Family Law
Recent Family Law Cases
FAMILY LAW (Through 08/25/25)
By: Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s note is italicized.
Balandran v. Balandran
7/22/2025, Certified for Publication on 8/21/2025; CA 2/3: B335531 – Gaab, J.
Case Link
David Balandran died from COVID-19 in August 2021. His widow Felicia temporarily moved with their daughters to Arizona. Between September 2021 and May 2023, David’s parents (Grandparents) saw the children regularly—multiple times monthly in late 2021, with a gap in March-April 2022 when Felicia was in therapy and O.B. began therapy for anxiety, then resuming monthly through October 2022.
In July 2022, Grandparents’ counsel demanded a “permanent and long lasting solution” including overnight and weekday dinner visits. Their petition under Family Code section 3102 requested alternate weekends, weekday dinners, and various holidays. Felicia opposed, stating she was “a fit parent who had ‘voluntarily arranged and permitted visitation'” but objected to court interference with the children’s activities.
At trial, Grandparents testified a court order was necessary because “that’s the only way it seems we would be able to see them on a consistent basis.” Felicia testified she wanted flexibility for the girls’ schedules including therapy, gymnastics, and swimming. Evidence showed the interim order allowed Grandparents to override Felicia’s preferences—they refused to take the girls to gymnastics when it conflicted with their plans and openly disregarded Felicia’s preference against amusement parks.
Constitutional Analysis Under Troxel
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the order violated Felicia’s fundamental parenting rights under Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57. Troxel requires the trial court in grandparent visitation cases to: (1) presume fit parents act in children’s best interests; (2) give “special weight” to the surviving parent’s determinations; and (3) consider whether the parent offered “meaningful visitation” rather than denying contact. To overcome the presumption established by a fit parent’s restrictions on visitation, grandparents must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that denial of visitation would be detrimental to the children.
California courts applying Troxel to section 3102 have “substantially circumscribed the rights otherwise provided by the statute.” Where a fit parent allows visitation but prefers flexible scheduling over court orders, the parent is “entitled to a presumption that he will act in his child’s best interests” and preference for “less structured and more normal and spontaneous” visitation “must be given deference.”
Here, Grandparents saw the children more frequently than the grandparents in Troxel (one short monthly visit), Punsly (quarterly visits), or Kyle O. (three years without arranging visits). The trial court’s finding that only Grandparents could share stories about David was insufficient—this would always be true and would render the presumption meaningless. The trial court also improperly criticized Felicia for scheduling visits during “leftover time” and substituted its judgment for hers.
Ultimately, Grandparents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Felicia’s voluntary visitation schedule was detrimental to the children. The Court of Appeal also determined the trial court’s conclusion that Grandparents would not have visitation absent a court order was without merit: An 80-day gap occurred during unique circumstances—first year of bereavement, managing grief, addressing children’s needs, navigating COVID concerns— and was followed by over a year of regular visits before trial.
Several cases address the limited authority of trial courts to order grandparent visits against the wishes of a fit parent who has allowed some visitation. This case discusses just about all of them and is a great starting point when litigating this issue.
In re Marriage of R.K. and G.K.
8/18/2025; CA 2/6: B334571 – Yegan, J.
Case Link
Father (R.K.) had sole legal and physical custody under a December 2020 MSA, with Mother (G.K.) receiving visitation. Mother acknowledged “mental health issues after giving birth.” In October 2021, Mother sought modification claiming circumstances had changed, Father relocated and was “frustrating all current visitation.”
After a three-day evidentiary hearing in November 2022, the trial court made extensive adverse findings: Father is “high conflict,” “denied 80% of court-ordered electronic communications,” “consistently, wrongfully, and unilaterally cancelled” Mother’s visits, “acted as a gatekeeper,” violated Mother’s parental rights, made non-credible testimony and representations, is “incapable or unwilling to facilitate frequent and continuing contact,” is “deeply suspicious and accusatory,” and “improperly tried to influence” the visitation supervisor. The trial court found Mother has two years sobriety, continues treatment, and “historically made more reasonable efforts to coparent.”
The November 6, 2023 tentative decision granted Mother sole physical custody (even though she only requested joint physical custody) starting December 16, 2023. Father made no objections during the two-month period before the January 3, 2024 judgment.
Forfeiture and Inadequate Record
The opinion begins with the following warning:
This appeal illustrates two fundamental rules of appellate law. First, an appellant must affirmatively show error by reference to an adequate appellate record. (See post, at pp. 6-7.) There is no record here. Second, as a general rule, an appellate court does not consider claims of error that could have been, but were not, raised in the trial court. (See post, at pp. 7-8.) The claimed errors at issue here were never raised in the trial court.
Father forfeited his due process claims by failing to object to the tentative decision. “It is unfair to the trial judge and the adverse party to attempt to take advantage of an alleged error…when the error…could have been, but was not, brought to the attention of the trial court.” Filing a writ petition in the Court of Appeal doesn’t substitute for objecting in trial court.
Father’s failure to provide a reporter’s transcript, settled statement, or agreed statement was also fatal. Without an adequate record, the Court of Appeal will presume that each adverse finding is supported by evidence.
Father’s sibling-separation argument also failed through forfeiture as he did not raise the issue in the trial court.
The Merits: The Due Process Challenge
Father raised two distinct due process arguments:
- Lack of notice regarding sole physical custody: Father argued he was denied due process because Mother only requested joint physical custody in her October 2021 filing, yet the trial court awarded her sole physical custody without advance notice that this more drastic remedy was under consideration.
- The “de facto move-away” claim: Father contended the trial court effectively ordered a move-away of the child from her established home with him in El Dorado County to Mother’s home in San Luis Obispo County, without conducting a proper evidentiary hearing on the move-away issue.
Why Mother’s Request for Joint Custody Provided Sufficient Notice
The Court of Appeal found that Mother’s request for joint physical custody provided adequate notice for several reasons:
When Mother filed her request seeking “normalized Joint Legal/Joint Physical custody arrangement,” she placed the entire issue of physical custody before the court. The Court of Appeal explained that even if Mother had been granted only the joint physical custody she requested, this would still mean “Daughter would still live a significant part of the year at Mother’s home” under Family Code section 3004’s definition requiring “significant periods of physical custody” for each parent.
Crucially, the court noted: “Father should have known that, if Mother was granted sole physical custody, Daughter would be moved to Mother’s home in San Luis Obispo County.” This provided Father with sufficient notice of a potential change in Daughter’s residence to satisfy due process.
The Trial Court’s Authority to Exceed the Relief Requested
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court could, without giving express notice, lawfully award Mother sole physical custody even if she only requested joint physical custody. The court’s reasoning centered on the extensive adverse findings about Father’s conduct:
- Father was found not credible
- He violated court orders repeatedly
- He denied 80% of court-ordered electronic communications
- He acted as a “gatekeeper” preventing Mother’s visitation
- He was “manipulative” and had improperly tried to change the report from the visitation supervisor
Given these findings, the Court stated: “In light of these factual findings, the trial court could lawfully, in the exercise of its discretion and without giving express notice to Father, consider whether to award Mother more than she had requested and grant her sole physical custody.”
The key distinction was that this was “not a default proceeding” under Code of Civil Procedure § 580(a). Father appeared, opposed the request, and had a full opportunity to present evidence during the three-day hearing. The trial court’s discretion to fashion appropriate relief based on the evidence presented—even if exceeding what was requested—didn’t violate due process where Father had notice that custody was at issue and a full opportunity to be heard.
Why the Move Away Argument Failed
The Court rejected Father’s move-away argument by clarifying that Mother hadn’t moved anywhere—she remained in San Luis Obispo County where the family originally lived. Rather, it was Father who had unilaterally relocated with the child to El Dorado County in July 2021 without obtaining a move-away order. The Court of Appeal noted this was a “unilateral relocation” that Father “admitted…he did not obtain a move-away order from the court prior to relocating with the minor child.”
Stepsiblings and the Williams Standard
The Court distinguished between siblings and stepsiblings regarding the compelling circumstances requirement from In re Marriage of Williams. Under Williams, separating siblings requires “compelling circumstances” showing separation is in the children’s best interest.
However, citing J.M. v. G.H. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 925, the Court held that stepsiblings don’t trigger this heightened standard. The J.M. court reasoned that “Equating the relationship of a stepsibling…with that between a child and his biological sibling would be inappropriate, and requiring compelling circumstances to separate stepsiblings would affect all cases in which the subject of a custody dispute has a blended family.” Two of the three children were Father’s new wife’s children from another relationship—stepsiblings to Daughter. Only one was a half-sibling (Father’s child with his new wife), and Father provided no evidence about the strength of that bond.
Michael K. v. Janice Cho
7/10/2025, certified for publication on 7/28/2025; CA 1/5: A169917 – Burns, J.
Case Link
An Attorney’s Chargeback Dispute Triggers a Defamation Lawsuit
Attorney Janice Cho represented S.J. in divorce and domestic violence restraining order proceedings against S.J.’s husband Michael K., with legal fees totaling $92,211 charged to the couple’s joint credit card. When Michael disputed these charges through Chase Bank’s chargeback process, claiming they were excessive or duplicative, Cho responded with a response to MyCase (his credit card processor) and Chase that included statements mirroring S.J.’s allegations from the DVRO petition – specifically that Michael had regularly choked, punched, and raped S.J., traumatized their children through witnessing violence, monitored S.J. with tracking devices, and financially abused her by controlling marital finances. Michael subsequently sued Cho for libel, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on these statements made to Chase Bank.
The Trial Court Applied a Restrictive Reading of Anti-SLAPP Protection
The trial court denied Cho’s anti-SLAPP motion, applying a narrow interpretation of the statute’s protection. Citing Seltzer v. Barnes and Rand Resources v. City of Carson, the trial court held that for statements to be “in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial body” under § 425.16(e)(2), they must relate to “substantive issues in the litigation” and be “directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.” The court found this test unmet because the use of the community property credit card wasn’t itself an issue under review in the dissolution or DVRO proceedings, and Chase had no demonstrated interest in either proceeding.
The Court of Appeal Found Litigation Funding Constitutes Protected Petitioning Activity
The Court of Appeal reversed, emphasizing the Legislature’s mandate that the anti-SLAPP statute “shall be construed broadly.” The Court of Appeal applied established precedent from Rusheen v. Cohen holding that “any act” under § 425.16(b)(1) includes “communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.” The court noted that anti-SLAPP protection extends beyond just filing lawsuits to include “conduct that relates to such litigation, including statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation.” The court distinguished Paul v. Friedman, where an attorney’s investigation into personal matters unrelated to arbitration claims wasn’t protected, finding that Cho’s statements precisely mirrored S.J.’s allegations and weren’t extraneous to the litigation but directly explained why the legal fees were justified.
Chase Bank Had Sufficient Interest in the Litigation Despite Being a Non-Party
The Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s conclusion that Chase Bank lacked sufficient interest in the litigation. Following Timothy W. v. Julie W. and Dziubla v. Piazza, the court held that § 425.16(e)(2) doesn’t require statements be made to parties or potential parties. The Court of Appeal found Chase Bank’s status as Michael and S.J.’s creditor and MyCase’s role as Cho’s agent established “some interest” in the litigation – the minimum required under the statute. The court added a pragmatic observation: by claiming charges were “excessive or duplicative,” Michael opened the door for Cho to explain the underlying allegations’ complexity to justify the fees. The court noted that protected statements can be made to “publication to nonparties with a substantial interest in the proceeding,” distinguishing situations where statements are made to persons with no connection to the proceedings, such as the press.
The Chargeback Dispute Connected to Substantive Issues in Both the DVRO and Dissolution Cases
The Court of Appeal identified two ways Cho’s statements related to substantive litigation issues. First, the chargeback dispute itself concerned funding legal services, which courts recognize as protected petitioning activity. Second, S.J.’s allegations of financial abuse and her right to use community property funds were central issues in both proceedings. The DVRO petition specifically requested spousal support, child support, and attorney fees, while alleging Michael “controls all the money.” The court noted that depriving a spouse of funds for basic necessities qualifies as abuse under the DVPA. Additionally, the dissolution proceedings inherently involved characterization of marital assets and debts, making the use of community property funds to pay legal fees directly relevant to issues before the family court.
The Litigation Privilege Provided Absolute Immunity for Cho’s Statements
The court applied Civil Code § 47(b)’s litigation privilege using the four-part Silberg v. Anderson test, finding all elements satisfied. Cho’s statements were: (1) made in connection with judicial proceedings (the dissolution and DVRO cases); (2) by an authorized participant (S.J.’s attorney); (3) to achieve litigation objectives (ensuring continued representation); and (4) logically connected to the action (explaining why fees were justified given the case’s complexity). The privilege extends to communications made outside the courtroom to non-parties, and the court emphasized that “any doubt as to whether the privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” Because the privilege provides absolute immunity except for malicious prosecution claims, all of Michael’s tort causes of action were barred.
X.K. v. M.C.
7/24/2025, CA 1/4: A170020M
Case Link
X.K., a Chinese emigrant, sought a DVRO against her former husband M.C. after fleeing with their daughter to a confidential domestic violence shelter in August 2023. X.K.’s DVRO request detailed years of alleged abuse beginning in 2016, including M.C. slapping her head, lifting her by her ankles while eight months pregnant, strangling her with both hands, punching her shoulder hard enough to leave bruises, forcing sex within 42 days after childbirth, and sending a message stating “You think about suicide and I think about murder.”
After returning to California in December 2022, X.K. alleged M.C. and his parents controlled her movements, required her to be home every night, threatened to kick her out while keeping their daughter if she didn’t follow their rules, refused to let her use his car limiting her employment options, and refused to help with her green card application despite earlier promises.
The Trial Court Denied the DVRO Because It Viewed This as Merely a Custody Dispute
At the evidentiary hearing where X.K. represented herself and M.C. had counsel, the trial court denied her DVRO request with this reasoning: “What sticks out in our discussion today is that the vast, vast majority of this discussion has been regarding custody and visitation issues and that being the foundation of the dispute between the parents. And while there may be disagreements with the parents regarding custody and visitation, parenting time, et cetera, that doesn’t fall under the definition of what is domestic violence. This is a dispute over custody and visitation.” The trial court also questioned its jurisdiction over incidents that occurred years earlier in China.
The Appellate Court Found the Trial Court Applied an Incorrect Legal Standard
The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial court committed legal error in its understanding and application of the DVPA. The Court of Appeal emphasized that X.K. submitted facially sufficient evidence of physical abuse, sexual abuse, and conduct that disturbed her peace under Family Code sections 6203 and 6320. While the trial court was free to discredit X.K.’s evidence based on credibility, the record showed no express or implied credibility finding. Instead, the court denied the DVRO expressly because it considered this “merely a dispute over custody and visitation that did not fall under the definition of what is domestic violence.” That was an incorrect application of the law.
The Court Clarified That Abuse Can Include Coercive Control Even in Custody Contexts
The Court of Appeal explained that “disturbing the peace” under section 6320(c) includes conduct that “based on the totality of the circumstances, destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party,” including coercive control that unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty. This encompasses isolating a party from support systems, depriving them of basic necessities, and controlling or monitoring their movements, communications, daily behavior, finances, and economic resources. The Court of Appeal found X.K.’s allegations of being required to follow strict household rules, threatened with losing her child, denied transportation, and controlled financially could constitute such abuse if her evidence was credited.
The Trial Court Must Consider the Totality of Circumstances Including Past Incidents
While the Court of Appeal declined to address whether conduct occurring wholly in China constitutes “abuse” under the DVPA (finding the issue forfeited due to inadequate briefing), it held that the trial court must consider the totality of circumstances when evaluating whether M.C.’s conduct in California disturbed X.K.’s peace. This includes considering evidence of past incidents in China as context for assessing the impact of more recent conduct. The DVPA explicitly requires courts to “consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a petition for relief” under section 6301(d).
Remand Ordered for a New Hearing
Rather than directing entry of a DVRO, the appellate court remanded for a new hearing, recognizing that the trial court is best positioned to evaluate credibility and weigh evidence. The court noted that DVROs may properly issue in marital dissolution actions under section 6221(a), and that abuse allegations occurring in custody dispute contexts do not automatically disqualify them from protection. The opinion also noted that if X.K. remains self-represented on remand, the trial court should take a more active role in developing facts, as most DVRO litigants lack counsel and cannot be expected to know procedural steps or how to protect their due process rights.