Recent Family Law Cases

FAMILY LAW (Through 06/21/25)
By:  Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS

The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s note is italicized.

In re Marriage of Sunday Adeyeye and Adebukola Faramaye
06/20/2025, CA 4/3: G064553 -Sanchez J.
Case Link

Sunday Adeyeye, a U.S. citizen, signed an I-864 affidavit of support to sponsor his wife Adebukola Faramaye’s immigration from Nigeria. The I-864 affidavit required Adeyeye to “provide the intending immigrant any support necessary to maintain him or her at an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines” so that the immigrant “does not become a public charge.” The I-864 affidavit “is a legally binding contract enforceable by the sponsored immigrant in state or federal court.” After filing for dissolution, Faramaye sought $1,569 per month in spousal support based on the I-864 affidavit (125% of the federal poverty guidelines for a one-person household). Adeyeye opposed, arguing that since Faramaye earned $57,900 in 2023, he did not owe any support under the I-864 affidavit because Faramaye’s income exceeded 125% of the poverty guidelines.

The trial court ordered Adeyeye to pay $1,569 per month, refusing to consider Faramaye’s income. The court reasoned that work “in and of itself” could not negate the I-864 obligation, which only terminates under five specific circumstances, including when the immigrant has worked 40 qualifying quarters under Social Security.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a sponsored immigrant’s income must be considered when determining the sponsor’s support obligation under an I-864 affidavit. The sponsor is only required to pay the difference, if any, between the sponsored immigrant’s income and 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines.

The Court distinguished between the termination of a sponsor’s obligations (which occurs only under the five circumstances listed in the I-864) and the amount of support owed while the obligation exists. The plain language of the I-864 requires the sponsor to provide “any support necessary to maintain” the immigrant at 125% of poverty guidelines, not an unconditional payment of that full amount.

The Court remanded for the trial court to determine what qualifies as Faramaye’s “income” and to recalculate Adeyeye’s support obligation accordingly.

---

Shawn Agnone v. Kenneth Madick
05/30/2025, CA 2/3: B321252 – Egerton J.
Case Link

In this case, Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in connection with her divorce from Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition via Zoom, his attorney Jeffrey Katofsky refused to turn on his webcam despite being in the same room as Madick. Shawn’s counsel objected, explaining he could not tell if Katofsky was making visual signs or coaching Madick. Katofsky repeatedly refused, stating only that his computer was equipped with a webcam as required by the notice, but he did not “need to have [his] webcam on.” Shawn’s counsel observed Madick looking away from the camera before answering questions and terminated the deposition.

Shawn moved to compel Madick’s compliance and requested sanctions. Before the reply brief was filed, the dissolution action settled, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew the motion to compel but sought sanctions for the “gamesmanship” during the deposition, alleging that this behavior constituted misuse of the discovery process. The trial court granted sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay $9,981.

This case has an interesting procedural history. When originally decided, the Court of Appeal concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. The Supreme Court granted review and deferred action pending its decision in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024) 17 Cal.5th 46 (PwC). After deciding PwC, the Supreme Court transferred the case back with directions to reconsider in light of that decision.

Applying PwC, the Court of Appeal held that a trial court may invoke its “independent authority” to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 when confronted with an “unusual form of discovery abuse, or a pattern of abuse, not already addressed by a relevant sanctions provision.”

The Court rejected Madick’s argument that PwC only applies to “extreme circumstances.” The Court explained that PwC was decided as “purely a question of statutory interpretation” and that nothing in the decision suggests it is limited to extreme misconduct. Rather, the holding applies whenever courts are “confronted with an unusual form of discovery abuse, or a pattern of abuse, not already addressed by a relevant sanctions provision.”

Regarding California Rules of Court, rule 3.1010, the Court held that while the rule allows attorneys to appear remotely when they elect not to be “physically present at the deposition at the location of the deponent,” it cannot be read as blanket authorization for a deponent’s attorney to participate by audio-only means while physically present with the client “under circumstances where the attorney could surreptitiously coach the deponent outside opposing counsel’s view.”

The Court found that Katofsky’s refusal to make himself visible while physically present with Madick constituted an “unusual form of discovery abuse” that “plainly frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function.” The Court noted that coaching a deponent is a misuse of the discovery process under section 2023.010, citing Tucker v. Pacific Bell Mobile Services (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1548, where sanctions were affirmed for counsel coaching a deponent by putting a note in front of her.

The Court rejected Madick’s argument that there was no evidence of actual coaching, explaining that Shawn moved for sanctions precisely because Katofsky’s “gamesmanship” made it impossible to tell whether coaching was occurring. The Court also rejected Madick’s claim that the trial court made no finding he violated sections 2023.010 and 2023.030, noting that even without express findings, the court must review based on implied findings supported by substantial evidence.