Litigation
Litigation Update: November 2025
A monthly publication of the Litigation Section of the California Lawyers Association.
- Senior Editor, Eileen C. Moore, Associate Justice, California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three
- Managing Editor, Julia C. Shear Kushner
- Editors, Dean Bochner, Colin P. Cronin, Austin Evans, Jenn French, Ryan Wu, Jacquelyn Young
Our Updates:
- Plaintiffs Found Not Required to Plead Actual Damages/Injuries in Action Against Debt Collectors.
- Class Action Not Preempted by the National Bank Act.
- No Attorney Fees for Plaintiff After Defendant Failed to Timely Pay Arbitration Fees.
- District Court Ordered to Hear Dismissed Child Custody Matter Under the Hague Abduction Convention.
- Summary Judgment Reversed in Age Discrimination Case Despite the Fact Plaintiffs Did Not Apply for the Position.
- Trial Court Erred in Granting Anti-SLAPP Motion.
- Delegation of Issues of Arbitrability Not Clear and Unmistakable by Inclusion of Rules of an Arbitration Provider.
- Lack of Life Experience Is Not Listed in Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7 as a Presumptively Invalid Reason for a Peremptory Challenge.
- Another Vaccine Case Tossed.
- Slugging Someone on the Head with a Mallet Multiple Times Found Not to Be an “Accident” Under a Homeowner’s Policy.
- Cumulative Injuries of Professional Athletes.
- Issue of Whether Plaintiff Was an Aggrieved Employee in PAGA Case Did Not Need to Be Arbitrated.
- Denial of an Anti-SLAPP Motion Does Not Satisfy the Requirements for an Interlocutory Appeal in Federal Court.
- City Fails to Adopt Plan to Identify Development of Needed Housing.
- Medical Battery Case Against Doctor to Proceed in Trial Court.
- Transgender Legal Issues Continue.
- Statute that Changed Name of Law School Upheld.
- Youth Alone Is Not a Cognizable Group Under Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7, Which Prohibits Discrimination in Jury Selection.
- Attorney Found to Be a Vexatious Litigant.
- Court Read Arbitration Agreement and Non-Disclosure Agreement Together, Concluding Arbitration Agreement Is Unconscionable.
- Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Permitting Plaintiff to Amend Complaint.
- Challenging a Juror.
- Plaintiff’s Allegations Sufficiently Alleged Facts to Establish Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendant.
- Law Firm’s Woes in Getting Paid.
- Provision in Arbitration Agreement Waiving Right to Seek Public Injunctive Relief Unenforceable.
- Disabled Plaintiff Not Required to Show Removal of Barrier Was Readily Achievable Since Defendant Had Already Removed It.
- Family Court Lacks Discretion to Renew Domestic Violence Restraining Order for a Period Less than Five Years.
- Renewal of Judgment.
- A Lawyer Trying to Get Paid.
- Defendants’ Due Process Rights Not Violated by Subjecting Them to Personal Jurisdiction in California.
- Husband Must Fund a Trust With $1 Million for Spousal Support Upon His Death.
- Company Does Not Want to Provide Its Employees with Health Benefits that Include Abortion and Contraception.
Plaintiffs Found Not Required to Plead Actual Damages/Injuries in Action Against Debt Collectors. In a class action, plaintiffs contended defendants violated collection laws (Civ. Code, §§ 1788 et seq., 1812.700) by providing consumer debt collection notices that failed to conform to requirements concerning type size. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants because plaintiffs failed to allege any actual injury and thus lacked standing to pursue statutory damages. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Because a debt collector’s violation of the Rosenthal Act makes them liable for statutory damages — regardless of whether there were actual damages — we conclude a statutory violation is sufficient to confer standing upon a consumer. . . . The Rosenthal Act does not require a debtor to plead or prove injury to have standing to seek such damages.” (Kashanian v. National Enterprise Systems, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 1, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1037.)
Class Action Not Preempted by the National Bank Act. A class of borrowers claimed that a bank failed to pay interest on their escrow accounts as required by California Civil Code § 2954, subdivision (a). The National Bank Act was adopted in 1864 (12 U.S.C. § 38; NBA). Over the years, courts have shielded national banking from unduly burdensome and duplicative state regulation. Nonetheless, the district court held the National Bank Act did not preempt this action. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Lusnak [v. Bank of America, N.A., 883 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 2018)] controls this case, and under Lusnak, ‘the NBA does not preempt California Civil Code § 2954.8(a).’” (Kivett v. Flagstar Bank, FSB (9th Cir., Oct. 2, 2025) 154 F.4th 640.)
No Attorney Fees for Plaintiff After Defendant Failed to Timely Pay Arbitration Fees. The only issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to a plaintiff after a matter was returned to the superior court when the defendant did not timely pay its arbitration fees and was found to have forfeited its arbitral rights. The appellate court discussed the trial court’s factual findings that defendant initiated payment on Friday, July 7, the deadline date, but because of a processing delay, it was not received by AAA until the following Monday. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “As a matter of law, these uncontested findings fail to establish defendant’s untimely payment was strategic, willful, grossly negligent, or fraudulent, the prerequisites for forfeiture of arbitral rights and abandonment of the arbitration as interpreted in Hohenshelt [v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 310].” (Wilson v. Tap Worldwide, LLC (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 1, Oct. 2, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1077.)
District Court Ordered to Hear Dismissed Child Custody Matter Under the Hague Abduction Convention. One parent is American and the other French, and they have two minor children. The American mother received a restraining order from an Oregon court forbidding the French father from taking the children out of Oregon. A French court granted the father permission to bring the children to France, which is what the father did. The mother went to France and brought the children back to Oregon. The father thereafter brought an action in a federal district court under the Hague Abduction Convention, which requires a child wrongfully removed from the country of habitual residence to be returned to that country. But the district court declined to hear the action on the merits under the Fugitive Disentitlement Doctrine. Reversing and ordering the lower court to hear the matter on its merits, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: “We agree that the parental rights at stake in cases brought under the Hague Convention, as well as the treaty’s unique and important goals and purposes, counsel caution before a court extinguishes a fugitive’s right to seek the return of his or her children.” (Paris v. Brown (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 2025) 154 F.4th 663.)
Summary Judgment Reversed in Age Discrimination Case Despite the Fact Plaintiffs Did Not Apply for the Position. Plaintiffs are 54.4, 55.8, and 56.9 years old. All three were, by all accounts, exemplary Dealer Business Managers at Circle Ks. They each received strong performance reviews and earned company awards for their work. Their performance put them in line for promotion to the regional-director level, an opportunity in which they all expressed interest. When the position of West Coast regional director opened up, none of the three was given an opportunity to apply, and the position was given to someone who was 45.2 years old. The three plaintiffs sued for age discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for Circle K because plaintiffs did not apply for the job. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Plaintiffs have [] raised a material dispute of fact as to whether Circle K’s proffered explanation for selecting Angeles was pretext for illegal discrimination, making summary judgment inappropriate.” (Caldrone v. Circle K Stores Inc. (9th Cir., Oct. 3, 2025) 2025 WL 2811320.)
Trial Court Erred in Granting Anti-SLAPP Motion. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s grant of defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. Plaintiff alleged equitable causes of action resulting from a default judgment for which he contended he never received notice of the underlying action. Granting the anti-SLAPP motions, the court found that plaintiff had not established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claims because his declaration stating that he was not served with the 2006 summons and complaint and did not reside at the address where it was delivered was uncorroborated by any other evidence, and because plaintiff admitted that he defaulted on the debt. Reversing, the Court of Appeal concluded that “the trial court impermissibly weighed the evidence when it determined that [plaintiff’s] declaration was insufficient because it was uncorroborated. Moreover, because [plaintiff’s] challenge to the default judgment is based on lack of service, the court also erred in finding that he could not prevail on his equitable claims without establishing that he possessed a meritorious defense.” (Ahmed v. Collect Access, LLC (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Oct. 3, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1092.)
Delegation of Issues of Arbitrability Not Clear and Unmistakable by Inclusion of Rules of an Arbitration Provider. Plaintiffs filed a class action alleging multiple wage and hour violations under the Labor Code, and a separate representative action under the Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.). After the two actions were consolidated, defendants moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found there was not a clear and unmistakable agreement to delegate enforceability issues to the arbitrator, and subsequently granted in part and denied in part the motion to compel arbitration. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Here we hold, in the context of a mandatory arbitration agreement between an employer and an hourly worker, that the incorporation of the rules of an arbitration provider — without expressly specifying in the parties’ agreement that under those rules the arbitrator will decide the scope and validity of the arbitration agreement — is not clear and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to have those issues decided by the arbitrator. Absent unusual circumstances, an employer who intends to delegate issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator must express that intent in the arbitration agreement itself.” (Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc. (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Oct. 6, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1170.)
Lack of Life Experience Is Not Listed in Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7 as a Presumptively Invalid Reason for a Peremptory Challenge. Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7 prohibits discrimination in jury selection based on race, ethnicity, gender, and membership in other enumerated protected classes. Here, the prosecutor gave as reasons for a peremptory challenge that the juror lacked life experience and was very timid. The trial judge denied the criminal defendant’s challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “The lack of life experience is not listed in section 231.7 as a presumptively invalid reason for a peremptory challenge.” (People v. Garcia (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, Oct. 6, 2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1154.)
Another Vaccine Case Tossed. In August 2021, the Governor of Washington issued a proclamation requiring healthcare workers in Washington to be vaccinated against COVID-19. The proclamation also required that healthcare workers be given opportunities to be heard for the purpose of religious and medical exemptions. More than 80 healthcare workers refused to comply and were terminated. The terminated employees sued the state, but the district court dismissed their claims. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit rejected their federal and state constitutional and statutory claims. (Curtis v. Inslee (9th Cir., Oct. 6, 2025) 154 F.4th 678.)
Slugging Someone on the Head with a Mallet Multiple Times Found Not to Be an “Accident” Under a Homeowner’s Policy. An insurer issued a homeowner’s policy that covered injuries arising from an “occurrence,” which the policy defined as “an accident.” The insurer filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory relief, asking the trial court to determine it owed no duty to indemnify its insured in another action. In the other action, a jury determined the insured struck his housemate on the head with a mallet multiple times, and awarded the housemate $2.5 million dollars in compensatory damages. After reviewing the pleadings, the jury instructions, and the special verdict form, the trial court determined the findings of the jury in the underlying action conclusively established that the insured’s injury-producing conduct was not the result of an “accident,” and the housemate’s damages therefore did not arise from a covered “occurrence” under the policy. Affirming, the Court of Appeal found no error, stating: “The Policy defines an ‘occurrence’ as an ‘accident.’” (State Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Diblin (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 1, Oct. 7, 2025) 2025 WL 2837668.)
Cumulative Injuries of Professional Athletes. Wayne Gandy spent 15 years—from 1994 to 2009—as a professional football player with the National Football League (NFL). He played with the Los Angeles Rams during the 1994 season, his first with the NFL. He played the next three years with the St. Louis Rams under the contract he had signed in California with the LA Rams, but he never again played for a California team. He played for the Pittsburgh Steelers from April 1999 to February 2003, the New Orleans Saints from March 2003 to April 2006, and finally, petitioner Atlanta Falcons from April 2006 until he retired in February 2009. Six years after he retired, Gandy filed a claim in California for workers’ compensation, claiming a cumulative injury to multiple body parts. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) determined that the Falcons were exempted from liability under Labor Code § 3600.5, subdivisions (c) and (d). The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) rescinded that decision. Agreeing with the WCJ, the Court of Appeal annulled the decision of the WCAB, held the Falcons are exempted from liability under Labor Code § 3600.5, and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Atlanta Falcons v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 7, 2025) 2025 WL 2837697.)
Issue of Whether Plaintiff Was an Aggrieved Employee in PAGA Case Did Not Need to Be Arbitrated. This appeal analyzed whether the version of the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) in effect from mid-2016 to mid-2024 authorized an aggrieved employee to bring a PAGA action that seeks to recover civil penalties imposed for Labor Code violations suffered only by other employees (aka “headless” PAGA actions). The Court of Appeal, citing CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 872, 882, held: “We again conclude such PAGA actions were allowed.” (Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Sept. 9, 2025) 2025 WL 2846580, ordered published Oct. 8, 2025.)
Denial of an Anti-SLAPP Motion Does Not Satisfy the Requirements for an Interlocutory Appeal in Federal Court. California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, subdivision (i), states that an order granting or denying a special motion to strike is appealable. In Batzel v. Smith (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, the Ninth Circuit held that federal courts have jurisdiction to review such orders under the collateral order doctrine. Here, the Ninth Circuit changed its collective mind en banc, holding: “Upon reexamination, we now conclude that a district court’s denial of a motion to strike under the California anti-SLAPP statute does not satisfy the requirements for an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine.” (Gopher Media LLC v. Melone (9th Cir., Oct. 9, 2025) 154 F.4th 696.)
City Fails to Adopt Plan to Identify Development of Needed Housing. At issue here is the Housing Element Law (Gov. Code, §§ 65580–65589.11), which requires local jurisdictions to periodically review and adopt a state-approved “housing element” that explains how they will accommodate their fair share of regionally needed housing. Plaintiffs are developers who seek to develop houses. They contended the city’s housing element failed to adequately identify sites that could realistically accommodate “lower income” housing. Before the city council adopted the city’s housing element, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory relief. After the city adopted its housing element, plaintiffs amended the petition and complaint to add allegations about the city’s housing element, particularly the city’s use of a zoning “overlay” that would permit construction of affordable multifamily housing on sites that were otherwise zoned for commercial and industrial use. The trial court denied the petition and complaint. The Court of Appeal reversed, stating: “An overlay cannot be used to satisfy the minimum density and residential use requirements set out in section 65583.2, subdivision (h)(2) . . . , where the base zoning expressly permits development that does not include housing.” (New Commune DTLA LLC v. City of Redondo Beach (Cal. App. 2nd. Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 10, 2025) 2025 WL 2886322.)
Medical Battery Case Against Doctor to Proceed in Trial Court. Plaintiff and her husband sued the doctor who delivered her baby. The baby was born without any problems. In her complaint, plaintiff did not allege the doctor was negligent or violated a standard of care. She alleged many things she found objectionable, such as the glaring lights in the hospital room, unknown people entering the room, an unknown person placing her legs in stirrups without permission, and someone removing her socks without permission. The trial court sustained the doctor’s demurrer to all the causes of action except one, which plaintiff dismissed. Affirming to all but plaintiff’s cause of action for medical battery, the Court of Appeal stated: “We agree [with plaintiffs] in one respect—that Jane’s allegations are sufficient to state a medical battery claim based on Kachru performing the vacuum-assisted delivery over Jane’s objection.” (Doe v. Kachru (Cal. App. 1st. Dist, Div. 1, Oct. 14, 2025) 2025 WL 2902027.)
Transgender Legal Issues Continue. A public elementary and middle school holds after school programs called the Genders and Sexualities Alliance (GSA), which are not part of the curriculum and not disclosed to parents. At one program, the teacher awarded prizes to students who came out as transgender. Plaintiff’s sixth grade daughter announced she was transgender and that she “would be transitioning.” The next day, her parents enrolled her in a private school. Thereafter, the parents sued the school district for constitutional denial of the rights of parents and requested a permanent injunction requiring notice to parents when GSA programs were offered to students. The district court dismissed the action because of an issue involving municipal law in (D.Colo., Dec. 19, 2023) 2023 WL 8780860. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in 135 F.4th 924. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, concurred in denial but added a statement that included these words: “Petitioners tell us that nearly 6,000 public schools have policies—as respondent allegedly does—that purposefully interfere with parents’ access to critical information about their children’s gender-identity choices and school personnel’s involvement in and influence on those choices. The troubling—and tragic—allegations in this case underscore the great and growing national importance of the question that these parent petitioners present.” (Citation modified.) (Lee v. Poudre School District R-1 (U.S., Oct. 14, 2025) 2025 WL 2906469.)
Statute that Changed Name of Law School Upheld. On January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 1936 changed the name of what was formerly known as “Hastings College of the Law” to “College of the Law, San Francisco.” (Ed. Code, § 92200.) In their complaint, plaintiffs contended AB 1936 violates the contract clauses of the California and United States Constitutions, and alleged several other causes of action. The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend, dismissing the case. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Born in 1814, Serranus Clinton Hastings (S.C. Hastings) was the first Chief Justice of California and the State’s third Attorney General. In addition to holding these public roles, he amassed significant wealth from various real estate ventures and by 1870 became one of the largest landowners in California. [¶] . . . [¶] In 2017, the San Francisco Chronicle published an article titled ‘The Moral Case for Renaming Hastings College of the Law,’ which included allegations that S.C. Hastings was involved in fomenting violence and atrocities against Native Americans living in what is present-day Mendocino County. [¶] On October 28, 2021, The New York Times published an article questioning the College’s name with a headline that S.C. Hastings ‘masterminded the killings of hundreds of Native Americans.’ [¶] . . . [¶] Here, the legislative findings indicate that Assembly Bill 1936 was enacted to address the injustice inflicted on the Yuki people and the Native American people of the state and to begin the healing process for the crimes of the past.” (Hastings College Conservation Committee v. State (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 4, Oct. 15, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 272.)
Youth Alone Is Not a Cognizable Group Under Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7, Which Prohibits Discrimination in Jury Selection. Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7 prohibits discrimination in jury selection based on race, ethnicity, gender, and membership in other enumerated protected classes. In this case, the trial court overruled the defendant’s objection to the prosecution’s exercise of peremptory challenges against young jurors. The Court of Appeal held that youth, alone, is not a cognizable group under section 231.7. (People v. Hernandez (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 6, Oct. 15, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 256.)
Attorney Found to Be a Vexatious Litigant. Over the last five years, attorney Elena Kouvabina has—while self-represented—“commenced, prosecuted, or maintained” nine litigations that have been “finally determined adversely to [her].” (Code Civ. Proc., § 391, subd. (b)(1).) Kouvabina argued on appeal that her appeals did not constitute “litigation” within the meaning of § 391 because they arose from efforts to defend herself against defendant’s affirmative defenses. The Court of Appeal stated: “Even if a defendant’s appeal does not constitute ‘litigation’ within the meaning of section 391(b)(1), we conclude Kouvabina’s appeals and writs — under the facts presented here — arose out of proceedings as to which she was the ‘plaintiff.’” “On our own motion, we conclude she is a vexatious litigant and impose a prefiling order prohibiting her from filing new litigation while self-represented in the courts of this state without first obtaining permission from the presiding judge or justice where the litigation is proposed to be filed.” (In re Marriage of Kouvabina and Veltman (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 16, 2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 293.)
Court Read Arbitration Agreement and Non-Disclosure Agreement Together, Concluding Arbitration Agreement Is Unconscionable. When plaintiff was an employee of defendant, she signed three separate documents relating to arbitration: (1) an arbitration agreement; (2) a “Voluntary Dispute Resolution Policy”; and (3) a “Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement” (CND). Later, plaintiff sued defendant, alleging numerous causes of action, including disability discrimination. The trial court denied defendant’s petition to compel arbitration. Affirming, the Court of Appeal read the arbitration agreement and CND together and concluded the arbitration agreement is unconscionable, stating: “[T]he Arbitration Agreement’s carve-out for injunctive and declaratory relief . . . ‘excludes any request for injunctive relief, including one for a permanent injunction, related to unfair competition or unauthorized use of trade secrets or confidential information,’ which is more likely to be initiated by the employer.” (Gurganus v. IGS Solutions LLC (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 17, 2025) 2025 WL 2944090.)
Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Permitting Plaintiff to Amend Complaint. Plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted by her foster father in 1981, but after she obtained her juvenile records, she learned she was not under his care until 1984. She sought to amend her complaint, but the trial court denied her motion, concluding that Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (a)(1), which permits amendment of a pleading to correct a mistake, does not apply to actions under former Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1 because of the certificate of merit requirement, which requires a qualified expert to review a case and provide a sworn statement that a plaintiff has a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing an action against the defendant. Finding the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, the Court of Appeal reversed. (S.C. v. Doe 1 (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Oct. 17, 2025) 2025 WL 2945697.)
Challenging a Juror. Regarding Code of Civil Procedure § 231.7, which makes the denial of an objection to a peremptory challenge subject to de novo appellate review, the Court of Appeal held: “We granted a petition by defendant Gustavo Guzman to transfer this matter from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, in order to address the following issue: Whether the ‘deemed prejudicial’ standard of section 231.7(j) applies when an objection to a peremptory challenge was determined to have been erroneously granted. We conclude, based upon the statutory language, statutory scheme, and legislative history, that the deemed prejudicial standard does not apply when the objection to the peremptory challenge was erroneously granted. Instead, when an objection to a peremptory challenge under section 231.7 is erroneously granted, traditional rules and standards regarding prejudicial error apply.” (People v. Guzman (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 22, 2025) 2025 WL 2972244.)
Plaintiff’s Allegations Sufficiently Alleged Facts to Establish Specific Jurisdiction Over Defendant. Plaintiff offers computer and networking services to customers in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), which is its principal place of business. Defendant is a California-based distributor of Microsoft products. Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract and the district court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “[Defendant] intentionally directed its communications and other actions toward the CNMI. . . . [Defendant] knew [plaintiff] was based in the CNMI, that the software would be used in the CNMI, and that the transaction was for a product that specifically conformed to the requirements of the CNMI government [¶] . . . . [¶] [We] hold that [plaintiff] has alleged facts sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over [defendant] in the CNMI.” (SuperTECH, Inc. v. My Choice Software, LLC (9th Cir., Oct. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2983126.)
Law Firm’s Woes in Getting Paid. A law firm wanted to get paid for representing a sheriff. There was a conflict of interest between the sheriff and county counsel. The central dispute involved whether or not then-Sheriff Villanueva had the authority to retain—as opposed to select—independent counsel to represent him in the Mandoyan matter. Government Code § 31000.6 governs the employment of counsel for the sheriff when county counsel has a conflict of interest. In pertinent part, section 31000.6 states: “Upon request of the [sheriff or other listed officials], the board of supervisors shall contract with and employ legal counsel to assist the . . . sheriff . . . in any case where the county counsel . . . would have a conflict of interest in representing the . . . sheriff.” When the county didn’t pay the fees to the law firm, the law firm demanded arbitration under an agreement the sheriff had signed with the law firm. At that point, the county filed an action for declaratory relief seeking a declaration it had no agreement to arbitrate. The county obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining the arbitration and later an order granting summary judgment. The law firm filed a separate complaint for breach of contract and other causes of action. The trial court sustained the county’s demurrer to the law firm’s action. Appeals filed by the law firm in both actions were consolidated in the instant appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed both judgments, stating as to the first action: “We conclude the sheriff did not have the authority to retain Quinn Emanuel.” As to the second action, the appeals court stated: “Quinn’s subsequent lawsuit against the county defendants was properly dismissed on demurrer on either of two grounds: because it was a compulsory cross-complaint in the earlier declaratory relief action or because Quinn failed to allege compliance with the presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act.” (County of Los Angeles v. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 8, Oct. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2984701.)
Provision in Arbitration Agreement Waiving Right to Seek Public Injunctive Relief Unenforceable. The parties had a contract and plaintiff sued defendant to enjoin it from engaging in deceptive business practices, in violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and false advertising law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17500 et seq.). Defendant moved to compel arbitration and the trial court denied the motion, concluding plaintiff was seeking public injunctive relief, and that the agreement’s purported waiver of plaintiff’s right to seek such relief is unenforceable under California law. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “we conclude that under McGill [v. Citibank, N.A.(2017) 2 Cal.5th 945, 955], Coinbase’s petition was properly denied.” (Khan v. Coinbase, Inc. (Cal. App. 1st Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 23, 2025) 2025 WL 2985378.)
Disabled Plaintiff Not Required to Show Removal of Barrier Was Readily Achievable Since Defendant Had Already Removed It. Plaintiff lost his lower left leg and two right-foot toes to amputation, and he uses a prosthetic leg and wheelchair for mobility. He sued 7-Eleven, Inc., under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51, subd. (f)) after he personally encountered physical barriers to access when purchasing items at one of its stores. Following a bench trial, the district court ruled for plaintiff solely on the Unruh Act claim and awarded him $4,000 in statutory damages. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Because 7-Eleven’s voluntary remodeling demonstrates that barrier removal was readily achievable, nothing further was required of [plaintiff]. Under these circumstances, it does not matter that [plaintiff[ did not provide evidence to satisfy his initial burden. We do not apply the burden-shifting framework formalistically, as 7-Eleven suggests.” (Gilbert v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2025) 2025 WL 2990658.)
Family Court Lacks Discretion to Renew Domestic Violence Restraining Order for a Period Less than Five Years. A family court renewed a domestic violence restraining order for a period of nine months. The issue on appeal was whether a family court has discretion under Family Code § 6345 to renew a domestic violence restraining order for a period less than five years. Reversing, the Court of Appeal stated: “Examining the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the discretion now explicitly afforded the trial court is simply to decide whether the duration of a renewal should be for five years, or a longer period, or permanently.” (Hart v. Hart (Cal. App. 2nd Dist., Div. 2, Oct. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 3001823.)
Renewal of Judgment. A complaint for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and related claims did not specify any amounts of damages. Before taking the defendant’s default, the plaintiff mailed a statement of damages to the self-represented defendant’s address of record. Plaintiff thereafter got a default judgment of $1 million. Years later, plaintiff renewed the judgment and defendant moved to vacate the renewal on the grounds that the default judgment was void for lack of due process, in that: (1) plaintiff’s action was not one for personal injury, and thus the damages had to be specified in the complaint; (2) even if a statement of damages was appropriate, plaintiff did not use the form the Judicial Council adopted for that purpose (CIV-050); and (3) plaintiff failed to properly serve defendant with the statement of damages. Rejecting defendant’s challenges, the Court of Appeal stated the “lawsuit is one for personal injury [¶] . . . [¶] . . .There is no dispute that [plaintiff’s] statement of damages separately states her claimed general and special damages. This was sufficient for our purposes. . . . [Plaintiff] properly served her statement of damages by mailing it to the P.O. box [defendant] listed on his substitution of attorney form, which was the only address for [defendant] on file when [plaintiff] served the statement.” (Backlund v. Stone (Cal. App. 2nd. Dist., Div. 2, Oct. 27, 2025) 2025 WL 3001838.)
A Lawyer Trying to Get Paid. A lawyer represented a client and obtained a deed in trust to secure his fee for services in an underlying case. Also in that underlying case, the trial court ordered the client to convey the burdened property to fulfill a sales contract. But the lawyer’s deed on that property was obstructing the sale, and the trial court expunged the lawyer’s deed. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The lawyer brought the instant action against the buyer of the burdened property, seeking a declaration that his expunged deed was still valid. The lawyer also filed a lis pendens on the property. The trial court found that issue preclusion prevented the lawyer from succeeding in the instant case, and also ruled that his lis pendens was a slander of title and an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal agreed that issue preclusion prevented the lawyer from succeeding, but also found the litigation privilege protected the lawyer’s lis pendens. (Kim v. New Life Oasis Church (Cal. App. 2nd. Dist., Div. 8, Oct. 28, 2025) 2025 WL 3012393.)
Defendants’ Due Process Rights Not Violated by Subjecting Them to Personal Jurisdiction in California. The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The facts concerned two men married to each other, one from the U.S. and one from Saudi Arabia. Because homosexuality is a capital offense in Saudi Arabia, they have kept their relationship and sexual orientation hidden. After being in Saudi Arabia for a long time due to the pandemic, they booked a flight on defendant’s airline. When the couple arrived at the Riyadh airport to check in, the Lufthansa check-in agent requested that Roe identify his familial relationship with a United States citizen. Lufthansa representatives publicly and loudly demeaned the men, even after being shown their marriage license. They were allowed to board. They had a layover in Frankfurt. On their first flight, they explained what had happened to a Lufthansa employee and the captain on board. The employee and captain assured them that their information would be deleted from Lufthansa’s computers and that a Lufthansa agent would meet them in Frankfurt. No Lufthansa agent met them. On their second flight, from Frankfurt to San Francisco, they again explained what had happened to a Lufthansa employee on board. The employee assured them that their information had been deleted. The captain asked for a Lufthansa agent to meet Doe and Roe at the San Francisco airport so they could lodge a complaint. This time, a Lufthansa agent did meet them and assured them that an agent based in New York would call them within the hour. They never received such a call. About a month later, Doe discovered that the marital status on his Saudi government profile was changed from “single” to “married.” Doe and Roe alleged that there was no conceivable way the Saudi Arabian government could have learned about plaintiffs’ marriage other than as a result of this incident. The Saudi Arabian fears returning to Saudi Arabia. He has not seen his family, who all live in Saudi Arabia and who do not know about his sexuality, since the flight. Among other financial losses, Roe had to quickly sell real estate he manages in Saudi Arabia, incurring a loss of around $300,000. He has also developed pulmonary fibrosis, a terminal illness, which appears to be a result of the stress from the incident. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “Given the defendants’ extensive contacts with California, and the connection of those contacts to the suit here, we cannot say that their due process rights would be violated by the exercise of personal jurisdiction. [¶] . . . [¶] In sum, we hold that Lufthansa and LGBS are subject to personal jurisdiction in California.” (Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft (9th Cir., Oct. 30, 2025) 2025 WL 3030423.)
Husband Must Fund a Trust With $1 Million for Spousal Support Upon His Death. Family Code § 4337 provides that spousal support terminates on death. Family Code § 4360 permits security for spousal support after death. The lower court ordered the husband, who is much older than the 65-year-old wife, to fund a trust with $1 million to be used for spousal support, so the wife will have support upon his death. Affirming, the Court of Appeal stated: “Based on the parties’ wildly disparate net worth, their relative ages and differing life expectancies, and the cost-prohibitive nature of obtaining life insurance for [the husband] based on his age, we find the court had substantial evidence from which to conclude security for spousal support was ‘just and reasonable in view of the circumstances of the parties.’ We find no abuse of discretion.” (In re Marriage of Nelson (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Div. 3, Oct. 30, 2025) 2025 WL 3034122.)
Company Does Not Want to Provide Its Employees with Health Benefits that Include Abortion and Contraception. Oregon enacted a statute that requires most health benefit plans to cover abortion and contraceptive drugs. Oregon’s Right to Life (ORTL) filed this action against the State of Oregon. ORTL is not associated with any religious organization but advocates and educates on the dignity and respect for human life. The directors of ORTL have sincerely held religious beliefs against abortion and contraception. ORTL brought suit under the First and Fourteenth Amendments seeking relief from the requirement that ORTL provide abortion and contraception coverage. A district court judge dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit stated: “ORTL is a religiously motivated organization, governed by a board whose members have sincere religious beliefs, and with purposes to ‘be carried out . . . by means consistent with traditional Judeo-Christian ethics.’” (Oregon Right to Life v. Stolfi (9th Cir., Oct. 31, 2025) 2025 WL 3039959.)