Recent Dependency Cases

DEPENDENCY (current through 05/18/25)
By: John Nieman

The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Auther’s note is italicized.

B.D. v Sup. Ct. of CCC
4/30/25, CA 1/3 A172485
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A172485.PDF

Mother appealed the setting of a Welfare & Institutions (W&I) Code §366.26 hearing. A W&I §366.26 hearing is set when efforts to assist a parent/s to reunify have proven to be inadequate, so a permanent plan such as adoption must be chosen for the child/ren in question. Both findings require clear and convincing evidence. Mother claimed the trial court abused its discretion in finding that she was provided reasonable reunification services and that she had failed to make substantive progress in those reunification efforts.

The appellate court disagreed as to the first contention, but agreed with her second. The opinion goes into some depth of analysis of the difference between what is needed when the legislative intent is to favor efforts to reunify with a parent/s, and when the emphasis shifts to finding permanency for children in out-of-home care. The shift happens when 12 months of reunification services have been offered. At that time, if there is a substantial probability of return within the time frame allowed (up to 18 months from initial actual removal) then services must be extended. If not, they must be terminated. The hearing from which the W&I §366.26 was set was W&I §366.21(e) -the hearing after only 6 months of reunification services is being evaluated.

Relying primarily on M.V. v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 166, the appellate court distinguished between the “substantive progress” language of W&I §366.21(e)(3) and the “significant progress” language found in W&I §366.21(g)(1)(B) when a substantial probability of return finding is required to extend reunification services to 18 months. With that distinction it found inadequate evidence to support a finding that mother had failed to make substantive progress. There was no real dispute about her regular participation in services and visitation. Rather, the court cited specific examples of her progress which (for context, under the legal analysis at the W&I §366.21(e) hearing) needn’t be enough for actual return.

Importantly, this appellate court specifically disagrees with the interpretation of W&I §366.21(e)(3) in Fabian L. v. Superior Court (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1018 that, in addition to finding a parent made substantial progress at the 6-month review hearing, it must also find a substantial probability of return in order to grant 6 more months of reunification services (to the 12-month review hearing date).

However, because the date for the 12-month review hearing (12 months from placement in foster care, see W&I §361.49) was a mere week from the trial court’s decision, the error was found to be harmless. The trial court found that there was no substantial probability of return by the 12- or 18-month dates. The appellate court cited in a footnote In re M.F. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 86, which permits combining the 6- and 12-month review hearings when the timeframes for each overlap. Affirmed.

In re R.M. et al.
5/13/25, CA 4/2 E083229
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E083229.PDF

Through minor’s counsel, maternal grandmother made an oral W&I §388 motion. The motion was to change an order which denied her visitation with the minors that were subject of the trial court’s jurisdiction. That order was based on a detriment finding. Grandmother’s contention is that her due process rights were violated since the proper W&I §388 procedure was not followed. Pointing out that the grandmother was not a parent, nor did she fill a parental role for the children, it found she didn’t have the requisite due process rights to challenge the order. In an abundance of caution (common in such cases) the appellate court found that in any event substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusions relating to the W&I §388 petition even had the proper procedure been followed. Affirmed.

In re B.L.
5/14/25, CA 4/2 E085039
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E085039.PDF

Mother appeals the trial court’s taking jurisdiction under W&I §300(b) and a dispositional order requiring monitored visitation. Mother had a serious car accident while under the influence of alcohol. Mother actively resisted getting help at the scene of the accident and displayed denial during the initial investigation. The accident caused a significant brain injury to her infant daughter. The trial court sustained W&I §300(b) and (e) allegations.

Mother claims that the single instance of alcohol abuse and an accident is most analogous to In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 210. In J.N., the appellate court found that a single instance of alcohol abuse and the ensuing car accident that caused minor injuries was insufficient grounds to justify taking dependency jurisdiction. In that case as here, parents had made significant pre-jurisdictional progress in services. The appellate court points out that the severity of injuries was significantly different and consequently, no (e) petition was filed in J.N. Mother didn’t contest the W&I §300(e) petition in the trial court. Furthermore, W&I §300(e) specifically allows a single instance of abuse to justify jurisdiction. These differences made J.N. inapposite. The same factors that make this case different from J.N. also justified the visitation order. Affirmed.