Recent Dependency Cases

DEPENDENCY (current through 08/17/25)
By: John Nieman

The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s note is italicized.

In re Hunter V. et al.
7/30/25, CA 2/7 B339028
Case Link

Father appealed Jurisdiction and Disposition findings because of improper notice and his absence from those hearings (he was incarcerated locally). After multiple failures to transport father, and without objections to father’s final (and denied) continuance request, the court did the Jurisdiction and Disposition hearings. In so doing, it amended the petition to read “[Father] is incarcerated and is unable to parent his children or make an appropriate plan.”

This appellate court opted to employ the Chapman (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18) ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to evaluate the due process error relating to inadequate notice. The original basis for jurisdiction as to father was that he posed a safety risk based on his criminal history. Since the sustained allegation was materially different from the original basis for jurisdiction vis the father, notice was improper. The appellate court also found that the sustained allegation would not qualify as a Welfare & Institutions Code (W&I) §300(b)(1) basis for jurisdiction (risk of physical harm for failure to protect).

Penal Code §2625 requires that parents be transported to dependency hearings. While the Appellate Court acknowledged the need for promptness in juvenile dependency cases, it could find no significant deficit to the children’s best interests were a continuance granted -meaning there was inadequate reason to deny the request – perhaps especially in light of the right to be present. Reversed and remanded.

This was only one of various basic errors in this case. The opinion talks about the “arraignment” of each parent separately, and quotes an appellate case that refers to “charges” against a parent in a dependency proceeding. This continued propagation of criminal case terminology in dependency cases is unfortunate. Nowhere in dependency terminology is “arraignment” nor “charges” appropriate unless referring to a criminal case. It is misleading and troublesome that such terms are still employed without qualification. While it is true that parents frequently feel like they are facing criminal charges in dependency proceedings, they are not. As alluded to in this very opinion, dependency cases are legally about children and circumstances that present risks to their wellbeing.

In re L.M.
7/31/25, CA 1/3 A171105
Case Link

Mother appeals a decision to order visitation between the dependent minor L.M. and his sister who was not a dependent of the court.

The Appellate Court considers whether to address mother’s Constitutional challenge even though she did not specifically raise it in the trial court. But since it did not find that the statutes involved (W&I §388 and §16002) were facially unconstitutional, it did not exercise that right. Specifically it found that though they lack a requirement that courts give special consideration to a fit parent’s determination related to visits, they do not preclude such a consideration. Neither was there evidence in this case that mother’s objection to visits was not granted special consideration. There was a “settlement conference mode” off-the-record discussion before the court made its decision, and the record contained no information about that what was said during that ‘conference’. Likewise, there was no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering sibling visitation. Affirmed.

In re Ja. O.
8/4/25, CA S280572
Case Link

This is the long-awaited Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) case that will perhaps complete the ICWA guidance for Appellate Courts. The basic question was whether an ICWA inquiry was required in cases where a W&I §340 warrant was issued versus the other ways by which children initially are removed from parental (or guardian) custody.

Post grant of review in this case, Assembly Bill 81 of the 2023-24 legislative session (AB81) revised the law to require an ICWA inquiry in all cases, no matter the legal mechanism employed for removal. There was a difference of opinion as to the impact of this legislation on the modified statute, and hence previous cases (those decided before the new statute’s enactment on September 27, 2024). Namely, the question comes down to whether a new statute clarifies then-current law, or changes the law. The latter case would require a full analysis of the law prior to the enactment of AB81. The Supreme Court was arguably compelled to take that latter view , since one legislature is not qualified to evaluate another’s intent and AB81 was not retroactive.

Ultimately the Supreme Court decided that the original W&I §224.2 did intend to require an ICWA inquiry in all removal situations. Since the original opinion was that the ICWA inquiry was not required since removal was effectuated under a W&I §340 warrant, it was reversed and remanded to conduct the requisite ICWA inquiry and proceed accordingly.

The Concurring Opinion rejects any legislative guidance as to previous statutory intent. Though not stated, it is hard to reconcile this idea with the idea that even if stated explicitly, any change can be a mere “clarification”.