Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Competition: Spring 2015, Vol. 24, No. 1
Content
- California Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law and Federal and State Procedural Law Developments
- Chair's Column
- Editor's Note
- How Viable Is the Prospect of Enforcement of Privacy Rights In the Age of Big Data? An Overview of Trends and Developments In Consumer Privacy Class Actions
- Keynote Address: a Conversation With the Honorable Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, Justice of the California Supreme Court
- Major League Baseball Is Exempt From the Antitrust Laws - Like It or Not: the "Unrealistic," "Inconsistent," and "Illogical" Antitrust Exemption For Baseball That Just Won't Go Away.
- Masthead
- Nowhere To Run, Nowhere To Hide: In the Age of Big Data Is Data Security Possible and Can the Enforcement Agencies and Private Litigation Ensure Your Online Information Remains Safe and Private? a Roundtable
- St. Alphonsus Medical Center-nampa and Ftc V St. Luke's Health System Ltd.: a Panel Discussion On This Big Stakes Trial
- St. Alphonsus Medical Center - Nampa, Inc., Et Al. and Federal Trade Commission, Et Al. V St. Luke's Health System, Ltd., and Saltzer Medical Group, P.a.: a Physicians' Practice Group Merger's Journey Through Salutary Health-related Goals, Irreparable Harm, Self-inflicted Wounds, and the Remedy of Divestiture
- The Baseball Exemption: An Anomaly Whose Time Has Run
- The Continuing Violations Doctrine: Limitation In Name Only, or a Resuscitation of the Clayton Act's Statute of Limitations?
- The Doctor Is In, But Your Medical Information Is Out Trends In California Privacy Cases Relating To Release of Medical Information
- The State of Data-breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 2013 Mega Breaches and Beyond
- The United States V. Bazaarvoice Merger Trial: a Panel Discussion Including Insights From Trial Counsel
- United States V. Bazaarvoice: the Role of Customer Testimony In Clayton Act Merger Challenges
- Restoring Balance In the Test For Exclusionary Conduct
RESTORING BALANCE IN THE TEST FOR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
By Thomas N. Dahdouh1
The Federal Trade Commission’s recent monopolization cases against Intel2 and Google,3 two strikingly different recent decisions by Courts of Appeals â Novell v. Microsoft4 and ZF Meritor v. Eaton Corp.,5 and a recent article by Professor Herbert Hovenkamp6 all demonstrate the ongoing tumult in Sherman Act Section Two monopolization theory. Courts have struggled for some time now with the vague and circular test for Sherman Act Section Two cases, first enunciated in United States v. Grinnell Corp.7 Unfortunately, the line between exclusionary conduct and legitimate conduct cannot be delineated easily. Faced with the difficulty in assessing conduct in a fact-intensive and nuanced manner, some courts have sought "one-size-fits-all" tests that would allow a court to dismiss summarily meritless cases without engaging in fact-intensive investigation. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications Inc.8 and Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko9 have certainly encouraged such efforts. The reality is that the near limitless variation of exclusionary conduct â and the serious potential that such conduct could seriously impair competition â makes any such effort to find a uniform test likely to lead to a seriously under-deterrent enforcement regime.
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Rather, the right enforcement approach must utilize a flexible balancing test. The District of Columbia Circuit Court, sitting en hanc in the Microsoft case, unanimously adopted the right overarching, rule-of-reason approach: a court must balance the anticompetitive effect of the exclusionary conduct against the procompetitive justification for the conduct.10 This article suggests a further addition to the overarching balancing test: namely, that the balancing test be adjusted depending on the type of exclusionary conduct at issue in the case. This article proposes that one would first (1) identify the type of conduct involved and slot it along a continuum from most suspect to least suspect; and then (2) adjust how demanding the "balancing test" is along the two key inquiries of the balancing test: (a) the level of evidence necessary to show that the asserted justification for the conduct is nonpretextual and cognizable (that is, procompetitive and efficiency-enhancing), and (b) the level of causal proof necessary to show that the conduct played a role in the creation or maintenance of the defendant’s monopoly power.