February 2026
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates:
- Despite Similarities, Copyright Action Dismissed for Lack of Showing that What Is Similar Is the Copyright Holder’s Original Expression.
- Defendant Who Used a Copyrighted Photograph as the Basis for a Tattoo Prevailed.
- No Dormant Commerce Clause Violations in Local Licensing of Cannabis Dispensaries.
- California’s Ban on Openly Carrying Firearms Successfully Challenged.
- Grant of Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Jurisdiction Reversed.
- The Church Autonomy Doctrine Sometimes Trumps Laws Based on Protected Characteristics.
- Nonprofits Cannot Exploit Workers to Evade Wage Laws.
- Antitrust Cases Amidst Globalization.
- Refusal to Deal Is Not an Antitrust Violation.
- Who Gets the Fees When the First Law Firm Negotiates a Settlement and the Client Doesn’t Accept It Until He Substitutes in Another Firm?
- Showing of Standing in Class Actions.
- The Telephone Consumer Protection Act Does Not Prohibit Sending Text Messages with a Video File.
- The Parties Agreed to Be Governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.
- Congressman Running for Office Has Standing to Challenge Illinois Election Law.
- A Reasonableness Standard, Not Probable Cause, Applies When Police Enter a Home Without a Warrant During an Emergency.
- Nondisclosure Order Against Microsoft Valid.
- California Supreme Court Interprets the Public Records Act.
- The Five-Year Rule.
- Ordinance Prohibits Short-Term Rentals.
- Broker Who Hired Independent Contractor to Transport Cargo Owes No Duty of Care to Employees of Independent Contractor.
- In Federal Court, Rule 60(b) Timing Requirements Apply to Motions Alleging a Judgment Is Void.
- State Law Requiring a Certificate of Merit in Medical Malpractice Cases Does Not Apply in Federal Court.
- Nasty Accusations Against Trial Judge in Writ Petition Resulted in $25,000 Sanction Against Lawyer.
- Public Defender Has Discretion to Decline a Court Appointment.
- Sidewalk Vendors, State Law & City Ordinances Meet.
- U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms Limited Role of Federal Courts Under AEDPA’s Strict Standards.
- Control of Class Action Under Rule 23(d) Includes Authority to Decline to Enforce Arbitration Agreement.
- Conditioning Plaintiff’s Settlement Offer on Acceptance by Defendant Driver’s Insurance Carrier Does Not Invalidate It Under § 998.
- Violation of Prop 64 Requires Imminent Usable Quantity of Cannabis Readily Accessible to Vehicle Occupant to Justify Warrantless Search.
- No Appeal from Costs Judgment Following Nonappealable Voluntary Dismissal.
Despite Similarities, Copyright Action Dismissed for Lack of Showing that What Is Similar Is the Copyright Holder’s Original Expression. A district court granted summary judgment for defendant in a copyright action. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit observed that the author of an article entitled Top Guns, upon which plaintiffs claim a copyright, and a motion picture produced by defendant do share some similarities because they both depict the Navy’s real fighter-pilot training program. The appeals court added: “But copyright plaintiffs must show more than an allegedly infringing work’s general similarity to their own. They must show that what is similar is their original expression. Because Maverick does not share substantial amounts of the original expression of ‘Top Guns,’ we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment for [defendant].” (Yonay v. Paramount Pictures Corporation (9th Cir., Jan. 2, 2026) 163 F.4th 685.)
Defendant Who Used a Copyrighted Photograph as the Basis for a Tattoo Prevailed. Plaintiff copyrighted a photograph he took of Miles Davis. Defendant used that photograph as the basis for a tattoo. Defendant also drew a sketch of the photograph and made several social media posts related to the tattoo and the photograph. Before trial, the district court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. A jury subsequently found defendant was not liable for copyright infringement. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “First, . . . the district court’s order denying summary judgment was based on several triable issues of fact as to substantial similarity. Second, the district court did not err in denying [plaintiff’s] Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law. Because the jury’s verdict was based on an application of the intrinsic test, we will not second-guess it.” (Sedlik v. Von Drachenberg (9th Cir., Jan. 2, 2026) 163 F.4th 667.)
No Dormant Commerce Clause Violations in Local Licensing of Cannabis Dispensaries. Marijuana remains illegal under federal law but is legal for medicinal and/or recreational use in many states. Some states have adopted licensing and other rules for cannabis dispensaries. In two actions, dispensaries that operate in the state of Washington and the city of Sacramento contend that local licensing laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Two federal district courts dismissed the actions. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e decline to extend the dormant Commerce Clause to interstate commerce in a drug market that Congress has declared illegal.” (Peridot Tree WA, Inc. v. Washington State Liquor and Cannabis Control Board (9th Cir., Jan. 2, 2026) 162 F.4th 1179.)
California’s Ban on Openly Carrying Firearms Successfully Challenged. Plaintiff wishes to carry a firearm in California, yet California has banned open carry in all counties with populations greater than 200,000, which is home to roughly 95 percent of the state’s population. Plaintiff sued, challenging California’s open-carry restrictions under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment for California, holding that the Second Amendment does not protect plaintiff’s desired conduct. Affirming in part and reversing in part, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We agree with [plaintiff] that California’s ban on open carry in counties with a population greater than 200,000 fails under[New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v.] Bruen [(2022) 597 U.S. 1], and we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue. With respect to [plaintiff’s] as-applied and facial challenges to California’s licensing requirements in counties with populations of less than 200,000, we conclude that [plaintiff] waived his as-applied challenge by not contesting the district court’s dismissal in his opening brief and that [plaintiff’s] facial challenge fails on the merits on the record of this case. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on [plaintiff’s] challenges to the licensing scheme in counties with populations of less than 200,000.” (Baird v. Bonta (9th Cir., Jan. 2, 2026) 163 F.4th 723.)
Grant of Motion to Quash Service of Summons for Lack of Jurisdiction Reversed. In a motion to quash a summons, defendant asserted plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that its California contacts were substantially connected to the alleged claims and injuries, it lacked sufficient notice that its California activities would subject it to personal jurisdiction, and California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant would be unfair and unreasonable. The trial court granted the motion to quash. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Specific personal jurisdiction over [defendant] exists as plaintiffs’ claims arose out of or related to [defendant’s] contacts with California—namely, its purchase, distribution, and sale of gasoline in California—and [defendant] fails to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would be unreasonable.” (In re Fuel Industry Climate Cases (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Jan. 5, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 882.)
The Church Autonomy Doctrine Sometimes Trumps Laws Based on Protected Characteristics. A district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Washington Law Against Discrimination (RCW 49.60; WLAD) against plaintiff, a Christian ministry, for preferring and hiring co-religionists for non-ministerial roles. The religion clauses of the First Amendment, known as the church autonomy doctrine, protect religious institutions from government interference over their internal affairs involving faith and doctrine. Under the ministerial exception, the church autonomy doctrine bars the government from intruding in religious organizations’ choice of ministers and clergy. The issue in this case is whether the church autonomy doctrine may also shield religious institutions’ hiring of non-ministerial employees when it involves matters of faith and doctrine. The Ninth Circuit noted that hiring based on religious criteria may conflict with laws prohibiting employment decisions based on protected characteristics, and that ordinarily, even religious institutions must follow generally applicable employment laws. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and stated: “Under the church autonomy doctrine, Union Gospel may decline to hire as non-ministerial employees those who do not share its religious beliefs about marriage and sexuality. But unlike with the ministerial exception, the church autonomy doctrine only protects Union Gospel’s non-ministerial hiring decisions based on religious beliefs. So Union Gospel cannot discriminate on any other ground. And our decision is limited to religious organizations like Union Gospel. We do not consider the scope of the doctrine on other types of entities run by religious institutions, such as businesses or hospitals.” (Union Gospel Mission of Yakima Washington v. Brown (9th Cir., Jan. 6, 2026) 162 F.4th 1190.)
Nonprofits Cannot Exploit Workers to Evade Wage Laws. Plaintiff worked full time without wages for the Salvation Army, a nonprofit organization, in various operations that supported its retail thrift stores. His work was as part of a six-month, residential, substance abuse rehabilitation program. He now alleges that, under California law, the Salvation Army was required to pay him the minimum wage and overtime. The trial court determined that the wage laws do not apply because plaintiff was a volunteer, not an employee, and it granted summary judgment to the Salvation Army. The Court of Appeal vacated the judgment, remanded the case for further proceedings, and stated: “We agree that a volunteer for a nonprofit organization can fall outside the wage laws, but we conclude the trial court applied the wrong standard to distinguish a volunteer from an employee. . . . Even when a person is willing to volunteer their labor, the worker may not properly be deemed a volunteer if the nonprofit is exploiting the situation to evade the wage laws. Accordingly, in addition to requiring the existence of a bona fide volunteer agreement, the nonprofit must demonstrate that classifying the worker as a volunteer rather than an employee is not a subterfuge to obtain substandard labor.” (Spilman v. Salvation Army (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Jan. 6, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 913.)
Antitrust Cases Amidst Globalization. Usually antitrust claims based on injuries outside the U.S. are not authorized, but there are two narrow exceptions under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (15 U.S.C. § 6a; FTAIA): (1) if the anticompetitive conduct involves goods imported into the United States that Americans buy (the “import commerce” exclusion) or (2) if the anticompetitive conduct has a direct effect on domestic commerce that in turn causes the foreign antitrust injury to the plaintiff (the “domestic effects” exception). In this case, an American company based in California and two foreign entities argued they can bring antitrust claims against a Japanese-owned company for unlawful price-fixing. In a separate proceeding, the Japanese-owned company pleaded guilty to conspiring with competitors to fix prices of products sold in the U.S. and around the world. However, plaintiff purchased those products outside the U.S. Thus, a district court granted summary judgment, ruling the Sherman Act did not extend to such foreign injury. The Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded, stating: “NHK’s price-fixing in the U.S. led to domestic harm (i.e., higher prices for the suspension assemblies in the United States), and that effect also directly caused an antitrust injury abroad (because Seagate’s foreign entities overpaid for the suspension assemblies based on the inflated U.S. price). We, however, remand for the district court to determine whether Seagate has adduced sufficient evidence of proximate cause to survive summary judgment.” (Seagate Technology LLC v. NHK Spring Co., Ltd. (9th Cir., Jan. 8, 2026) 163 F.4th 1272.)
Refusal to Deal Is Not an Antitrust Violation. AliveCor is a medical-technology company that in 2017 created a software feature called SmartRhythm to detect episodes of atrial fibrillation (“Afib”) using the Apple Watch. The following year, Apple adopted a different system, using a different algorithm that was no longer compatible with SmartRhythm, and at the same time Apple added its own software feature to detect irregular heart rate data. AliveCor filed an antitrust suit, claiming that Apple had violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. AliveCor alleges that Apple did so for the purpose of disabling software, like SmartRhythm, that would have competed with Apple’s new software to detect irregular heartbeats, thereby monopolizing the market for heart rhythm analysis apps on the Apple Watch. A district court granted summary judgment in favor of Apple. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and stated: “Even assuming AliveCor is correct that Apple’s refusal to continue sharing the old heart rate algorithm’s data with third-party app developers is distinct from Apple’s improvement to Workout Mode, that conduct is properly classified as a refusal to deal. AliveCor would therefore need to establish an exception to the ‘general rule that there is no antitrust duty to deal’ to succeed under Section 2. []. Because AliveCor has not done so here, AliveCor’s Section 2 claims fail as a matter of law.” (AliveCor, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (9th Cir., Jan. 8, 2026) 163 F.4th 1259.)
Who Gets the Fees When the First Law Firm Negotiates a Settlement and the Client Doesn’t Accept It Until He Substitutes in Another Firm? In a personal injury case that did not look too good for the catastrophically injured plaintiff on liability, plaintiff’s first lawyer obtained an offer exceeding $6 million. After the first law firm advised the family there was a strong chance of a defense or very small money verdict, however, plaintiff’s family hired another lawyer because the insurance liens for medical care were so high. A few weeks later, with plaintiff’s authorization, the second lawyer settled the case for the amount negotiated by the first lawyer. The amount of $2,706,750 was placed in an account pending resolution of who gets the fee. In the declaratory relief action that followed, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the first law firm. The Court of Appeal described the issue on appeal: “This case presents the question: If a client-principal ratifies an unauthorized settlement after terminating the attorney-agent, does that ratification obligate the client-principal to pay the attorney their previously agreed-upon contingency fee?” Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Because the client in this case had the option of rescinding the settlement agreement due to lack of consent, and because the client did not have to ultimately execute the settlement agreement to avoid a loss, the client did not carry his burden on summary judgment of raising any triable issues of material fact as to whether his ratification of the settlement agreement was truly voluntary.” (Chong v. Mardirossian Akaragian LLP (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 5, Jan. 8, 2026) 2026 WL 63123.)
Showing of Standing in Class Actions. After class certification but before trial, defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff needed to demonstrate class-wide standing. Plaintiff argued he merely needed to produce evidence that the named class member—but not unnamed class members—could satisfy the standing requirements. The district court ruled in favor of defendant in granting a partial summary judgment. Because the district court required direct evidence of standing, the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating: “[P]laintiffs can use either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence.” (Healy v. Milliman, Inc. (9th Cir., Jan. 9, 2026) 164 F.4th 701.)
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act Does Not Prohibit Sending Text Messages with a Video File. It is unlawful to make any call using an artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service. (Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(iii); TCPA.) Plaintiff sued defendant under the TPCA for sending a text message containing a video file that required plaintiff to choose to listen to the video. The district court dismissed the action. Affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the action, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because the text message at issue here was made and initiated without the playing of a prerecorded voice, it did not violate these provisions.” (Howard v. Republican National Committee (9th Cir., Jan. 13, 2026) 164 F.4th 1119.)
The Parties Agreed to Be Governed by the Federal Arbitration Act. Plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiff’s individual claims and to dismiss her class claims. The only issue raised on appeal was whether the court correctly found the parties’ arbitration agreement is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; FAA). Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “As we explain, the court correctly found the FAA governs the parties’ arbitration agreement because they agreed to be bound by the act. We therefore affirm the order granting West Coast Dental’s motion to compel arbitration of Tuufuli’s individual claims and to dismiss her class claims.” (Tuufuli v. West Coast Dental Administrative Services (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Jan. 13, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1048.)
Congressman Running for Office Has Standing to Challenge Illinois Election Law. Illinois law requires election officials to count mail-in ballots postmarked or certified no later than election day and received within two weeks of election day (Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, §§5/19–8(c), 5/18A–15(a)). In May 2022, Congressman Michael Bost and presidential elector nominees Laura Pollastrini and Susan Sweeney sued the Illinois State Board of Elections and its executive director (respondents), claiming that counting ballots received after election day violates federal law. They principally contended that doing so conflicts with 2 U.S.C. § 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1, which set election day as the Tuesday following the first Monday in November. The district court dismissed the case for lack of standing and an appellate court affirmed. Reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “As a candidate for office, Congressman Bost has standing to challenge the rules that govern the counting of votes in his election.” Because only one plaintiff needs standing for a suit to proceed, the court did not address whether Pollastrini and Sweeney had standing to sue as prospective presidential electors. (Bost v. Illinois State Board of Elections (U.S., Jan. 14, 2026) 2026 WL 96707.)
A Reasonableness Standard, Not Probable Cause, Applies When Police Enter a Home Without a Warrant During an Emergency. A man told his ex-girlfriend on the telephone that he was going to kill himself. She tried to talk him down and then heard a pop sound. She called 911 to report the incident. When the police arrived, the man emerged from a closet where he was hiding. He had a black object in his hand that appeared to be a gun. Fearing he was about to be shot, the officer fired his own rifle. The bullet hit the man in the abdomen, and another officer rushed to administer first aid. An ambulance was called to take the man to the nearest hospital (where he recovered). Meanwhile, one officer found a handgun in a laundry basket next to the place where the man had stood. The county attorney charged the man with assaulting a police officer. The man moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the home entry, arguing the police had violated the Fourth Amendment by coming into his house without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the police officers were responding legitimately to an “emergency.” A Montana jury then found him guilty of the crime charged. When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, the high court noted that police officers may enter a home without a warrant if they have an “objectively reasonable basis for believing” that someone inside needs emergency assistance. (Brigham City v. Stuart (U.S., 2006) 547 U. S. 398, 400.) The question presented was whether that standard means that officers must have “probable cause” for the intrusion, as they typically would when investigating a crime. The U.S. Supreme Court stated: “We hold it does not. The probable-cause requirement is rooted in, and derives its meaning from, the criminal context, and we decline to transplant it to this different one. Brigham City’s reasonableness standard means just what it says, with no further gloss. And here it was satisfied because the police had “an objectively reasonable basis for believing” that a homeowner intended to take his own life and, indeed, may already have shot himself. (Case v. Montana (U.S., Jan. 14, 2026) 2026 WL 96690.)
Nondisclosure Order Against Microsoft Valid. The Los Angeles Police Department served petitioner Microsoft Corporation with a search warrant for electronic data associated with an email account assigned to a University of Southern California (USC) graduate student who was under investigation for committing rape. The warrant was served along with a nondisclosure order (NDO) prohibiting Microsoft from notifying certain individuals about the search warrant for 90 days, including the target of the investigation and anyone at USC. Microsoft conceded the NDO’s validity with respect to its prohibition against notifying the target of the warrant’s existence. The issues were limited, therefore, to whether the NDO’s prohibition against notifying a contact at USC of the existence of the warrant violated the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (Pen. Code, § 1546 et seq.; CalECPA) and/or infringed on Microsoft’s First Amendment free speech rights. Ruling against Microsoft, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude the trial court made the required findings under CalECPA and that the NDO withstands strict scrutiny.” (Microsoft Corporation v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 4, Jan. 14, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1100.)
California Supreme Court Interprets the Public Records Act. In consolidated appeals, the California Supreme Court addressed two issues. First, does the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, § 7920.000 et seq.; CPRA) authorize a superior court to grant declaratory relief for violations of its provisions when it is undisputed that an agency has disclosed all existing records that are responsive to a records request and not exempt from disclosure? Second, when an agency responds to a CPRA request by asserting the requested records fall under a statutory exemption from disclosure, does the CPRA require that the agency retain the records for three years from the date the exemption is invoked? As to this first issue, California’s high court held: “[W]e conclude from the statutory text, considered in light of the CPRA’s purpose ‘increasing freedom of information’ [], that declaratory relief under the CPRA is available in at least some circumstances in which all existing responsive, nonexempt records have been disclosed in response to a records request.” The second issue addressed when an agency responds to a CPRA request by asserting that the requested records fall under a statutory exemption from disclosure. In that instance, does the CPRA require that the agency retain the records for three years from the date the exemption is invoked? The high court held: “As to the second issue, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the CPRA does not ‘impose a duty upon public agencies to preserve all documents responsive to a public records request that have been withheld as exempt’ for a period of three years, commencing from when a public agency invokes a statutory exemption as a reason to withhold the records.” (City of Gilroy v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (Cal., Jan. 15, 2026) 19 Cal.5th 38.)
The Five-Year Rule. The statutory deadline to bring a case to trial is five years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.) Judicial Council Emergency Rule 10 extended the five-year deadline by six months for cases filed on or before April 6, 2020. Code of Civil Procedure § 583.330 also provides an exception where the parties may extend the statutory deadline either by written stipulation or “[b]y oral agreement made in open court, if entered in the minutes of the court or a transcript is made.” The five-year, six-month statutory deadline for plaintiff to bring the case to trial was October 19, 2024. At the March 27, 2024, case management conference, the trial court set the trial date for February 3, 2025. On November 1, 2024, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to bring the action to trial by the statutory deadline. In opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff argued that the parties verbally agreed to the February 2025 trial date at the March 2024 case management conference, and defendants’ verbal stipulation in that regard “was recorded in the minute order.” She argued the parties accordingly made an oral agreement in open court to extend the statutory deadline under § 583.330, subdivision (b), and defendants were precluded from seeking dismissal of the case under § 583.360. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “We decline to create new law that when a minute order is silent as to any discussion relating to the trial date, a court may infer that a defendant expressly agreed to the new trial date, thereby entering into an oral stipulation under section 583.330, subdivision (b).” (Randolph v. Trustees of the California State University (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Jan. 15, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1228.)
Ordinance Prohibits Short-Term Rentals. A county enacted an ordinance that prohibits short-term rentals without authorization. After determining an apartment complex violated the ordinance, the county imposed fines totaling $4,000. Other tenants in the complex complained about loud parties at the units rented through Airbnb. The complex sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the county violated the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause. The district court denied the complex’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The record before us demonstrates that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Diamond Sands failed to show serious questions that the fines at issue are grossly disproportionate or that Clark County’s ordinance is facially unconstitutional.” (Diamond Sands Apartments, LLC v. Clark County Nevada (9th Cir. , Jan. 16, 2026) 164 F.4th 759.)
Broker Who Hired Independent Contractor to Transport Cargo Owes No Duty of Care to Employees of Independent Contractor. The employee of a carrier hired by a broker to transport cargo across state lines sued the broker for negligence in not protecting him from harm. California law presumes that a person (here, the broker) who hires an independent contractor (here, the carrier) owes no duty of care to the employees of that independent contractor for the injuries those employees suffer while working for the independent contractor. The trial court granted summary judgment to the broker on this ground. On appeal, the employee argued that the broker had a nondelegable duty to protect the carrier’s employees and that the broker actually exercised control over the carrier’s transportation of cargo. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Because the undisputed evidence indicates that the broker did not perform any duties of a carrier and did not actually exercise any control over the carrier’s transport of the cargo, the trial court correctly determined that there were no triable issues of fact and properly granted summary judgment.” (Hu v. XPO Logistics, LLC (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 5, Jan. 16, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1197.)
In Federal Court, Rule 60(b) Timing Requirements Apply to Motions Alleging a Judgment Is Void. The question presented here was whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 60(c)(1)’s requirement that parties make rule 60(b) motions within a “reasonable time” applies to a motion seeking relief from an allegedly void judgment under rule 60(b)(4). The U.S. Supreme Court held: “We hold that this time limit applies to a motion alleging that a judgment is void.” (Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton (U.S., Jan. 20, 2026) 2026 WL 135998.)
State Law Requiring a Certificate of Merit in Medical Malpractice Cases Does Not Apply in Federal Court. Under Delaware law, a plaintiff may not sue for medical malpractice unless an affidavit of merit accompanies the complaint. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the requirement does not apply in federal court. (Berk v. Choy (U.S., Jan. 20, 2026) 2026 WL 135974.)
Nasty Accusations Against Trial Judge in Writ Petition Resulted in $25,000 Sanction Against Lawyer. The Court of Appeal sanctioned attorney T. Matthew Phillips $25,000. This is what happened. In a writ petition filed in the Court of Appeal, the attorney stated the trial judge “actively retaliates,” “systematically discriminates,” “acts in concert” with the attorney’s client’s opponents, “openly and notoriously” champions the attorney’s client’s opponents, “purposely failed to serve” a DVRO, issued “fake” and “forged” court orders, and “magically disappeared” a scheduled hearing “because Her Honor had no wish to explain whether (or not) she penned the now-infamous [forged] judicial signature.” Issuing the sanctions, the appeals court said that “what attorneys cannot do is what Phillips did here: make serious accusations of impropriety against the court without a scintilla of supporting evidence.” (N.D. v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Jan. 20, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1292.)
Public Defender Has Discretion to Decline a Court Appointment. A trial court determined a criminal defendant’s petition for habeas corpus seeking relief under the Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code, § 1473) made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. Defendant was entitled to appointed counsel, and the court appointed the public defender. The public defender attempted to decline the appointment, but the trial court determined that pursuant to Government Code § 27706, subdivision (a), unless he was unavailable, he was required to accept the appointment. The public defender filed the instant petition for writ of mandate challenging the court’s order. Issuing a writ of mandate, the Court of Appeal stated: “We hold that section 27706, subdivision (g) . . . governs public defenders’ representation of habeas petitioners like Reed, not section 27706(a). Under section 27706(g), public defenders have discretion to decline to represent a petitioner, and they need not make any showing of unavailability.” (Harmon v. Superior Court of Riverside County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, Jan. 20, 2026) 117 Cal.App.5th 1236.)
Sidewalk Vendors, State Law & City Ordinances Meet. Effective January 2, 2019, Government Code §§ 51036 through 51039 set forth the scope of permissible regulation of sidewalk vendors by local municipalities. Plaintiff appealed from an order denying his request for a preliminary injunction. He is a licensed sidewalk vendor who has supported his family by selling packaged snacks outside Petco Park in San Diego since 2009. In 2022, the city enacted a new set of ordinances that regulate sidewalk vending within its borders. Plaintiff received a series of citations based on the new ordinances on two separate occasions; the city impounded his product, along with at least one envelope of money from his sales. Reversing, the Court of Appeal concluded “that at least two of the City’s sidewalk vending regulations—namely regulations that purport to allow the impoundment of Mustaqeem’s items and that restrict vending operating hours beyond those of other area businesses—are in direct conflict with the state law on their face, and that the trial court did not adequately consider those specific conflicts in its ruling on the preliminary injunction.” (Mustaqeem v. City of San Diego (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Jan. 22, 2026) 2026 WL 174947.)
U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms Limited Role of Federal Courts Under AEDPA’s Strict Standards. Following an unsuccessful appeal in Maryland state court, a prisoner convicted as an accessory before the fact to attempted murder petitioned for federal habeas relief. He asserted a failure to disclose a forensic report of five computers found at his home, which showed that one, a laptop, had not been used since 2005 and contained no search term relating to the alleged use of a Gatorade bottle as a homemade silencer. Petitioner argued this computer was the one to which a witness referred in testimony that he used for research, and the evidence discredited the witness. The district court granted the petition under Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, and the Fourth District affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the lower federal courts failed to strictly comply with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); AEDPA). The high court held that the Maryland state court applied the correct rule for the materiality element for a Brady claim and reasonably concluded based on the strength of other evidence that the undisclosed evidence didn’t satisfy that element. The court explained “Faithful application of [AEDPA] standards sometimes puts federal district courts and courts of appeals in the disagreeable position of having to deny relief in cases they would have analyzed differently if they had been in the shoes of the relevant state court. But federal courts are dutybound to comply with AEDPA, and we have granted summary relief when the lower courts have departed from the role AEDPA assigns.” (Klein v. Martin (U.S., Jan. 26, 2026) 2026 WL 189976.)
Control of Class Action Under Rule 23(d) Includes Authority to Decline to Enforce Arbitration Agreement. A group of former employees who worked as recruiters for a staffing agency brough a putative class action in state court for violations of California wage and hour laws based on a misclassification of recruiters as exempt from overtime. The employer removed the action to federal court and moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion and the employer filed an interlocutory appeal. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)’s permission to exercise control over a class action and enter appropriate orders governing the conduct of counsel and parties included the authority to decline to enforce a mandatory arbitration agreement applicable to class members. It further concluded the district court correctly held that invalidation, as opposed to corrective notice, was required due to the employer’s misleading communications and the district court properly ruled on enforceability rather than delegating that decision to the arbitrator. (Avery v. TEKsystems, Inc. (9th Cir., Jan 28, 2026) 2026 WL 218992.)
Conditioning Plaintiff’s Settlement Offer on Acceptance by Defendant Driver’s Insurance Carrier Does Not Invalidate It Under § 998. Plaintiffs in a negligence and loss of consortium action stemming from a vehicle collision made a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure § 998 to defendant driver. Plaintiffs conditioned the offer on its acceptance by defendant driver’s insurance carrier. Defendant rejected the offer, a jury found in plaintiffs’ favor. But the lower court denied plaintiffs’ motion for prejudgment interest and plaintiffs filed a cross appeal. Reversing, the Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s analogy to the prohibition on offers conditioned on acceptance by multiple parties. The court explained: “‘[A] defending insurer cannot be bound to a settlement to which it has not agreed and in which it has not participated . . . .’ [Citation.] Implicit in any settlement offer to a party defended by an insurer, therefore, is a requirement of insurer consent, because without that consent there is no settlement. Plaintiffs’ ‘condition’ was nothing more than an express, and redundant, recognition of that implicit requirement. Put another way, defendant’s insurer’s consent was required whether or not plaintiffs expressly said so in their offer.” (Matthews v. Ryan (Cal. App. 2nd. Dist., Div. 1, Jan. 28, 2026) 2026 WL 221121.)
Violation of Prop 64 Requires Imminent Usable Quantity of Cannabis Readily Accessible to Vehicle Occupant to Justify Warrantless Search. Police officers pulled over a vehicle in which petitioner was a passenger for failing to fully stop at a crosswalk. Officers did not suspect the driver of being under the influence, but saw a rolling tray and “weed crumbs” on the floor. The officers searched the car and the driver’s purse. They collected .36 grams of material off the floor and found an unregistered pistol near petitioner’s seat. Petitioner filed a habeas petition based on a warrantless search following denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and dismiss the charges. The Court of Appeal denied the petition. The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court, explaining, “[A]t a minimum, to constitution a violation of [Health and Safety Code §] 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4), marijuana in a vehicle must be of a usable quantity, in imminently usable condition, and readily accessible to an occupant.” (Sellers v. Superior Court of Sacramento County (Cal., Jan 29. 2026) 2026 WL 236327.)
No Appeal from Costs Judgment Following Nonappealable Voluntary Dismissal. Family members of an assisted living facility resident sued the facility operator, voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice, and appealed from voluntary dismissal. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The family members moved to set aside the voluntary dismissal, which was denied, and they again appealed. The Court of Appeal again dismissed the appeal. The trial court entered judgments of costs for the facility operator and the family members appealed that judgment. Dismissing an appeal in this matter for a third time, the Court of Appeal explained, “[P]laintiffs here . . . do not challenge th[e] costs in this appeal. Instead, they challenge, among other things, the trial court’s summary adjudication ruling and denial of their motion to set aside the voluntary dismissal. . . . [A]llowing plaintiffs to raise this claims in this appeal would amount to an impermissible ‘back-door review of a nonappealable order.’” (Viani v. Fair Oaks Estates, Inc. (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Jan. 28, 2026) 2026 WL 221112.)