The 14-Day Deadline That Lapsed a Year Earlier: A Lesson in Stay Finality

The following is a case update written by Hale Andrew Antico, Chief Counsel of Antico Law Firm, analyzing Fantasia v. Diodato, 154 F.4th 1123 (9^th Cir, 2025), a recent case of interest:

Summary

In Fantasia v. Diodato, the Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court’s order reimposing the automatic stay was a final, appealable order under Ritzen. Because Fantasia’s appeal to the district court was filed over a year later, it was untimely, depriving the district court of jurisdiction.

To view the published decision, click here.

Facts

In 2019, Keri Diodato (“Debtor”) filed Chapter 13 bankruptcy while acting as trustee for mother Frances Fantasia’s irrevocable trust. Prior to the chapter 13, following a falling-out between them, Fantasia had initiated a lawsuit against the Debtor, alleging trust fund misuse. Fantasia moved for relief from stay so the state court litigation could proceed. The bankruptcy court granted the motion, entering an order in February 2020 that both granted relief from the automatic stay and permissive abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).

In early 2021, the state court informed the parties that the earliest trial date would be in late 2022. After learning this, Debtor moved for relief from the abstention order under Federal Rule 60(b)(6), arguing that bankruptcy court was the best forum, a contention Fantasia opposed. In March 2021, the bankruptcy court vacated its February 2020 stay relief and abstention order (“2021 Order”), reimposing the automatic stay.

Fantasia then filed adversary proceedings which were consolidated in February 2022 and then tried the following May. The bankruptcy court ruled in Debtor’s favor on all claims and entered a final judgment in July 2022. With the loss, Fantasia characterized the 2021 Order as dealing with a mere interlocutory issue of forum selection (abstention) and argued it was therefore itself interlocutory. Reasoning that she had to wait for a final judgment on the entire adversary proceeding before appealing the 2021 Order to the district court, she appealed it in August 2022.

On appeal, Fantasia disputed the 2021 Order, and Debtor contended that there was no jurisdiction to hear an appeal, as the 14-day window after the 2021 Order had passed. The district court first ruled that it had jurisdiction, finding the 2021 Order was not final and that Fantasia’s appeal in 2022 was timely. On the merits, however, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s 2021 Order, ruling against Fantasia. Fantasia appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit.

Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit grappled with the threshold question of whether the district court had jurisdiction to hear Fantasia’s appeal based on timeliness. The analysis begins with whether the order was final, and if so, whether the appeal was timely.

Starting with 28 USC § 158(a)(1), district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from “final judgments, orders and decrees.” To determine if the 2021 Order was “final,” the Ninth Circuit relied chiefly on a recent Supreme Court ruling that stated that an order granting or denying relief from the automatic stay is final and immediately appealable because it “forms a discrete procedural unit within the embracive bankruptcy case” and “occurs before and apart from proceedings on the merits of creditors’ claims.” Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35 (2020). The fact that the 2021 Order did not grant nor deny the stay—but reimposed it—is a “distinction without a difference” for purposes of finality. Fantasia v Diodato at *4.

In evaluating whether the Order disposed of a discrete dispute, the Ninth Circuit turned to another Supreme Court case that interpreted  a dismissal dispute as altering the status quo and fixing the rights and obligations of the parties. Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 502 (2015). Here, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the 2021 Order altered the status quo by the bankruptcy court reasserting jurisdiction over the case from the state court. Fantasia v Diodato at *4, citing Harrington v. Mayer (In re Mayer), 28 F.4th 67, 71 (9th Cir. 2022). Further, the reimposing of the automatic stay altered Fantasia’s rights, barring her from action in state court.

In response, Fantasia argued that the 2021 Order should be construed as a non-final “abstention order,” implying that it both was final as to the stay, but also interlocutory as to the final judgment.  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Order’s two components but ultimately disagreed that they can be severed and analyzed as two separate orders. It noted the strong connection between abstention and the stay: if exclusive jurisdiction returns to the bankruptcy court, the stay is reimposed, and vice versa.  As it stated, “the two parts of the order rise and fall together.” Fantasia v Diodato at *5.  To allow otherwise would empower a party to fully litigate a claim in bankruptcy court and then, upon a loss, get a do-over by then appealing an abstention order. The Ninth Circuit stated that there was no authority for this in the Bankruptcy Code, and “we are unwilling to impute to Congress an intention to require such a wasteful expenditure of judicial resources.” Id.

Fantasia cited the pre-Ritzen BAP decision In re GACN, Inc., 555 B.R. 684, 691 (BAP 9^th Cir., 2016), which dealt with the finality of a pure abstention order, in support of her argument. The Ninth Circuit found this reasoning inapposite, stating such pre-Ritzen BAP decisions are “of limited persuasive value… because they were decided… without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s more recent finality analysis.” Fantasia at 16. The court was thus rejecting Fantasia’s attempt to apply GACN to this entirely different context of an order reimposing the automatic stay.

Consequently, as the 2021 Order resolved a discrete dispute and altered the status quo, it was final. Because it was final, Fantasia had fourteen days to appeal. Because she did not appeal the 2021 Order until August 2022, her appeal was untimely. As a result, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit ruled it also lacked jurisdiction to review the order, the merits of the order, or the dispute itself, and therefore vacated the district court order affirming the 2021 Order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Author’s Commentary

When something is both final and not final, it’s neither. A final judgment is a full stop. But what if the sentence is still being written? Every budding Louis Litt knows that if you lose in court, you can always appeal. But when exactly is something “final?” Frances Fantasia found herself in a labyrinth not of walls, but of deadlines… a Kafkaesque jurisdictional trap, a world where the ink is dry on one part of the document but the rest of the page is blank. She believed she had time, but the clock was ticking the moment the status quo was altered.

The Ninth Circuit has long held that stay relief orders were final because they resolved discrete disputes within larger cases. In re Conejo Enterprises, Inc., 96 F. 3d 346 (9th Cir. 1996). Fantasia applies this principle post-Ritzen, applying it to reimposition of stays and clarifying that hybrid stay/abstention orders are final if they definitively dispose of procedural issues, even when intertwined with abstention. This approach distinguishes pre-Ritzen BAP cases like GACN, which applied an “ends the litigation” finality test for pure abstention orders. In mixed contexts, the order was final under Ritzen‘s framework regardless of Fantasia’s procedural posture.

This case emphasizes that procedural orders must be assessed carefully. For pure abstention without stay components, § 1334(d) remains a jurisdictional obstacle, making immediate review infeasible. However, for hybrid stay/abstention orders, Ritzen‘s functional test applies, deeming them final if they resolve discrete procedural issues. This creates a strategic imperative for counsel: analyze for stay-related components or accept the jurisdictional dead-end for pure abstention. Jurisdiction is now about timing—the clock starts ticking upon altering the status quo. No longer must practitioners wait for full adjudication; if an order fixes rights and obligations, it is immediately appealable under Ritzen.

The Ninth Circuit invoked the specter of a wasted judicial resources. That tension is built into Ritzen. The Supreme Court in Ritzen acknowledged the risk of piecemeal appeals but concluded that the rule was necessary to avoid the greater inefficiency of forcing creditors to litigate fully, only to “redo the litigation all over again” if a late appeal succeeded.  Certainly not every scheduling order will satisfy the standard, but it’s conceivable that multiple issues in a months-long litigation battle could be sent to the BAP or district court, for fear of losing their rights under Rule 8002.

Fantasia’s argument treated the two components as separable, a procedural Schrödinger’s Order that was simultaneously final and not final until the final judgment made it one or the other. The Ninth Circuit, however, saw it for what it was: an indivisible unit. The court noted the inescapable link between reimposing the stay and granting abstention; they were two sides of the same jurisdictional coin. To sever them would create a dangerous loophole, allowing a party to lose on the merits and then, as a calculated fallback if it suits them, challenge the underlying procedural order. Attempting to split this hybrid order would create a strategic do-over, allowing parties to revisit adjudicated issues under the guise of challenging procedural components.        

The compass for navigating this finality labyrinth has one true north provided by Ritzen: Did the order definitively resolve a discrete procedural dispute within the larger bankruptcy case? An “alter the status quo” insight from Bullard lights the way. Relief from the stay is a clear example, but now we know that reimposing it is, as well. If there are two issues, where you think one is interlocutory and the other is not, the answer is that the entire order is deemed final for appeal purposes.

And here is the labyrinth’s cruelest trap: even once you’ve found the correct path, the 14-day clock of Rule 8002 is already ticking. It is a jurisdictional deadline, immune to pleas for more time. When the alarm sounds, the path itself collapses beneath you, and your appeal is dead.  For appeals involving abstention orders, 28 USC § 1334(d) adds a second, inescapable trapdoor: even a timely appeal only unlocks a single appellate track. Once the BAP or District Court hears it, its judgment is final, and the circuit court’s door is sealed by statute. This transforms the Ritzen clock from a deadline into the only key to the final courtroom door.

Finality isn’t always the period finishing a sentence, but a comma, or semicolon; this is true even if the sentence is still being written. It’s the ultimate resolution of the “final or not final” paradox: an order can seem both, and the attorney must decide whether to appeal now or wait. For the practitioner, your brilliant argument means nothing if you miss the cutoff. When a bankruptcy court order resolves a disputed procedural issue, especially one involving forum selection like stay relief or abstention, the only safe course is to treat it as potentially final under Ritzen and file a protective appeal within the 14-day period. Assuming it is interlocutory based on pre-Ritzen precedent is a dangerous gamble

In bankruptcy, as in life, the devil is not only in the details… but in the deadline.  If the order is final, its sentence is complete. Period.

These materials were written by Hale Andrew Antico, Chief Counsel of Antico Law Firm, representing consumer debtors in the Central District of California, and President of the Central District Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys Association, with editorial contributions by Joseph Boufadel with Salvato Boufadel LLP in Los Angeles and Santa Ana, California and the Hon. Meredith Jury (ret.).