Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Competition: Fall 2018, Vol 28, No. 1
Content
- Antitrust Is Already Equipped To Handle "Big Data" Issues
- Antitrust, Privacy, and Digital Platforms' Use of Big Data: a Brief Overview
- Antitrust Treatment of the Introduction of New Drug Products: the Tension Between Hatch-waxman's Dual Goals of Cheaper Drugs and Better Drugs
- Applying Illinois Brick To E-Commerce: Who Is the Direct Purchaser From An App Store?
- Chair's Column
- D-Link Systems: Possible Signs For the Future of Ftc Data Security Enforcement
- Editor's Note
- Masthead
- "No-poach" Agreements As Sherman Act § 1 Violations: How We Got Here and Where We're Going
- Smart Contracts and Blockchains: Steroid For Collusion?
- The Difficulties of Showing Pass Through In Indirect Purchaser Component Cases
- The Hold-up Tug-of-war—Paradigm Shifts In the Application of Antitrust To Industry Standards
- Above Frand Licensing Offers Do Not Support a California Ucl Action In Tcl V Ericsson
ABOVE FRAND LICENSING OFFERS DO NOT SUPPORT A CALIFORNIA UCL ACTION IN TCL V ERICSSON
By Robert B. McNary1
Disputes involving standards essential patents arise when contributors of proprietary technology to industry standards and standards implementers wishing to make use of that proprietary technology fail to agree on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory ("FRAND") licensing terms for proprietary technology that reads on the standard. Resolving these FRAND disputes in a fair and efficient manner is highly important for the continued expansion of global technology networks. The proper role of antitrust and competition laws in this process—if any—has been an ongoing topic of discussion.
In recent remarks regarding innovation policy, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Makan Delrahim stated his general preference for using contract law—not antitrust law—for disputes involving standard essential patent licensing commitments:
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