E-Briefs, News and Notes: March 2026

Dear Section Members:

We are seeking submissions for the next issue of Competition, the journal published by the Antitrust and Consumer Protection Section. The issue will cover a wide range of antitrust and consumer protection cases, with a national scope but a California focus. We are particularly interested in articles about antitrust and search, ad tech, and AI. We accept articles from practitioners, academics, and law students. We are flexible on article length.

Submit your article here.

Thank you!

Ryan Sandrock

This summer, we are again hosting mixers to connect summer associates, law students and new lawyers (within their first eight years of practice) interested in antitrust and consumer protection law, with law firms, public agencies, in-house legal departments, and economic consulting firms.

This event offers a valuable opportunity to build relationships, explore career pathways, and engage with professionals across the antitrust and consumer protection community.

The San Francisco mixer will be held on June 11, 2026 and the Los Angeles mixer will be held on July 9, 2026. Registration will be available soon.

By Matt Veldman

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Apple in a monopolization case brought by Alivecor, a third-party developer of software for the Apple Watch, in an opinion released on January 8, 2026.

Alivecor sued Apple for monopolizing the market for Apple Watch-compatible heart rhythm analysis apps by removing third-party app developers’ access to data from Apple’s Heart Rate Path Optimizer (“HRPO”) algorithm. Removing that access impeded competitors’ software that competed with Apple’s newer proprietary heart rhythm analysis feature, called Irregular Rhythm Notification (“IRN”).

Apple moved for summary judgment principally on the argument that replacing one heart rate software with another was a per se lawful product improvement under Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp. LP, 592 F. 3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010). If Allied Orthopedic didn’t per se bar Alivecor’s claims, Apple argued that its conduct was at most a refusal to deal, and Alivecor could not meet the high burden for a refusal to deal claim. 

The district court had agreed that Apple’s conduct was a per se product improvement under Allied Orthopedic. On appeal, Alivecor argued that Apple’s choice to remove developer access to the old HRPO software and data was separate conduct from any product improvement brought about by the new software, since Apple could have continued to allow developer access to the old data even after it added the new software. 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed, though without reaching Alivecor’s argument that Apple’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct was separate from its product improvement. Instead, without deciding whether Apple’s conduct was per se lawful under Allied Orthopedic, the court analyzed the conduct under Trinko’s strict refusal-to-deal standard and found that as a matter of law Apple’s refusal to share the data was not anticompetitive. Applying Trinko, the court held that “Alivecor, at bottom, seeks a ruling that Apple was obligated to provide its HRPO data to its competitors, both before and after it stopped generating HRPO data.” Alivecor, 163 F.4th at 1268. 

Seeking to avoid the fatal characterization as a refusal to deal, Alivecor tried to characterize the conduct as a different kind of Section 2 conduct, noting that even in Allied Orthopedic the Ninth Circuit did not characterize the conduct as a refusal to deal. The court distinguished Allied Orthopedic, explaining that there, the defendant who sold monitors and sensors to hospitals discontinued selling old monitors, to the disadvantage of competitor sellers of sensors compatible with old monitors. Here, by contrast, the heart rate data was never a separate product sold to customers–it was always an input that was shared with competitors to use in competitors’ products. Refusing to continue to provide that data thus “maps perfectly onto the refusal-to-deal doctrine.” Id. at 1269. 

The court went on to find that the Aspen Skiing exception to refusal-to-deal was not applicable, since Alivecor did not argue that Apple was sacrificing its own profits, which is key to the exception found in that case. It also rejected Alivecor’s argument that the “essential facilities” doctrine applied. To invoke that doctrine, Alivecor needed to show that Apple controlled an essential facility that is unable to be practically duplicated by Alivecor and is otherwise unavailable. It also needed to show that Apple refused to provide access and that it was feasible for Apple to provide that access. See id. at 1270-71 (quoting Aerotec Int’l, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 836 F. 3d 1171, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016)). The court reasoned that because Apple’s own heart analysis feature relied on IRN data rather than HRPO data, no reasonable jury could find that access to HRPO data was essential for competition. Id. at 1271. 

The court was careful to limit its holding, stating that not all claims involving product design changes will necessarily be refusals to deal. Product hop cases in the pharmaceutical delay cases provide one such example, and in any case defining anticompetitive conduct is “highly fact-dependent.” See id. at 1269 n.3. Because the conduct here mapped “perfectly” onto the refusal-to-deal doctrine and no exception applied, Alivecor’s claims failed as a matter of law, and summary judgment was appropriate.

By Eugene Addo

On January 30, 2026, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for equitable relief and Defendant Google’s motion to decertify a class following a jury verdict awarding approximately $425.6 million in damages to a class of Google users. Plaintiffs alleged that Google collected anonymized user data despite representations that disabling the supplemental Web & App Activity (“sWAA”) setting would stop such data collection.

Factual Background

Plaintiffs represented two subclasses of Google users (Android users and non-Android users) who had disabled the sWAA setting in their accounts. Id. at *2. This setting governs data related to Google Chrome history and activity from third-party applications and sites using Google services. Id. Plaintiffs allege that despite disabling the setting, Google collected anonymized data from their activity on third-party applications and used that data for commercial purposes, contradicting Google’s disclosures indicating that a disabled sWAA setting prevents such data collection. Id. Plaintiffs asserted three claims under California law: (1) violation of the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (CDAFA); (2) Invasion of privacy under the California Constitution; and (3) common law intrusion upon seclusion. Id.

Procedural Background

After a three-week trial, the jury returned a mixed verdict. Id. Google was not held liable under CDAFA but was found liable for invasion of privacy and common law intrusion upon seclusion. Id. The jury awarded $425,561,947 in compensatory damages and rejected punitive or nominal damages. Id. Following the verdict, Plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction on future sWAA data collection and disgorgement of $2.36 billion in net profits. Id. at *2-3. Google moved to decertify the class and vacate the verdict. Id. at *3.

Plaintiffs’ Permanent Injunction

Permanent Injunctions require the existence of prospective irreparable harm. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs’ asserted legal violation stemmed from Google’s prior misrepresentations about its data practices, not from data collection itself. Id. at *4. After trial, Google revised its disclosures to clarify that it “can” collect data not associated with a user’s account regardless of settings. Id. at *4-5. The court found that this change cured the core problem with disclosure as users were now made aware of Google’s practices. Id. at *5. The court rejected Plaintiffs argument that the updated language remained misleading or vague, reasoning that no reasonable user would interpret it to mean they could disable anonymized data collection. Id. at *5. It also found that while nothing prevents Google from making use of the data it already collected, it had already changed its disclosures and compensated Plaintiffs for the harm. Id. at *6.

Plaintiffs’ Request for Disgorgement

Plaintiffs sought $2.36 billion in disgorgement representing alleged profits from Google’s use of the sWAA-off data. Id. at *7. This required a showing of (1) disgorgement as an equitable remedy, (2) a lack of an adequate legal remedy, and (3) a reasonable approximation of profits. Id.

First, the court found that disgorgement was an equitable remedy because Plaintiffs sought to recover specific profits allegedly traceable to Google’s use of their data. Id. at *8. It rejected Google’s argument that disgorgement was unavailable after the jury rejected the CDAFA claim, noting that Plaintiffs sought disgorgement under all claims and that California law permits profit recovery from intrusion upon seclusion involving conscious interference with protected interests. Id. The court also rejected Google’s contention that Plaintiffs failed to trace data collection to precise profits, explaining that Plaintiffs need only show “a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation.” Id. at *9.

Second, the court held that Plaintiffs failed to show a lack of an adequate legal remedy on the basis that the jury could have awarded more in substantial damages. Id. at *9-10. It reasoned that equitable relief is intended to fill gaps where legal remedies are unavailable, not to give plaintiffs a second opportunity after a jury declines to award additional compensation. Id. at *10.

Third, the court was skeptical of Plaintiffs’ evidence for revenue estimation. Id. at *11. Plaintiffs’ expert estimated Google’s profits by attributing advertising revenue to conversion tracking allegedly enabled by the disputed data. Id. at *13. The court found this approach to be speculative because conversion tracking merely demonstrates ad effectiveness and does not necessarily generate revenue directly attributable to the data. Id. at *14. Plaintiffs could have compared (1) the amount advertisers spent with Google after been shown conversion analytics with SWAA-off data, and (2) the amount those advertisers would have spent had the analytics not been available. Id. Other evidence at trial suggested that Google may not have lost much in revenue had it not collected sWAA-off data. Id. at *14.

Since Plaintiffs failed to show that legal remedies were inadequate and failed prove a reliable estimate of profits, the court denied disgorgement. Id. at *15.

Defendant’s Motion to Decertify Class

Google argued for class decertification because trial evidence assessed offensiveness as to the type of data collected, and since class members used different third-party apps that collected different data on different users, there was no “common” issue to establish claims under invasion of privacy and intrusion upon seclusion. Id. at *15-16. The court rejected that argument, finding that Plantiffs’ theory of harm focused on Google’s alleged misapprehensions rather than individualized data differences. Id. at *17. Trial evidence showed that users generally anticipated no data collection once sWAA settings had been turned off. Id. Ultimately, key questions common to the class were whether Google misled users about its practices, and whether the data type could reveal meaningful information about users. Id. These issues could be resolved with class-wide proof. Id. Google’s additional arguments regarding differences among users or device settings failed to establish that common issues do not predominate over individual ones. Id. at *18. Thus, Google’s motion to decertify was denied.

By Sam Smith

Background

Plaintiff Seagate Technology, LLC (“Seagate”) is an American company based in California that is a leading manufacturer of hard disk drives. Seagate does not produce all the key components that go into the hard disk drive, including the product at issue, called suspension assembly (“SA”). A Seagate hard disk drive is built with parts and assembled all over the world. Plaintiff Seagate Technology Thailand (“Seagate Thailand”) assembles most of Seagate’s suspension assemblies. The suspension assemblies are then incorporated into a part called the head stack assemblies, which is either done by Seagate Thailand or China. Lastly, the head stack assemblies are incorporated into the finished hard disk drives in Thailand, China, or Singapore and are shipped to Plaintiff Seagate Singapore International Headquarters (“Seagate Singapore”) for distribution. Seagate Singapore either sells the hard disk drives directly or distributes them to other seagate entities, such as Seagate. Seagate Technology v. NHK Spring Co., 163 F. 4th 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 2026).

Seagate has alleged Defendant, Japanese-owned NHK Spring Co., Ltd. (“NHK”), has harmed them by violating the Sherman Act by price-fixing the price of SAs. Id. at 1276. NHK entered a guilty plea in 2019 for price-fixing SAs in the U.S and elsewhere. Id. at 1277-78. However, NHK in response to Seagate’s Sherman Act claims have asserted that Seagate Thailand and Singapore are the entities who bought the price-fixed SAs from NHK. Therefore, the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (“FTAIA”) bars Seagate’s antitrust claims. Id. at 1276.

Importantly, while all SAs were purchased by foreign entities, Seagate stated that the foreign entities – Seagate Thailand and Singapore – lacked any ability to decide on any terms of purchase. Including, price, quantity, or the timing of the order. Rather, Seagate’s Commodities Management Team located in Minnesota decided all terms of purchase for the foreign entities. Resulting in the foreign entities entering orders at perimeters instructed by Seagate. These terms of purchase were set quarterly through bidding on a Request for Quotation. The Request for Quotation would be sent by Seagate to NHK and negotiated by Seagate. Once agreed upon purchase prices and volumes were allocated, Seagate would send the agreed-upon prices and volume to Seagate Thailand and Singapore to purchase the SAs at the appropriate times instructed. The Request for Quotations were stated in NHK’s plea agreement as the chief instrument that NHK used to fix prices. Id. at 1278-79.

Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act

The FTAIA largely closes U.S. Courthouse doors to antitrust claims based on injuries outside of the United States. However, the FTAIA has two exceptions when antitrust injury occurring outside U.S. borders can allow access to U.S. Courthouses. First, if the conduct involves goods imported into the United States that Americans buy, known as the “import commerce exclusion.” Second, if the anticompetitive conduct has a direct effect on domestic commerce that in turn causes the antitrust injury to the plaintiff, known as the “domestic exception.” Id. at 1280-81.

Procedural History

In July 2019, NHK plead guilty to criminal price-fixing from June 2008 to at least April 2016. NHK engaged in a global conspiracy with another competitor to fix the price of SAs in the United States and elsewhere. In NHK’s plea agreement it is stated that the primary purpose of the conspiracy was to fix the price of hard disk drive SAs sold in the United States and elsewhere. Id. at 1278-79.

Shortly after NHK’s guilty plea, Seagate brought the current claim. NHK brought a motion for summary judgment that argued if the SAs were bought by the Thai subsidiary, Seagate Thailand, then it would be considered wholly foreign commerce and the FTAIA would make the claim ineligible for Sherman Act relief. On May 15, 2023, the district court held that the “import commerce exclusion” applied and denied summary judgment. However, on November 17, 2023, the district court reconsidered their previous summary judgment ruling and ruled the “import commerce exclusion” does not apply and granted NHK’s motion for summary judgment. Additionally, the district court denied Seagate the opportunity to amend and add indirect purchaser claims. Id. at 1279-80.

Seagate advanced several positions on appeal, including: “(1) that the FTAIA does not apply to any of its claims, (2) that the domestic effects of NHK’s price-fixing proximately caused Seagate’s antitrust injuries abroad, and (3) that at least a subset of it claims qualify as ‘import trade or commerce.’” Id. at 1280.

Decision

FTAIA Import Commerce Exclusion

For the “Import Commerce Exclusion” to apply, the alleged price-fixed product must have been directly imported in the United States. Previous court decisions have strongly suggested that for the Import Commerce Exclusion to apply the imported product must be an end-product. All incorporated parts of a final product do not allow the Import Commerce Exclusion to apply to them. Therefore, the Court held that because SAs are not an imported end-product; rather, imported as an incorporated product within the final end-product of hard disk drives the Import Commerce Exclusion does not apply. Id. at 1282-83.

FTAIA Domestic Effects Exception

The “Domestic Effects” exception has two strict requirements: (1) the anticompetitive conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on certain U.S based commerce, and (2) that effect give rise to an antitrust claim. Id. at 1283.

For the first prong, the Court held that the NHK’s guilty plea stating, “during the relevant period, the conspiracy had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on interstate and import trade commerce,” confirms that the first prong had been met. Further, the Court stated that the first prong does not require any analysis of plaintiff’s individual claim or injury and only focuses on if there was a direct and substantial effect on the U.S economy – which NHK has admitted in their guilty plea. Id. at 1284-85.

For prong two, the Court stated that Seagate must show that the harm of NHK’s conduct on U.S domestic commerce directly caused Seagate Thailand and Singapore to suffer overcharges on SAs because of NHK’s price-fixing. A court must analyze whether other actors or forces may have affected the foreign prices, and if so, the plaintiff has not met the second prong. The Court stated that most “Domestic Effects” exceptions fail because it is often hard to show the harmful effect on U.S domestic commerce proximately caused the foreign antitrust injury. However, the Court stated Seagate’s claim appears to be of the unique nature to satisfy prong two. The Court held that because Seagate controls the quarterly Request for Quotations – effectively controlling and setting Seagate Thailand and Singapore’s purchasing prices – the higher U.S prices for SAs caused by NHK’s price-fixing would have directly caused Seagate Thailand and Singapore to overpay. Seagate argued that this situation creates only one price between Seagate and Seagate Thailand and Singapore, and the U.S and foreign price was one in the same. Id. at 1285-87.

In conclusion, the Court determined the factual question of if the post Request for Quotation prices were actually set by Seagate, and limited what the foreign subsidiaries could pay, must be decided by the district court. While the Court suspects Seagate has presented enough evidence to demonstrate that, the Court remanded for the district court to assess that issue. Id. at 1287. Additionally, the Court distinguished Seagate’s allegations from past cases demonstrating why Seagate’s allegations may allege the unique situation where the Domestic Effects exception to the FTAIA applies. See id. at 1287-89.

Indirect Purchasers Claim

Lastly, the Court did not agree with the district court’s holding that Seagate did not plead enough facts to suggest that Seagate may have indirectly purchased SAs from Seagate Thailand. The Court held that the district court must decide if Seagate has alleged its high degree of control over Seagate Thailand and Singapore gives it standing to sue as an indirect purchaser of priced fixed SAs. Id. at 1289.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Court vacated the district court’s previous rulings and remanded for further proceedings because the Court believed Seagate may have presented enough evidence for the Domestic Effects exception to the FTAIA to apply. Id.

By Eric A. Rivas

Overview

On January 20, 2026, Judge Beth Phillips (W.D. Mo.) granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss a putative class action challenging pharmacy benefit managers’ (PBMs) alleged “rebate” and “steering” schemes under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and asserting a Robinson–Patman Act § 2(c) “commercial bribery” theory. The court held that, although plaintiffs adequately alleged Article III standing, they failed to plausibly plead a Sherman Act conspiracy because the complaint did not allege sufficiently “parallel” conduct to support an inference of agreement, and the Robinson–Patman claim failed for lack of antitrust standing because plaintiffs alleged consumer-type injuries rather than the competitor harms the statute protects. The court dismissed both counts.

Procedural Background

Plaintiffs—one individual consumer and two third‑party payors—filed a class action against three vertically integrated PBM groups affiliated with CVS/Caremark, UnitedHealth/OptumRx, and Express Scripts/Evernorth, along with related entities, alleging conspiracies (a) to raise drug prices through rebate agreements with drug manufacturers in exchange for favorable formulary placement and (b) to steer patients to the PBMs’ affiliated pharmacies. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of Article III standing and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, dismissing Count I (Sherman Act § 1) for failure to plausibly allege an agreement and Count II (Robinson–Patman § 2(c)) for lack of antitrust standing.

Factual Background

The court summarized the pharmaceutical distribution chain and PBMs’ roles in creating formularies and negotiating manufacturer rebates that can be tied to drug placement and patient cost sharing. Plaintiffs alleged the rebate model incentivizes higher list prices and formulary placement of higher‑priced drugs, while PBMs earn a percentage of rebate amounts. Plaintiffs further alleged that vertical integration enables PBMs to steer patients to affiliated pharmacies through plan design features and communications.

Plaintiffs identified three PBM groups—CVS/Caremark (including Zinc), UnitedHealth/OptumRx (including Emisar), and Express Scripts/Evernorth (including Ascent)—and alleged each operates as an integrated enterprise across PBM and pharmacy functions. The named plaintiffs were an individual consumer who purchased Tirosint at CVS and two plan sponsors (Iberia Parish School Board and the City of Laurel, Mississippi) whose pharmacy benefits were administered through PBMs.

Count I alleged a horizontal conspiracy across the three PBM groups to extract and retain supra-competitive rebates via “rebate aggregators” and to steer patients to affiliated pharmacies; Count II alleged a Robinson–Patman § 2(c) “commercial bribery” theory premised on manufacturers’ rebates as inducements for formulary placement.

Discussion

Standing

The court treated defendants’ standing challenge as a facial attack and applied Article III’s requirements of injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability. It concluded that each named plaintiff alleged payment of higher prices for prescription drugs than would have been paid absent defendants’ conduct, satisfying injury-in-fact at the pleading stage. The court also held traceability was adequately alleged because price increases were plausibly pleaded as a response to the formulary–rebate scheme exerting a coercive effect on manufacturers, even if manufacturers set wholesale prices.

Addressing standing scope, the court explained Plaintiffs could challenge the alleged scheme beyond the specific drugs they purchased where the same alleged conduct plausibly implicated a common set of concerns across class members. The court viewed the issue as closer to typicality/adequacy but, even if framed as standing, found sufficient similarity to proceed.

Sherman Act § 1 (Count I)

Applying Twombly and Iqbal, the court emphasized that parallel conduct, plus “something more,” is generally required to support an inference of agreement under Section 1. Mere similarity in business practices over time, without temporal alignment and similarity of conduct, is insufficient. The court found Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege parallel conduct for either the rebate‑aggregator or steering theories.

For the rebate theory, plaintiffs alleged the three groups created rebate aggregators over different years—Express Scripts’ Ascent in 2019, CVS’s Zinc in 2020, and UHG’s Emisar in 2021—and began exclusionary formulary practices years apart (CVS in 2012, Express Scripts in 2014, UHG in 2016). The court held these staggered timelines undermined any inference of parallel conduct.

For the steering theory, plaintiffs relied on patient communications that differed in content and occurred across 2020–2024, again defeating parallelism as to both timing and substance. Because plaintiffs failed to allege parallel conduct, their circumstantial conspiracy theory could not proceed, and the court dismissed Count I.

Robinson–Patman Act § 2(c) (Count II)

The court dismissed the § 2(c) claim for lack of antitrust standing, explaining that Robinson–Patman protects competitors from discriminatory pricing and commercial bribery practices that distort competition among buyers or sellers, not consumer-type injuries like paying higher retail prices. Plaintiffs, acting as ultimate consumers/plan sponsors, alleged increased drug costs stemming from the rebate scheme, which did not constitute the kind of injury the statute targets.

Key Takeaways

• A plausible showing of Section 1 parallel conduct requires sufficient similarity in conduct and close temporal proximity. Courts may reject parallelism where the defendants’ alleged conduct is staggered by a year or more or differs in substance.
• Robinson–Patman § 2(c) remains narrowly focused on competitor harms and market access distortions, not downstream consumer price effects, limiting § 2(c) as a vehicle for plan sponsors or consumers challenging rebate-driven pricing.

Conclusion

The Western District of Missouri dismissed the complaint in its entirety: it held that Plaintiffs had Article III standing but failed to plausibly allege a Section 1 conspiracy due to the absence of adequately pleaded parallel conduct, and it dismissed the Robinson–Patman § 2(c) claim for lack of antitrust standing because Plaintiffs alleged consumer-type injuries rather than competitor harms. The court subsequently entered judgment for Defendants.

By Wesley Sweger

On January 30, 2026, Judge Hector Gonzalez of the Eastern District of New York dismissed an antitrust action brought by four academics against several large publishers of peer-reviewed scholarly journals and their trade association, the International Association of Scientific, Technical, and Medical Publishers (“STM”). The court granted three foreign parent entities’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead an unlawful agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

Background

Plaintiffs alleged that major scholarly publishers—including Elsevier, Wiley, Sage, Springer Nature, Taylor & Francis entities, and Wolters Kluwer entities—coordinated through STM to reduce competition in the publication of scholarly journal articles. The theory centered on STM’s “International Ethical Principles for Scholarly Publication,” which plaintiffs characterized as binding restraints affecting manuscript submission and scholarly labor.

Specifically, Plaintiffs pointed to three purported “rules” drawn from the STM Principles as the centerpiece of the challenged conduct: the “Unpaid Peer Review Rule” (publishers allegedly do not compensate scholars for peer review services), the “Single Submission Rule” (authors allegedly may not submit manuscripts to more than one journal at a time), and the “Gag Rule” (authors are allegedly restricted from sharing their research while a manuscript is under submission and review). Plaintiffs alleged these practices suppressed competition and enabled publishers to increase their profits and maintain market dominance.

All defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Three foreign defendants—Informa PLC, Taylor & Francis Group, Ltd., and Wolters Kluwer N.V.—also moved under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Defendants

The court addressed personal jurisdiction first and dismissed the foreign parent entities. Because the Sherman Act authorizes nationwide service of process, the due process inquiry focused on each defendant’s contacts with the United States as a whole. The court found that Plaintiffs relied largely on generalized allegations that the foreign entities transacted business in the United States and participated in the alleged conspiracy. The court found those allegations insufficient, particularly where defendants submitted sworn declarations describing certain entities as holding companies without U.S. offices, employees, or direct publishing operations.

Plaintiffs advanced two additional theories. First, under a principal-agency theory, they argued that the foreign parents’ control over their U.S. subsidiaries permitted the court to impute the subsidiaries’ domestic contacts to the parents. The court rejected this argument, explaining that Plaintiffs alleged only corporate ownership and generalized control, not specific facts showing that the subsidiaries’ contacts could be attributed to the parents. Second, Plaintiffs invoked a conspiracy-based theory, contending that participation in the alleged conspiracy supplied the necessary forum contacts. The court declined to apply that theory here, finding that Plaintiffs had not pled specific facts tying each foreign parent to the development, adoption, or promulgation of the STM Principles.

Failure to State a Sherman Act Claim

Turning to the merits, the court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim for failure to plausibly allege an agreement in restraint of trade. Plaintiffs alleged that the STM Principles are direct evidence of a conspiracy because they are “a document or conversation explicitly manifesting the existence of [an] agreement,” but the court concluded that reading the STM Principles as anything other than “a collection of policies and guidelines concerning best practices” required “a significant inferential leap.” 2026 WL 248040 at *15–16.

Applying that framework, the court evaluated each of Plaintiffs’ three “rules,” concluding Plaintiffs’ interpretation was not supported by the text. As to the “Single Submission Rule,” for example, the court found the relevant Principle’s “plain language . . . demonstrates that it is designed to guide, not govern,” and that, even under an “extreme reading,” it was “at most, a straightforward reminder” rather than an “explicit policy, or rule” prohibiting competitive conduct. Id. at *19.

The court reached a similar conclusion regarding the “Gag Rule.” It held that Plaintiffs’ reading depended on construing the provision “in a vacuum,” contrary to the “tenor and structure” of the Principles as “guidelines” and “best practices.” Id. at *20. The court also noted that a straightforward reading of the Principle underlying the “Gag Rule” is that its aim was not to “gag” authors but to “protect authors by establishing a norm” of confidentiality before publication. Id. at *19.

Because the court found none of plaintiffs’ three purported “rules” constituted direct evidence of a conspiracy, it “ha[d] no occasion to reach” whether any alleged restraint was reasonable or unreasonable. Id. at *16.

By Anna Ali

Former undergraduate students filed a case against large universities in the Northern District of Illinois for violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act for conspiring to suppress competition on financial aid. Corzo v. Brown Univ., No. 22 C 125, 2026 WL 91424, at *1. On January 12, 2026, Judge Matthew Kennelly denied the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the merits and on the statute of limitations, and Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Defendant University of Pennsylvania’s (UPenn) withdrawal defense. Id.  

The case stems out of the Defendants’ involvement and activities in the 568 Presidents Group. Id. at *2. Universities and colleges created the 568 Presidents Group in 1998 after Congress enacted a temporary antitrust exemption—named the 568 Exemption—that permitted some agreements regarding financial aid between two or more institutions of higher education where students are admitted on a need-blind basis. Id. at *1-2. Congress enacted this exemption in 1994 after the Department of Justice Antitrust Division brought a civil antitrust enforcement action in 1991 against eight Ivy League Schools and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Id. at *1. The lawsuit ultimately ended in a consent decree that limited collusion on financial aid. Id.

Since its creation, the 568 Group has collaborated on common financial aid principles and practices, with Congress renewing the 568 Exemption several times. Id. at *4. The 568 Group adopted the Consensus Methodology (CM), which was a set of common standards for fifteen areas in determining a family’s ability to pay, developed Professional Judgment Guidelines to standardize the manner in how local professional judgment was used in need analysis, and created a Technical Committee to review and revise both sets of standards. Id. at *2-4.

On January 9, 2022, the students initiated this lawsuit, alleging that the 568 Group violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a price-fixing cartel that is designed to reduce or eliminate financial aid as a locus of competition, and that in fact has artificially inflated the net price of attendance for students receiving financial aid. Id. On October 1, 2022, Congress declined to renew the 568 Exemption and, a month later, the 568 Group formally dissolved. Id. at *4.

The Court Denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court rejected Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find for them on the elements of a Section 1 claim under the Sherman Act. Id. at *1. The court held that to succeed under Section 1, Plaintiffs must show: “(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy; (2) a resultant unreasonable restraint of trade . . .; and (3) an accompanying injury.” Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993)).

In this case, the court found that Plaintiffs provided enough evidence to convince a reasonable jury Defendants entered into an agreement due to the fact that Defendants were members of the 568 Group. 2026 WL 91424, at *6. Further, under the quick-look doctrine, the court held that a reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ conduct resulted in an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at *7-16. Moreover, the court held Plaintiffs exhibited enough evidence to show an injury for the purposes of summary judgment. Id. at *16-18. Finally, the court rejected all of Defendants’ defenses that would preclude a jury from finding for Plaintiffs. Id. at *18-22.

The Court Found that a Jury Could Reasonably Find that Defendants Entered into an Agreement by Being Part of the 568 Group.  

The court held a jury reasonably could find the agreement element satisfied due to the undisputed fact that all the Defendants were members of the 568 Group and collaborated on devising common financial aid practices, which they all at least partially implemented. Id. at *6. For the first element to be proven, there must be concerted action that restrains trade. Id. at *5.

Here, the court rejected the Defendants’ arguments that students could not prove the agreement element because Plaintiffs could not show that there was an overarching conspiracy to artificially inflate the net price of attendance. Id. Instead, the court held that Plaintiffs did not need to show an overarching conspiracy. Id. Rather, Plaintiffs only needed to show that there was an agreement as Section 1 does not require any particular kind of agreement to trigger antitrust scrutiny. Id. The court held that Defendants triggered antitrust scrutiny by simply being members of the 568 Group. Id. at *6. Furthermore, the court held that there was enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the 568 Group agreed on and adhered to the Consensus Approach to avoid bidding wars based on the reports and internal communications in the record highlighting the perils of failing to follow the approach. Id. at *6-7.

The Court Held that, Using the “Quick Look” Mode of Analysis, Plaintiffs Produced Enough Evidence to Show an Unreasonable Restraint of Trade for the Purposes of Summary Judgment.

The court held that there was enough evidence for a jury to reasonably find that the Defendants had the market power to artificially increase prices and harm competition. Id. at *16. Section 1 prohibits agreement only if it unreasonably restrains trade. Id. at *7. The court held that the inquiry is confined to a consideration of impact on competitive conditions. Id.

Here, using the “quick look” mode of analysis, the court held that Plaintiffs presented enough evidence supporting the rough contours of a relevant market, high enough market shares to infer market power, and the proposed effects of that market power in the form of an artificial price increase. Id. at *16. Thus, the court held that a jury could reasonably find that the challenged agreement harmed competition. Id.  

The Court Held that the “Quick Look” Mode of Analysis was the Appropriate Vehicle to Analyze Defendants’ Conduct.

The court, rejecting Plaintiffs’ arguments of applying per se condemnation to this case, held that “quick look” analysis of Defendants’ conduct was appropriate. Id. at *8. The court held that per se treatment is appropriate only when the courts have “amassed ‘considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue’ and ‘can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances.’” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 89 (2021). For other agreements, “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the[y] would have an anticompetitive effect . . . but there are nonetheless reasons to examine potential procompetitive justifications.” Agnew, 683 F.3d at 336. These agreements should not be condemned per se but can be assessed with a “quick look,” which typically entails shifting the initial burden to the defendants to rebut the presumption that the agreement is anticompetitive. 2026 WL 91424, at *7. If the defendants meet that burden, a full rule of reason analysis may be necessary. Id.

Here, the court found the lack of judicial experience with the higher education market cautioned strongly against per se classification in this case as Plaintiffs, instead of arguing that the challenged agreement fixed prices or components of pricing, argue that the agreement had an effect of fixing a component of pricing. Id., at *8. The court found that the agreement at issue was one on general standards that arguably—not obviously—narrow decision-making on a single aspect of pricing that can be undone by decisions regarding other aspects of pricing. Id. at *9. Further, the court held that no other court has applied the per se rule to another agreement with a similarly attenuated relationship to price fixing, which cut against Plaintiffs’ arguments that per se condemnation was appropriate here. Id. Thus, the court decided to analyze the agreement under the “quick look” mode of analysis. Id.

The Court Found that Plaintiffs Produced Enough Evidence to Show, that in the Relevant Market, Defendants had Enough Market Power to Cause Harm to Competition.

The court found that Plaintiffs provided enough evidence to show that Defendants’ agreement caused harm to competition. Id. at *16. The court held that a plaintiff has two ways to meet its initial burden to show that an agreement harms competition. Id. at *9. One is to provide evidence of the rough contours of a relevant market, the defendant’s market power, and the detrimental effects of the assertion of that power. Id. The other is to provide a precise market definition and enough market power to presume harm to the market. Id.

In this case, under the first method, the court upheld Plaintiffs’ market definition of twenty-two “elite, private universities whose average rankings in the U.S. News & World Report [USNWR] put them in the top 25 for universities during the Class Period” as the rough contours of a relevant market. Id. at *10, *15. Plaintiffs put forth two main kinds of evidence: a regression model characterized as a modified version of the “Hypothetical Monopolist test” created by their expert and the expert’s analysis of Brown Shoe factors as practical indicia that help define the relevant market. Id. at *10, *12.

The court rejected Defendants’ arguments that the regression model did not analyze how students would react if the universities raised prices, or provide any “statistical test of cross-elasticity of demand”, that is, assess product interchangeability. Id. at *11. The court held that a jury reasonably could infer from that evidence that the students could not defeat the price increase because products outside the candidate market were not sufficiently interchangeable. Id.

Further, the court found that Defendants’ three main arguments against Plaintiffs’ expert’s Brown Shoe analysis were not persuasive enough to prevent a jury from reasonably accepting his conclusions. Id. at *14. First, the court rejected the Defendants’ argument that the cutoff USNWR ranking of top 25 was wholly arbitrary, and instead found that the point of the analysis was to show that the market power was not arbitrary. Id. The universities failed to rebut this showing because they failed to explain why the expert’s analysis was wrong. Id.

Second, the court rejected Defendants’ arguments that schools compete on multiple dimensions not captured by the USNWR, which suggested the existence of smaller markets. Id. The court found this argument to be uncompelling stating that, while there may be individual consumers who view their options differently, antitrust laws are concerned with aggregates. Id. Thus, Defendants failed to show that consumers, as an aggregate population, do not view the elite, private universities as a separate market. Id.

Finally, the court rejected Defendants’ challenges to the expert’s interpretations as contradictory. Id. Specifically, Defendants pointed to three public universities that had a higher win-rate than thirteen elite, private universities. Id. While the court found that some of the studies, viewed in isolation, raised some questions about market definition, considering all of the metrics together showed that schools that appeared to be in the market for one reason may be excluded for another reason. Id. at *15. Thus, the court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently proved the rough contours of the market. Id.

Next, the court held that Plaintiffs sufficiently showed that Defendants had enough market power to cause the anticompetitive effects that they proffer. Id. at *16. Plaintiffs’ expert used three calculations to show that the Defendants controlled roughly 77-79% of the market. Id. at *15. The court held that the requisite percentage of the market might depend in part on other characteristics of the market. Id. In this case, the expert showed that the market was relatively stable due to high barriers to entry making market share a relatively good indication of market power. Id. at *16. These high barriers the court listed include well-established research and post-graduate programs, large endowments, and higher quality faculty. Id. For that reason, the court concluded that the expert’s market share calculations in the 70% range were sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of market power. Id.

Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs’ use of their expert’s regression to show an artificial price increase provided enough evidence to show detrimental effects of Defendants’ assertion of their market power for the purposes of summary judgment. Id. The court found that the universities’ methodological challenges did not preclude a jury from reasonably finding that the regression showed an artificial increase in prices. Id. The court further rejected Defendants’ attempts to challenge discrete parts of the agreement as not possibly harming competition. Id. The court held that it would not be appropriate to prevent the jury from viewing the alleged conspiracy in its entirety. Id.

The Court Held that Plaintiffs Demonstrated Article III Standing and Antitrust Standing.

The court held that the students had Article III standing and antitrust standing to bring the claims before the court. Id. at *18. Article III standing limits the federal courts’ jurisdiction to cases involving an injury-in-fact traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at *17. The court held that monetary harm, like paying an artificially inflated tuition cost, qualified as an injury-in-fact. Id.

The court rejected Defendants’ arguments that some plaintiffs did not pay tuition themselves and instead had tuition paid for by a parent as a gift. Id. The court held that when the students were admitted to universities, they alone incurred the legal obligation to pay tuition. Id. The parents, in contrast, had no contract or agreement with the universities. Id. Per the court’s finding, as far as the law is concerned, the parents would be seen as gifting or loaning the money to the students. See Rynasko v. N.Y. Univ., 63 F.4th 186, 195 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2023). The students then paid their tuition with that money and suffered an injury when they paid too much. 2026 WL 91424, at *17.

The court rejected Defendants’ arguments on lack of antitrust standing for similar reasons. Id. at *18. Defendants invoked the Illinois Brick doctrine stating, “a bright-line rule that authorizes suits by direct purchasers but bars suits by indirect purchasers.” Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 587 U.S. 273, 279 (2019) (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977)). Defendants argued that students who had parents pay were not direct purchasers, but rather gift recipients. 2026 WL 91424, at *17. The court once again held that the students were the ones paying due to their legal obligation to the universities. Id. at *18.Thus, the court held that the students had standing to sue the universities, not the parents. Id.

The Court Rejected Application of Affirmative Defenses on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

The court then turned to Defendants’ affirmative defenses as to why summary judgment should be granted in their favor. Id. The court first examined and rejected Defendants’ arguments that some of the named Defendants were immune from antitrust liability under the 568 Exemption. Id. Then, the court reviewed and provided its reasoning as to why Defendants’ statute of limitations defense did not apply. Id.

The Court Found the 568 Exemption is not Applicable to Defendants’ Agreement.

The court rejected arguments put forth by some of the named Defendants that they were immune from liability because they were individually need-blind and therefore protected regardless of the practices of other 568 Group Members. Id. The 568 Exemption provides that “[i]t shall not be unlawful under the antitrust laws for 2 or more institutions of higher education at which all students admitted are admitted on a need-blind basis, to agree or attempt to agree” to four enumerated types of agreements. Improving America’s Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, § 568(a), 108 Stat. 3518, 4060 (1994). Antitrust exemptions are to be strictly construed. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973). By its text, the exemption protects agreements, not individual universities. And it only protects certain agreements—those between “2 or more institutions of higher education at which all students admitted are admitted on a need-blind basis.” § 568(a). The court held that the exemption requires all of the “2 or more institutions” to admit all students on a need-blind basis. 2026 WL 91424, at *18.

In this case, the court held that for the 568 Exemption to apply, every institution in the agreement must admit all students on a need-blind basis. Id. at *19. The court found that, because it is undisputed that some of the 568 Group members did not do so, none of the universities may benefit from the 568 Exemption’s protections in this case. Id.

The Court Rejected Defendants’ Affirmative Defense that the Statute of Limitations had Run. 

Finally, the court rejected Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at *21. The timeliness of antitrust claims is governed by the Clayton Act’s limitations provision, which states that “[a]ny action to enforce any [antitrust] cause of action . . . shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued.” 15 U.S.C. § 15b; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971). A cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 810 (2024) (internal quotations omitted).

In the Seventh Circuit, the antitrust statute of limitations “is qualified by the discovery rule,” a federal common law rule that postpones accrual until the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury and its cause through the exercise of reasonable diligence. In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); see Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644 (2010).

In this case, the court found that even a reasonably diligent plaintiff would be unlikely to detect that they had been injured at all. 2026 WL 91424, at *21. The court held that a student receiving their financial award, even one lower than they had hoped for, has no reason to suspect that their award should have been higher. Id. The court explained that the students who even register that the award seems low would likely attribute this to one of the many opaque and nebulous factors that go into financial aid calculation. Id. Even if the information about the 568 Group was publicly available for years, the court found that it did not necessarily mean that it all would have been known by a reasonably diligent plaintiff. Id.

The Court Denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to UPenn’s Withdrawal Defense.

The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of UPenn’s withdrawal defense based on its resignation letter from the 568 Group. Id. at *23. Per the court, generally, affirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators are sufficient to establish withdrawal or abandonment. Id. at *22. Implicit in that formulation is the principle that merely ceasing to participate in the conspiracy is not enough. Id.

Based on these principles, the Seventh Circuit has held that a conspirator may not effectuate a legally effective withdrawal by merely announcing that it is ceasing to participate. United States v. Nagelvoort, 856 F.3d 1117, 1129 (7th Cir. 2017). For communication of withdrawal alone to suffice, it must “disavow the conspiracy and its criminal objectives.” Id. (quoting United States v. Vallone, 698 F.3d 416, 494 (7th Cir. 2012)).

In this case, the court found that UPenn’s resignation letter alone was not a legally effective withdrawal as a matter of law because the letter was a far cry from repudiation. 2026 WL 91424, at *23. The court found that the part of the letter that created the most tension with Defendants’ conspiracy was UPenn’s explanation that it felt it needed “increased flexibility in its need analysis.” Id. Still, the court found that a question existed on whether UPenn took an affirmative act inconsistent with the goals of the conspiracy by resuming competition. Id. For example, UPenn provided evidence that it announced several discrete changes to its financial aid policies, including an increase of income threshold for students to qualify for UPenn’s “highly aided” program. Id. For that reason, the court held that a jury could reasonably find that UPenn’s expansion of its highly aided program was inconsistent with the goals of avoiding bidding wars. Id. at *24.

By Cheryl Johnson

Plaintiffs’ consumer class action alleged Google foreclosed competition in the general search market with exclusive dealing agreements making Google the default general search engine on various devices and browsers and with carriers, violating Section 2 and UCL Section 17200 and constituting unjust enrichment. 2026 WL 160536, at *1-3. Google’s motion to dismiss the action was largely denied, ruling that antitrust standing was properly alleged, but finding the fraudulent concealment pleading deficient.

Plaintiffs’ allegations that in the absence of Google’s challenged agreements that better search engines might have emerged that offered better compensation, more privacy and less ads plausibly alleged antitrust standing. Id. at *1. Google’s objections that the allegations were speculative, theoretical, and fanciful were rejected, citing the existence of rival search engines with rewards, better privacy and fewer ads though the quality of their search results may have been suboptimal due to the challenged agreements. Id. at *4-5. Google’s failure to implement better privacy protections did not show otherwise, as Google did not face the competitive pressures in the but-for world. Id. at *4. Describing Plaintiffs’ but-for world as unclear and ill conceived, Google asserted that it would still be the default search in that world due to its superior quality. Id. at *6. But the court ruled that even if Google had a lawful advantage due to superior quality, it was “not entitled to maintain and magnify that advantage” through anticompetitive conduct and agreements. Id. at *6.

Google contended that its default agreements going back to 2005 made the claims untimely. The court disagreed, finding the time tolled both by the government’s case against Google and the continuing violations doctrine under both federal and state law. Id. at *9 and n.3. However, plaintiffs’ allegations of fraudulent concealment were dismissed as inactionable puffery and lacking the required specificity and explanation of falsity. Id. at *11-12.

Today, the Justice Department and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) filed a statement of interest in Collision Communications Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., et al. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The statement reaffirms the importance of preserving incentives to innovate, which are key to growth and dynamic competition in the U.S. economy and fundamental to the U.S. patent system.

“Innovation is core to dynamic competition, and vigorous competition is central to the success of the American economy. Policies that preserve incentives to innovate are therefore vital to safeguarding competition,” said Deputy Assistant Attorney General Dina Kallay of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “We are pleased to partner with our USPTO colleagues to address these critical issues and support innovators, both big and small.”

“The USPTO again joined the Justice Department in filing a statement of interest because a thorough evaluation as to whether a patent owner is entitled to injunctive relief is foundational to the exclusionary right a patent confers,” said John A. Squires, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. “Injunctions prevent ongoing and irreparable harm to innovators and the innovation economy, and ensure that legal remedies can stop unlawfully copied inventions from continuing to harm innovators.”

Today’s statement of interest explains that unduly limiting patentees’ ability to seek injunctive relief to block patent infringement undermines the incentive to innovate. A patentee’s right to exclude is grounded in the U.S. Constitution. Non-practicing patentees should not be categorically denied the opportunity for injunctive relief and, under certain circumstances, such patentees can demonstrate irreparable harm and the inadequacy of monetary damages to compensate for the harm of continuing infringement. The statement was filed in support of neither party and does not take a position on the merits or the ultimate outcome of the questions at issue in the case.

The Antitrust Division routinely files statements of interest and amicus briefs in federal court. These statements are available on the Division’s website.

The Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, together with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York, filed a civil antitrust lawsuit today challenging The New York and Presbyterian Hospital’s (New York-Presbyterian) anticompetitive contract restrictions that deny New Yorkers the choice of lower cost healthcare options.

The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, charges New York-Presbyterian with violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act. New York-Presbyterian is the largest and most powerful hospital system in New York City. It owns and operates eight hospitals and many outpatient facilities in the New York City area. The suit seeks to enjoin New York-Presbyterian from imposing contractual restrictions that preclude insurers and employers from offering New Yorkers budget-conscious health insurance plans. This is the second case the Division has brought this year to ensure that Americans can access healthcare markets with robust competition and receive high quality, affordable care.

“Millions of New Yorkers pay more for healthcare because of these anticompetitive practices,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “At the direction of President Trump, this Justice Department will fight relentlessly to ensure that Americans get the healthcare they need without facing exorbitant costs.”

“Healthcare is a vital sector of our nation’s economy that touches the life of every single American,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Omeed A. Assefi of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division. “New York-Presbyterian has known for years that the American consumer wants budget-conscious health plans that reduce healthcare costs. But rather than offer consumers choice, New York-Presbyterian uses its market power to protect its margins, impede competition from rival hospitals, and prevent employers and unions from creating these plans. The Antitrust Division will continue to hold hospitals violating the antitrust laws accountable. I am grateful for the dedicated work of our staff and the Southern District of New York in this matter.”

“The high cost of healthcare is frustrating to every New Yorker,” said U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton for the Southern District of New York. “Our Office will continue to work with our partners in the Antitrust Division to investigate and confront anticompetitive practices that contribute to higher healthcare costs.”

As alleged in the complaint, New York-Presbyterian imposes plan restrictions in its contracts with payors that prevent payors from offering plans that, for example, do not include New York-Presbyterian or do not feature New York-Presbyterian in the most favored tier of the plan. New York-Presbyterian even forbids payors from offering lower copays when patients chose to receive care at New York-Presbyterian’s — often lower priced — rivals. These unlawful restrictions insulate New York-Presbyterian from price competition, limiting its rival hospitals from competing for patients based on lower prices or better value, and prevent the development of budget-conscious plans for New Yorkers that are available in other parts of the United States.

The Federal Trade Commission issued a policy statement today announcing that the Commission will not bring an enforcement action under the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA Rule) against certain website and online service operators that collect, use, and disclose personal information for the sole purpose of determining a user’s age via age verification technologies.

The COPPA Rule requires operators of commercial websites or online services directed to children under 13, and operators with actual knowledge they are collecting personal information from a child, to provide notice of their information practices to parents and to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting, using, or disclosing personal information collected from a child under 13.

Age verification technologies play a critical role in helping parents as they monitor their children’s online activities. Since COPPA was enacted in 1998, there’s been an explosion in the use of internet-connected technologies by children. To help parents navigate the challenges associated with their children’s online activities, some states have started requiring some websites and online services to use age verification mechanisms to help determine the age of users. But as noted at the FTC’s recent workshop on age verification technologies, some age verification technologies may require the collection of personal information from children, prompting questions about whether such activities could violate the COPPA Rule.

“Age verification technologies are some of the most child-protective technologies to emerge in decades,” said Christopher Mufarrige, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “Our statement incentivizes operators to use these innovative tools, empowering parents to protect their children online.”

The policy statement states that the Commission will not bring an enforcement action under the COPPA Rule against operators of general audience sites and services and mixed audience sites and services that collect, use, or disclose personal information for the sole purpose of determining a user’s age without first obtaining verifiable parental consent—if they comply with certain conditions, specifically that they:

• do not use or disclose information collected for age verification purposes for any purpose except to determine a user’s age;
• do not retain this information longer than necessary to fulfill the age verification purposes, and delete such information promptly thereafter;
• disclose information collected for age verification purposes only to those third parties the operator has taken reasonable steps to determine are capable of maintaining the confidentiality, security, and integrity of the information, including by obtaining certain written assurances from those third parties;
• provide clear notice to parents and children of the information collected for age verification purposes;
• employ reasonable security safeguards for information collected for age verification purposes; and
• take reasonable steps to determine that any product, service, method, or third party utilized for age verification purposes is likely to provide reasonably accurate results as to the user’s age.

The policy statement indicates that the Commission intends to initiate a review of the COPPA Rule to address age verification mechanisms. The policy statement will remain effective until the Commission publishes final rule amendments on this issue in the Federal Register, or until otherwise withdrawn.

The Commission vote to issue the policy statement was 2-0.

The lead staffer on this matter is Manmeet Dhindsa from the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

The Federal Trade Commission announced today that it is seeking public comment on an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) concerning the agency’s Rule Concerning the Use of Prenotification Negative Option Plans, commonly known as the Negative Option Rule. The ANPRM asks the public: to weigh in on the current Rule; whether proposed amendments are needed; and about potential regulatory alternatives to address deceptive or unfair negative option practices.

Negative options are a common form of marketing in which the absence of affirmative consumer action constitutes consent to be charged for goods or services. Negative options are widely offered and can provide benefits to both sellers and consumers. However, such practices can harm consumers when companies make misleading or inadequate disclosures, bill consumers without their consent, or make cancellation difficult or impossible. The Commission continues to receive thousands of complaints each year — including more than 100,000 complaints in the past five years—about negative options and related practices.

“Negative option subscriptions can offer procompetitive features to consumers and the marketplace more broadly by lowering transaction costs and ensuring consumers receive uninterrupted service,” said Christopher Mufarrige, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “The Commission’s enforcement track record suggests, however, that negative option subscriptions continue to be plagued by difficult cancellation processes, unlawful retention tactics, and a suite of other impediments that prevent consumers from easily switching or ending subscription services. Neither consumers nor competition are protected when consumers are enrolled in programs that they either do not want or cannot cancel.”

The ANPRM announced today, seeks public comment to determine whether and how the Commission should use its authority to address negative option marketing, including whether the agency should amend the current rule to address deceptive or unfair acts or practices. Specifically, the FTC is seeking the following information to ensure its rulemaking adequately responds to concerns from both consumers and industry:

• Marketplace for Negative Option Programs. The Commission seeks information on the extent to which businesses market products and services using negative options and how these negative option programs operate;
• Negative Option Practices. The Commission seeks information on practices that 1) prevent consumers from understanding the terms of a negative option program, 2) result in consumers being enrolled without their express informed consent, or 3) deter consumers from canceling their enrollments, and whether such practices are prevalent in the marketplace;
• Addressing Unlawful Practices. The Commission seeks information on specific ways to address unfair or deceptive negative option practices, including retaining the current Rule, adopting provisions of the vacated 2024 Rule or some other provisions, or implementing alternatives to regulation (such as educating consumers and businesses on how to avoid unlawful negative option practices), and the costs and benefits of each of these measures; and
• Supporting Studies and Data. The Commission encourages commenters to submit supporting market studies, economic data, or other empirical evidence.

Once the ANPRM has been published in the Federal Register, consumers can submit comments electronically for 30 days. Consumers also may submit comments in writing by following the instructions in the “Supplementary Information” section of the Federal Register notice. The primary attorney on this matter is Hong Park in the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection.

The Federal Trade Commission is sending letters to 97 auto groups nationwide, warning them that the prices they advertise must be the total price—including all mandatory fees—that consumers will be required to pay.

The letters encourage dealers to review their advertising and pricing practices, including ensuring advertised prices include all fees consumers will be required to pay when buying a vehicle. At a minimum, this includes evaluating advertised prices to ensure they match actual prices charged to consumers. The FTC will continue to monitor the marketplace, the letters state, and will take additional action as warranted to ensure compliance with the FTC Act and other rules the Commission enforces.

“The Trump-Vance FTC is committed to preventing auto dealers from misleading consumers with low advertised prices and then adding on mandatory fees at the end of the purchasing process,” said Christopher Mufarrige, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection. “The FTC will remain focused on monitoring auto dealerships to ensure that the market functions efficiently and competitors are transparently competing on price.”

The letters are part of the FTC’s ongoing work to ensure price transparency across multiple markets, including rental housing, ticketing and hotels, grocery and delivery services, and auto sales and leasing. To help support affordability in the marketplace, the agency is dedicated to ensuring that consumers only pay the advertised price for products and services, and are not subject to undisclosed fees, hidden charges or other illegal conduct.

The letters the FTC sent to the auto dealers cite several examples of illegal pricing practices in the auto industry including:

• advertising a price that does not reflect all required fees,
• advertising a price that reflects rebates or discounts not available to all consumers,
• advertising a price that fails to take into account the amount of an additional required down payment,
• conditioning the advertised price on consumers using dealer financing,
• requiring consumers to buy additional items not reflected in the advertised price, and
• advertising unavailable or non-existent vehicles.

The letters also note several pending actions the FTC has brought to address deceptive pricing practices in the auto industry including cases against Lindsay Chevrolet, Leader Automotive Group and Asbury Automotive Group.

Today, Federal Trade Commission Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson directed FTC staff to form a Healthcare Task Force that will engage in a coordinated, integrated approach to healthcare enforcement and advocacy to protect American patients, healthcare workers, and taxpayers.

In a memorandum, Chairman Ferguson directed the FTC’s Bureaus of Competition, Consumer Protection and Economics, as well as the Office of Policy Planning and Office of Technology to form the Healthcare Task Force.

The Healthcare Task Force will:

• Lead targeted enforcement and advocacy initiatives focused on key priorities;
• Devise coordinated agencywide strategies on investigations;
• Take a proactive and strategic approach to identifying amicus and statement of interest opportunities; and
• Identify emerging issues and new priority areas for enforcement and advocacy.

The Healthcare Task Force will also seek to expand its membership to include other agencies and law enforcement partners, including the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice.

The formation of the FTC’s Healthcare Task Force is the Commission’s latest action to “create a more competitive, innovative, affordable, and higher quality healthcare system” as directed by President Trump’s executive order. In the last year, the FTC has secured several wins for Americans, including:

• A landmark settlement with Express Scripts, Inc., and its affiliated entities requiring them to adopt changes to their business practices that increase transparency and are expected to lower patients’ out-of-pocket costs for drugs like insulin by up to $7 billion over 10 years;
• A successful challenge against Edwards’ proposed acquisition of JenaValve that preserves competition on innovation and product quality;
• An abandonment of the proposed merger of Alcon and Lensar, preserving competition on price and innovation;
• Securing $145 million in consumer redress from companies alleged to have misled millions of consumers seeking health insurance into purchasing indemnity, telemedicine, and health discount plans; and
• Taking action against substance-abuse treatment facilities that used telemarketers to impersonate other facilities and funnel consumers with substance-abuse disorders from recommended, local facilities to their own, and securing $2.4 million in redress for consumers.

In standing up the Healthcare Task Force, Chairman Ferguson will continue the FTC’s efforts to address existing and emerging consumer-protection and competition issues across the healthcare industry.

NEW YORK — California Attorney General Rob Bonta today issued a statement on the resumption of states’ landmark trial against Live Nation, the parent company of Ticketmaster, to hold the concert giant accountable for harming consumers and the live music industry through its anticompetitive conduct. In 2024, Attorney General Bonta, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), and a bipartisan coalition of attorneys general filed a lawsuit against Live Nation alleging that its strong dominance over ticketing and concert amphitheater markets has allowed it to engage in a wide variety of anticompetitive behaviors that have harmed artists, their fans, and the venues that support them. The trial in this case started on March 2, and on March 9, U.S. DOJ announced a settlement with Live Nation — an action promptly rejected by a bipartisan group of attorneys general. 

“California and a bipartisan coalition of states today head back to trial to hold Live Nation accountable for the harm it has caused to the live music industry and to American consumers nationwide. Live Nation has manipulated the market, hurt artists, fans, and businesses nationwide, all while getting richer — not because it is better, but because it has acted illegally. Ask almost anyone: The stories of expensive and frustrating interactions with Ticketmaster are many. This is by design,” said Attorney General Bonta. “California is excited to get back to work, present new evidence to the jury, and to fight for a better deal for consumers. Any resolution in this case must actually serve consumers, the marketplace, and the law.”

Attorney General Bonta will never step away from California’s responsibility to look out for the economic wellbeing of the people. Allowing big corporations to raise prices and push competitors out of the marketplace with impunity will only worsen the affordability crisis felt by Americans.

BACKGROUND

The 2024 lawsuit alleges Live Nation violated Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which prohibit anticompetitive agreements and monopolization. Monopolization offenses occur when a single firm maintains an unlawful monopoly, for example by using its control of the market to exclude rivals and harm competition just like in this case. In addition, the complaint alleges violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. In the lawsuit, the coalition alleges that Live Nation has:

• Harmed fans through higher fees. Fans’ ticketing experience — from buying a ticket to showtime — is also worse than it would be if the industry was competitive.
• Maintained its monopoly in ticketing markets by locking up venues through restrictive long-term, exclusive agreements and threats that venues will lose access to Live Nation-controlled tours and artists if they sign with a rival ticketer.
• Leveraged its extensive network of major concert amphitheaters to force artists to select Live Nation as their promoter instead of its rivals, harming competition for concert promotions.  

The lawsuit asks the court to restore competition in the live entertainment industry by prohibiting Live Nation from engaging in its anticompetitive practices, ordering Live Nation to divest Ticketmaster, and securing financial compensation for California, as well as for fans who were overcharged by Live Nation, leading them to pay more than they would have in a competitive market for tickets. 

OAKLAND — California Attorney General Rob Bonta today, alongside a coalition of eight attorneys general, filed a lawsuit to block the acquisition of Tegna Inc. (Tegna) by Nexstar Media Group, Inc. (Nexstar). Tegna and Nexstar are two major broadcast station companies that own and operate television stations throughout the country. If allowed to proceed, the deal would create the largest broadcast station group in the United States, putting more broadcast programming in the hands of fewer people, removing control from the communities they report to, cutting local jobs, and significantly impacting the delivery of news and other media content to Americans nationwide. Due to the considerable increase in consolidation, the deal is also expected to raise prices and harm consumers. In California, the combined entity would own half of the Big Four (FOX, NBC, ABC, and CBS) network-affiliated stations, including the local FOX and ABC stations in the Sacramento-Stockton-Modesto area and the local FOX and CBS stations in the San Diego area. Alarmingly, reports have already detailed Nexstar’s firing of long standing journalists in Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York.

“Today, my office has filed a lawsuit to block the proposed merger of broadcasting giants Nexstar and Tegna. This merger would cause incredibly high levels of concentration in local TV markets and is expected to raise cable and satellite prices across the country, causing irreparable harm to local news and consumers who rely on their reporting as a critical source of information,” said Attorney General Bonta. “If approved, this multibillion-dollar deal would combine the nation’s largest and third-largest television-station conglomerates, creating a behemoth covering 80% of U.S. television households. This merger is illegal, plain and simple, running contrary to federal antitrust laws that protect consumers. When broadcast media is owned by a handful of companies, we get fewer voices, less competition, and communities lose the critical check on power that local journalism delivers.”

The lawsuit, filed today in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleges that the merger clearly violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which holds that mergers that substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly are illegal. If the Nexstar/Tegna merger is allowed to proceed, local markets will immediately see a lessening of competition, including both the Sacramento and San Diego markets. 

In addition to the U.S. Department of Justice (U.S. DOJ), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) also has authority and responsibility to halt such a merger, as the $6.2 billion Nexstar/Tegna deal would violate an FCC rule which would prohibit this merger. However, on February 7, 2026, President Trump tweeted “Get that deal done!,” saying that the two companies should be allowed to merge in order to “Knock out the Fake News” from the “Fake News National TV Networks.” FCC Chairman Brendan Carr immediately responded on social media: “Let’s get it done.” 

In filing today’s lawsuit, Attorney General Bonta joins the attorneys general of New York, Colorado, Illinois, Oregon, North Carolina, Connecticut, and Virginia.

The Trump Administration has shown states and consumers that it is more concerned with protecting corporate interests than doing its job to defend the public and uphold consumer protection and antitrust laws that help make life affordable for American families. Attorney General Bonta has responded by intervening when the Trump Administration allegedly greenlit the Hewlett-Packard Enterprises/Juniper Networks merger not for the public interest, but to line the pockets of its friends, and by continuing to fight for a better deal for consumers after U.S. DOJ settled days into the much-awaited Live Nation/Ticketmaster trial — an action promptly rejected by a bipartisan group of attorneys general.

Antitrust enforcement is an essential component of a healthy economy. Competitive marketplaces established through antitrust vigilance help consumers by ensuring fair prices for goods and services, an array of products to choose from, quality goods and services, and the steady introduction of innovative new products. As part of the Attorney General’s commitment to enforce antitrust laws, the California Department of Justice has launched an Antitrust Complaint Form for people to report anticompetitive conduct that potentially violates the antitrust laws.