Litigation
Litigation Update: January 2026
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates:
- Even Though Juvenile Dependency Jurisdiction is Terminated, a Jurisdiction Challenge May Not Be Moot on Appeal.
- The Davis-Sterling Act Requires Fairness in HOA Elections.
- Plaintiff Excused from Not Complying with Government Claim Requirement When Defendant Public Entity Failed to Demonstrate It Was Registered on the Registry of Public Agencies of Each County Where It Maintains an Office.
- Statements of Counsel Are not Evidence in Petition for Military Diversion.
- Wrongful Eviction Claims Do Not Arise from Protected Activity Vis-à-Vis the Anti-SLAPP Statute.
- Privette Doctrine Found to Apply to Homeowner, Whose Insurance Company Hired an Inspection Company to Inspect Home.
- Malicious Prosecution.
- No Evidence to Support Cause of Action Against School District for Negligent Supervision.
- Shopping Centers May Not Completely Ban Expressive Activity.
- Terminating Sanctions for Failure to Respond to Discovery Requests.
- Lemon Law Damages.
- Federalism Explained by the U.S. Supreme Court.
- Mediator/Arbitrator Was Sued by Losing Party, and, After the Court Dismissed the Suit, Turned Around and Sued the Losing Party for Malicious Prosecution.
- No Ancillary Jurisdiction Under Code of Civil Procedure § 1294.2 in Appeal of Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration.
- Military Veteran Criminal Defendant Not Entitled to Resentencing Hearing Because He Was Convicted of a Super Strike.
- Apple, Inc. in Contempt.
- Judgment of Contempt of Parent by Family Court Annulled.
- Easements Do Not Good Neighbors Make.
- A Plaintiff’s Incorrect Legal Belief Does Not Necessarily Bar a Claim Under California’s Whistleblower Statute.
- County’s Administrative Procedure Does Not Apply to Whistleblower Retaliation Claims.
- Wife in Divorce Awarded the Couple’s Frozen Embryos Pursuant to a Contract Between the Husband and Wife.
- The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 Barred Enforcement of the Parties’ Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreement.
- Indebtedness of City.
- University Violated Professor’s First Amendment Rights.
- Early Evaluation Conference in Construction-Related Accessibility Cases.
- It Takes Two to Legally Separate.
- Ninth Circuit Declined to Disturb Incorrect Arbitration Award.
- Some Causes of Action Against Healthcare Facility Will Be Arbitrated; Others Will Not.
- “One Tiny Drop Changes Everything,” Elizabeth Holmes.
- HOA Board Denied Request for Homeowner to Build Accessory Dwelling Unit.
- Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Permitting Last-Minute Expert, Long After Expert Witness Exchange.
- Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration Reversed.
- Getting Into the Weeds of the Song-Beverly Act.
- Deployment of National Guard in Illinois.
- Suit to Reinstate Federal Research Grants.
- Homeless Veterans Win!
- New Trial Granted on the Basis of Attorney Misconduct in Violating Motions in Limine.
- Motion to Arbitrate PAGA Claim Denied.
- Credit Card Company Did Not Violate the CARD Act When It Raised Interest Rates.
- Criminal Defendants’ Ability to Pay Fines and Costs.
- Lower Court Did Not Err in Issuing Preliminary Injunction in False Advertising Case.
- Personal Injury Verdict and Postjudgment Cost Order Affirmed.
- Service of Process on Secretary of State Found to Be Proper.
Even Though Juvenile Dependency Jurisdiction is Terminated, a Jurisdiction Challenge May Not Be Moot on Appeal. A mother was reported to the Department of Justice, and her name was placed in California’s Child Abuse Central Index (CACI]) after her children were removed for violence the mother committed. Once listed in the CACI, an individual remains listed until the age of 100, at which point the listing is removed. At the hearing in juvenile court, the children explained the injuries were either fabricated or accidently caused, and the juvenile court returned the children to their mother, terminating jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the mother had appealed the jurisdiction finding by the juvenile court, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot after jurisdiction was terminated. Reversing the dismissal of the mother’s appeal by the Court of appeal, the California Supreme stated: “Reversal of a jurisdictional finding can redress that harm by prompting removal of the parent from the CACI (§§ 11169, subd. (a), 11170, subd. (a)) or by preserving a parent’s right to a grievance hearing to challenge an agency’s failure to reclassify the report as unsubstantiated.” (In re S.R. (Dec. 1, 2025) 18 Cal.5th 1042.)
The Davis-Sterling Act Requires Fairness in HOA Elections. Plaintiff contended her homeowners’ association (HOA) violated Civil Code § 5105, part of the Davis-Sterling Act, after another HOA member circulated a petition to recall her from the HOA’s board, and the HOA did not give plaintiff equal access to the association’s media (newsletter, website, etc.). When the HOA responded with election information and the election process, it followed its covenants, conditions and restrictions (CC&Rs). The HOA took plaintiff off the board. The matter ended up in court and the trial court found in for the HOA. On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that in the event of a conflict between an HOA’s governing documents and the Davis-Sterling Act, the act prevails. Reversing the judgment of the lower court, the Court of Appeal stated: “Construing section 5105 and the phrase ‘association media’ independently, we conclude Association failed to provide Arroyo equal access to association media for purposes reasonably related to her recall election, and thus we reverse the judgment.” (Arroyo v. Pacific Ridge Neighborhood Homeowners Association (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Dec. 1, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 627.)
Plaintiff Excused from Not Complying with Government Claim Requirement When Defendant Public Entity Failed to Demonstrate It Was Registered on the Registry of Public Agencies of Each County Where It Maintains an Office. Plaintiff sued defendant public entity for wrongful termination, but he did not file a claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et. seq.). The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer. On appeal, plaintiff contended he was excused from filing a claim because defendant had not registered on the Registry of Public Agencies. In its analysis, the Court of Appeal discussed Government Code § 53051, which requires a public agency, within 70 days after the date of commencement of its legal existence, to file a form with the Secretary of State and that this information is kept in Registry of Public Agencies maintained by the Secretary of State and the county clerk of each county. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating: “Although defendants have provided evidence [defendant] is on the registry maintained by the Secretary of State, they have yet to demonstrate [defendant] also has registered with the clerks of each county in which [defendant] maintains an office, as is required by statute. Plaintiff therefore is entitled to amend his complaint to allege PTSC’s failure to register.” (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Dec. 2, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677.)
Statements of Counsel Are not Evidence in Petition for Military Diversion. A military veteran was arrested for drunk driving and charged with misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code § 23152. He successfully requested diversion from prosecution pursuant to Penal Code § 1001.80. The district attorney appealed to the appellate division of the superior court, arguing the veteran failed to provide evidence he suffered from alcohol abuse due to his military service and, thus, did not show he was qualified for diversion. The appellate division affirmed the trial court’s diversion order. The Court of Appeal ordered the matter transferred to it. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the appellate division’s conclusion that statements of the veteran’s counsel regarding the cause of the veteran’s statutory condition (alcohol abuse) satisfied the causation requirement of § 1001.80. The appellate court reviewed de novo the trial court’s finding that the veteran should be diverted and concluded there was a lack of evidence to support the trial court’s diversion order. The court reversed and remanded with directions “to conduct a new hearing applying the standards articulated here and in Segura[v. Superior Court (2025)] 113 Cal.App.5th 1242.” (People v. Holliday (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Dec. 2, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 664.)
Wrongful Eviction Claims Do Not Arise from Protected Activity Vis-à-Vis the Anti-SLAPP Statute. A landlord wanted his seven tenants to move out, but none of them wanted to leave. One of the tenants, however, was behind in rent and the landlord sued that tenant for unlawful detainer. The landlord thereafter removed the numbers on the separate residences to give the impression the building was only one dwelling. Sheriff’s deputies executed a writ of possession after the landlord obtained a default unlawful detainer judgment against the one tenant who was behind, but since it appeared there was only one dwelling, all seven tenants were evicted. In the current action for wrongful eviction brought by the six tenants who were current with their rent when evicted, the trial court granted the landlord’s anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “We conclude [the tenants] claims do not arise from protected activity.” (Noon v. Fuentes (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 4, Dec. 2, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 651.)
Privette Doctrine Found to Apply to Homeowner, Whose Insurance Company Hired an Inspection Company to Inspect Home. A homeowner’s insurance company hired a company to inspect the home to decide whether, and at what rate, the homeowner’s insurance policy would be renewed. The inspection company’s employee fell down some outside stairs and was injured. He sued the homeowner and, relying on Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, the trial court granted summary judgment for the homeowner. On appeal, plaintiff contended the Privette Doctrine did not apply here because the homeowner failed to meet her initial burden of establishing that she was a “hirer,” either directly or indirectly, of the inspection company. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision and stated: “[F]or purposes of analyzing Privette, there is no legal distinction between [the homeowner] and her insurance carrier—both are ‘hirers’ within the meaning of the doctrine. . . By paying her insurance carrier for insurance coverage, [the homeowner] has in essence paid for the inspection. And by consenting to allow [plaintiff] to enter her property to carry out the contracted inspection, she has delegated to the independent contractor the responsibility for workplace safety.” (Andrews v. Wagner (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, Dec. 3, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 766.)
Malicious Prosecution. A disabled man using a wheelchair sued a toy store for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; ADA) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51 et seq.). The man contended he could not comfortably shop because the sales counter at the toy store was too high. The district court dismissed the ADA claim and transferred the Unruh Act claim to state court. The superior court found that the man’s visit to the toy store was not for the purpose of shopping, but solely to search for statutory violations to support a lawsuit, and entered judgment for the toy store. The toy store then filed the instant case against the man for malicious prosecution. This time, a different superior court judge found the toy store could not prove that the man lacked probable cause or acted with malice in filing the underlying action, and entered judgment for the man. Reversing, the Court of Appeal found that the facts in the underlying case, as decided by the first superior court judge, were preclusive and sufficient to show the man filed his lawsuit without probable cause and with malice. (Landis’ Labyrinth, Inc. v. Whitaker (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Dec. 3, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 724.)
No Evidence to Support Cause of Action Against School District for Negligent Supervision. Plaintiff sued several defendants, including a school district, alleging the director of his school’s childcare program sexually abused him when he was a minor. The trial court partially granted and partially denied the district’s motion for summary adjudication. The district petitioned the Court of Appeal for extraordinary relief as to the causes of action that the trial court declined to summarily adjudicate in favor of the district. The appeals court issued an order to show cause limited to the claim for negligent supervision. Issuing a writ of mandate directing the lower court to grant summary adjudication as to that cause of action, the Court of Appeal noted: “The undisputed facts show no district employee, let alone a supervisor, witnessed any of the alleged sexual assaults or inappropriate behavior by [the program director], and [plaintiff] did not report them to anyone during his time at the middle school. There also is no evidence any district employee observed anything that reasonably should have triggered suspicion of abuse to justify an inference of constructive knowledge.” (Rancho Cucamonga Central School District v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, Dec. 3, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 718.)
Shopping Centers May Not Completely Ban Expressive Activity. Plaintiff asked shopping centers to permit him to distribute leaflets proclaiming his view that men are not legally and financially responsible for supporting children born outside of marriage. Pursuant to a policy prohibiting expressive activity on their property, including leafletting, the shopping centers declined plaintiff’s request, and plaintiff sued. The trial court concluded plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the merits because he offered unlicensed legal advice that was not constitutionally protected—namely, that men do not have to comply with child support obligations— and denied plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated that “defendants may impose appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive activity, but they may not ban it entirely.” (Salazar v. Majestic Realty Co. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Dec. 4, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 813.)
Terminating Sanctions for Failure to Respond to Discovery Requests. Plaintiff sued the owners of a hotel for bed bug infestation. After defendants filed a series of motions to compel discovery responses from plaintiff, the trial court imposed terminating sanctions. Affirming, the Court of Appeal concluded the lower court did not abuse its discretion, stating: “We hold that the mandatory relief provision of [Code of Civil Procedure §] 473(b) applies to an order granting an unopposed request for dismissal as a terminating sanction, but we conclude that [plaintiff] otherwise failed to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to mandatory relief.” (Rodriguez v. WNT, Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Dec. 4, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 791.)
Lemon Law Damages. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly withheld damages for the costs of replacement vehicles because such costs did not qualify as cover or incidental damages. But the appeals court also found that the trial court erred by not ordering plaintiff to return the vehicle after it awarded him the purchase price. (Maneri v. FCA US LLC (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Dec. 5, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 897.)
Federalism Explained by the U.S. Supreme Court. Here is the U.S. Supreme Court’s entire opinion, without citations: “PER CURIAM. [¶] Louisiana immunizes healthcare providers from civil liability during public health emergencies. Below, the Louisiana Court of Appeal held that this state statute barred plaintiff’s federal claims. That decision is incorrect. Defining the scope of liability under state law is the State’s prerogative. But a State has no power to confer immunity from federal causes of action.‘[T]he Judges in every State’ are bound to follow federal law, ‘any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ [¶] Plaintiff’s federal claims may well fail on other federal grounds. But that is for the Louisiana courts to decide in the first instance. The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Louisiana Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.” (Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC (U.S., Dec. 8, 2025) 2025 WL 3506945.)
Mediator/Arbitrator Was Sued by Losing Party, and, After the Court Dismissed the Suit, Turned Around and Sued the Losing Party for Malicious Prosecution. In a neighbor-to-neighbor dispute, the homeowner’s association (HOA) retained an attorney to mediate/arbitrate the dispute. Before the mediator/arbitrator issued an award, the complaining neighbor informed the mediator/arbitrator that if the award was not favorable to him, the complaining neighbor would sue the mediator/arbitrator, the HOA board, and the other neighbor. The mediator/arbitrator ultimately announced his intention to issue an award against the complaining neighbor, but it is unclear whether he ever did. The complaining neighbor subsequently sued the mediator/arbitrator for breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court ruled against the complaining neighbor, concluding that the mediator/arbitrator did not owe him a fiduciary duty. The mediator/arbitrator then sued the complaining neighbor for malicious prosecution, which is the instant case. The complaining neighbor filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, which the trial court denied. Affirming, the Court of Appeal explained that in the earlier action, the trial court denied the mediator/arbitrator’s motion for sanctions against the complaining lawyer under Code of Civil Procedure § 128.7, and that “a discretionary sanctions ruling did not trigger the so-called ‘interim adverse judgment rule,’ which [the complaining neighbor] hoped would shield him from [the mediator/arbitrator’s] malicious prosecution suit.” (Peterson v. Zhang (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Dec. 8, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 956.)
No Ancillary Jurisdiction Under Code of Civil Procedure § 1294.2 in Appeal of Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration.
2018: Plaintiffs filed this wage and hour case against former employer.
2022: Trial court certified eight plaintiff classes.
2022-23: Defendant produced 3,000 signed arbitration agreements.
2023: Defendant moved to compel arbitration, which the court denied based on waiver.
In addition to denying defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion for evidentiary and issue sanctions, precluding defendant from presenting evidence of the arbitration agreements or arguing that class members had signed such agreements. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The sanctions order is not intermediate to the arbitration order. ([Code Civ. Proc.,] § 1294.2.) Although the arbitration order mentions the sanctions order, the orders are ‘logically separate’, and we do not need to review the sanctions order to ‘effectuate’ our ruling on the arbitration order. We therefore conclude the sanctions order does not fall within our ancillary jurisdiction under [Code of Civil Procedure §] 1294.2 and dismiss that portion of Sierra Pacific’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.” (Sierra Pacific Industries Wage and Hour Cases (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Dec. 9, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1038 (internal citations omitted).)
Military Veteran Criminal Defendant Not Entitled to Resentencing Hearing Because He Was Convicted of a Super Strike. Penal Code § 1170.91 entitles qualifying military veterans to seek resentencing for the purposes of considering whether the veteran suffered brain trauma, substance abuse, and various other mitigating conditions in the course of military service. Harrison is a military veteran sentenced in 1995 to an indeterminate life sentence for assaulting and causing the death of a child, his first and only felony conviction. The trial court denied his petition for resentencing without conducting a hearing. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Harrison is ineligible for resentencing under the unambiguous terms of section 1170.91, subdivision (c), because he has been ‘convicted of’ a super strike.” (People v. Harrison (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Dec. 10, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1145.)
Apple, Inc. in Contempt. Plaintiff Epic Games, Inc. sued defendant Apple, Inc. for alleged antitrust violations related to Apple’s App Store. After a bench trial, the district court enjoined Apple from certain anticompetitive business practices. Namely, Apple could not prohibit App Store developers from using buttons, links, or other calls to action to encourage customers to make purchases from the developers rather than Apple. Apple claimed to comply with the injunction, but it instead prohibited developers from using buttons, links, and other calls to action without paying a prohibitive commission to Apple, and it restricted the design of the developers’ links to make it difficult for customers to use them. The district court found Apple in contempt, and issued an order to address Apple’s violations of the injunction. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We affirm the district court’s contempt findings. We reverse and remand in part the district court’s imposition of civil contempt sanctions, but we otherwise affirm that order. Separate from the contempt issues, Apple urges us to vacate the injunction, citing new cases from the California Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court. We reject its arguments. We also reject its request for a new district judge on remand.” (Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc. (9th Cir., Dec. 11, 2025) 161 F.4th 1162.)
Judgment of Contempt of Parent by Family Court Annulled. The trial court held a parent in contempt for violating custody orders related to her son. Before the contempt order, both parents were ordered to share joint legal custody and ordered not to schedule activities during the other’s parenting time. Annulling the judgment of contempt, the Court of Appeal found: “Strictly construed, Houser did not violate this order.” It stated: “Because the order sharing joint legal custody did not require both parents’ consent for any particular activities, Houser had the legal authority to unilaterally sign her son up for sports activities and to get him braces. And while the sports teams did result in some of Xander’s activities occurring during Larsen’s parenting time, Houser did not schedule those events, the teams did, and thus she did not violate the letter of the order. [¶] More broadly, life for a teenager involves sports, activities, and occasional medical needs. While co-parenting requires communication, a parent who facilitates these normal life activities for their child should not be held in contempt unless they have willfully violated the express and specific terms of a court order. The orders here lack the specificity required to support the court’s findings.”(Houser v. Superior Court of Orange County (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Nov. 19, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1182.)
Easements Do Not Good Neighbors Make. Defendant uses a road easement on plaintiff’s property to access his property. The parties settled an earlier case, which involved defendant clearing trees and performing construction on the easement without plaintiff’s permission. Plaintiff thereafter filed this suit seeking to prohibit defendant from paving the easement’s gravel road. After a bench trial, the court found in for plaintiff. On appeal, defendant contended his easement right includes the right to pave the easement’s gravel road. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Defendant’s easement rights specifically may include the secondary right to pave the gravel road, but this would require investigating whether the trial court’s factual finding lacked substantial evidence, and defendant does not make such a challenge on appeal.” (Bernstein v. Sebring (Cal. App. 3rd Dist., Dec. 15, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1264.)
A Plaintiff’s Incorrect Legal Belief Does Not Necessarily Bar a Claim Under California’s Whistleblower Statute. Plaintiff contended his employer violated the Equal Pay Act (Lab. Code, § 1197.5; EPA) by paying him less than other coworkers performing similar duties. He also contended he qualifies under California’s whistleblower statute (Lab. Code, § 1102.5, subd. (b)) because, when he complained about the disparity in pay, he had reasonable cause to believe he disclosed a legal violation. Upholding the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff, the Court of Appeal stated: “Contreras did not believe Green Thumb was paying him less because of his gender, race, or ethnicity. But ‘[t]he [EPA] does not prohibit variations in wages; it prohibits discriminatory variations in wages.’” But while “a section 1102.5 claimant may not rely on a perceived violation of a nonexistent law,” plaintiff “‘point[ed] to some legal foundation for his suspicion’” and ‘section 1102.5[, subdivision] (b) only requires an employee to have ‘reasonable cause’ to believe that a law has been violated. (Italics added.) There is no requirement that the employee prove an actual violation.” (Contreras v. Green Thumb Produce, Inc. (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Dec. 15, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1251.)
County’s Administrative Procedure Does Not Apply to Whistleblower Retaliation Claims. Plaintiff sued his employer, a fire department, under California’s whistleblower statute and other Labor Code violations (Lab. Code, §§ 1102.5, 6310, & 98.6). The trial court entered judgment against plaintiff, finding he was barred by his failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not appeal his termination to a county commission. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We conclude that [plaintiff] was not required to exhaust administrative remedies provided under the County’s internal rules as those rules do not apply to his whistleblower retaliation claims.” (Romero v. County of Kern (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Dec. 15, 2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1189.)
Wife in Divorce Awarded the Couple’s Frozen Embryos Pursuant to a Contract Between the Husband and Wife. A divorcing couple had a regarding what will happen to two frozen embryos—which they created under a written agreement with an in vitro fertilization (IVF) provider—now that their marriage was ending. Petitioner appealed an order awarding the embryos to the wife, the real party in interest, who wished to use them to attempt to bear a child. Asserting he no longer wants to father a child with real party, petitioner sought to have the embryos discarded. At the center of the dispute is the written agreement the two parties entered into with their IVF provider when they embarked on the IVF process. The agreement is entitled “Informed Consent In Vitro Fertilization (IVF).” The agreement provided that upon divorce, the parties had the options of: (1) thawing and discarding the embryos; (2) donating the embryos for research; (3) donating the embryos to a specified person or couple; or (4) the embryos would be “[m]ade available to the partner if he/she wishes.” The parties here agreed to option 4. The trial court concluded the IVF Agreement was valid, clear, and unambiguous, and it awarded the embryos to real party. Declining to rule for petitioner, the Court of Appeal concluded that “the parties have entered into a valid contract specifying how frozen embryos created by IVF shall be treated in the event of divorce, the parties’ contract governs.” (Pham v. Superior Court of Orange County ((Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Dec. 16,2025) 2025 WL 3638359.)
The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 Barred Enforcement of the Parties’ Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreement. In 2012, defendant hired plaintiff to work as a security employee. As part of the hiring process, plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement. In 2023, while plaintiff was working security, there was a complaint about plaintiff being gay. A supervisor asked plaintiff intrusive and embarrassing questions about his sexual activity, and told plaintiff he would be removed from that assignment and given fewer hours. Thereafter, employees mocked plaintiff. When plaintiff complained about the mocking, he was terminated. Plaintiff sued, and defendants moved to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. Affirming, the Court of Appeal held the trial court did not err by considering the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (9 U.S.C. §§ 401–402) sua sponte. (Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (Cal App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Dec. 16, 2025) 2025 WL 3639429.)
Indebtedness of City. The local debt limitation in the California Constitution prohibits cities and counties from incurring any indebtedness or liability that exceeds their income and revenue for that year, unless the indebtedness or liability has first been approved by two-thirds of the voters. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 18, subd. (a).) The debt limitation, however, does not apply to indebtedness or liability a local government may incur to fulfill an obligation imposed by law. Here, the City of San Jose sought to finance the unfunded liability in its retirement plans by issuing pension obligation bonds. Defendants contended the pension obligation bonds required voter approval because they would create a municipal debt in excess of the current year’s income. The trial court entered judgment for the city, finding that the proposed bonds fall within the obligation-imposed-by-law exception to the local debt limitation. The Court of Appeal affirmed but framed its conclusion differently: It determined the proposed bonds would not cause the city to incur any new indebtedness or liability because “the debt the [C]ity seeks to refund already exists.” Affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the California Supreme Court stated: “Even assuming the proposed bonds would incur new debt, the City has an obligation imposed by law to address the existing shortfall in its retirement plans.” (City of San Jose v. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association (Cal., Dec. 18,2025) 2025 WL 3674317.) .)
University Violated Professor’s First Amendment Rights. A professor who has taught computer science for many years publicly commented on a university’s adoption of a land acknowledgment, which is a formal statement acknowledging that certain land was originally home to some indigenous people. The university also recommended that faculty include the land acknowledgment in their syllabi. Plaintiff viewed the university’s land acknowledgment, and the recommendation to include it in syllabi, as a political statement, part of “an agenda of ‘diversity, equity, and inclusion’ that treats some groups of students as more deserving of recognition and welcome than others on account of their race or other immutable characteristic.” Plaintiff wrote an email explaining his views, suggesting an alternative to the university’s land acknowledgment, and thereafter included his alternative in his syllabi. The university reprimanded him and threatened discipline. Plaintiff sued various administrators and faculty members for violating his rights under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “We hold that the university’s actions toward the professor violated his First Amendment rights.” (Reges v. Cauce (9th Cir., Dec. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3685613.)
Early Evaluation Conference in Construction-Related Accessibility Cases. The Construction-Related Accessibility Standards Compliance Act (Civ. Code, §§ 55.51–55.545) entitles certain defendants in construction-related accessibility suits to a stay and an “early evaluation conference.” Plaintiff filed a complaint against owners of a restaurant, alleging the presence of accessibility barriers. The restaurant requested that the trial court schedule an early evaluation conference. The court stayed the proceedings, scheduled the conference, and ordered plaintiff to serve and file a statutory statement. Plaintiff filed a statement but excluded information about the attorney fees and costs he had incurred. At issue was whether the required disclosure of claimed attorney fees and costs under Civil Code § 55.54, subdivision (d)(7) violated a plaintiff’s attorney-client privilege. The trial court dismissed the action. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The Act contains no indication that the Legislature intended the attorney-client privilege to apply to the early evaluation conference.” (Johnson v. Rubylin, Inc. (Cal. App. 6th Dist., Dec. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3687544.)
It Takes Two to Legally Separate. A family court granted a husband’s motion to dismiss a wife’s petition for legal separation. The husband submitted a declaration stating: “I do not consent to a California judgment of legal separation.” Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Family Code section 2345 does not expressly authorize a motion to dismiss. However, by creating a condition to rendering a judgment of legal separation (the consent of both parties), section 2345 impliedly authorizes dismissal if that condition has not or cannot be met.” (In re Marriage of Patel (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Dec. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3687995.)
Ninth Circuit Declined to Disturb Incorrect Arbitration Award. An arbitrator apparently forgot that a year earlier the parties had agreed to bear their own costs and fees on some counterclaims they settled. The parties did not remind the arbitrator of the earlier stipulation when they briefed the issue of attorney fees for the remaining claims. In the end, the arbitrator awarded fees on claims where there was a stipulation the parties would bear their own costs. The losing party petitioned the district court to vacate and modify the award and the prevailing party moved to confirm the award. The lower court held the arbitrator did not exceed authority by awarding attorney fees for the settled counterclaims. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e will not disturb even an incorrect legal decision by an arbitrator unless it was completely irrational or reflected manifest disregard of the law.” (VIP Mortgage Incorporated v. Gates (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 3704357.)
Some Causes of Action Against Healthcare Facility Will Be Arbitrated; Others Will Not. Plaintiffs are successors in interest to decedent. They filed a complaint for negligence, elder abuse, and other causes of action. Defendant healthcare facility moved to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the facility’s motion as to the survivor claims but denied it as to the claims filed in plaintiffs’ individual capacities for wrongful death, fraud, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.; UCL). The trial court also stayed litigation of plaintiffs’ individual claims pending the conclusion of the arbitration. Modifying the trial court’s order and affirming as modified, the Court of Appeal stated: “Kindred is correct that the trial court should have compelled arbitration of the wrongful death claim. But Kindred has failed to demonstrate error in the denial of arbitration of Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s fraud and UCL claims.” (Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC (Cal App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Dec. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3704596.)
“One Tiny Drop Changes Everything,”Elizabeth Holmes. The vision shared by the two criminal defendants to investors was that “one tiny drop changes everything.” They claimed that one drop of blood would allow for fast, accurate, and affordable laboratory tests in contrast to traditional testing methods that require large needles to draw blood from a vein. The defendants were each convicted on numerous fraud charges. One was sentenced to 135 months imprisonment and the other to 155 months. On appeal, they primarily argued the district court erred in admitting purportedly lay witnesses to give expert testimony. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness may provide opinions ‘rationally based on the witness’s perception’ that are ‘not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.’ [¶] . . . [¶] . . . But the fact that a witness’s testimony pertains to scientific matters, or conveys opinions drawn from the witness’s own experiences with such matters, does not automatically render it expert testimony within the ambit of Rule 702.” (United States v. Holmes (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 3763250.)
HOA Board Denied Request for Homeowner to Build Accessory Dwelling Unit. Defendants applied to their homeowner’s association (HOA) to construct an accessory dwelling unit (ADU) on their property. The HOA’s design review committee indicated it had no expertise on ADUs, and “formally referred” the application to its board of directors. The board considered the application, and, in a comprehensive letter citing concerns about traffic safety and fire safety, denied it. Defendants sued in a cross-complaint, alleging causes of action for breach of governing documents, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with business expectation, and declaratory relief. The trial court granted the HOA’s motion for summary judgment on the cross-complaint. Affirming, the Court of Appeal analyzed the business judgment rule, stating: “‘Under this rule, a director is not liable for a mistake in business judgment which is made in good faith and in what he or she believes to be the best interests of the corporation, where no conflict of interest exists.’ [¶] . . . [¶] In sum and in short, the Board acted well within the governing documents—and the law.” ((Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 2, Dec. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 3704973 (citation omitted).)
Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Permitting Last-Minute Expert, Long After Expert Witness Exchange. An apparently minor vehicular accident resulted in this action. Four years after the accident, expert medical reports were exchanged. Almost a year and a half after that, a week before trial, plaintiff produced a medical report from a different doctor. The new report recommended spinal surgery. The jury returned a substantial award for plaintiff. Finding the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the last-minute evidence, the Court of Appeal stated: “Surprise experts are tremendously abusive because experts can be such powerful witnesses. . . By code, McDonald needed court permission to add his new expert Gravori. McDonald did not file the mandatory motion. (See § 2034.610, subd. (a)(1).) He failed to seek court permission. [¶] . . . [¶] It was an abuse of discretion to permit McDonald to go forward with this surprise witness, deposition or no.” (McDonald v. Zargaryan (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Dec. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 3704598.)
Denial of Motion to Compel Arbitration Reversed. Plaintiff sued defendant, her former employer, for disability discrimination. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The trial court found that pursuant to Civil Code § 1642, the parties’ arbitration agreement should be read together with their nondisclosure agreement. The facts show that defendant Tesla electronically sent plaintiff a written offer of employment. The letter had paragraphs, without a separate heading, that referred to arbitration. There were also paragraphs related to nondisclosure of confidential information. Civil Code § 1642 states: “Several contracts relating to the same matters, between the same parties, and made as parts of substantially one transaction, are to be taken together.” Defendant contended the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts Civil Code § 1642. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Although we disagree that the FAA preempts section 1642, we agree that the trial court should have severed the allegedly unconscionable terms and enforced the arbitration agreement. Those terms applied to all proceedings, and not just arbitrations, and had no bearing on the causes of action that Wise asserted. Nor did they threaten the arbitration procedure itself. The terms were therefore collateral to and severable from the arbitration agreement, and the interests of justice favored enforcement of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.” (Wise v. Tesla Motors, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Dec. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 3707196.)
Getting Into the Weeds of the Song-Beverly Act. The first paragraph of the opinion of the Court of Appeal sums this up: “The Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the Act) allows the buyer of a defective car to obtain restitution from the car’s manufacturer. (Civ. Code, §§ 1793.2, 1794.) But what if the buyer is not the person who drives the car; may the driver also obtain restitution under the Act? And what if the car is wrecked in a collision before the manufacturer provides restitution; may the manufacturer subtract any insurance payout received by the buyer from its own restitution payment? We conclude the answer to these questions is no.” (Towns v. Hyundai Motor America (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 4, Dec. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 3707173.)
Deployment of National Guard in Illinois. A federal district court entered a temporary restraining order barring the federalization and deployment of the National Guard in Illinois. The Seventh Circuit denied the government’s motion for a stay, permitting the guard to remain federalized within Illinois but maintaining the bar on deployment. Thereafter, the government asked the U.S. Supreme Court to stay the district court’s order. Denying the application for a stay, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “[A]t least in this posture, the Government has not carried its burden to show that [10 U.S.C.] § 12406(3) permits the President to federalize the Guard in the exercise of inherent authority to protect federal personnel and property in Illinois. We need not and do not address the reviewability of findings made by the President under § 12406(3) or any other statute.” (Trump v. Illinois (U.S., Dec. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 3715211.)
Suit to Reinstate Federal Research Grants. Last June, a federal district court issued a class-wide preliminary injunction ordering three governmental agencies to reinstate research grants the agencies had terminated pursuant to executive order. The government appealed and moved for a partial stay of the injunction pending appeal. Granting in part and denying the government’s motion in part, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Contrary to the government’s argument, this case does not appear to be one in which an agency decided not to ‘fund a program.’ Rather, it is one in which more than a dozen agencies selected particular grants for termination regardless of the programs through which they were funded, based on their connection to [diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA)] and environmental justice.” (Thakur v. Trump (9th Cir., Dec. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 3760650 (citation omitted).)
Homeless Veterans Win! Plaintiffs, who are homeless and disabled military veterans, sought to return the West Los Angeles Veteran Affairs (VA) Grounds to its intended use: housing disabled veterans. After a four-week bench trial, the district court ruled in plaintiffs’ favor and found that the land-use leases the VA had with the Regents of the University of California, Los Angeles, Brentwood School, and Bridgeland Resources, LLC were unlawful. The lower court voided these leases and enjoined the VA from renegotiating them. The district court also ordered the VA to build supportive housing for veterans on the West Los Angeles VA Grounds. Affirming in part and denying in part, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[W]e affirm the district court’s grant of class certification.” “[T]he harm caused to Plaintiffs will be remedied by voiding the lease unless and until the VA can demonstrate that it is compliant with the Leasing Act.” “[M]embers of Plaintiffs’ putative class are denied meaningful access to necessary healthcare services and placed at serious risk of institutionalization.” (Powers v. McDonough (9th Cir., Dec. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 3718737.)
New Trial Granted on the Basis of Attorney Misconduct in Violating Motions in Limine. In the first phase of the trial, a jury awarded more than $1,000,000 to plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant a new trial, explaining the plaintiff’s lawyer, Michael K. Blue, violated several motions in limine. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated the defendant did not receive a fair trial because of Blue’s prejudicial misconduct and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial. (Allen v. Patel (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, Dec. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 3718739.)
Motion to Arbitrate PAGA Claim Denied. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to compel arbitration of a complaint under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA). At the time of the denial, the trial court commented that “[i]n light of the law that every claim asserted under the PAGA is a claim asserted by the plaintiff as a proxy or agent of the state, there is no such thing as an ‘individual PAGA claim.’” Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Although we now know that PAGA actions can be ‘divided into individual and non-individual claims where the parties have agreed to arbitrate individual claims’ [(Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1114)], the fact that that is the case today tells us nothing about whether LaCour and Marshalls actually made such an agreement more than a decade ago. We agree with LaCour that they did not.” (LaCour v. Marshalls of CA, LLC (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Dec. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 3731034.)
Credit Card Company Did Not Violate the CARD Act When It Raised Interest Rates. Plaintiff filed a class action under the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 ( 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(a); CARD Act). During the relevant period, from March 2022 through July 2023, the Federal Reserve raised the Federal Funds Rate ten times to curb inflation, causing the Prime Rate to more than double from a low of 3.25% to a high of 8.25%. In response to this increase, rates on Bank of America’s variable-rate credit cards changed accordingly, and those higher rates were applied to the outstanding balances incurred before the rate increases. Plaintiff alleged that Bank of America violated the CARD Act and advanced a collateral claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.). The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that Bank of America’s formula for calculating the interest rate for variable-rate credit cards did not violate the CARD Act because it fell within the § 1666i-1(b)(2) exception. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because [plaintiff’s] credit card agreement with Bank of America changes rates ‘according to operation of an index that is not under the control of the creditor § 1666i-1(b)(2), we hold that it does not violate the CARD Act.’” (Milliken v. Bank of America, N.A. (9th Cir., Dec. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 3751868.)
Criminal Defendants’ Ability to Pay Fines and Costs. A criminal defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and by force likely to produce great bodily injury, conspiracy to commit murder, and conspiracy to dissuade a witness, along with other crimes and enhancements. At the sentencing hearing, defendant’s counsel asked the court to impose a minimum restitution fine and stay any additional payment orders “due to [defendant’s] inability to pay.” The sentencing court denied the request, stating: “There is a possibility that the defendant may be able to earn funds while he is incarcerated, so I’m going to decline to make that finding at this time.” The court imposed various fines and ancillary costs. The California Supreme Court reversed and ordered the case remanded to the trial court, stating: “We hold that a challenge to the amount of a criminal fine should initially be reviewed under the excessive fines provisions of the United States and California Constitutions. [¶] . . . upon request, a court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) or a court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)). Although our holding resolves the orders in this particular case, we urge the Legislature to revisit issues surrounding court-ordered ancillary payments in criminal cases and address them in a more comprehensive manner.” (People v. Kopp (Cal., Dec. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 3755596.)
Lower Court Did Not Err in Issuing Preliminary Injunction in False Advertising Case. InSinkErator and Joneca are competitors. Both companies manufacture garbage disposals. InSinkErator contended that Joneca competed by misrepresenting the specifications of its units. The district court agreed with InSinkErator, finding that Joneca’s claims were literally false and apt to shift business from InSinkErator to Joneca, and issued a preliminary injunction against Joneca. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[T]he district court did not err in finding that Joneca’s horsepower claims were material because they likely influenced consumer purchasing decisions.”(InSinkErator, LLC v. Joneca Company, LLC (9th Cir., Dec. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 250032.)
Personal Injury Verdict and Postjudgment Cost Order Affirmed. A worker excavating soil with a bulldozer ruptured a high-pressure underground gas line resulting in an explosion and fire that killed the worker and injured several neighbors on adjoining property, the plaintiffs here. Plaintiffs filed a personal injury lawsuit against multiple defendants who hired the worker’s employer to perform the excavation work. Following a jury trial, plaintiffs were awarded $73 million in past and future noneconomic damages with liability split amongst the defendants including Ag-Wise, the defendant here. The trial court awarded costs to plaintiffs including prejudgment interest under Civil Code § 3291 and expert witness fees under Code of Civil Procedure § 998. On appeal, Ag-Wise contended: (1) the trial court’s instruction on the retained control exception to a hirer’s liability was unsupported by the evidence and inaccurately stated the law; (2) the court erroneously refused to instruct the jury on the collateral negligence exception to the peculiar risk doctrine; (3) plaintiffs’ attorneys engaged in prejudicial misconduct; (4) plaintiffs’ damages award is excessive; and (5) the award of interest and costs should be reversed because plaintiffs’ § 998 offer was not made in good faith. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment and postjudgment cost orders. (Ruckman v. Ag-Wise Enterprises, Inc. (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Dec. 29, 2025) 2025 WL 3755335.)
Service of Process on Secretary of State Found to Be Proper. Despite reasonable diligence, plaintiff could not serve corporate defendant. The court therefore authorized service of defendant by hand delivery to the Secretary of State. Pursuant to Corporations Code § 1702, subdivision (a), service in this manner is deemed complete ten days later. Here, the trial court voided a default and default judgment against a corporate defendant after the court determined service to be incomplete until the secretary forwarded notice to the defendant, which did not occur until a month after the court entered the default judgment. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Because the court’s determination is inconsistent with the plain language of the Corporations Code, we reverse.” (SoCal Lien Solutions, LLC v. BDB Properties (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Dec. 31, 2025) 2025 WL 3771233.)