Litigation
Litigation Update: December 2025
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates
- Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Denied.
- Charter City’s Voter ID Provision Preempted by State Statute.
- There Never Was an Equal Rights Amendment.
- Plaintiff’s Takings Clause Argument Rejected After His Property Loss Due to Police Apprehending a Criminal.
- Denial of Anti-SLAPP Motion Reversed.
- This Case Fizzled.
- U.S. Supreme Court Gave Go-Ahead for Sex at Birth Designations on Passports.
- Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights.
- Did the Prevailing Party at Trial Forfeit Prevailing Party Attorney Fees by Not Agreeing to Mediate?
- Improper Service of Process.
- Negligence Per Se Claim to be Retried.
- U.S. Supreme Court Declined to Revisit Obergefell v. Hodges.
- Independent Accountant Not Liable for Information in SEC Registration Statement.
- Free Speech Rights When Complaining About Police Misconduct.
- Disputes Over Medical Necessity Determinations in Workers’ Compensation Cases.
- Sanctions Incurred During Appeal of Misuse of Discovery Sanctions.
- Post-Removal Amendments to Complaints Can Undermine Federal Jurisdiction.
- Summary Judgement in Favor of Class with Gender Dysphoria Vacated.
- Another Attorney Sanctioned for AI Hallucinations.
- Plaintiff in Coordinated Proceedings Must Pay Common Benefit Fee.
- The FSLA Does Not Require an Agency Relationship with the Actual Employer.
- Reduction of Damages in Medical Malpractice Case.
- Trial Court Wrongly Analyzed Tort Claim Against Police in Pursuit of a Suspect When Plaintiff Was Injured.
- The One Who Didn’t Settle Was Left Without a Chair.
- It’s Not Wise to Wait till the Last Day to File a Notice of Appeal.
- No Showing of Actual Malice in Defamation Claim Involving a Documentary.
- Court Dismissed Case of Incarcerated Plaintiff Because Plaintiff Did Not Appear for Trial.
- The Difficulty of Keeping Anonymous in a Defamation Case.
- Ministerial Exception Found Not to Apply to Wage Claim.
- The Trial Court Erred in Not Giving Plaintiffs Leave to Amend Their Complaint.
- Veterinarian Loses License.
- Right to Confront Child Accuser.
- The Circuit Court Failed to Analyze the Claim Asserted.
- Roundup Verdict Against Monsanto Upheld.
- Mismanagement of Estate by Executor.
- Forced Assignment of a Copyright to Satisfy Spousal/Child Support Debt.
- Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants Affirmed After Woman as Injured While a Passenger on a Bus.
- Agreement to Rent to Low Income Households Survived Later Foreclosure.
- Alluding to Past Violent Incident Constituted Credible Threat of Workplace Violence.
- California Organic Food and Farming Act Applies to Feminine Hygiene Products.
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Denied. A process server went to defendant’s “usual place of business” on five occasions to serve defendant. Each time, the office administrator said defendant “was not in at this time.” On the last attempt, the server completed substituted service by leaving documents with the office administrator and mailed them to defendant at the same address. In 2020, the trial court granted a default judgment against defendant. Four years later, defendant moved to vacate the default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (d), which allows a court to set aside a void default, contending the service address was not her usual place of business. Plaintiff opposed the motion by offering proof from the State of California’s Department of Real Estate showing defendant got her real estate license in April 2016 and her “Responsible Broker” at that time was the business where service was made. The trial court ruled defendant failed to overcome the presumption of proper service created by the sworn proof of service. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “This story is missing a lot of pieces. . . [¶] . . . [T]he [office administrator] kept telling the process server that [defendant] ‘was not in at this time.’ This usage implied the [office administrator] indeed knew [defendant], that [defendant] was around generally, but that [defendant] was out at that moment.” The appeals court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings. (Lee v. Yan (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Nov. 3 , 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 975.)
Charter City’s Voter ID Provision Preempted by State Statute. Voters passed a ballot measure to amend the charter of the City of Huntington Beach to include section 705, subdivision (a)(2), which provides: “Beginning in 2026, for all municipal elections: . . . The City may verify the eligibility of Electors by voter identification.” In response, the State of California enacted Elections Code § 10005, which forbids local governments from enacting or enforcing any charter provision, ordinance, or regulation requiring a person to present identification for the purpose of voting. The state thereafter sought a writ of mandate prohibiting implementation or enforcement of the city’s voter identification requirement though an injunction. The city demurred and the trial court sustained the demurrer. The state then filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal. Concluding the state statute preempts the voter identification provision in the city’s charter, the Court of Appeal remanded the case “to the trial court with directions to (1) issue a writ of mandate invalidating section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the Huntington Beach City Charter and directing defendants to cease its implementation or enforcement; (2) enter a permanent injunction barring defendants from implementing or enforcing section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the Huntington Beach City Charter; and (3) issue a declaratory judgment that section 705, subdivision (a)(2) of the Huntington Beach City Charter is preempted by and violates California law.” (People ex rel. Bonta v. City of Huntington Beach (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Nov. 3, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 962.)
There Never Was an Equal Rights Amendment. Plaintiff brought this action under the Military Selective Service Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 3801 et seq.). He alleged that the statute’s requirement that men, but not women, register with the Selective Service System violates his rights under the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which he contended was ratified as the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a plausible claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, stating: “[T]he ERA was not ratified by three-fourths of the States prior to the deadline set by Congress, June 30, 1982, and the Archivist of the United States did not publish or certify the ERA.” (Valame v. Trump (9th Cir., Nov. 4, 2025) 157 F.4th 1172 (Mem.).)
Plaintiff’s Takings Clause Argument Rejected After His Property Loss Due to Police Apprehending a Criminal. Plaintiff owns a print shop. An armed fugitive fleeing from police entered the shop, threw plaintiff out, and barricaded himself inside. Police surrounded the shop. After a 13-hour standoff, officers fired dozens of tear gas cannisters through the shop’s walls, door, roof, and windows, causing about $60,000 in property damage. Plaintiff filed an action against the city under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that the city should pay for the damage and citing the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The district court entered judgment for the city. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “The meaning of the Takings Clause at the Founding and two centuries of precedent demonstrate that the government’s destruction of private property when necessary for the defense of public safety is exempt from the scope of the Takings Clause.” (Pena v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir., Nov. 4, 2025) 158 F.4th 1033.)
Denial of Anti-SLAPP Motion Reversed. Plaintiff alleged that the Walt Disney Company violated the Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) after Disney decided not to book the Village People for future musical concerts at Disney venues and allegedly made false or misleading statements to the band’s agents about the possibility of hiring the band. Disney filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The trial court denied the motion. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Disney argues its selection of which musical acts to showcase at its public concerts, as well as its communications with the Village People about the band’s potential participation in the concerts, is protected conduct under the anti-SLAPP statute. We agree. Therefore, we reverse the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion and instruct the trial court to assess whether [plaintiff] has shown that her claims have at least minimal merit.” (Willis v. Walt Disney Company (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Nov. 4, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1001.)
This Case Fizzled. An environmental group sued a restaurant and its owner over its annual Fourth of July fireworks show, alleging that defendants violated the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) by setting off fireworks that fell into Alamitos Bay without a permit. Declining to hear the case on its merits, the Ninth Circuit found it to be moot because after the district court found in defendants’ favor, the California Regional Water Quality Control Board issued defendants a permit. (Coastal Environmental Rights Foundation v. Naples Restaurant Group, LLC (9th Cir., Nov. 5, 2025) 158 F.4th 1052.)
U.S. Supreme Court Gave Go-Ahead for Sex at Birth Designations on Passports. Transgender and non-binary American citizens filed a class action challenging the State Department policy requiring all passports to reflect only applicants’ sex assigned at birth and removing options for intersex, non-binary, and gender non-conforming applicants to select “X” as sex marker on their passports. In 778 F.Supp. 394, the district court granted plaintiffs an injunction on April 18, 2025, enjoining the State Department from applying its policy. On September 4, 2025, in 151 F.4th 9, the First Circuit Court of Appeals denied the government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay of the injunction, stating: “Displaying passport holders’ sex at birth no more offends equal protection principles than displaying their country of birth—in both cases, the Government is merely attesting to a historical fact without subjecting anyone to differential treatment.” (Trump v. Orr (U.S., Nov. 6, 2025) 2025 WL 3097824.)
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights. In 2017, the Legislature enacted the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Long-Term Care Facility Residents’ Bill of Rights. Health and Safety Code § 1439.51, subdivision (a)(5) prohibits staff at long-term care facilities from “[w]illfully and repeatedly fail[ing] to use a resident’s preferred name or pronouns after being clearly informed of the preferred name or pronouns,” when they do so “wholly or partially on the basis of a person’s actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, or human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) status.” Plaintiff is a group dedicated to opposing efforts “to coerce society to accept [the] transgender fiction . . . .” Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate to block enforcement of the pronoun provision. The trial court denied the petition; the Court of Appeal reversed in part, holding that the provision violates the First Amendment because it is insufficiently tailored to address the state’s interest in eliminating discrimination, and hence is facially unconstitutional. (66 Cal.App.5th 696) The California Supreme Court reversed and stated: “In light of this unique setting and scope, we conclude that the provision should be analyzed, and upheld, as a regulation of discriminatory conduct that incidentally affects speech. It should not be subject to First Amendment scrutiny as an abridgment of the freedom of speech. And even assuming the statute were subject to intermediate scrutiny, we find the provision easily satisfies that test. Finally, we conclude that the possibility of enforcement by way of pre-existing criminal penalties for particularly egregious violations of the statute does not render the challenged pronouns provision facially unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court’s judgment.” (Taking Offense v. State (Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) 578 P.3d 409.)
Did the Prevailing Party at Trial Forfeit Prevailing Party Attorney Fees by Not Agreeing to Mediate? In the purchase of real property, the parties agreed to “mediate any dispute or claim arising . . . out of this Agreement, or any resulting transaction, before resorting to arbitration or court action.” A dispute arose and judgment was entered in favor of defendant. Thereafter, defendant moved for attorney fees and costs. The trial court declined to issue an award for fees and costs because: “even though the [Meyers] are the ‘prevailing parties’ their refusal to mediate, per the terms of the contract, denies them the recovery of attorney fees.” The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “We hold that the fact that the Meyers initially refused the Evleshins’ request to mediate the dispute, of itself, did not preclude their recovery of prevailing-party attorney fees under the Agreement. There is evidence in the record that would support the conclusion that, after the Meyers’ initial refusal to mediate, they (still before the Evleshins filed suit) offered to mediate the dispute. Based upon our independent determination in construing the contract [], we conclude as follows: If, in fact, the Meyers offered to mediate the dispute before the action was filed by the Evleshins, the Meyers did not forfeit their right to prevailing-party attorney fees due to their initial refusal to mediate. Accordingly, we will reverse the postjudgment order of August 8, 2023, and we will remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion on the Meyers’ motion for attorney fees.” (Evleshin v. Meyer (Cal. App. 6th Dist., Nov. 6, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1021.)
Improper Service of Process. Service of the summons and complaint on defendant, a corporate entity, was made by personally delivering copies to an employee of a related business entity that operated from the same principal place of business as defendant, followed by sending duplicate copies via regular mail to the chief executive officer of defendant. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to quash. The Court of Appeal reversed and stated: “The answer to that question turns on whether Molina [the employee of a related business] is properly deemed to be an individual ‘apparently in charge’ [] within the meaning of section 415.20. Based on the record before us, we conclude Molina was not apparently in charge.” (Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Nov. 6, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1048.)
Negligence Per Se Claim to be Retried. In July 2016, two small children fell out of the second-floor bedroom window in the apartment where they lived with their mother. Both children sustained severe injuries; one partially recovered, but the other never did and suffers from permanent brain damage. The complaint alleged general negligence and negligence per se. Plaintiffs contended that in renovating the apartment building shortly before the accident, defendants violated the California Building Standards Code by installing their bedroom window without a fall prevention device, which allegedly amounted to negligence per se. Following the close of plaintiffs’ case at trial, the trial court granted a nonsuit motion. The Court of Appeal affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial and stated: “Because, on this record, there was no foreseeability of harm to plaintiffs, their general negligence claim fails for lack of any showing of duty. To the extent the complaint pleaded negligence per se, we conclude nonsuit was improper. The court found that, under section 3404.1.1, defendants were exempt from the requirement under section 1013.8 that they install a fall prevention device on operable upper floor windows. The crux of this ruling was that the plaintiffs’ bedroom window was code-compliant without a fall protection device when the apartment building was originally constructed, and all defendants did in replacing the window was make an ‘alteration’ using ‘like-for-like’ ‘original building materials.’ We hold that that interpretation of the 2013 Building Code was incorrect.” (Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes, LLC (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Nov. 7, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1072.)
U.S. Supreme Court Declined to Revisit Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) 576 U.S. 644 that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to license and recognize the marriages of same-sex couples. Davis was a Rowan County, Kentucky clerk who denied a same-sex couple’s request for a marriage license on July 6, 2015. On July 10, 2015, the couple, Ermold and Moore, filed a federal civil-rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Davis both individually and in her official capacity as the Rowan County Clerk. A jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages to each plaintiff for their emotional distress. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment. Davis filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Her arguments were: (1) Whether the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause provided a defense to tort liability; (2) Whether she should be able to assert First Amendment defenses as an individual; and (3) Whether Obergefell v. Hodges should be overturned. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. (Davis v. Ermold (U.S., Nov. 10, 2025) 2025 WL 3132017.)
Independent Accountant Not Liable for Information in SEC Registration Statement. A company decided to go public and was required to file a Registration Statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission to do so. Defendant accounting firm reported in part: “In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Company as of December 31, 2017 and December 31, 2016, and the result of its operations and its cash flows for each of the two years in the period ended December 31, 2017 in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America.” Plaintiff sued defendant for alleged incorrect statements of revenue and losses. The district court dismissed the action under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77a). Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, an independent accountant is not strictly liable for the information in a Registration Statement or a client’s financial statements simply because the accountant certified the financial statements prepared by the issuer.” (Hunt v. PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (9th Cir., Nov. 10, 2025) 159 F.4th 603.)
Free Speech Rights When Complaining About Police Misconduct. When someone complains about misconduct of a police officer, Penal Code § 148.6, subdivision (a)(1), requires that the complainant read and sign an advisory informing the complainant that filing a knowingly false complaint of police misconduct is a crime. The case examines whether section 148.6, subdivision (a)’s provisions violate constitutional free speech rights. The trial court concluded it was bound by [People v.] Stanistreet [(2002) 29 Cal.4th 497] and enjoined the city from accepting any complaint alleging misconduct by a peace officer unless the complainant had signed the advisory required by section 148.6, subdivision (a)(2). The Court of Appeal affirmed. Reversing, the California Supreme Court stated: “[W]e conclude that while the Legislature had a legitimate and significant interest in remedying the harmful effects of abusive false claims of police misconduct, section 148.6(a) is not narrowly tailored to meet those objectives.” (Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (Cal., Nov. 10, 2025) 578 P.3d 460.)
Disputes Over Medical Necessity Determinations in Workers’ Compensation Cases. When a request for authorization of treatment is submitted and there is a dispute over whether the requested treatment is medically necessary, that dispute must be resolved through the utilization review and independent medical review processes, rather than in an extra-statutory proceeding before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. (Illinois Midwest Insurance Agency LLC v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Nov. 10, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1168.)
Sanctions Incurred During Appeal of Misuse of Discovery Sanctions. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s imposition of $10,475 in monetary sanctions against a lawyer and his client. When the matter went back down, the trial court ordered an additional $113,532.50 for fees incurred in opposing the unsuccessful appeal. Affirming the order for additional sanctions, the Court of Appeal stated: “This appeal presents the issue whether (Code of Civil Procedure) sections 2023.030[, subdivision] (a) and 2031.320[, subdivision] (b) authorize an award of appellate attorney’s fees that were incurred in connection with successfully defending an appeal from an order imposing monetary sanctions. We hold that sections 2023.030[, subdivision] (a) and 2031.320[, subdivision] (b) in this situation serve as fee shifting statutes and authorize a trial court to award a successful respondent attorney’s fees incurred on appeal.” (Baer v. Tedder (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Nov. 10, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1139.)
Post-Removal Amendments to Complaints Can Undermine Federal Jurisdiction. Plaintiffs brought a class action against defendants alleging state law claims. Defendants removed the case to federal court. Plaintiff amended the complaint and sought remand. The district court denied their motion to remand because precedent suggested that post-removal amendments to class action complaints, amending the nature of the claims, do not undermine federal jurisdiction. Vacating the lower court’s order and directing the lower court to remand the case to state court “unless Defendants establish another basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,” the Ninth Circuit stated: “After Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger [(2025) 604 U.S. 22], that is no longer true. ‘When a plaintiff amends her complaint following her suit’s removal, a federal court’s jurisdiction depends on what the new complaint says.’” (Faulk v. Jeld-Wen, Inc. (9th Cir., Nov. 14, 2025) 159 F.4th 618.)
Summary Judgment in Favor of Class with Gender Dysphoria Vacated. Plaintiffs filed a class action, suing Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois for refusing to cover treatment for gender dysphoria. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the class. Meanwhile, Tennessee joined the growing number of states restricting sex transition treatments for minors by enacting the Prohibition on Medical Procedures Performed on Minors Related to Sexual Identity (Tenn. Code Ann. §68–33–101 et seq.), and the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case, issuing its decision last June. In United States v. Skrmetti (2025) 605 U.S. 495 , the Supreme Court held that, because the Tennessee law classifies people based on age and medical diagnosis, it does not discriminate on the basis of sex or transgender status and therefore does not trigger heightened scrutiny and does not violate Constitutional equal protection guarantees. Vacating the grant of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit stated: “On remand, the district court will have the opportunity to consider the issues potentially left open by Skrmetti and to conduct further proceedings consistent with our opinion. (Pritchard on behalf of C.P. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois (9th Cir., Nov. 17, 2025) 159 F.4th 646.)
Another Attorney Sanctioned for AI Hallucinations. After filing a petition for writ of supersedeas, Attorney Jeffrey Dean Grotke filed the appellant’s opening brief (AOB) in the same case. Both the petition and brief cited nonexistent purportedly published cases. None of the nonexistent cases supported the legal propositions for which Grotke cited them, and he did not cite any other legal authority to support the propositions. When the appellate court gave Grotke an opportunity to explain, he responded with cases that bore the same names, albeit entirely different volume and page numbers. In response to an order to show cause, Grotke filed a declaration that he signed under penalty of perjury: “[F]our authorities cited in [his] appellate briefing were mis-cited at the reporter/volume/page level. I accept responsibility for this error. It was not willful. It resulted from a breakdown in my citation-verification process during compilation from vLex (vlex.com). [¶] . . . I did not fabricate opinions, quotations, or pin citations. The authorities I intended to rely upon are real published California decisions. My error was in providing reporter citations that, at the volume/page listed, resolved to different opinions than the ones I intended.” “I cannot identify a single, specific cause for each mismatch.[¶] . . . [T]he core allegation as to using ‘AI hallucination’ cases is entirely untrue.” Issuing sanctions of $1,750 for violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), the Court of Appeal stated: “Grotke admitted that he used AI in some fashion when preparing the AOB and that it was ‘possible’ that he used AI in some fashion when preparing the Writ. But he maintains that the four spurious citations resulted from clerical error and that he intended to cite the actually existing cases for the propositions described in the declaration that he filed in response to our order to show cause. We find that Grotke’s claims are not credible. [¶] . . . [A]ll four spurious citations are completely different from the correct citations for the actually existing cases that have those case names. Grotke’s spurious citations bear the hallmarks of hallucinated citations produced by generative AI.” (Schlichter v. Kennedy (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 2, Nov. 17, 2025) 2025 WL 3204738 (internal citation omitted).)
Plaintiff in Coordinated Proceedings Must Pay Common Benefit Fee. Plaintiff’s case against a car manufacturer was added to a group of coordinated state court proceedings involving claims of unintended acceleration in cars Toyota manufactured. After the case was settled, plaintiff moved to exempt his case from the eight percent common benefit fee imposed by court order on all plaintiffs in the coordinated proceedings to compensate counsel for investigatory and legal work. Plaintiff contended he did not use the shared materials and should not have to pay the fee. The Court of Appeal affirmed, stating that if plaintiff came to believe his case was factually distinct from the others, he could have sought removal from the coordinated proceedings. (Pruchnik v. JCCP4621 Common Benefit Committee (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 7, Nov. 17, 2025) 2025 WL 3205045.)
The FSLA Does Not Require an Agency Relationship with the Actual Employer. A dancer at a club sued the club’s owners and managers under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. § 8; FLSA) for misclassifying its dancers as independent contractors and violating corresponding wage and hour provisions. After she filed the complaint, a partner and manager of the club canceled an agreement for plaintiff to perform at a weekly variety show at another club with the same owners, citing the suit and explaining his intent to protect the club from legal liability. After receiving the cancellation, plaintiff amended the complaint to allege that the decision to bar her from performing constituted retaliation in violation of the FLSA. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that the FLSA only provides a private right of action for retaliation committed by current employers. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “While the Act requires an underlying employment relationship, it covers retaliation committed by the employer or ‘any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.’ 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b), 203(d). In the context of retaliation, the phrase ‘indirectly in the interest of an employer’ does not require an agency relationship with the actual employer or the conferral of any direct benefit to the employer.” (Hollis v. R&R Restaurants, Inc (9th Cir., Nov. 18, 2025) 159 F.4th 677.)
Reduction of Damages in Medical Malpractice Case. In a medical malpractice case giving rise to questions involving the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), a jury awarded plaintiff close to $7.5 million in economic damages and $10 million in noneconomic damages against defendant doctor. Before trial, she reached settlements with another doctor and a hospital. The court reduced the award to $4,353,225. On appeal, plaintiff asserted three errors in the way the trial court reduced the damages award to account for the pretrial settlements and the jury’s finding that the doctor’s proportionate responsibility for plaintiff’s injury was 15 percent, with other tortfeasors 85 percent at fault. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Without more, then, there is no inconsistency between Rashidi [v. Moser]’s [ holding that the MICRA cap does not apply to settlement recoveries and its dictum that, under Proposition 51, when the jury has allocated responsibility among multiple tortfeasors, the percentage fault of a nonsettling defendant must be applied to the capped award (at least if the other tortfeasors are health care providers subject to MICRA). [((2014) 60 Cal.4th 718.)][¶] . . . [¶] . . . [Plaintiff] has not persuaded us that the unadjusted Espinoza [v. Machonga (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 268,] methodology is preferable to the Mayes [v. Bryan (2006) 39 Cal.App.4th 1075,] rule] when all tortfeasors are health care providers subject to MICRA. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Plaintiff] has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to deduct the $250,000 distributed to her son for purposes of the offset calculation.” (Snover v. Gupta (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Nov. 18, 2025) 2025 WL 3215132.)
Trial Court Wrongly Analyzed Tort Claim Against Police in Pursuit of a Suspect When Plaintiff Was Injured. Plaintiff was severely injured after a car driven by an 18-year-old ran a red light and collided with her vehicle. At the time, the 18-year-old was being followed by a police officer employed by defendant. Plaintiff sued the 18-year-old and the City of Pleasanton for negligence. After a bench trial on the city defendant’s liability only, the trial court concluded the city defendant was not liable under Vehicle Code § 17004.7, which immunizes a public entity from liability for collisions caused by fleeing suspects when the entity has a written policy on “vehicular pursuits” by peace officers and provides regular training on the policy. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Having determined that the trial court misinterpreted section 17004.7, we further conclude that the misinterpretation was prejudicial because there is a reasonable probability [plaintiff] would have obtained a better result had the court used the correct legal standard. [¶] . . . [W]e emphasize that section 17004.7 immunizes public entities from suit in relatively narrow circumstances if they have adopted and implemented a vehicular pursuit policy.” (Gilliland v. City of Pleasanton (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 1, Nov. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3225067.)
The One Who Didn’t Settle Was Left Without a Chair. Plaintiff, Brown, is one of several plaintiffs who sued the same employer under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2699 et seq.; PAGA). The employer settled with one of the PAGA plaintiffs who had filed suit earlier than Brown did. Then, the employer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in Brown’s case, arguing that res judicata barred Brown’s PAGA claim and that Brown lacked standing to bring a PAGA claim for violations occurring after the date of the other settlement. The trial court granted the motion and Brown appealed. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[The settling plaintiff’s] settlement fully encompassed and released Brown’s claims as to all [the employer’s] entities, thus satisfying all elements of claim preclusion.” (Brown v. Dave & Buster’s of California, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Nov. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3228867.)
It’s Not Wise to Wait till the Last Day to File a Notice of Appeal. Plaintiff retained a third-party filing service, which unsuccessfully attempted to electronically file a notice of appeal and a motion for a waiver of the undertraining requirement on the last day to appeal from a decision of the Labor Commissioner. After the clerk rejected the electronic filing attempt, the service attempted to file the documents in person the next day, one day late. The trial court determined the notice of appeal was untimely. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Our Supreme Court has held that [Code of Civil Procedure §] 98.2’s deadline for seeking review of a Labor Commissioner decision is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” (Dobarro v. Kim (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Nov. 19, 2025) 2025 WL 3228546.)
No Showing of Actual Malice in Defamation Claim Involving a Documentary. Plaintiff sued Netflix for defamation in a documentary that stated plaintiff was involved in the sexual assault and abuse of a former employee. The trial court granted Netflix’s motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The Court of Appeal affirmed on the ground that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the element of actual malice. (Onetaste Incorporated v. Netflix, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 3, Nov 20, 2025) 2025 WL 3240319.)
Court Dismissed Case of Incarcerated Plaintiff Because Plaintiff Did Not Appear for Trial. Plaintiff is a criminal defendant who sued his lawyer in the instant case for breach of contract for not filing a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf. On multiple occasions, plaintiff informed the trial court he was incarcerated. Nonetheless, the trial court dismissed the action when plaintiff did not appear for trial. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We find this was prejudicial error, because the dismissal deprived Park of meaningful access to the courts as an incarcerated plaintiff.” (Park v. Guisti (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Nov. 20, 2025) 2025 WL 3241154.)
The Difficulty of Keeping Anonymous in a Defamation Case. Plaintiffs are now adults, but were minors when they filed this action. The trial court granted plaintiffs’ motion to proceed under pseudonyms, but the motion did not include supporting evidence. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “In most cases, a party seeking to proceed pseudonymously should provide evidence supporting his or her motion to allow the trial court to make ‘[e]xpress factual findings’ on the matter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).) And to enable the court to conduct a recusal check, the party seeking to use a pseudonym should provide the parties’ real names under seal.” (Roe v. Smith (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 2, Nov. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 3250870.)
Ministerial Exception Found Not to Apply to Wage Claim. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a ministerial exception under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Here, the Court of Appeal considered whether the ministerial exception barred claims under California’s minimum wage-and-overtime laws even though there was no evidence that those claims would interfere with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. The Court of Appeal concluded: “The [trial] court held that the ministerial exception barred Lorenzo’s wage-and-hour claims even though defendants presented no evidence that her claims raised an ecclesiastical concern. But without such evidence, the Religion Clauses cannot and do not bar Lorenzo’s wage claims. We therefore reverse.” (Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 5, Nov. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 3251314.)
The Trial Court Erred in Not Giving Plaintiffs Leave to Amend Their Complaint. The night the Vallees moved into the neighborhood, Larry Vallee angrily complained about the noise made by the air-conditioning unit of Casey and Andrew Sproul. When his anger and threatening behavior continued, the police were contacted. At some point, Leslie Vallee told the Sprouls there were no firearms in the residence. The final incident occurred when Leslie was in her side yard breaking up boxes for the recycle bin. Larry approached the gate, speaking in an angry tone, unlocked the gate, and approached Casey with a metal baseball bat in his hand. He grabbed her face, shoved her to the ground, hit her in the head and body with his fists, repeatedly struck her head with the metal bat, and ripped a handful of hair from her scalp. He stopped attacking her when Casey’s nine-year-old son ran to her aid and yelled at Larry to stop hurting her. Multiple neighbors called the police and Larry barricaded himself inside his house. A standoff ensued, during which Leslie returned home and told police that there were guns in the house. Finally, Larry took his own life by shooting himself with an AR-15 rifle. Thirteen firearms were found in the home, most of them in the bedroom Leslie and Larry shared, and all registered in the names of Leslie or her sons. Casey and Andrew sued Leslie. The trial court sustained Leslie’s demurrer without leave to amend, concluding the complaint did not show Leslie had a duty to control her husband’s behavior. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Although we agree with this ruling, we conclude plaintiffs should have had the opportunity to amend their complaint to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation, and accordingly we reverse the judgment.” (Sproul v. Vallee (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Nov. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 3251224.)
Veterinarian Loses License. An eight-year-old cocker spaniel was taken to plaintiff, a veterinarian, for a wellness exam. Plaintiff did not inform its owners the dog had a fever of 103.4 degrees and proceeded to administer vaccines, which should not have been administered to a febrile animal. Shortly thereafter, the dog died. The owners filed a complaint with the California Veterinary Medical Board. Previously, the board disciplined plaintiff for the death of another animal, which also resulted from his failure to identify, treat, and appreciate the seriousness of a life-threatening condition and to communicate that condition to the animal’s owners The board revoked plaintiff’s veterinary license based on findings of negligence, incompetence, and unprofessional conduct. Plaintiff petitioned to the superior court, which court partially granted relief to plaintiff. Directing the lower court to deny plaintiff’s petition in full, the Court of Appeal stated: “The incompetence finding is supported by case law and clear and convincing evidence.” (Deol v. California Veterinary Medical Board (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Div. 3, Nov. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 3266254.)
Right to Confront Child Accuser. A child spent a weekend visiting her father, the defendant here. After returning home, the child told her mother that she had been sexually abused. Eventually, that report led to criminal charges against defendant. At trial, the state moved for permission to place a screen between the child and defendant. The defendant contended such a procedure would violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact. The trial judge granted the state’s motion. Established law holds: “Consistent with the Sixth Amendment, a court may screen a child witness from the defendant when ‘necessary to protect [the child] from trauma that would be caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where such trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate.’” On appeal, the prosecution rejected the notion that it had to put on proof that trauma would impair the child’s ability to communicate if face-to-face with a defendant. The U.S. Supreme Court held there was constitutional error in excusing the prosecution from presenting proof, but also discussed whether the error was harmless. Concluding there was error and remanding, the high court held: “Accordingly, on remand the State remains free to argue, and the Mississippi Supreme Court remains free to consider, whether the error in this case warrants a new trial under the harmless-error standard.” (Pitts v. Mississippi (U.S., Nov. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 3260171.)
The Circuit Court Failed to Analyze the Claim Asserted. At issue in a criminal trial was whether defendant could have been the shooter given his location and the angle of the bullet wound. After the state rested its case, Juror #4’s curiosity got the best of him, and he decided to check out the crime scene for himself. Shortly after jury deliberations began, Juror #4 told the jury about his visit, and the jury promptly reported his visit to the court. The parties conferred and eventually agreed that rather than declare a mistrial, the court would dismiss Juror #4 and deliberations would proceed with 11 jurors. The jury convicted defendant. On appeal, defendant argued his lawyer was ineffective for not seeking to voir dire the entire jury. The Fourth Circuit reversed, but not on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, declaring that the trial was marred by a “combination of extraordinary failures from juror to judge to attorney” that deprived defendant of his right to be confronted with the witnesses against him and his right to trial by an impartial jury. Reversing the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “The Fourth Circuit’s ‘radical transformation’ of Sweeney’s simple ineffective-assistance claim departed so drastically from the principle of party presentation as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” The high court remanded the matter to the circuit court to analyze the ineffective-assistance claim the defendant asserted. (Clark v. Sweeney (U.S., Nov. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 3260170.)
Roundup Verdict Against Monsanto Upheld. To kill weeds, plaintiff applied the herbicide Roundup around his home property monthly, throughout the year, every year, from 2000 to 2020. He was diagnosed with mycosis fungoides, a form of non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. Plaintiff sued, alleging defendant failed to warn consumers that using Roundup in accordance with widespread and common practice presented a substantial danger. A jury found Monsanto liable and awarded plaintiff $7 million in economic damages and $325 million in punitive damages. The trial court granted Monsanto’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part and reduced the punitive damages to $21 million. Monsanto appealed and asserted the trial court erred by failing to conclude Dennis’s failure-to-warn claims were preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.) and by failing to conclude that the punitive damages award violated due process by punishing Monsanto multiple times for the same conduct. Affirming, the Court of Appeal found no preemption, and regarding the $21 million punitive damages award, stated: “[T]he trial court found that Monsanto was ‘a multibillion-dollar company which intentionally used its vast resources over several decades to protect its profits over the safety of ordinary consumers [like Dennis], showing a reckless disregard for the health and safety of the public.’” (Dennis v. Monsanto Company Cal. App. 4th Dist, Div.1, Nov. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 3267899.)
Mismanagement of Estate by Executor. The son of decedent was the executor of his father’s estate. The father had been in the business of insurance, and the son, who had no experience in the insurance business, held himself out to be its chief operating officer. The trial court found the son was disqualified under Probate Code §§ 8402, subdivision (a)(3) and 8502, subdivision (a). Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Judge Buchwald’s express finding about how [the son] treated [the deceased’s widow], and how that in turn impaired the business; his observations about the evidence of [the son] being disruptive rather than constructive; and the trial transcript itself—strongly support our conclusion that Judge Chou did not abuse his discretion under sections 8402(a)(3) and 8502(a).” (Estate of Bodmann (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Nov. 21, 2025) 2025 WL 3295732.)
Forced Assignment of a Copyright to Satisfy Spousal/Child Support Debt. Husband/father owed wife/mother $2 million in unpaid spousal and child support. He allegedly had no assets to satisfy the debt, but he did hold a copyright on a deceased sculptor’s works. The wife successfully requested the trial court to assign the copyright to a receiver so the copyright could be monetized. The husband asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the order. Affirming the lower court’s order, the appeals court stated: “Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a) provides that, absent an exception, ‘all property of the judgment debtor is subject to enforcement of a money judgment.’ (§ 695.010, subd. (a).) Brett, however, has not convinced us that any exception for copyrights applies. In addition, although no published California decision has yet held that a court may order the forced assignment of a copyright in particular, cases dating back to the 19th century uphold the forced assignment of other forms of a debtor’s intellectual property to satisfy a creditor’s judgment.” (In re Marriage of Strong (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Nov. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 3268649.)
Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants Affirmed After Woman as Injured While a Passenger on a Bus. Plaintiff was injured when she fell while riding as a passenger on a public bus operated by defendant bus driver and defendant transit district. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants. On appeal, plaintiff contended there were triable issues of fact whether the bus driver was negligent and that the trial court erred in invoking the primary assumption of risk doctrine. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “After independently reviewing the record, we conclude there was no evidence defendants acted negligently, and the bus’s video shows the sole proximate cause of [plaintiff’s] injury was her own negligence.” (Agustin v. Golden Empire Transit District (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Nov. 26, 2025) 2025 WL 3292872.)
Agreement to Rent to Low Income Households Survived Later Foreclosure. The City of Los Angeles by and through the housing department granted a nonparty a 35 percent density bonus that allowed the nonparty to develop one more unit than otherwise would be authorized, resulting in a three-unit project. In exchange, the nonparty agreed to rent one of the three units exclusively to low-income households for at least 30 years, which agreement was recorded against the property in 2006. Meanwhile, the nonparty borrowed approximately $240,000 against the property in 2005, and, in 2013, the lender foreclosed on the property. In 2019, plaintiffs purchased the property, allegedly unaware of the 2006 agreement. And, in 2023, after the city sent a notice demanding they comply with the agreement, plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title and for declaratory relief against the city. The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer to the complaint with prejudice. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[T]he agreement before us survived the foreclosure.” (Rodriguez v. City of Los Angeles (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Nov. 26, 2025) 2025 WL 3295008.)
Alluding to Past Violent Incident Constituted Credible Threat of Workplace Violence. Defendant challenged the evidentiary sufficiency of a workplace violence order resulting from his conduct while working at a fire station. There was evidence that in one profanity-laden encounter, defendant alluded to an incident in which a firefighter fatally shot another firefighter. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s reference to the prior shooting constituted a credible threat of violence warranting issuance of the workplace violence restraining order. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “[Defendant] does not dispute, and thus tacitly agrees with, the County’s assertion that in making the statement in question to [another employee] on October 11, 2022, [defendant] made a ‘knowing and willful statement’ for the purposes of the statutory definition of “credible threat of violence.’” (County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Nov. 26, 2025) 2025 WL 3295027.)
California Organic Food and Farming Act Applies to Feminine Hygiene Products. An environmental advocacy group sued the manufacturer of feminine hygiene products, alleging that some of its products are labeled and sold as “organic” and as “made with” organic ingredients in violation of California’s law regulating organic products, the California Organic Food and Farming Act ( Health & Saf. Code, § 110810 et seq.; Food & Agr. Code, § 46000 et seq.; COFFA). The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the manufacturer on the ground that feminine hygiene products are not subject to California’s organic products law. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “We hold that COFFA applies to all products sold as ‘organic’ or containing ‘organic’ materials, including the feminine hygiene products at issue here.” (Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 2, Nov. 26, 2025) 2025 WL 3295711.)