Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Competition: Spring 2014, Vol. 23, No. 1
Content
- Chair's Column
- Does the First Amendment Immunize Google's Search Engine Search Results From Government Antitrust Scrutiny?
- Editor's Note
- First Amendment Protection For Search Engine Search Results
- Judges Speak Out: the Make-or-break Moment of Certifying a Class With Judges Marsha Berzon, Virginia Phillips, John Wiley, and Curtis Karnow
- Landmark Civil Price-fixing Verdicts of 2013: Lessons From the Vitamin C and Urethanes Trials With Trial Counsel and Observers William a. Isaacson, Daniel S. Mason, Joseph Goldberg, and Michael Tubach
- Lcd Redux: Follow-on Class Action and Direct Purchaser Litigation From 2012'S Doj Criminal Prosecutions Views from Trial Experts Bruce Simon, Howard Varinsky, and Robert Freitas
- Masthead
- Noerr-pennington: Safeguarding the First Amendment Right To Petition the Government
- Regulation of Companies' Data Security Practices Under the Ftc Act and California Unfair Competition Law
- The Irrelevance of the First Amendment To the Modern Regulation of the Internet
- The Market-participant Exception To State-action Immunity From Antitrust Liability
- The Misapplication of Matsushita's Heightened Summary Judgment Standard
- The Supreme Court In Borough of Duryea V. Guarnieri Signals a Retreat From Pre's Broad Deference To the Right To Petition
- Trial By Sample: a Post-game, Locker Room Chat Exploring the McAdams V. Monier Trial: a Roundtable With Trial Counsel Jeffrey Cereghino and William Stern
- Update On California State Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law and Federal and State Procedural Law
- Do First Amendment Principles Limit the Antitrust Agencies' Ability To Prohibit Enforcement of Standards-essential Patents?
DO FIRST AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES LIMIT THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES’ ABILITY TO PROHIBIT ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS-ESSENTIAL PATENTS?
By David L. Meyer1 and Fabien Thayamballi2
Recent antitrust enforcement actions have called attention to the potential that application of the antitrust laws, like all governmental action, is limited by the constraints of the First Amendment. This is not a new development. The half-century old Noerr-Pennington doctrine reflects, at least in part, limitations placed on the reach of the antitrust laws by the First Amendment right of petition. Recent developments at the interface between antitrust and patent enforcement have brought renewed attention to the potential for antitrust enforcement to run afoul of constitutional limits.
The issue is starkly illustrated by dueling comments issued by commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") addressing recent agency settlements that limited the defendants’ ability to enforce their standards-essential patents in the courts by seeking injunctive relief. The commissioners disagreed on the proper application of Noerr-Pennington immunity, which shields genuine attempts to influence governmental action from antitrust liability irrespective of their effects on competition. In each case, the FTC opined that the owner of patents essential to the practice of industry standards could be subjected to liability for seeking injunctions against parties that were prepared to enter patent licenses, contrary to the owners’ prior commitments to license those patents on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory ("FRAND") terms. Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen dissented in both cases, arguing that "the Noerr-Pennington doctrine precludes Section 5 liability for conduct grounded in the legitimate pursuit of an injunction or any threats incidental to it."3 The FTC majority’s response to that objection was that enforcing Section 5 does not offend the First Amendment when it merely "requires those making promises to keep them."4
Antitrust law is often invoked to regulate activities that could be regarded as within a class protected by the First Amendment. At least in some sense price fixing and other agreements in restraint of trade entail both "association" and "speech." However, since early in the last century, antitrust jurisprudence has paid little attention to First Amendment limitations, with the exception of Noerr-Pennington immunity and the occasional limits on the remedial powers of courts to regulate ongoing behavior by entities, like newspapers, for which expression is their stock in trade. If expressive conduct causes competitive harm that brings it into conflict with the antitrust laws, the conduct generally has not been treated as protected by the First Amendment. No court has suggested that the Constitution gives cartelists the privilege to utter "I agree" without consequence.