E-Briefs, News and Notes: January 2026

The Section is delighted to host the fourth annual Consumer and Unfair Competition Law Institute (CUCLI) in Los Angeles on January 30, 2026, at the City Club LA.

As the Section’s signature consumer protection conference, CUCLI brings together thought leaders, top enforcement officials, and leading practitioners to discuss important topics in California consumer protection law, including:

• Fireside Chat with Rohit Chopra, former Director of the CFPB and a former Commissioner of the FTC.
• Enforcers Panel – a panel of consumer protection enforcers address the latest enforcement trends.
• Children and Consumer Protection – industry leaders focus on efforts to protect children online.
• Judges Panel – managing complex consumer protection litigation and recent trends.
• Who Wants to Be an Ethical Lawyer?  A game show on legal ethics.  (1 hour MCLE).

The Institute will conclude with a reception and the presentation of the Consumer and Unfair Competition Law Award to the team from the California Attorney General’s office that prosecuted a big-box retailer and its CEO for targeting Spanish-speaking immigrants and other consumers lacking access to traditional credit with predatory business practices. 

This is a not-to-be-missed event for practitioners working at the intersection of consumer protection, unfair competition, and enforcement.

Register for the Consumer and Unfair Competition Law Institute today.

We look forward to seeing you on January 30, 2026 at the City Club in downtown Los Angeles!

By Alex J. Tramontano

Diverging Approaches

Two recent developments illustrate different approaches to algorithmic pricing under antitrust law. On August 15, 2025, the Ninth Circuit in Gibson v. Cendyn Group, LLC, No. 24-3576, affirmed dismissal of price-fixing claims against Las Vegas hotels using common pricing software, holding that independent adoption of algorithmic pricing tools does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Less than two months later, California enacted Assembly Bill 325, effective January 1, 2026, which dramatically expands Cartwright Act liability for algorithmic pricing and lowers pleading standards, effectively rejecting the federal approach in this area.

1. Gibson v. Cendyn: Federal Judicial Restraint

Plaintiffs alleged that major Las Vegas Strip hotels violated Section 1 by using Cendyn’s revenue management software (GuestRev, GroupRev, and RevCaster), which generated pricing recommendations allegedly leading to inflated room rates. The Ninth Circuit held that these licensing agreements did not constitute unlawful restraints of trade, establishing several critical principles:

No Vertical Relationship. Cendyn’s software provided back-office advisory services but did not operate at a different level of the supply chain for hotel room rentals. The court analogized Cendyn to a tax advisor whose recommendations affect business decisions but who does not contribute to the production of the relevant market goods.

Ordinary Sales Contracts. Finding the agreements neither horizontal (not between competitors) nor vertical, the court characterized them as ordinary sales contracts that do not restrain trade in the relevant market.

Independent Adoption Lawful. Even conscious parallel conduct, where competitors knowingly adopt the same pricing software, does not violate Section 1 absent an agreement among competitors. Antitrust law does not require businesses to avoid service providers merely because competitors use them.

Information Sharing Distinguished. The court noted its analysis might differ if Cendyn had shared confidential competitor information among users. The absence of such pooling proved critical, as each hotel’s proprietary data remained segregated. No Aggregation. The court rejected aggregating individual licensing agreements to find anticompetitive effects, holding that higher prices alone do not constitute competitive harm.

2. AB 325: California’s Aggressive Expansion

Signed October 6, 2025, by Governor Newsom, AB 325 amends the Cartwright Act with three major provisions (§ citations are to California Business and Professions Code):

• Common Pricing Algorithm Prohibition (§16729(a)). Makes it unlawful to use or distribute a common pricing algorithm, defined as any methodology used by two or more persons that relies on competitor data to recommend, align, stabilize, set, or influence prices, as part of any restraint of trade. Unlike federal approaches that distinguish between confidential and public competitor data, AB 325 applies broadly to both categories.

• Coercion Prohibition (§16729(b)). Creates standalone liability for coercing another person to adopt algorithmically-recommended prices. The statute does not define ‘coercion,’ creating significant uncertainty about what conduct triggers liability. This provision does not require proof of conspiracy or traditional restraint of trade.

• Relaxed Pleading Standard (§16756.1). Explicitly rejects Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Plaintiffs need only allege facts demonstrating that an agreement is plausible; they need not plead facts excluding independent action at the pleading stage. This allows plaintiffs to survive motions to dismiss based on parallel conduct plus plausible connection (such as shared algorithm usage).

Companion Legislation: Enhanced Penalties

Senate Bill 763, enacted simultaneously, increases criminal fines for corporate violators from $1 million to $6 million per violation and individual fines from $250,000 to $1 million. It adds civil penalties up to $1 million per violation and clarifies that Cartwright Act remedies are cumulative with other state law remedies, including California’s Unfair Competition Law ($2,500 per violation), substantially amplifying potential exposure.

Critical Differences and Implications

Standards of Pleading and Proof. Under Gibson, plaintiffs must allege facts demonstrating agreement and restraint of trade, with parallel conduct insufficient. Under AB 325, parallel conduct plus algorithm usage may suffice for pleading purposes, with the heightened ‘excluding independent action’ standard deferred to summary judgment.

Public Data Treatment. Under Gibson, federal courts may distinguish between algorithms using confidential versus public competitor data. AB 325’s definition of ‘competitor data’ lacks this limitation, potentially reaching algorithms relying solely on publicly available information.

Compliance Complexity. Practices lawful under federal law may violate California law. Companies must either adopt California-compliant practices nationwide (increasing costs but reducing complexity) or maintain different approaches for California versus other markets (reducing costs but increasing operational complexity).

Undefined Terms. AB 325’s failure to define ‘coercion’ creates some uncertainty. Features making recommendation implementation easy (like Cendyn’s ‘autopilot’ mode in Gibson) could constitute coercion if they make rejection burdensome.

Implications. The contrast between Gibson and AB 325 reflects fundamental disagreement about antitrust law’s role in regulating algorithmic pricing. The Ninth Circuit’s traditional approach emphasizes bedrock requirements of agreement and restraint while declining to expand liability based on technological change alone. California’s legislation reflects recognition that algorithmic coordination may require new legal tools beyond traditional doctrine.

In re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, No. 4:11-cv-6714-YGR (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025)

By David Lerch

In this litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that Apple charges iPhone operating system (“iOS”) app developers a supracompetitive commission, which developers then pass on to consumers through higher prices to download an app or make in-app purchases. 

The Plaintiffs alleged that Apple unlawfully monopolized the aftermarket for iOS apps and advanced two claims against Apple on behalf of a certified class: (1) unlawful monopolization of the applications aftermarket in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and (2) attempted monopolization of the applications aftermarket in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs moved to certify the class in June 2021, but the Court rejected the motion because it did not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement and they could not prove antitrust injury on a class-wide basis.  The Court analyzed Professor Daniel McFadden’s econometric model and determined that the model was not reliable and that McFadden was not qualified to opine on app development, pricing, or payment processing (Order at 2-3).  Plaintiffs then submitted a supplemental report from McFadden and a new expert report from Dr. Rosa Abrantes-Metz and the Court concluded that the model was capable of showing antitrust injury on a classwide basis (Order at 3).  In particular, the Court stated that it accepted Plaintiffs’ representation that Professor McFadden can: (i) match the Apple identification numbers he has with actual consumers to ascertain class members, and (ii) limit the percentage of unharmed class members swept in by the narrowed class definition. The Court further noted that should Professor McFadden’s model fail to do both, the Court would consider whether to modify or decertify all or part of the class (Order at 4).  The Court explained that completing the full analysis may have been economically unfeasible before the class was certified (Order at 4).

Consumer plaintiffs engaged Darryl Thompson, the CIO of JND Legal Administration, to deduplicate and match Apple’s payor records to consumers (Order at 5).  Apple then engaged its own expert, Victoria Stodden, to examine Thompson’s work. Professor Stodden found that she could not replicate Thompson’s work and instead identified several alarming errors.  Thompson failed to match all payment records belonging to the named plaintiff, Mr. Pepper, and determined that “Rob Pepper” and “Robert Pepper” were different people, despite data that listed the same home address and credit card information for each.  In addition, Thompson lumped together all payment records for individuals that shared the first name Kim, despite that those over 40,000 records have nothing else in common, including different last names and addresses.  Thompson did not omit, or otherwise address, records that listed Apple’s Headquarters or “N/A” as the payor address. In addition, Professor Stodden points to an instance where Thompson identified 1.9 million “unique payors” in King Salmon, Alaska—a town of 375 residents.  Thomspon conceded at his deposition that his work contained several errors and admitted that he could not provide an error rate or confidence interval to validate his work (Order at 6).

Apple moved to strike Thompson’s testimony as unreliable and decertify the class (Order at 7).  In particular, Apple argued that: (1) Thompson was not qualified to clean and match Apple’s payor data for purposes of the model; (2) his method and application of those methods was unreliable and, (3) his analysis was irrelevant because it misunderstood the key term “payor” as “account holder.” (Order at 7-8). The Court agreed that Thompson’s opinions should be excluded because Thompson was not qualified to offer an expert opinion on data cleaning and matching as a non-statistician (Order at 8).

Rule 702 requires that the Court determine that an expert witness “is qualified by special knowledge as an expert in the relevant area of expertise.” AFMS LLC v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 2014 WL 12515335, *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2014). An expert’s opinion will be excluded if it does not have a reliable foundation or if it is not based in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 149 (1999). The Court stated that Thompson is not a statistician and does not have a degree or training in statistics (Order at 8).  In addition, Thompson conceded that he has never served as a testifying expert in a prior case and counsel for plaintiffs confirmed that Thompson had never previously performed a similar matching exercise (Order at 9).  Apple’s expert stated that there was extensive literature regarding both data matching and date cleaning (Order at 9).  In addition, the Court noted that Thompson testified that he did know how to measure or quantify an error rate (Order at 10).

Plaintiffs argued that Thompson had been involved with data deduplication and claims administration in large antitrust settlements (Order at 10).   The court concluded that this experience was not relevant, and that when deduplicating payor records for purposes of providing class notice or administering a settlement, over-notice may be appropriate.  The Court stated that the deduplicated data was intended to serve as an input to an econometric model that would determine whether class members have antitrust standing (Order at 10).  An accurate and reliable measure was necessary because antitrust injury is an element of plaintiffs’ claims. The Court stated that not only has Thompson never performed such work, but despite his work experience, he was not familiar with basic statistical methods and could not provide an error rate or some other mechanism to validate his work (Order at 10-11).  The Court noted that matching records to consumers is necessary to prove antitrust injury—an element of consumer plaintiffs’ antitrust claim. The Court concluded that Thompson was not qualified to serve as an expert in identifying payors for purposes of consumer plaintiffs’ damages model (Order at 11).

II. Reliability

To determine reliability, a Court may analyze: “1) whether a theory or technique can be tested; 2) whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 3) the known or potential error rate of the theory or technique; and 4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within the relevant scientific community.” United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000) (Order at 11).  The Court concluded that Thompson’s methodology (in which he used code to clean and manipulate data) could not be tested or replicated. In his supplemental report, Thompson claimed that he first cleaned Apple’s data using a proprietary data cleansing algorithm that he had developed and wrote new code to deduplicate the payor data. Counsel for plaintiffs produced Thompson’s code to Apple. Upon review, Apple and its expert Professor Stodden determined that Thompson’s code was not complete and would not run without significant modifications. Thompson stated that he did not save code to “create” rounds two and three of deduplication.  At his deposition, Thompson admitted that his code was not in “deliverable” form and could not be run without modifications, which were not recorded. Nor did Thompson record, or could he otherwise explain his reasoning for selecting the data fields that he prioritized (Order at 12).  Further, the Court noted that Thompson outsourced work to a third party, Melissa Data Solutions, but could not explain or describe what that third party did. (Order at 13).  The Court concluded that Thompson failed to record, or explain, his entire methodology such that it could be replicated. Although the Court agreed that an expert may make reasoned judgment calls based on their expertise, that expert must document and record those judgment calls so that they may be tested and analyzed, citing Open Text S.A. v. Box, Inc., 2015 WL 349197, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2015) (Order at 13-14).  The Court noted that such documentation was particularly important, where, as here, consumer plaintiffs seek damages exceeding $20 billion.

In addition, the Court noted that Plaintiffs failed to dispute Apple’s arguments that Thompson’s method was not peer reviewed, nor did he rely on any method that has been peer reviewed, and his method is not generally accepted in the scientific community.  The Court found that Thompson’s failure to provide an error rate, confidence interval, or otherwise meaningfully validate his work weighs in favor of excluding his testimony (Order at 15).

Plaintiffs argued that none of the errors that Apple identified would have been match dispositive, meaning that the records could still have matched based on some other trustworthy piece of data.  The Court stated that Plaintiffs failed to point to other trustworthy pieces of date to evaluate the reliability of Thompson’s work (as to whether Thompson’s errors impacted the accuracy of the result) (Order at 17). The Court noted that Thompson effectively admitted that he kept unreliable, and invalid, information in the dataset by maintaining Apple’s address in the data set while acknowledging that it was not a valid payor address (Order at 17).  In addition, the Court noted that Thompson matched over 40,000 individuals that shared the first name Kim (Order at 18).   As to reliability, the Court noted that Apple pointed to an instance where Thompson identified 1.9 million “unique payors” located in King Salmon, Alaska, a town of 375 residents (Order at 18-19).  The Court concluded that it did not have a consistent or cohesive explanation of how the exemplar errors occurred, and in the face of obvious error, Thompson did not correct, systematically analyze, or eliminate the data, and so given those errors, the Court agreed with Apple that Thompson did not reliably apply his methodology (Order at 20-21).

The Court also stated that Thompson equated payors with the names listed in payor records (Order at 21).  Apple asserted that payors must be identified through payment information.  To the extent plaintiffs argued that children were “purchasers” because they directed the payment, those children likely would not have Article III or antitrust standing to advance their claim because they do not have a concrete economic injury. See Y.H. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 2024 WL 5431490, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2024) (Order at 21).  The Court agreed that Thompson’s analysis was not relevant to this case because it does not identify payors (Order at 22).

III. Motion to Decertify

 “A district court may decertify a class at any time.” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 966 (9th Cir. 2009). A motion for class decertification is subject to the same standard as a motion for class certification under Rule 23.  Wood v. Marathon Ref.  Logistics Servs. LLC, 2024 WL 4868181, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2024).   The Court noted that given its prior orders, the crux of the dispute is whether consumer plaintiffs satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement as it relates to injury and damages.  “When individualized questions relate to the injury status of class members, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the court determine whether individualized inquiries about such matters would predominate over common questions.” Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Bumble Bee Foods LLC, 31 F.4th 651, 668 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).  The Court noted that this was particularly true in antitrust class actions, where plaintiffs must prove as an essential element of the cause of action, that antitrust injury is capable of being established through a common body of evidence, applicable to the whole class. Id. at 666.  Where experts are involved, a court must decide if the expert’s methodology is “capable of showing class-wide antitrust impact” in light of “factors that may undercut the model’s reliability . . . .” Id. at 683.

The Court noted that the McFadden-Song model attempts to predict “the app and in-app content prices consumers would have paid absent Apple’s alleged misconduct” through analyzing the but-for commission rate, consumer demand, and developer costs (Order at 24). The Court stated that because of the differing injury status, it is crucial that the model accurately and reliably match payor records to actual consumers to determine whether the consumer was injured, and if so, to what extent (Order at 25).

The Court concluded that without the Thompson report, there was no methodology to match Apple ID accounts to consumers, and therefore no way to show that antitrust injury is “capable of being established through a common body of evidence, applicable to the whole class.” (Order at 26-27, citing Olean, 31 F.4th at 666).  The Court also concluded that plaintiffs no longer satisfied the predominance inquiry for three reasons, which overlapped with the Court’s prior Daubert analysis: first, Thompson’s matching exercise is unreliable, untested, and contains obvious errors; second, Thompson’s work is ultimately not relevant because his methodology revolves around names and does not identify injured class members; and third, plaintiffs argue that all class members are “harmed” by a lack of choice, which satisfies the “antitrust injury” requirement, however consumer plaintiffs would still be required to prove damages on a class wide basis (Order at 26).  Therefore, the Court concluded that plaintiffs failed to provide a model capable of reliably showing class wide injury and damages or reliably limit the percentage of uninjured class members and decertified the class (Order at 27).

IV. Ninth Circuit Review

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(f) petition seeking leave to appeal the Court’s decertification order. On December 18, 2025, the Ninth Circuit granted this petition.

In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litig., 1:19-cv-06734, MDL 2931 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2025)

By Lacy Nguyen

What Happened:

On September 22, 2025, a federal district court denied class certification for a group of dentists, holding that the relevant market for dental services is local and individual questions of Delta Dental’s localized market power and antitrust impact predominated over any common issues.

Background:

Plaintiffs are ten dentist and dental practices who sought to represent 240,000 dental providers who contracted with Delta Dental’s Premier or PPO Networks. Defendants are thirty-nine Delta Dental “Member Companies” and the Delta Dental Plan Association (DDPA). Defendants contract with local dentists to sell and administer insurance plans across multiple states.

Plaintiffs alleged Defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain competition in the market for dental goods and services. The alleged anticompetitive conduct included (1) market allocation by dividing the U.S. market into Exclusive Service Areas (ESAs), (2) price fixing by coordinating to set artificially low reimbursement rates, and (3) limitations of the revenue Member Companies could derive from non-Delta Dental branded insurance.

In response, Defendants argued: (1) ESA agreements foster competition by encouraging local Member Companies to recruit and build networks throughout their entire assigned territory, (2) information sharing amongst Member Companies promotes efficiency, (3) Member Companies are not required to have the lowest reimbursement rates, and (4) second brands compete with Delta Dental in several markets.

Plaintiffs sought class certification for 23(a) and 23(b)(3) class from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on the issue of predominance, arguing that antitrust impact could not be proven with common, class-wide evidence.

Rule of Reason:

Plaintiffs argued that the claims should be treated under a per se analysis because Defendants’ conduct involved market allocations, horizontal price-fixing, and output restrictions. The court rejected this argument and chose a rule of reason analysis, finding that the history and context of the Deta Dental network distinguished Defendants’ conduct from typical per se restraints. Additionally, the court adopted the rule of reason framework after acknowledging the pro-competitive justifications presented by the Defendants.

Class Cert Ruling:

The court’s analysis centered on the requirements for a Rule 23(b)(3) class, particularly the issue of predominance. The court analyzed whether Plaintiffs could use common proof to demonstrate antitrust impact from the conspiracy. Using the three-step burden-shifting framework from the rule of reason, the court determined that the market at issue was largely local because “dental patients choose providers close to where they live or work.” The court noted that several Plaintiffs themselves conceded to the localized nature of the dental services they provide. Thus, the court found Delta Dental’s market power varied across the U.S and likely did not have market power in areas where there was significant competition with competing plans. Further, the court also rejected Plaintiffs’ expert Gustavo Bamberger’s conclusions regarding class-wide impact. The court rejected Bamberger’s methodology for class-wide impact because his model—which relied on a national market—failed to account for the massive variations in local market power and competition faced by each of the 240,000 providers. Because the expert’s model could not prove on a class-wide basis that every class member suffered an antitrust injury, the court found the model insufficient to establish predominance and denied class certification.

Emily Elizabeth Lazarou, et al., v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, No. 24-1994 (7th Cir.)

By Anna Ali

The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal, with prejudice, of psychiatrists’ tying claim alleging that the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology (“ABPN”) used its monopoly power over specialty certifications to force them to purchase ABPN’s “maintenance of certification” (“MOC”) product. Lazarou v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, 2025 WL 3022661, at *1 (7th Cir. 2025). The plaintiffs’ theory of the case required that psychiatrists and neurologists view ABPN’s product as a viable alternative to fulfilling their continuing medical education (“CME”) requirements. Id. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that ABPN’s MOC products were not plausibly reasonably interchangeable with the CME products. Id.

For doctors to maintain their license, most states require completion of a certain number of CME hours. The Lazarou complaint focused on two categories of CME products: Category 1 “direct credits” and Category 2 credits earned by purchasing CME self-assessment products. Id. Category 1 “direct credits” are earned by either purchasing products from any accredited vendor or completing educational activities and applying to the American Medical Association (“AMA”) for “direct credit.” Id.

Licensed doctors may also purchase certifications from medical specialty boards such as the ABPN. Id. According to the complaint, while board certification is not legally required, almost all medical organizations require board certification for employment, hospital privileges, and coverage by health insurance plans. Id. To maintain their specialty certification, doctors must purchase ABPN’s MOC product annually for a $175 fee or risk revocation. Id. Doctors can only secure MOC from the ABPN. Id.

ABPN’s MOC has two main components: Activity Requirements and an Assessment Requirement. Id. at *2. As part of the Activity Requirements, every three years doctors must obtain 90 CME credits and complete one Improvement in Medical Practice (referred to as “PIP”) activity. Id. Of the 90 CME credits, 66 must be CME Category 1 and 24 must be CME Category 2 self-assessment credits. Id. For the MOC Assessment Requirement, doctors can either complete an Article-Based Pathway every three years or pass a Recertification Exam every ten years. Id. When a doctor successfully completes an Article-Based Pathway, ABPN waives 16 out of the 24 CME Category 2 self-assessment credits. Id. ABPN similarly waives 8 out of the 24 CME Category 2 self-assessment credits for doctors who take the Recertification Examination. Id. Plaintiffs filed this class action claiming that ABPN’s tying of its certifications and MOC violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Id.

The Seventh Circuit found that the Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that the MOC was a substitute for CME products. Id. at *4. The Court used its past decision in Siva v. Am. Bd. of Radiology, 38 F.4th 569 (7th Cir. 2022) in concluding that Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that a reasonable consumer would see the ABPN’s MOC products as a true competitor in the CME market. Lazarou, 2025 WL 3022661,at *4. In Siva, the Seventh Circuit found that a radiology board’s MOC was not a substitute for the rest of the market’s CME. Siva, 38 F.4th at 580-81. In that case, radiologists had to: (1) obtain certain CME credits from a third-party vendor every year; (2) complete an examination component consisting of weekly tests; and (3) fulfill a series of practice improvement projects. Id. at 579. The Seventh Circuit held that the first requirement was not a likely substitute for CME because it would be redundant to purchase MOC to then be forced to buy CME elsewhere. Id. Moreover, CME provided educational content, but MOC’s first requirement did not. Id. As to the second and third requirements, these did involve educational content. Id. at 580. However, the Court found there was “no reason to think radiologists would view these tests and activities as viable [CME] products” since they could not “earn CME credits by completing [them].” Id.

Plaintiffs argued their complaint addressed Siva’s shortcomings by alleging that (1) ABPN’s MOC contains educational content and (2) doctors use ABPN’s MOC to meet state CME licensure requirements partially or in full. Lazarou, 2025 WL 3022661,at *4. On the second point, Plaintiffs presented two theories. Id. First, Plaintiffs alleged that many states accept MOC participation as full satisfaction of CME requirements, without the need to obtain any additional Category 1 credits, referred to as the “full satisfaction theory.” Id. Second, Plaintiffs allege that doctors who complete the Recertification Examination may apply to the AMA for direct CME credit and use those credits towards state licensing requirements, referring to this as the “direct credit theory.” Id. The Court rejected all of Plaintiffs’ arguments. Id.

The Court rejected Plaintiffs’ first point because it found that only the MOC Assessment Requirements can lead to direct CME credit and are therefore equivalent to other CME products. Id. MOC’s Activity Requirements are different and, as the Court found, not CME-equivalent. Id.

The Court rejected the full satisfaction theory because it did not account for the MOC product’s requirements in their entirety. Id. Specifically, the use of ABPN’s MOC did not account for the required PIP activity and the Assessment Requirement. Id. at *5. When taken into account, doctors signing up to buy fewer CME credits to satisfy their state licensure CME obligations would also have to spend considerable time, money, and effort completing a PIP, taking 30 article-based exams every three years or a Recertification Examination every ten years—all in addition to paying a $175 fee for MOC. Id. Thus, the Court found that ABPN’s MOC could not be inferred to be a viable alternative to CME products. Id.

Finally, the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ direct credit theory. Id. Plaintiffs argued that psychiatrists and neurologists can apply ABPN’s Assessment products to satisfy state CME requirements, which was the case for one of the named Plaintiffs. Id. The Court found the theory implausible because it would require doctors to invest more time, money, and effort in the long run due to the longer list of requirements associated with the ABPN’s MOC. Id.   

The Seventh Circuit also rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their dismissal should not have been with prejudice. Id. at *6. The Court found that Plaintiffs had multiple opportunities to amend their complaint. Id. Thus, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had not abused its discretion when it denied Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend. Id.   

Overall, in Lazarou, the majority solidified its finding in Siva that specialty board MOC products are not reasonably interchangeable with CME products doctors purchase to maintain their license. The Court held that it would be implausible to hold that doctors could purchase MOC products as a way to satisfy CME requirements because it would result in considerably more work for the doctors. Thus, the district court finding was affirmed, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Id. at *6.

Judge Maldonado wrote the dissent for the opinion, stating her concerns about the continuously heightening pleading standard for antitrust claims in the circuit. Id. She reviewed the evolution of pleading standards for antitrust claims and argued that Plaintiffs’ 51-page complaint was replete with details such that dismissal was unwarranted. Id. at *6-7. She argued that, by affirming the dismissal, the Court was “changing the goal posts in the middle of the game.” Id. at *7.

In re Visa Debit Card Antitrust Litigation, 24-cv-7435, 1 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 28, 2025)

By Sam Smith

Visa debit cardholders and merchants brought separate complaints that alleged Visa had violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Both classes of Plaintiffs alleged that Visa monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market for debit network services, as well as entered into contracts with banks and merchants that restrained trade. In re Visa Debit Card Antitrust Litigation, 24-cv-7435, 1 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 28, 2025). Plaintiffs alleged that Visa used de facto exclusive dealing contracts to prevent competitors from competing fairly, and as a result Visa can charge supra-competitive prices and stop market entry. Id. at 2.

Both classes of Plaintiffs are considered indirect purchasers because neither interact directly with Visa. The Merchant Plaintiffs interact directly with their acquiring bank, and their bank interacts directly with Visa. The Cardholder Plaintiffs interact directly with their bank (the “issuer”), and the issuer interacts directly with Visa. Id. at 3-4.

The Cardholder Plaintiffs brought injunctive relief claims under the Sherman Act, and damages claims under individual states’ antitrust and consumer protection laws. Visa argued that the Cardholder Plaintiffs do not have federal or state antitrust standing because, inter alia, they cannot show antitrust injury. Id. at 9-10. The Court held that an antirust injury does exist because the Cardholder Plaintiffs adequately alleged they have been injured through indirectly paying the high fees caused by Visa’s anticompetitive conduct. Importantly, the Court held, the Cardholder Plaintiffs alleged they have been injured in the same market that the anticompetitive conduct occurred through a straightforward pass through of inflated prices from acquirers and merchants. Id. 10-11.

Visa’s motion to dismiss the Cardholder Plaintiffs’ state law claims for damages was denied and granted in part. Applying California’s Cartwright Act, the Court rejected Visa’s argument that Cardholder Plaintiffs’ injuries were speculative. Id. at 13. The Court held that to dismiss based solely on the risk of potential duplicative recovery that can occur with indirect purchasers is not an adequate reason to dismiss the case at this stage.

However, the Court dismissed with prejudice the Cardholder Plaintiffs’ Illinois and Arkansas state antitrust law claims because only state attorney generals may bring claims under each of those states’ statutes. Id. at 19. Their Mississippi state antitrust law claim was dismissed without prejudice because the complaint contained no allegations of a wholly intrastate transaction. While their South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin state antitrust law claims were not dismissed because the complaint did contain allegations that residents of each state were injured. Id. at 20. The Utah state antitrust law claim was dismissed without prejudice because none of the named plaintiffs are from Utah. Id. at 21. Lastly, the Cardholder Plaintiffs’ State Consumer Protection claims were dismissed without prejudice because the Cardholder Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under Missouri law; therefore, the Court held they lack Article III standing to bring claims under other states’ consumer protection laws. Id. 23.

Visa’s motion to dismiss the Merchant Plaintiffs’ claims was largely based on the same arguments against the Cardholder Plaintiffs and was decided the same way by the Court. However, the Merchant Plaintiffs sought damages under federal antitrust laws. The Court held Visa sells network services to banks and banks sell routing and processing services to merchants. Thus, the Merchant Plaintiffs are indirect purchasers and Illinois Brick bars damages under the Sherman Act. Id. at 28. The Court further held that Visa’s argument for dismissal of the Colorado and New Jersey state antitrust law claims, to the extent it seeks damages before the states’ Illinois Brick repealer laws went into effect, are arguments for class certification. Id.

By Cheryl Johnson

On October 10, 2025, the UK’s Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) designated Google’s general search and search ad services as having strategic market status (SMS) under the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (the Act). Pp. 5,12. Under the Act, SMS status may be provided to firms with “substantial and entrenched market power” with respect to digital activity, a position of strategic significance in respect to a digital activity and revenue exceeding one billion euros in the UK or 35 billion euros globally.  Pp. 12-14, 151.  The UK Act expressly differs from EU law which designates firms who are found to have market “dominance” and are “gatekeepers”. Pp. 14, n. 30, 66.

Google’s SMS designation followed a mandatory investigation which did not find or assume any wrongdoing on Google’s part, and which also drew on other competition authorities’ actions and findings involving Google. Pp. 5-6, 140-45. The SMS designation permits the UK to employ a range of possible remedies or interventions identified in its earlier June 2025 report. Pp. 5- 6, 15.

SMS IN GENERAL SEARCH AND SEARCH ADVERTISING SERVICES.  Google’s search services were found to have a “commanding” position with “substantial and entrenched market power”, providing a “key gateway” through which over 90% of UK people navigate the internet, and over 200,000 UK businesses rely on Google’s advertising and pay over 10 billion pounds. Pp. 5, 62, 152-54. Google enjoyed this position for an extended period, during which no rivals made any real inroads for at least fifteen years. Pp. 9, 64, 93, 145.  While use of AI assistants for search was growing, they were less than 5% of Google search queries.  Further, given the significant uncertainty as to AI’s future evolution, AI assistants were perceived as complementary rather than substitutable with traditional search engines. Pp. 74-86, 146, 149-151.  Social media, specialized search and Apple were also found not to be competitive threats to Google search. Pp. 89-91, 94-95, 147.

BARRIERS TO COMPETITION. The persistence ofGoogle search’s strong position was protected by market features preventing effective competition and was amplified by Google’s strong position in and revenue from advertising. Pp. 9, 64, 111-12, 148-49.  Importantly, Google’s access to users and significant default positions in the UK for which Google paid some 3 to 4 billion pounds, limited rivals’ ability to build scale and improve their own search results. Pp.116-123,135.  Google’s access to a wide volume and variety of data provided it an advantage in tailoring search results and search advertising that a U.S. court deemed “insurmountable”. Pp. 124-130. The huge cost to build a search infrastructure like that of Google with its web index of some 20 to 30 billion websites and hundreds of billions of webpages was another barrier to rivals. Pp. 130-33, 135. Additionally, Google’s search supremacy was entrenched by Google’s wider ecosystem of products that allowed it to tailor and self preference its own products. Pp. 9, 64, 135-136.

REMEDIES

A “roadmap” was published by the CMA on June 24, 2025 (and available on the CMA website) describing in detail possible interventions that the CMA intends to  consider should Google receive an SMS designation. While the scope of interventions can extend beyond the scope of the relevant digital activity, the assessments required for the imposition of interventions are subject to a separate legal process requiring further public consultations.   P.5, 31.

Final decision available here.

De Coster v. Amazon.com, 2:21-cv-00693-JHC, *1, (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2025)

By Sam Smith

A class of around 300 million consumers who made purchases on Amazon was recently certified by the Western District of Washington. De Coster v. Amazon.com, 2:21-cv-00693-JHC, *1, (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2025). The Plaintiffs alleged that Amazon uses its significant market power in the online retail marketplace to impose inflated fees on third-party sellers causing third-party sellers to increase their prices for goods sold on Amazon. Id. Amazon has roughly 2.3 million third-party sellers (45x more than the next online market retailer) that sell around 237 million different products. Id. at 1-2*.

Plaintiffs allege that Amazon can impose artificially high fees on third-party sellers through Amazon’s requirement that third-party sellers keep their prices as high or higher off Amazon. Third-party sellers’ failure to do so will result in: 1) ineligiblity for the “Buy Box”, 2) their goods will be removed from Amazon, 3) their shipping options will be suspended, and 4) their ability to sell any goods on Amazon will be terminated or suspended. The “Buy Box” is the white box next to the product where consumers can click “Add to Cart” or “Buy Now.” Id. at *4.

Amazon argued that the Plaintiffs cannot satisfy commonality under rule 23(a) and predominance under 23(b) for the class to be certified. Amazon argued: 1) a Platform Most Favored Nation (PMFN) cannot be established, 2) the challenged conduct did not have a widespread effect on the entire class, 3) the damages are too complex for class treatment, 4) Plaintiffs’ expert’s model demonstrating common injury and damages is unreliable, 5) Plaintiffs’ expert did not demonstrate a reliable model for identifying unharmed class members, and 6) Plaintiffs’ have not provide a common method for establishing market definition and market power. Id. at *11.

The Court found that Plaintiffs established on a more probable than not basis that the PMFN policy existed through evidence demonstrating that Amazon understood their policies to prevent third-party sellers from offering lower prices elsewhere and that third-party sellers had the same understanding.  See id. at *12-23. Plaintiffs asserted that Amazon’s Select Competitor Featured Offer Disqualification program (“SC-FOD”), Amazon’s Standard for Brands, The Seller Code of Conduct, the Marketplace Fair Pricing Provision, and the previous Price Parity Clause (“PPC”) were all policies and practices that implemented an anti-discounting policy in various ways. Id. at 4. For example, Amazon’s SC-FOD can disqualify a third-party seller’s “Buy Box” feature if the price of the product off Amazon is lower than it is on Amazon. Id. at *15-16. Evidence also showed that Amazon considers an “uncompetitive” price for a product as a price one cent or more higher than the product’s price off Amazon. Id. at *14. The result of an uncompetitive price can have results as drastic as suspended or terminated selling privileges. Additionally, Amazon has a monitoring system to compare prices on different sites and multiple internal Amazon memorandums suggested that Amazon’s expectation is that third-party sellers must still comply with the PPC even though it is not in effect anymore. Id. at *13, 16. Therefore, the Court found that Plaintiffs have presented enough evidence that a PMFN policy on a more probable than not basis existed. Id. at *21.

Next, Plaintiffs’ expert explained that the unharmed class members caused by focal-point pricing is less than 1% because the class of consumers are consumers who have made 5 or more purchases on Amazon. The Court determined that at the current point in time there is not significant evidence to not certify the class based on a great enough number of unharmed class members. Id. at *24-25.

The Court held that Amazon’s argument that Plaintiffs’ expert did not show how the alleged inflated referral fee affects each product listed on Amazon lacked merit. The Court held that the Plaintiffs’ expert presented evidence that the referral fee was the same across all products and a product-by-product analysis was unnecessary to show harm to the class of consumers. Id. at 30-32. Amazon’s argument that Plaintiffs’ expert’s model demonstrating common injury, damages, and standing is unreliable based on his theoretical assumptions was denied by the Court. The Court determined that Plaintiffs’ expert’s model could be relied on by each individual class member if they decided to bring an individual claim, and Amazon’s contentions went more to the persuasiveness of Plaintiff’s expert’s opinion. Id. at *35-36. Similarly, the Court determined the dispute between experts on identifying uninjured class members is not enough to defeat class certification on the issue of predominance. Id. at *37.

The Court held that Plaintiffs have shown market definition and market power. The Court specifically mentioned that Amazon is a two-sided market, and a two-sided market can only compete with other two-sided markets.  Therefore, the 72% share of the Online Retail Marketplaces Market satisfied the Plaintiffs burden. Id. at *42-44.

The Plaintiffs easily satisfied typicality and adequacy of representation under 23(a). Id. at *44-46. Amazon argued that the unprecedented size of the proposed class would cause the class action to be unmanageable. However, the Court found the argument unpersuasive because a class action is the only fair and efficient means for the controversy and certified the class. Id. at 48.

Tina Cavalleri, et al. v. Hermes International, Case No. 3:24-cv-01707-JD (N.D. Cal.)

By Anna Ali

On September 17, 2025, Northern District of California Judge James Donato granted Hermes International and Hermes of Paris’s motion to dismiss the second amended complaint by a putative class on behalf of national and Californian consumers. 2025 WL 2662897. The suit alleged that Defendants engaged in an unlawful tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California’s False Advertising Law. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants refused to sell their popular Birkin bag to consumers unless those consumers also bought other Hermes products. Id. at *1. The Court dismissed the complaint due to deficiencies in plausibly pleading a proper tying product market, market power in the tying market, and harm to competition in the tied product market.

The Court first found that Plaintiffs wrongfully assumed that all tying arrangements are per se illegal. Id. To apply per se condemnation, a plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant tied together the sale of two distinctive products or services; 2) that the defendant possesses enough economic power in the tying market to coerce its customers into purchasing the tied product; and (3) that the tying arrangement affects a not insubstantial volume of commerce in the tied product market. Id. at *2; see also Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple, Inc., 67 F.4th 946, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2023). The Court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts to justify per se application to the case at hand. 2025 WL 2662897, at *2.

However, the Court applied per se liability for the purposes of dismissal and still found that Plaintiffs failed to allege a tying product market. Id. at *1. The Court ruled that an essential element of a tying claim included plausible allegations of Defendants’ market power with respect to the tying product. Id. at *2. In this case, Plaintiffs alleged that the tying product market was the market for elitist luxury handbags in the United States. Id. The Court held that Plaintiffs’ reliance on institutional investment papers and academic articles on luxury good consumption failed to plausibly allege the relevant market as needed to survive at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. The Court explained that the materials simply described consumer perceptions about product quality and exclusivity rather than a relevant market for antitrust purposes. Id. Without a cognizable tying market, the Court further found that Plaintiffs only made conclusory allegations of market power. Id.

Finally, dismissal of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint was also based on failure to plausibly identify the tied product market and harm done in the market due to Defendants’ conduct. Id. at *3. The Court found that Plaintiffs’ amended complaint failed to properly identify a single, cohesive tied market and instead provided a “kaleidoscope of products covering everything from ‘scarves and shawls, ready to wear clothing, footwear, watches, jewelry, fragrancies, accessories (including hats, gloves, ties, and sunglasses)’ to ‘home goods such as table wear, furniture, blankets, and decorative objects like vases and trays.’” Id. The Court found the amended complaint to be devoid of any facts to support “lumping such a hugely diverse array of non-substitutable products into a single market” and that competition for these goods had been illegally restrained by Defendants. Id.

The Court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice as it found that the second amended complaint marked Plaintiffs’ third opportunity to state a plausible Sherman Act claim. Id. For that reason, the Court ruled that further leave to amend was not warranted and refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. Id.

Lyricfind, Inc. v. Musixmatch, S.P.A. et al, NDCA Case No. 25-cv-02265-JSC (September 3, 2025)

By David Lerch

LyricFind, Inc. alleged that TPG Global, LLC, a private equity group, and Musixmatch orchestrated an anticompetitive scheme to foreclose competition and cement Musixmatch’s monopoly position as the provider of music lyric services.  The Court denied Musixmatch’s 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction and also concluded the complaint plausibly alleged that TPG independently participated in a “buy-or-bury” scheme to either purchase LyricFind or prevent it from competing.

I. Factual Background

LyricFind and Musixmatch are competitors who provide music lyric services to digital services providers (DSPs), like Spotify and YouTube Music, which display music lyrics on their digital streaming platforms (Order at 2). The services LyricFind  and Musixmatch provide fall into two categories: (1) “Lyric Rights Licensing,” in which they obtain licenses to display lyrics and convey those rights to DSPs and (2) “Lyric Data Services,” in which they provide a transcription of the lyrics in the form of digital files and the ability to administer royalty payments to the holders of the lyric rights.  LyricFind and Musixmatch are the two largest competitors in these markets.  Musixmatch’s contract with Spotify (the largest customer of Lyric Data Services and Lyric Rights Licensing) was set to expire in 2024.  In the fall of 2023, LyricFind began negotiating with Spotify to take over Musixmatch’s role as Spotify’s supplier of Lyric Data Services.  The complaint alleges that, fearing Spotify and other DSPs would switch to LyricFind, TPG and Musixmatch agreed to exclude LyricFind and other providers from the market so it could continue charging unlawfully inflated prices without the risk of losing business. First, TPG tried to purchase LyricFind to insulate Musixmatch from competition. TPG and Musixmatch then allegedly plotted to disrupt LyricFind’s negotiations with Spotify by wrongfully leaking confidential and NDA-protected information about LyricFind to Spotify.  Musixmatch, at the direction of TPG, then entered into an exclusive agreement with music publisher Warner Chappell Music, Inc (WCM agreement) which gave Musixmatch: (1) the exclusive right to provide Lyric Data Services for WCM’s titles and (2) the exclusive right to sublicense Lyric Rights Licensing for WCM’s titles.  

II. Procedural Background

On March 5, 2025, LyricFind filed a complaint against TPG and Musixmatch in the Northern District of California, alleging 13 claims, including monopolization,  attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize  the Lyric Data Services Market, monopoly leveraging in the Lyric Data Services Market,  attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize of the Lyric Rights Licensing Market,  an unlawful exclusionary arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act, violation of the Cartwright Act, a UCL claim, intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of contract.  LyricFind alleged the monopolization, attempted monopolization, and monopoly leveraging causes of action against Musixmatch alone and the remaining causes of action against TPG and Musixmatch (Order at 4).

III. Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Jurisdiction

Musixmatch filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction (Order at 5).  The Court noted that the Ninth Circuit has interpreted Section 12 of the Clayton Act to grant personal jurisdiction over any corporate antitrust defendant with minimum contacts with the United States.  D’Augusta v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 117 F.4th 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2024) (Order at 7).  As to purposeful direction, the complaint alleges that under the WCM Agreement’s terms, DSPs that wish to display lyrics for WCM’s titles must now obtain Lyric Data Services from Musixmatch and many of the world’s largest DSPs are located in the United States, including Vevo, Amazon, Meta, Apple, Google. (Order at 8).  The Court held that the fact that the agreement’s effects will be felt elsewhere in addition to the United States does not change this conclusion (Order at 9, citing Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006)). The Court also stated that it would reach the same result if it applied the purposeful availment test given that Musixmatch advertised a San Francisco office (Order at 11).

The Court stated that the second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis asks whether the claim arises out of or is related to the defendant’s forum-related activities. (Order at 12).  Musixmatch’s contacts with the forum include its entry into an allegedly anticompetitive agreement targeted at the United States.   The Ninth Circuit also employs a multi-factor balancing test to determine the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. The Court determined based on purposeful interjection, a foreign defendant with a United States office, conflicting sovereigns, United States interests in adjudicating a Sherman Act violation, efficiency, the Plaintiff’s choice to sue in the United States, and alternate fora, that personal jurisdiction was reasonable (Order at 13-15).

IV.  12(b)(6) Motion by TPG and Musixmatch

As to antitrust standing, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit has distinguished cases where the alleged injury “was simply a loss of greater profits caused by increased competition stemming from the alleged wrongful acts,” Glen Holly Ent., Inc. v. Tektronix, Inc., 352 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 2003), and reasoned the plaintiff’s loss stemmed from an unlawful agreement, dressed up as a competitor collaboration, to kill off a product in order to end competition (Order at 17).  The Court concluded that LyricFind plausibly alleged that the only option for most DSPs will be to contract with Musixmatch, effectively excluding LyricFind, and all other providers, from the relevant markets while threatening their ability to remain operational (Order at 17-18).  The Court also concluded that LyricFind’s allegations also support a plausible inference that, as in Glen Holly, there is no pro competitive aspect to the agreement.

With regard to the exclusive contract claims, the Court stated that a Sherman Act Section 1 exclusive dealing claim requires a substantial foreclosure of competition. CoStar Grp., Inc. v. Com. Real Est. Exch., Inc., 141 F.4th 1075, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025) (Order at 20).  The Ninth Circuit noted that other courts of appeals recognize de facto exclusive agreements and cited an Eleventh Circuit case where an agreement was found to be exclusive even though it was short-term and voluntary (Order at 21).  In addition, the Court noted that the complaint alleges lyric providers’ agreements with DSPs often span multiple years. Even if the agreement was short in duration, the allegations support an inference that DSPs who presently contract with Musixmatch because of its exclusive access to WCM titles will be locked into that contract with Musixmatch for several years and so the percentage of songs WCM controls in the music publishing industry does not determine whether the WCW exclusive agreement substantially forecloses competition in the Lyric Data Services and Lyric Rights Licensing markets.  The Court concluded that LyricFind alleges that it depends on its ability to offer a complete catalog, and without WCM songs, LyricFind cannot do so (Order at 24).

Regarding market definitions issues for the Lyric Data Services Market, the Court stated that in terms of defining the relevant market, there was no fatal legal defect requiring dismissal at this stage (Order at 26).  The Court concluded that the market includes “the creation of data files that contain the actual text of lyrical transcriptions,” “the data to synchronize the transcriptions to sound recordings, either line- by-line or word-by-word,” and “processing and distributing lyric-related royalties” and at the motion to dismiss stage, when LyricFind alleges a specific product market, the hypothetical possibility that DSPs might opt to use AI instead does not render the market definition legally deficient. 

As to the Lyric Rights Licensing Market and Lyric Rights Sublicensing Submarket, the Court stated that LyricFind plausibly alleges an economically distinct submarket by alleging LyricFind and Musixmatch act as “specialized vendors.” (Order at 29). Accepting these allegations as true, the Court concluded that LyricFind plausibly alleges there is an economically distinct submarket for DSPs seeking to sublicense rights from a lyric services provider rather than negotiate and license directly from music publishers.  The Court also concluded that LyricFind plausibly alleges direct evidence of Musixmatch’s market/monopoly power in the Lyric Rights Sublicensing Submarket (Order at 30).  However, the Court stated that LyricFind did not plausibly allege Musixmatch has market/monopoly power in the Lyric Rights Licensing Market given market share at 31%. The Court noted that all the cases LyricFind cited regarding indirect evidence involved a market share of greater than 31%. See Epic Games, 67 F.4th at 985 (market share of 52% to 55%); Syufy Enters. v. Am. Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 1986) (market share of 60% to 69%); Pac. Coast Agr. Exp. Ass’n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975) (market share of 45% to 70%) (Order at 30-31).

With regard to concerted action, the Court noted that claims premised on agreements or conspiracies failed because Musixmatch has not engaged, and cannot engage, in the requisite “concerted action” under Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984), with either TPG or WCM.  District courts have interpreted Copperweld to mean “coordinated activity by parties who lack independent sources of economic power and separate interests does not warrant scrutiny.” Levi Case Co. v. ATS Prods., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 428, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Order at 32). The Court noted that the complaint supports a plausible inference Musixmatch and WCM have separate economic interests: Musixmatch seeks to exclude competition, and WCM seeks to maximize its own revenue (Order at 33).

As to intent to monopolize, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “[s]pecific intent to monopolize will normally be proved by inference from conduct.” Hunt- Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1980). Here, the complaint alleges two acts from which to infer WCM’s intent: (1) WCM entering the agreement, and (2) WCM informing Spotify that, because of the Exclusive, LyricFind could no longer supply Lyric Data Services for WCM’s titles (Order at 34).  As currently pled, these allegations do not support a plausible inference WCM entered the agreement with the specific purpose of maintaining Musixmatch’s monopoly in the lyric rights and services markets.  LyricFind does not allege WCM intended for Musixmatch to monopolize the relevant markets, nor does LyricFind point to other allegations from which to plausibly infer WCM had such intent.

The Court noted that the complaint included a monopoly leveraging claim stating that Musixmatch has leveraged its monopoly power in the LyricData Services Market to obtain or attempt to obtain a monopoly in the Lyric Rights Licensing Market and Lyric Rights Sublicensing Submarket in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Relying on Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 547 (9th Cir. 1991), Musixmatch moved to dismiss this claim on the ground monopoly leveraging is not an independent theory of section 2 liability. The Ninth Circuit has subsequently clarified that while it rejected Berkey Photo’s definition of “monopoly leveraging” in Alaska Airlines, “to the extent that ‘monopoly leveraging’ is defined as an attempt to use monopoly power in one market to monopolize another market, this theory remains a viable theory under Section 2.” Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Washington Nat. Gas Co., 99 F.3d 937, 951 (9th Cir. 1996) (Order at 34-35).

TPG also argued that LyricFind fails to allege TPG independently participated in the alleged anticompetitive conduct, directed or controlled Musixmatch’s actions, or otherwise engaged in unlawful behavior.  As an initial matter, the parties agree that, pursuant to Copperweld, TPG and Musixmatch constitute a single economic and legal entity and are thus incapable of conspiring with one another, so, TPG cannot be liable on the theory it conspired with Musixmatch.  The Court concluded that TPG could be liable because: (1) TPG took direct acts to further the buy-or-bury scheme; (2) TPG directed Musixmatch to pursue the agreement; (3) TPG approved the agreement; and (4) TPG and Musixmatch coordinated their anticompetitive conduct as a single enterprise” (Order at 41). The complaint also alleges LyricFind and TPG entered into an NDA and Musixmatch materially breached their obligations pursuant to the NDA by disclosing LyricFind’s confidential information to unauthorized third parties (Order at 41). The disclosure of confidential information to Spotify did not harm LyricFind’s negotiations with Spotify because the negotiations continued “notwithstanding Defendants’ wrongful disclosures.”  (Order at 42).  The complaint includes intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage claims (Order at 43). In both claims, LyricFind alleges Defendants were aware of LyricFind’s negotiations with Spotify and iHeartRadio, and its existing and prospective negotiations with other DSPs, and undertook the anticompetitive scheme to undermine LyricFind’s negotiations and ensure that Musixmatch, not LyricFind, was awarded these contracts.  The Court held that because LyricFind plausibly alleges Musixmatch’s entry into the agreement violates antitrust laws and TPG independently committed acts that furthered the allegedly anticompetitive scheme (Order at 44).   However, the Court concluded that LyricFind failed to allege a duty of care running from TPG to LyricFind as to the negligence-based claim and so dismissed with leave to amend (Order at 44).

By Anna Ali

Moderator: Josh Holian, Latham & Watkins LLP
Panelists: Paul Wong, NERA; Elise Nelson, NVIDIA; Tom Dahdouh

Tom Dahdouh opened the panel’s discussion by urging attendees to remember the importance of our institutions and the risks of a partisan application of the antitrust laws. He urged the federal agencies to re-focus on bringing antitrust cases and encouraged state enforcers to monitor federal merger matters, predicting that state enforcement will play an increasingly important role.

Elise Nelson, Senior Competition Counsel of NVIDIA, emphasized the importance of certainty for business teams. She noted greater predictability in merger review under the current administration—such as whether a second request is likely to come from an HSR filing—while observing increasing uncertainty globally, particularly in Europe, with a noticeable impact on global businesses. Elise also noted the importance of certainty as states increasingly consider implementing their own merger control regulations, particularly where new regulations could function as a de facto tax on in-state business. Elise encouraged in-house teams to engage with regulators early to get ahead of potential issues and provide an understanding of the business.

On nascent competition, Paul Wong, Managing Director of NERA, underscored the analytical challenges given limited case law and literature. Tom Dahdouh noted that the FTC had used retrospective studies to show anticompetitive impact and suggested additional such studies could guide courts and parties assessing nascent competition. Elise Nelson cautioned that assessing nascent competition is not a “one size fits all” situation, urging market-specific analysis of competitive dynamics. Paul Wong agreed, noting that markets evolve at different speeds and that this variation should inform forward-looking assessments.

Moderator: Jill Manning, JAMS
Panelists: Alexis Gilman, Alston & Bird LLP; Bryn Williams, Colorado Attorney General’s Office; Kuru Olasa, Munger, Tolles & Olson

A $24.6 billion merger between Albertsons and Kroger creating a supermarket giant with more than 5,000 stores, included stores that were dominant and close competitors in the Western  U.S.   Washington and Colorado sued to block the merger under their respective state antitrust laws in their state courts, while the FTC teamed with a multistate group and brought a third action in an Oregon federal court.

The panel discussed the many issues presented by  multiple venue merger challenges, including differing facts, complaints and legal standards, differing rules, procedures, and timing in the various courts, resource constraints, sharing of witnesses and experts, and burdens on third party witnesses.

The pros and perils of the defense decision to not offer their own market definition and rely on criticisms of the governments’ definition of a supermarket market not including  specialty grocers, Trader Joes, Amazon, Costco and other food purveyors was discussed, as was ineffective modeling to attempt to establish nonlocal boundaries of that market.

The checkered history of the proffered divestiture buyer and the parties’ own past divestitures helped doom the proffered fix and avoid a resolution of the differing standards for an effective fix. Because invocation of the common interest privilege by the merging parties can limit testimony about the fix, it must be carefully  considered at the outset. Finally, the Colorado AG emphasized its handling of the merger challenge entirely with in-house staff was intended to send a strong message about the threat of meaningful state enforcement in the merger world.

By Alex J. Tramontano

Overview

The panelists provided insight into the intentions behind the proposed changes, including comments and criticisms. Overall, the Commission is significantly advanced in finalizing revisions to the Cartwright Act, addressing both single firm conduct provisions and merger review standards.

Single Firm Conduct

Working Group Recommendations

Eric Enson discussed California’s need for a robust single firm conduct provision to prohibit anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. The Working Group considered multiple approaches, including Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the Working Group’s own recommendations, and staff proposals based on those recommendations. The consensus emerged that Section 2 does not provide sufficient protection, having been diluted by Chicago School jurisprudence. Additionally, the abuse of dominance standard carried problematic precedential baggage that hampered the Working Group’s recommendation.

Enhanced Version

Eric Enson reported that the Commission ultimately selected an enhanced version of the provision. Key issues that remain to be addressed include single firm restraint of trade scenarios and the distinction between competitive and predatory pricing. A significant concern raised is the market power threshold; without adequate definition, smaller firms could face unintended liability under these requirements.

Panel Discussion Regarding Single Firm Conduct

Diana Moss emphasized the importance of eliminating the requirement that harmed rivals demonstrate they are as efficient or nearly as efficient as the defendant. She noted the inherent impossibility of smaller market participants meeting this standard when competing against much larger defendants. Moss also raised concerns about how to distinguish harmful single firm conduct from legitimate business practices, noting that firms routinely price below cost for various competitive reasons, including market signaling and gaining market share.

David Kesselman argued against abandoning the legislation, advocating trust in the courts to interpret the law properly. He views this as an opportunity to return to the original intent of the Sherman Act, noting that California would not be bound by federal precedent on these issues. He presented a hypothetical suggesting that direct evidence of harm to competition or collusion should alleviate the burden of proving market power.

Mergers

General Framework

The Commission is evaluating whether California needs its own merger law, comparable to Section 7 of the Clayton Act. One proposal would require California to review all mergers meeting specified criteria. Concurrently, Senate Bill 25 is pending, and would require notification for transactions meeting the Hart-Scott-Rodino threshold where 20 percent or more of the business operates in California.

Four Proposed Options:

• Option 1 (SB 25): Notification required for transactions meeting HSR threshold with 20 percent or more California business presence.
• Option 2: Incorporates the Philadelphia National Bank standard (See 374 U.S. 321).
• Option 3: Similar to Option 2 but incorporates Federal Merger Guidelines and creates rebuttable presumptions where the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) exceeds 1800 (“highly concentrated”).
• Option 4 (Appreciable Risk): Prohibits mergers that would lessen competition by more than a de minimis amount.

Panel Commentary on Merger Proposals (Lightning Round)

Diana Moss noted the absence of vertical merger guidance in current proposals.

Eric Enson advocated that states should receive Hart-Scott-Rodino (“HSR”) data to make independent determinations about merger review. He argued against adopting the appreciable risk standard in Option 4. David Kesselman expressed doubt that the Commission will ultimately adopt Option 4.

By Delaney Brooks

Moderator: Chris Wheeler, Farella Braun + Martel LLP

Panelists: Hope Brinn, Berger Montague PC; James Crooks, Fairmark Partners LLP; Ashley K. Corkery, Cooley LLP

How the Sherman Act should regulate the activities of colleges and universities has been a hot topic in antitrust law since its inception. At the 35th GSI, this year’s Antitrust in Higher Education Panel delivered a fascinating update about recent antitrust developments on campus, from college sports to financial aid decisions.

First, we heard from Ashley K. Corkery, who brought us up to speed on the House v. NCAA settlement, which will reshape the way college athletes may be compensated for use of their name, image, and likeness (NIL). In House, a class of Division I student-athletes challenged the NCAA’s longstanding rule restricting compensation of student-athletes for commercial use of their NIL. Following five years of motion practice, the Honorable Claudia Wilken recently issued final approval in a landmark settlement resolving the case. Ashley detailed the relief available under the settlement, which includes nearly $2.6 billion in past damages to student-athletes, along with forward-looking relief requiring the NCAA to change its rules governing compensation. Case No. 20-cv-03919, Dkt. No. 717 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2025). While the settlement will allow student-athletes to be paid for commercial use of their NIL under a revenue-sharing system moving forward, Ashley highlighted the profitability disparities that persist in athletic programs, with only men’s football and men’s basketball turning a profit. Under this new regime, only one thing is certain: the way student athletes promote themselves both on and off the field is sure to change.

Next up, Jamie Crooks turned our attention to the sidelines, with an update about the coaches’ compensation. In Smart v. NCAA, a class of volunteer coaches took aim at the NCAA’s rule limiting the number of paid coaching positions each school may employ and requiring any additional coaching positions to be unpaid. The parties recently settled, with the Honorable William Shubb approving a $50 million fund – a whopping 99% of plaintiffs’ estimated damages – that will provide back pay to the volunteer coaches. Case No. 22-cv-02125, Dkt. No. 85 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025). Jamie described the plaintiffs’ “stupidly simple” wage fixing theory of liability, and highlighted their reliance on Judge Kavanaugh’s observation that “Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair market rate … [t]he NCAA is not above the law.” NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).

Finally, Hope Brinn took us into the shrouded world of college admissions, where a group of college presidents were alleged to have fixed financial aid packages at the nation’s most elite colleges and universities. Hope first laid out the history of the so-called “568 Presidents’ Group,” named for the exemption to antitrust law for colleges and universities who award financial aid packages on a need-blind basis. Plaintiffs alleged that the elite member universities of the 568 group did not qualify for the exemption, however, because their practice of admitting wealthy “development candidates” while agreeing to fix the financial aid packages of commonly admitted students was not actually need-blind, and thus constituted an illegal price-fixing scheme. Henry v. Brown Univ., Case No. 22-cv-00125 (N.D. Ill.). Hope explained that plaintiffs have reached settlements with 12 of the 17 defendant universities, with litigation continuing against the remaining five. Relief from the existing settlements, which recently exceeded $300 million, will go directly to students whose financial aid packages were negatively impacted by the 568 Group’s “consensus agreements.” While not an admission of liability, Hope noted that the 568 President’s Group has since disbanded. In sum, all the panelists agreed that the reach of antitrust law over the nation’s institutes of higher learning is far from settled. But as each of these three settlements teach us, how students pay for college, and how they receive compensation for contributions to their schools, will continue to play out in the courts.

By Brantely I. Pepperman

The third installment of the always-popular ethics panel provided thoughtful and informed advice on how attorneys should navigate various situations that can arise with the increasing use of artificial intelligence in the practice of law. By acting out four scenarios, panelists discussed what attorneys should—and, just as importantly should not do—when using AI:

• To prepare for and take depositions;
• To review documents for production and prepare privilege logs during discovery;
• To practice law, generally, and to operate a law firm; and
• To research, prepare, and draft legal briefs, as well as make oral argument, to courts.

In illustrating how ethical dilemmas relating to AI can arise in every-day legal situations and how to navigate them, the panelists illustrated how AI, used properly, can benefit attorneys and their clients, and, conversely, how AI, used improperly, can also result in ethical and judicial discipline and other repercussions.

Panelists included:

• Ken O’Rourke (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati)
• Catherine Simonsen (Simonsen Sussman)
• Michael Tubach (O’Melveny & Myers)
• Qianwei Fu (Zelle)
• Stephen McIntyre (Paul Hastings)
• Paul Riehle (Faegre Drinker)
• Gary Smith (Hausfeld)
• Hanna Steinbach (Harness)
• Jill Manning (JAMS)
• Jeff VanHooreweghe (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati)
• The Hon. Laurel Beeler (U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California)

By Wesley Sweger

Moderator: Shira Liu, BRS LLP
Panelists: Magistrate Judge Alex G. Tse; Magistrate Judge Laurel D. Beeler

The judges’ panel at this year’s Golden State Institute offered an invaluable, candid, and refreshing look into how members of the bench think about antitrust cases—from the very first complaint to trial.

Magistrate Judges Alex G. Tse and Laurel D. Beeler shared practical insights on what makes pleadings effective, emphasizing clarity and storytelling over technicality. They reminded practitioners that a complaint is not only a legal document but also a first impression—both of counsel’s credibility and of the case’s narrative. A readable, well-organized complaint builds early trust with the court and lays the groundwork for future proceedings.

The panel also offered a behind-the-scenes perspective on courtroom and procedural issues that often make or break cases. From the tone of discovery correspondences to the precision of sealing requests, the judges underscored that civility and diligence matter as much as substance.

Finally, the conversation turned to trial strategy. When it comes to experts, for example, both judges encouraged practitioners to focus on clarity and persuasion rather than exhaustive detail: expert testimony, like the broader case, should tell a coherent story that a layperson can follow. Taken together, the panel offered a practical look at what judges value most from practitioners and how small choices in tone, structure, and judgment can shape the course of a case.

By Alex Tramontano

Moderator:   Lee Berger, Steptoe LLP
Panelists: Manish Kumar, Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. D.O.J.; Valarie Williams, Alston & Bird LLP; Todd Seaver, Berman Tabacco

Department of Justice Antitrust Division Under the Trump Administration

Assistant Attorney General Abagail Slater now leads the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division, bringing an “America First” approach to antitrust enforcement. Slater is a serious antitrust enforcer with ten years of experience as a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) antitrust enforcement attorney. While she holds conservative antiregulatory positions, her approach also includes populist enforcement goals.

Continuity in Enforcement

• The Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) review process will likely remain unchanged;
• The 2023 Merger Guidelines will likely stay in effect.

Policy Shifts

• Renewed openness to remedies through consent decrees (departure from prior “fix-it first” approach);
• Elimination of warning letters;
• Significant staffing changes within the division.

FTC Leadership and Direction

Andrew Ferguson serves as FTC Chair, implementing a “MAGA approach” and elevating conservative voices. The dismissal of two Democratic Commissioners is currently under review by the U.S. Supreme Court.

Labor Market Antitrust Enforcement

Labor market antitrust enforcement has emerged as a priority area under both AAG Slater and FTC Chair Ferguson. The agencies have signaled robust enforcement through updated guidelines and enforcement actions.

Notable Enforcement Actions

U.S. v. Lopez, No. 2:23-cr-00055 (D. Nev.) – The government secured its first-ever jury conviction in a labor market context. The case involved wage fixing and price fixing in Nevada, with defendants convicted on all Sherman Act and wire fraud counts.

In re Gateway Services, No. 2210170 (FTC) – This matter addressed anti-competitive practices beyond traditional wage fixing, including non-disclosure and non-compete agreements, repayment provisions, and information exchanges through third-party intermediaries.

Expanded Guidelines

The 2023 Merger Guidelines contain extensive discussion of labor markets, recognizing they are susceptible to the same competitive concerns as product and buyer markets. DOJ and FTC released replacement Human Resources Guidelines in January 2025. The guidance extends these principles with more robust enforcement signaling.

Student Athletes

In Zeigler v. NCAA, No. 3:25-cv-00226 (E.D. Tenn.), the DOJ filed a statement of interest arguing that the rule of reason should apply to restrictions in the student athlete labor market, underscoring the agency’s priority on labor market issues.

DOJ Criminal Antitrust Whistleblower Program

Initiated in May 2025, this program offers whistleblowers between 15 and 30% of the amount of the criminal fine or recovery for providing original, detailed, and timely information critical to prosecution.

Major Monopolization Cases

U.S. v. Google (Search), 1:20-cv-03010 (APM)

On September 2, 2025, Judge Amit Mehta imposed significant behavioral remedies but rejected the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) call for a breakup of the company. The court remedied the default browser arrangements while preventing Google from using its search monopoly to gain AI market advantage.

U.S. v. Google (Ad Tech), 1:23-cv-00108 (LMB)

In April 2025, Judge Brinkema ruled that Google had illegally monopolized the ad server and ad exchange markets, while rejecting the advertiser ad network claims. A two-week trial ended in October 2025. Judge Brinkema is now deliberating on a decision, which is expected sometime in 2026.

U.S. v. Visa (Monopoly Exclusion), 1:24-cv-7214 (S.D. N.Y.)

In September 2024, the U.S. Department of Justice sued Visa, alleging the company used exclusionary tactics to maintain dominance in the debit card network market. This included exclusionary contracts and agreements with Apple and PayPal preventing competitors from entering the market. In June 2025, Judge Koeltl denied Visa’s motion to dismiss the DOJ’s complaint. In October 2025, Judge Koeltl also allowed antitrust claims brought by cardholders against Visa to move forward, finding that they had adequately alleged they were directly injured by Visa’s alleged anticompetitive conduct.

Algorithmic Pricing

Real Estate:

U.S. v. RealPage, No. 1:24-cv-00710 (M.D.N.C.) – This matter examines whether AI tools that take in information and provide pricing recommendations constitute anticompetitive conduct. Key factors include whether the tool operates as a mandate or locks users into specific pricing, rather than merely making recommendations.

Hospitality:

Gibson v. Cendyn Group, No. 2:23-cv-00140 (D. Nev.) – In contrast to RealPage, this case involves AI that uses only a single company’s data and provides recommendations rather than mandates. The court found this arrangement permissible.

Healthcare:

VHS Liquidating Trust v. Multiplan, No. CGC-21-594966 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Francisco) – In a case involving California Cartwright Act and UCL claims, the Court granted demurrer with no leave to amend, finding that reimbursement rates set via contract did not qualify as anticompetitive conduct under federal guidance.

Multiplan Health Insurer Provider Litigation, No. 1:24-cv-06795 (N.D. Ill.) – Matter involving alleged Sherman Act violations by insurers alleged to be using data to suppress reimbursement rates to healthcare providers. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in April 2025 supporting the plaintiffs’ legal theory. In June 2025, Judge Kennelly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding parallel pricing with plus factors adequately alleged, allowing the federal and state antitrust claims to proceed to discovery.

App Store Litigation

Epic v. Apple, No. 4:20-cv-05640-YGR (N.D. Cal 2020) – Epic successfully proved its UCL claim, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Apple was subsequently found to have violated the injunction by continuing to use “scare screens,” resulting in further relief granted on appeal.

In Re Apple iPhone Antitrust Litigation, No.4:11-CV-06714-YGR(N.D. Cal.) – Scheduled for trial in February 2026, pending motions for summary judgment and decertification.

In Re Google Play Store Antitrust Litigation, No.3:20-cv-05671-JD (N.D. Cal.) – This case involved Section 1 and Section 2 claims that Google improperly monopolized and restrained trade within the Android app markets. The jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor of Epic, finding that Google engaged in exclusionary conduct in violation of antitrust laws due to (1) its restrictions on app distribution through the Play Store and (2) its tying of in-app payments to Google Play Billing. Following the December 2023 jury verdict, the district court issued a permanent injunction in October 2024, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed in July 2025. (147 F.4th 917)

Smartphone Monopolization

U.S. v. Apple, No. 2:24-cv-04055 (D. N.J.) – Sixteen states and the U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust lawsuit against Apple for monopolization or attempted monopolization of smartphone markets in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The government seeks injunctive relief to prevent Apple from continuing the alleged anticompetitive conduct. In June 2025, U.S. District Judge Xavier Neals denied Apple’s motion to dismiss.

WASHINGTON – The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division filed a proposed consent decree today to resolve the United States’ claims against LivCor, LLC, a Blackstone portfolio company, as part of its ongoing enforcement action in the Middle District of North Carolina against algorithmic coordination and other anticompetitive practices in rental markets across the country. Today’s proposed decree builds on the Justice Department’s success in obtaining proposed consent decrees in the same enforcement action against RealPage, Inc. and two other large landlords, Cortland Management, LLC and Greystar Management Services, LLC.

On January 7, 2025, the United States, together with its state co-plaintiffs, filed a complaint alleging that LivCor, along with five other landlords, actively participated in a scheme to set their rents using each other’s competitively sensitive information through common pricing algorithms. As alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint, LivCor and other landlords, including five codefendants, shared competitively sensitive data to generate pricing recommendations using RealPage’s algorithms, which also included anticompetitive rules that aligned their pricing. In addition, LivCor and other landlords discussed competitively sensitive topics—including pricing strategies, rents, and selected parameters for RealPage’s software—directly with each other.

“The Trump-Vance Administration is committed to an economy that works for all Americans,” said Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “Landlords across America are on notice that the competition laws protect renters from the harms caused by competitors sharing competitively sensitive information or aligning prices, whether through an algorithm or otherwise.”

If approved by the court, the proposed consent decree would require LivCor to:

• Refrain from using any anticompetitive algorithm that generates pricing recommendations using its competitors’ competitively sensitive data or that incorporates certain anticompetitive features;
• Refrain from sharing competitively sensitive information with competitors;
• Accept a court-appointed monitor if it uses a third-party pricing algorithm that is not certified pursuant to the terms of the consent decree;
• Refrain from attending or participating in RealPage-hosted meetings of competing landlords; and
• Cooperate with the United States’ claims against other defendants.

Today, the Justice Department filed a statement of interest in a private lawsuit challenging accreditation standards and procedures employed by the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA). The statement of interest explains that professional accreditation societies, like the AVMA, cannot erect anticompetitive hurdles that reduce competition by restricting the number of veterinary providers entering the profession.

“Pets and animals give us so much in life and form the backbone of American food security, but their healthcare needs can add up over time,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Dina Kallay of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “The Justice Department is committed to supporting pet owners, livestock farmers, and aspiring veterinarians by ensuring that accreditation standards and procedures do not unnecessarily restrict competition in veterinary education and services. Free markets succeed when there is robust competition unhindered by unnecessary restrictions. Veterinarian services are no exception to this rule.”

The rising cost of veterinary services threatens livestock farmers and pet owners’ ability to afford healthcare for their animals. Yet, despite growing population, for decades the United States has had only about 34 accredited veterinary colleges, all solely accredited by the AVMA. In this lawsuit, an accredited veterinary school alleges that the AVMA has effectively reinterpreted its research accreditation standard to require schools to adopt a high-cost research model with an on-site teaching hospital. That policy, the plaintiff alleges, not only jeopardizes its accreditation, but also prevents new veterinary colleges from opening and unreasonably raises the cost of veterinary education.

The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division filed a proposed settlement today to resolve the United States’ claims against RealPage Inc. as part of its ongoing enforcement against algorithmic coordination, information sharing, and other anticompetitive practices in rental housing markets across the country. The proposed settlement would help restore free market competition in rental markets for millions of American renters.

“Competing companies must make independent pricing decisions, and with the rise of algorithmic and artificial intelligence tools, we will remain at the forefront of vigorous antitrust enforcement,” said Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division.

RealPage is a provider of commercial revenue management software and services for the conventional multifamily rental housing industry. As alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint, RealPage’s revenue management software has relied on nonpublic, competitively sensitive information shared by landlords to set rental prices. RealPage’s software has also included features designed to limit rental price decreases and otherwise align pricing among competitors. In addition, RealPage has hosted meetings attended by competing property management companies where competitively sensitive information was shared.

If approved by the court, the proposed consent judgment would require RealPage to:

• Cease having its software use competitors’ nonpublic, competitively sensitive information to determine rental prices in runtime operation;
• Cease using active lease data for purposes of training the models underlying the software, limiting model training to historic or backward-looking nonpublic data that has been aged for at least 12 months;
• Not use models that determine geographic effects narrower than at a state level, which is broader than the markets alleged in the complaint;
• Remove or redesign features that limited price decreases or aligned pricing between competing users of the software;
• Cease conducting market surveys to collect competitively sensitive information;
• Refrain from discussing market analyses or trends based on nonpublic data, or pricing strategies, in RealPage meetings relating to revenue management software;
• Accept a court-appointed monitor to ensure compliance with the terms of the consent judgment; and
• Cooperate in the United States’ lawsuit against property management companies that have used its software.

Today, the Federal Trade Commission filed a notice that it will appeal the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia’s November 2025 ruling in favor of Meta Platforms, Inc. (“Meta”) in the FTC’s monopolization case against Meta. The appeal will be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

The FTC continues to allege, and robust evidence at trial demonstrated, that for over a decade Meta has illegally maintained a monopoly in personal social networking services through anticompetitive conduct – by buying the significant competitive threats it identified in Instagram and WhatsApp.

FTC Bureau of Competition Director Daniel Guarnera issued the following statement regarding the FTC’s notice of appeal:

“The U.S. economy thrives when competition can flourish and U.S. businesses compete fairly against one another. Yet Meta has maintained its dominant position and record profits for well over a decade not through legitimate competition, but by buying its most significant competitive threats. The Trump-Vance FTC will continue fighting its historic case against Meta to ensure that competition can thrive across the country to the benefit of all Americans and U.S. businesses.” 

The Federal Trade Commission will require The Boeing Company (Boeing) to divest significant Spirit AeroSystems Holdings, Inc. (Spirit) assets to resolve antitrust concerns surrounding Boeing’s $8.3 billion acquisition of Spirit.

The FTC’s proposed order will protect competition in the large commercial and military aircraft markets, which are critical to American commercial travelers and national security.

“American commercial travelers and our military deserve to fly on dependable aircraft, manufactured with reliable components,” said David J. Shaw, Principal Deputy Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition. “The Trump-Vance FTC’s action today protects aircraft manufacturing competition to ensure that Americans across the country can continue to access high-quality aircraft to reach their next destination.”

The proposed merger seeks to combine Boeing, one of the world’s largest manufacturers of commercial and military aircraft, with Spirit, the world’s largest independent supplier of aerostructures, such as fuselages and wings, which are critical structural components of both commercial and military aircraft.

Under a proposed consent order, Boeing will divest:

• Key Spirit businesses that currently supply aerostructures to Airbus SE (Airbus), including all necessary assets and personnel. These assets will be divested to Airbus.
• Boeing will also divest Spirit’s Subang, Malaysia aerostructures business that currently supplies aerostructures to Boeing and Airbus. Spirit’s Subang business will be divested to Composites Technology Research Malaysia Sdn. Bhd (CTRM).

The divestitures resolve FTC allegations that Boeing’s acquisition of Spirit would give Boeing the ability and incentive to raise the cost or degrade Airbus’ access to inputs for its competing aircraft. The FTC’s proposed order requires Boeing to provide transitional services to Airbus and CTRM to assist them in manufacturing various products. The FTC has also appointed a monitor to oversee the divestitures and ensure that both Boeing and Spirit comply with the divestiture order.

The FTC’s order also requires Boeing and Spirit to continue to provide aerostructures and aerostructure services to competing contractors for military aircraft programs. Spirit is required to continue its existing contracts with other contractors and continue to be available as a supplier for future competitors. It also cannot discriminate in favor of Boeing in its dealing with other competing military aircraft companies and must protect those companies’ confidential information.

The FTC alleged that without these requirements, Boeing would have the ability and incentive to deny or limit competitors’ access to Spirit’s aerostructure products and technologies, inhibiting competitors’ ability to compete against Boeing. Boeing could also gain access to sensitive proprietary information relating to its competitors and exploit it to its own advantage, the complaint further alleges.

FTC staff cooperated closely with staff of the competition agencies in the European Union and United Kingdom, and with the staff of the U.S. Department of War (DoW) to analyze the proposed acquisition and potential remedies. The Commission especially appreciates the collaborative relationship between DoW and FTC staff to assess the impact of the transaction on national security and the defense industrial base.

The Commission vote to issue the complaint and accept the consent agreement for public comment was 2-0.

The public will have 30 days to submit comments on the proposed consent agreement package. Instructions for filing comments appear on the docket. Once processed, they will be posted on Regulations.gov.NOTE: The Commission issues an administrative complaint when it has “reason to believe” that the law has been or is being violated, and it appears to the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest. When the Commission issues a consent order on a final basis, it carries the force of law with respect to future actions.

OAKLAND — California Attorney General Rob Bonta co-led a coalition of 22 attorneys general in filing a lawsuit challenging the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) Acting Director’s unlawful decision not to fund the agency’s operations, preventing it from performing legally mandated functions. The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, challenges the decision by CFPB Acting Director Russell Vought to refuse to request the necessary funding for the agency from the Federal Reserve, in violation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). The CFPB was created to protect consumers in the financial marketplace, and it performs critical functions necessary to the functioning of the financial system. For 14 years, the CFPB has served as an invaluable partner to state attorneys general and state banking regulators, as an enforcer, regulator, and resource for consumers. Shortly after taking office, the Trump Administration launched a campaign of destruction and systemic shuttering of the CFPB, threatening catastrophic harm to hardworking families and consumer financial markets nationwide. Today’s lawsuit challenges the latest step in the Trump Administration campaign to shutter the agency.

“President Trump seems intent on making life more unaffordable for Americans — whether by withholding food assistance, pushing policies that would make energy more expensive, or by placing chaotic tariffs on essential items. At the same time, the Administration continues to abandon its responsibility to protect and defend American consumers being taken advantage of by Big Corporations, dismantling the agency that stands up for consumers against big banks, debt collectors, and credit reporting companies,” said Attorney General Bonta. “The Trump Administration’s latest effort to destroy the CFPB means that hundreds of thousands of consumer complaints will fall on deaf ears. If you have ever had issues with your car loan, mortgage loans, or bank fees, if you have ever disputed a credit score error and expected to have the federal government on your side, this impacts you. By refusing to fund the CFPB, even when legal and appropriate funding mechanisms are available, the Trump Administration has sharpened its message that it does not care about affordability, that it does not care to be on the side of families and working Americans. California cares. With this lawsuit, we demand that the federal government keep up its side of the deal by lawfully funding the Bureau and its critical work.”  

BACKGROUND

After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act, establishing the CFPB as a federal financial regulator whose first priority is protecting consumers. The CFPB is tasked with enforcing numerous federal consumer protection statutes and enacting regulations to further these efforts. 

As the cornerstone of federal consumer financial protections for 14 years, the CFPB has been an invaluable enforcement partner to California, working to protect hardworking families and make the marketplace fairer here in California and across the country, returning over $20 billion to Americans since its creation. Among other important functions, the CFPB maintains a publicly available online complaint handling system and database through which consumers can submit complaints about financial products and services and receive responses from regulated entities.   

The Trump Administration has taken a series of actions intended to debilitate the CFPB, including issuing a suspension of work across the agency, terminating probationary employees, attempting to issue reduction in force notices to 90% of the CFPB’s workforce — a move that was swiftly blocked by the courts.The continued gutting of the CFPB leaves no oversight over large, national banks and credit unions, guts oversight of payday lenders, the mortgage markets, and credit reporting agencies — and dramatically shrinks the Bureau’s supervisorial oversight of the markets for auto finance, consumer reporting, debt collection, and international money transfer services — leaving millions of consumers unprotected. 

THE LAWSUIT 

On November 10, the CFPB gave notice that it would not request funding from the Federal Reserve to continue its operations based on legal analysis it had received from U.S. DOJ advising that it could not lawfully draw funds from the Federal Reserve because the Federal Reserve is “unprofitable.” The CFPB also stated it has sufficient funds to operate until at least December 31, 2025. At that time, the CFPB is expected to imminently cease operations, including taking its online consumer complaint handling system and database offline.   

U.S. DOJ’s interpretation of the statute has been widely criticized by consumer advocates as well as former CFPB and Federal Reserve officials as being unlawful. The attorneys general argue U.S. DOJ’s advice comes from a misreading of language in the Dodd-Frank Act authorizing the CFPB to draw its funding from “the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System.” The CFPB and U.S DOJ’s conclusion that the term “combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System” refers to the Federal Reserve’s profits, calculated by subtracting its interest expenses from its revenues, is an incorrect and unlawful interpretation.  

In the lawsuit today, the attorneys general allege that CFPB’s refusal to seek funding to continue its operations, including operating its consumer complaint database is ultra vires, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious as the Dodd-Frank Act clearly provides a mechanism for funding the CFPB to perform its statutorily mandatory functions — which include: 

• Rooting out unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices by writing rules, supervising companies, and enforcing the law;
• Enforcing laws that outlaw discrimination in consumer finance;
• Taking consumer complaints;
• Enhancing financial education;
• Researching the consumer experience of using financial products; and
• Monitoring financial markets for new risks to consumers.  

The attorneys general argue that CFPB’s failure to seek funding for continued operations, including operations of its consumer complaints database, will harm consumers and result in the above statutorily mandated functions not being performed. The attorneys general ask the court to declare this action unlawful and ensure CFPB is properly funded.

Attorney General Bonta is leading this lawsuit along with the attorneys general of New York, Oregon, New Jersey, and Colorado. They are joined by the attorneys general of Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawai‘i, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  Attorney General Bonta has been an outspoken critic amid the attempts of the Trump Administration’s CFPB to shrink its responsibilities and has submitted amicus briefs in Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and in National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought, lawsuits challenging the Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle the CFPB.

OAKLAND — California Attorney General Rob Bonta today commended the preliminary approval of a new class action settlement and related resolution of claims by the attorneys general that, if approved by the court, will require Capital One to provide $425 million in restitution and better interest rates for its 360 Savings customers who were cheated out of higher interest payments on their savings accounts for years. Last year, Attorney General Bonta joined a bipartisan coalition of attorneys general in opposing an earlier proposed class action settlement that did not deliver enough for Capital One customers who were wronged. This new settlement more than doubles the value of the earlier one. The resolution, preliminarily approved this week, includes an order resolving related claims by California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Ohio, and Rhode Island, giving those states the authority to enforce payment of consumer relief, and stopping Capital One from making false or deceptive statements or otherwise violating state consumer protection laws pertaining to interest rates provided by the bank’s deposit accounts. This resolution follows the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (CFPB) dismissal of a related enforcement action against the company and underscores the value of continued attorney general enforcement efforts in the wake of the Trump Administration’s cuts to the CFPB. 

“Capital One misled consumers through false marketing and a lack of transparency regarding its savings account system, cheating consumers nationwide. Given an opportunity to make loyal customers whole, Capital One sank their teeth in even more, attempting to underpay people it harmed and continue its deceptive practices,” said Attorney General Bonta. “My office proudly stepped in and called this out for what it was: unacceptable and hopelessly inadequate. California consumers deserve a fair deal and someone fighting in their corner. We celebrate a settlement of more than double what was initially brought to the table. I thank my friend and colleague, New York Attorney General Letitia James, for leading this effort and taking further action to hold Capital One accountable.”

Capital One marketed its 360 Savings accounts as “high interest” accounts with “one of the nation’s best savings rates” that would earn its customers more than an average savings account. However, while interest rates rose nationwide beginning in 2022, Capital One kept the interest rates for its 360 Savings accounts artificially low. This saved Capital One nearly $3 billion in interest. Instead, Capital One created “360 Performance Savings,” a nearly identical type of savings account that provided much higher interest rates than 360 Savings — at one point, more than 14 times higher.

In September, Attorney General Bonta joined a bipartisan coalition of attorneys general in filing an amicus brief opposing a proposed class action settlement that would have shortchanged 360 Savings customers. The proposed settlement would have delivered less than $300 million in restitution payments and $125 million in future additional interest payments while allowing Capital One to continue to underpay 360 Savings customers’ interest. After Attorney General Bonta and the coalition raised objections to this settlement, the court rejected it.

Capital One has now agreed to a new settlement that would deliver substantially more for 360 Savings customers. The settlement, which was preliminarily approved by the court this week, will require Capital One to pay $425 million in restitution. The settlement will also require Capital One to match 360 Savings and 360 Performance Savings interest rates, erasing the misleading two-tiered system of accounts and providing an estimated $530 million to consumers nationwide in future additional interest.

OAKLAND — California Attorney General Rob Bonta today announced the beginning of the notice process for consumers to receive payment in the $700 million Google Play Store antitrust settlement. The 2023 settlement, secured by Attorney General Bonta and a coalition of 53 attorneys general, resolves allegations that Google violated antitrust laws by monopolizing the Android smartphone application market. In addition to significant monetary returns to California consumers, the settlement includes a variety of key injunctive terms to open up the markets to competition and prevent Google from further engaging in anticompetitive conduct. 

“Google took advantage of Android phone customers by limiting consumer choice, inflating prices on in-app purchases, and creating an unfair marketplace. California stood up to Google, took it to court, and secured a great settlement,” said Attorney General Bonta. “Now, I am proud to announce the start of the process that ensures Google’s ill-gotten profits are distributed to consumers that were harmed by this conduct. My office is committed to protecting consumers, holding industry accountable, and ensuring the wallets of hardworking Californians are protected from illegal actions by big corporations.”

As part of the $700 million settlement secured by Attorney General Bonta, Google will pay $630 million, minus costs and fees, to consumers who made purchases on the Google Play Store between August 2016 and September 2023 and were harmed by Google’s anticompetitive practices. Most consumers covered by this settlement will not have to do anything to receive a payment from the Settlement Fund.

Affected consumers will be contacted by email to notify them of the settlement — the notice administrator will also advertise the settlement across a variety of platforms. Once the notice process has completed, the court will hold a final approval hearing on April 30, 2026 to consider whether to approve the settlement. Once the court grants final approval to the settlement, a settlement administrator will distribute settlement funds to affected consumers.

The settlement fund will make the majority of payments automatically through PayPal or Venmo, and no claim form is necessary in most cases. Once the settlement has been approved by the Court, consumers will receive an email from PayPal or a text from Venmo notifying them of their incoming payment at the email address or mobile phone number associated with their Google Play account. Additional details are in the Settlement Agreement and Release available on the website www.GooglePlayStateAGAntitrustLitigation.com

Important Information and Dates:

• Affected consumers who do not want to receive payment from the Settlement Fund and want to bring their own case against Google, must submit a request to be excluded via online form at www.GooglePlayStateAGAntitrustLitigation.com or in writing on or before February 19, 2026.
• Affected consumers who want to object to the settlement can file a written objection on or before February 19, 2026.
• The Court will hold a hearing on April 30, 2026, to consider whether to approve the settlement.

As part of the settlement, Google must also pay the states an additional $70 million for their sovereign claims, including state-specific penalties, fees, and costs. 

In 2021, the multistate coalition of attorneys general sued Google alleging that the company unlawfully monopolized the markets for Android app distribution and in-app payment processing. Specifically, the states claimed that Google signed anticompetitive contracts to prevent other app stores from being preloaded on Android devices, bought off key app developers who might have launched rival app stores to the Google Play store, and created technological barriers to deter consumers from directly downloading apps to their devices.