Recent Family Law Cases

FAMILY LAW (Through 3/22/2026)
By:  Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s note is italicized.

Sheerer v. Panas
3/19/26 CA 1/4: A171804 – J. Moorman
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A171804.PDF

In the published portion of this opinion, the court addressed Father’s respondent’s brief, which he prepared as a self-represented litigant using a generative AI tool. The brief contained fabricated case citations and quotations. The court extended to self-represented litigants the same warning previously issued to attorneys: no brief or other paper filed in any court should contain citations that the person responsible for submitting it has not personally read and verified. The court cautioned that its redress for false and missing citations is not limited to disregarding a brief; it may also impose monetary sanctions. The court declined to impose sanctions here, given Father’s admission of error and the best interests of the children.

In re Marriage of Jenkins
3/18/26 CA 1/4: A169217 – J. Streeter
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A169217.PDF

The Court of Appeal affirmed an order setting aside a default judgment in a marital dissolution case, holding that a default judgment adjudicating property division issues exceeded the relief requested in the dissolution petition where the petition stated community and separate property were “to be determined,” warranting vacatur under Code of Civil Procedure section 580.

Code of Civil Procedure section 580 limits the relief available in a default judgment to what is demanded in the complaint (or petition). The statute serves a due process function: a defendant who defaults is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the complaint, but is entitled to rely on the complaint as defining the maximum scope of liability. In family law, this means a default judgment may not award property or relief that was not specifically identified and requested in the dissolution petition. Separately, Family Code section 2122 permits a court to set aside a judgment on grounds including actual fraud, perjury, duress, mental incapacity, mistake of fact or law, or failure to comply with disclosure requirements, provided the motion is brought within the applicable time limits. Family Code section 2121 establishes the policy favoring finality of judgments while permitting set-aside in the interest of justice.

Wife filed a standard form dissolution petition listing all property as “To be determined.” After Husband failed to respond, Wife obtained a default and—through ex parte communications with the court—secured a default judgment that awarded her the family home (which Husband claimed was his separate property gifted by his parents), divided stock options and retirement accounts, and allocated debts. The Court of Appeal held that the default judgment exceeded the scope of relief demanded in the petition. Because the petition did not specifically identify or value the property to be divided, Husband had no notice of the property claims against him, and the judgment could not stand under Code of Civil Procedure section 580.

As a threshold matter, Wife argued that Family Code sections 2121 and 2122 provide the exclusive grounds for setting aside a dissolution judgment, and that Code of Civil Procedure section 580 has no application. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the Family Code itself presupposes the application of the Code of Civil Procedure to family law cases (Fam. Code, § 210), and that numerous cases have long recognized that section 580 applies in dissolution proceedings. The court explained that while Family Code section 2122 provides exclusive statutory grounds for set-aside of dissolution judgments—displacing traditional equitable set-aside law—the existence of exclusive statutory grounds cannot preclude constitutional grounds for the same relief. Section 580 always serves as a constitutional backstop, ensuring compliance with due process.

The court distinguished In re Marriage of Andresen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 873, which held that due process may be satisfied in dissolution cases simply by the petitioner’s act of checking the appropriate boxes on a standard form petition, even without specifying values. The court found Andresen inapposite because the petitioner in that case at least attached a property declaration listing items for division, whereas here Wife listed nothing—every property-related entry was marked “TBD.” Wife argued that her later-served preliminary disclosures cured the deficiency by adding detail to the “TBD” entries. The court rejected this argument, holding that the disclosures were filed long after they were due (they were due within 60 days of service of the petition under Family Code section 2104) and none of the additional detail would have reached Husband before Wife requested entry of his default. Unlike the respondent in Andresen, Husband had no basis on which to make an informed decision about whether to appear or risk suffering default.

On the alternative Family Code grounds, the court affirmed the set-aside under Family Code section 2122, subdivision (e), which permits vacatur of uncontested judgments on grounds of mistake, either mutual or unilateral. Wife argued that a default judgment is not an “uncontested” judgment within the meaning of the statute, but the court rejected this, finding that a default judgment is plainly “uncontested.” Substantial evidence supported the finding of mistake: a clerical error in the original hearing date, the subsequent ex parte correction of that date, and Wife’s reliance on mailed service to an address where Husband did not live all combined to deprive him of notice of the financial jeopardy he faced. The court found it likely that, had Husband known ownership of the family home—which he claimed was gifted by his parents as separate property—might be assigned to Wife without meaningful equalizing reimbursement, he would have appeared and objected.

The court also rejected Wife’s argument that the family court erred in failing to issue a statement of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 and Family Code section 2127. Statements of decision under Code of Civil Procedure section 632 are generally required only after bench trials, not upon the resolution of motions. As for Family Code section 2127, requires the trial court to issue a statement of decision  “as to actions or motions” under Chapter 10 of the Family Code (set asides), the court held that it requires no particular form of statement and no particular mode of procedure—it is sufficient that the court explain the legal grounds for setting aside the judgment and find the material facts necessary to support the order. The family court’s comments at the hearing, tentative ruling, and final order, taken collectively, adequately explained the basis for the set-aside.

Wife also argued that Husband’s set-aside motion was time-barred because she had served disclosures in the fall of 2022 that put him on notice of the issues he later raised, and he failed to bring his motion within one year of that notice. The court rejected this argument. To the extent the set-aside was grounded on Code of Civil Procedure section 580, the judgment was void for exceeding the relief demanded in the petition, and a void judgment may be attacked at any time. To the extent the set-aside was grounded on Family Code section 2122, subdivision (e), the one-year limitations period runs from entry of judgment, and Husband filed his motion within that window. Finally, Wife argued that even if the default judgment was properly vacated, Husband remained in default and should not have been permitted to file a responsive pleading. The court rejected this as well, holding that upon determining a default judgment must be vacated for exceeding the relief demanded, a family court has discretion either to modify the judgment to conform to the pleading or to vacate the underlying default and allow the case to proceed on a contested basis.

As a remedy, the Court of Appeal directed Wife to amend her dissolution petition to identify all assets for division in accordance with the FL-100 form instructions. Husband was permitted to file an answer to the amended petition, and the case was ordered to proceed on a contested basis.

In re Domestic Partnership of Torres Campos and Munoz
3/5/26 CA 4/1: D085584 – J. Buchanan
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D085584M.PDF

Family Code section 2605, enacted in 2019, authorizes a court to assign sole or joint ownership of a community property pet in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding, taking into consideration the care of the pet. The statute treats pets differently from other personal property by permitting the court to consider factors beyond mere economic value. In this pet custody case under section 2605, the Court of Appeal affirmed the family court’s order denying shared custody and visitation of a dog, holding that although the family court erred by citing and relying on fictitious case authorities in its order, the appellant forfeited this claim of error by drafting and submitting the very order containing those fabricated citations without objecting or alerting the court to the error.

Respondent’s counsel cited nonexistent cases—“Marriage of Twigg” and “Marriage of Teegarden”—obtained from a Reddit article and apparently from AI tools. Appellant’s counsel drafted and submitted the proposed order after hearing that included these fictitious authorities but failed to verify the citations or object. The Court of Appeal concluded that it is an abuse of discretion for a court to rely in material part on fictional case authorities, as reliance on fake cases is fundamentally incompatible with an informed exercise of discretion controlled by genuine principles of law. However, the forfeiture doctrine barred relief. Under the doctrine of forfeiture, a reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. The doctrine is designed to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court so they may be corrected, and to advance efficiency and deter gamesmanship. Here, appellant’s own counsel had an independent duty to verify the citations in any proposed order submitted for signature by the court.

The court imposed $5,000 in sanctions against respondent’s counsel for citing fictitious authority in the Court of Appeal and directed the clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the State Bar. The court found the conduct particularly egregious because counsel doubled down after being alerted to the fake cases, providing additional fabricated citation information and insisting the nonexistent case was “a legitimate California Supreme Court case.”

The Court of Appeal discussed Standard 10.80(b)(3) of the Standards of Judicial Administration, effective September 1, 2025, which requires judicial officers using generative AI to verify the accuracy of AI-generated material. The court emphasized that it is equally important that judicial officers and court staff who are not themselves using generative AI verify the citations contained in proposed orders submitted to them by counsel.

In re Marriage of Hoch
2/17/26 CA 4/3: G063467 – J. Sanchez
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063467.PDF

In this case involving cross-appeals from multiple family court orders, the Court of Appeal addressed sanctions under Family Code section 271, discovery sanctions, and mutual domestic violence restraining orders, in the context of a Jehovah’s Witness marriage where the concept of “headship” played a central role.

Several statutory frameworks are at issue. Family Code section 271 authorizes attorney’s fees and costs as sanctions against a party whose conduct frustrates the policy of promoting settlement and reducing litigation costs through cooperation. Critically, section 271 sanctions must be “tethered” to attorney’s fees and costs actually incurred by the other party and may not be imposed as punishment. (In re Marriage of Erndt & Terhorst (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 898, 904.) Under the DVPA, Family Code section 6320 authorizes restraining orders to prevent, among other things, “disturbing the peace” of the other party, which since 2021 expressly includes “coercive control”—defined as a pattern of behavior that unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and personal liberty. (§ 6320, subd. (c).) Family Code section 6305 governs the issuance of mutual DVROs and imposes strict requirements: a court may not issue mutual restraining orders unless both parties present written evidence of abuse and the court makes “detailed findings of fact” that both parties acted as a primary aggressor and neither acted primarily in self-defense. In making this determination, the court must consider the Penal Code section 836, subdivision (c)(3) factors identifying the “dominant aggressor” and must weigh the parties’ respective acts against each other—not evaluate each party’s conduct in isolation.

The Court of Appeal held that the family court abused its discretion by imposing $35,000 in sanctions under Family Code section 271 against Husband for refusing to stipulate to allow Wife to amend her petition for legal separation to seek marital dissolution. Husband, a practicing Jehovah’s Witness, stated his religious beliefs would not permit him to facilitate a divorce. The court reasoned that stipulating is by its nature not obligatory, and that Husband’s concern was reasonable and held in good faith. The court further held that Wife could have avoided the cost of a motion for leave to amend by simply filing a separate petition for dissolution. The court also found that the $20,000 portion of the award denominated as “sanctions” was improper because section 271 requires that sanctions be tethered to attorney’s fees and costs actually incurred; sanctions under section 271 may not be imposed as punishment.

The court affirmed sanctions against Husband under Family Code section 2107(c) for failing to timely serve a preliminary declaration of disclosure and under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030 and 2031.310(h) for deficient discovery responses. Husband argued his inability to afford counsel constituted substantial justification, but the court rejected this argument, noting that Husband was represented by counsel during the relevant periods and that self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the DVRO against Husband, finding that his pattern of surveillance—including accessing Wife’s Snapchat, iCloud, and Google accounts, tracking her vehicle via the Mercedes Me app, monitoring her reading material, and repeatedly appearing uninvited at her home—constituted coercive control under Family Code section 6320. While one ground for the DVRO—Husband’s “inappropriate use of religion” in refusing to consent to legal separation—was erroneous because Husband had a statutory right not to agree to a legal separation, the remaining grounds were sufficient to support the order.

However, the court reversed the mutual DVRO as to Wife, holding that the family court failed to engage in the analysis and make the findings required by Family Code section 6305 to issue mutual restraining orders. The family court had found each party to be the primary aggressor as to the other’s DVRO request—exactly the opposite of what section 6305 requires, which is that the court weigh the parties’ respective acts of domestic violence against each other in concert. The court further held that substantial evidence did not support a finding that Wife was a primary aggressor, as the DVRO against her was based on three discrete, isolated incidents that did not rise to the level of a course of conduct comparable to Husband’s sustained pattern of coercive control.

Chapman v. Avon Products, Inc.
2/11/26 CA 2/8: B327749 – P.J. Stratton
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B327749.PDF

The Court of Appeal affirmed a $40.8 million compensatory and $10.3 million punitive damages verdict against Avon Products in this asbestos/mesothelioma case, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting expert testimony about the presence of chrysotile asbestos in Avon talc products based on a revived older testing method. The court held that a party’s agreement to frame an evidentiary challenge as a Sargon reliability challenge, rather than a Kelly/Frye general acceptance challenge, waives any claim that the trial court should have applied the stricter Kelly standard.

California applies two distinct frameworks for challenges to expert testimony. Under the Kelly/Frye standard, a party challenging the admissibility of evidence derived from a new scientific technique must show the technique has not gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Kelly applies only to expert opinion based on a new scientific technique, and places the burden on the proponent to establish general acceptance. Under the Sargon standard, the trial court acts as a “gatekeeper” to exclude expert opinion that is based on reasons or matter of a type on which an expert may not reasonably rely, or that is speculative or conjectural. Sargon does not require general acceptance; rather, it asks whether the expert’s opinion is based on matter that is “clearly invalid and unreliable.” The two standards serve different purposes: Kelly screens novel scientific techniques for community acceptance, while Sargon screens all expert opinions for foundational reliability. Critically, Kelly is the stricter standard because it can exclude a methodology even if the trial court finds it reliable, if the technique lacks general acceptance.

Avon challenged several evidentiary rulings, including the admission of plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Longo’s testimony about chrysotile detection using an older concentration technique and polarized light microscopy. When the trial court asked Avon whether its challenge was under Kelly or Sargon, Avon’s counsel stated Kelly was “subsumed” within Sargon and the focus was reliability. The Court of Appeal held that this concession waived any Kelly general acceptance challenge. The court further held that the trial court properly exercised its Sargon gatekeeper role, finding Dr. Longo’s methodology was not “clearly invalid and unreliable.”

Author’s Note: While this is not a family law case, it is highly relevant to family law practitioners who deal with expert testimony in contested proceedings. The case provides a thorough discussion of the interplay between Kelly/Frye and Sargon standards for admissibility of expert opinions and illustrates how strategic concessions at trial can waive important evidentiary challenges on appeal. Practitioners should be precise in articulating the basis for any challenge to expert testimony.

Woodhouse v. State Bar of California
2/27/26 CA 2/8: B346662 – J. Wiley
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B346662.PDF

Code of Civil Procedure sections 391 through 391.7 establish California’s vexatious litigant framework. The statute provides two distinct mechanisms. Under sections 391.1 through 391.6, a defendant may move to require a vexatious litigant to furnish security in a pending case if the court determines there is no reasonable probability the plaintiff will prevail; failure to post security results in dismissal. Under section 391.7, enacted in 1990, a court may go further and enter a prefiling order prohibiting a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge, who may condition filing on posted security. The two mechanisms differ in a critical respect: sections 391.1–391.6 allow the litigation to proceed (subject to security), while section 391.7 bars the filing of new actions altogether absent leave of court. Vexatious litigant statutes are constitutional and do not deprive a litigant of due process.

Section 391 defines “vexatious litigant” under several alternative tests. Under subdivision (b)(1), a person is a vexatious litigant if, while acting in propria persona, the person has commenced or maintained at least five litigations in the preceding seven years that were finally determined adversely. Under subdivision (b)(4), a person is a vexatious litigant if any court in any state has previously designated the person a vexatious litigant based on substantially similar facts, transactions, or occurrences.

The trial court found Woodhouse qualified as a vexatious litigant under both statutory definitions. Under section 391, subdivision (b)(1), Woodhouse had commenced at least five lawsuits in propria persona within the preceding seven years, all finally determined adversely. Under section 391, subdivision (b)(4), both the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York had previously declared Woodhouse (and his alter ego company Havensight Capital LLC) to be vexatious litigants based on substantially similar facts. The Southern District of New York had issued a nationwide injunction prohibiting Woodhouse from filing any new federal court action relating to his allegations absent leave of court and compliance with pre-filing conditions.

The appellant, an attorney placed on involuntary inactive status by the State Bar, had filed numerous lawsuits across state and federal courts against companies including Nike, Meta, Alphabet, and Warner Bros. Discovery, as well as federal judges and government officials. His complaints included allegations of over 2,000 assassination attempts, decapitations of fellow attorneys and a federal court clerk, a “genocide hotel” in Pismo Beach allegedly responsible for over 15,000 deaths, conspiracies involving Russian and Moldovan military forces, the incineration of Ninth Circuit Judge Carlos Bea, and the deployment of an atomic weapon on his property. Following his placement on involuntary inactive status, Woodhouse sent threatening communications to the State Bar, including a threat to “drown [a State Bar judge] to death,” which resulted in a three-year Workplace Violence Restraining Order.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Woodhouse’s complaint asserted facts that are delusional as a matter of law and therefore had no possibility of success. The court relied on Huang v. Hanks (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 179, which held that California courts possess inherent authority to dismiss complaints that are frivolous because they lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact, including claims describing “fantastic, delusional, or fanciful scenarios.” The court also cited multiple federal court rulings dismissing Woodhouse’s prior complaints on identical grounds, including the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that Woodhouse’s allegations “fell solidly in the realm of fantasy or delusion” and the Second Circuit’s affirmance of a nationwide pre-filing injunction against him. The court noted that these federal rulings, while applying federal law, are consistent with California’s approach under Huang and Code of Civil Procedure section 436.

The court further addressed the gatekeeping role of retained counsel, observing that self-represented plaintiffs avoid the institutional check that licensed attorneys provide against frivolous litigation. Retained attorneys are governed by rules of ethics and professional conduct, are subject to disciplinary sanctions, and face malicious prosecution liability—all of which deter filing of unmeritorious claims. The vexatious litigant statute serves as a substitute gatekeeping mechanism where that check is absent. The court emphasized, however, that the power to dismiss delusional complaints must be used sparingly and only in the most obvious cases, as courts must remain open to proof that seemingly startling claims are in fact true.

J.S. v. D.A.
2/25/26 CA 4/1: D086356 – J. Do
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D086356.PDF

The federal and state constitutions guarantee meaningful access to the courts. For incarcerated individuals who are parties to civil proceedings, this right requires the court to take affirmative steps to ensure the prisoner can participate, particularly where the proceeding threatens the prisoner’s significant interests. Courts have a range of tools available to facilitate access, including telephonic appearances under Code of Civil Procedure section 367.75, appointment of counsel, depositions, written testimony, or closed-circuit television. In the second reversal of a DVRO in this matter, the Court of Appeal reversed a five-year domestic violence restraining order, holding thatthe trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider and rule on an incarcerated respondent’s request for a telephonic appearance before holding the evidentiary hearing without him.

Respondent was incarcerated at a correctional facility and filed a handwritten request asking the court to order the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to prepare him for a telephonic appearance. The court continued the hearing once but never addressed the telephonic appearance request, and ultimately held the evidentiary hearing and issued a five-year DVRO without respondent present. The Court of Appeal held that indigent inmates who are defendants in bona fide civil actions threatening their interests have a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. The court has a variety of measures available—including telephonic appearances, appointment of counsel, depositions, or closed-circuit television—and must at minimum exercise its discretion to select an appropriate means of affording meaningful access.

The court reinstated the TRO to remain in force for at least 30 days after issuance of the remittitur to protect petitioner while a new hearing is conducted. The court emphasized that duplicative proceedings necessitated by such preventable errors are burdensome for victims of domestic violence and may discourage them from pursuing protective relief.

Jogani v. Jogani
2/24/26 CA 2/1: B338590 – J. Weingart
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338590.PDF

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.300, the trial court must exclude the testimony of an expert witness if the party offering the testimony unreasonably failed to comply with the expert witness disclosure requirements of sections 2034.210 through 2034.310. These provisions require a party to disclose the general substance of the expert’s expected testimony in advance of trial, ensuring the opposing party has a fair opportunity to prepare for cross-examination and to retain rebuttal experts. In this partnership dispute among five brothers involving global diamond and real estate enterprises, the Court of Appeal conditionally affirmed a judgment of approximately $6.85 billion, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exclude testimony about an undisclosed expert opinion on lost investment profits. The expert’s opinion—that investments sold during the 2008 financial crisis would have appreciated to $1.98 billion if held—was not disclosed prior to trial, and its admission was prejudicial error.

Following a five-month jury trial, three brothers obtained declaratory relief establishing their partnership shares and were awarded compensatory and punitive damages. On appeal, defendants raised seven issues, primarily concerning evidentiary rulings. The Court of Appeal rejected challenges to the remaining evidentiary rulings.

As to the Gujarati-to-English translations, the court held that defendants forfeited their hearsay challenge by failing to object on hearsay grounds until after the transcripts had already been admitted and discussed at length before the jury. Even on the merits, the court applied the “language conduit” theory of Correa v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 444, under which a translated statement is treated as the statement of the original declarant—not the translator—if the translator was generally unbiased and adequately skilled. The Correa factors favored admission: the translator was a professional agency recognized by Indian courts; defendants’ own forensic expert found no significant translation errors after reviewing the recordings; and defendants had been invited six years before trial to identify any errors in the transcripts but never responded.

As to the testimony of prior consistent statements by third-party witnesses, the court held that Evidence Code sections 791, subdivision (b) and 1236 permitted the admission of prior consistent statements even before the declarant (Shashi) himself testified. Section 791(b) requires only that there be a “charge” of fabrication or improper motive—not “evidence” of it, as the Legislature required in subdivision (a)—and that the prior statement was made before the alleged motive arose. Defendants’ opening statement attacking Shashi’s anticipated testimony as fabricated constituted such a charge. The court further held that sections 791(b) and 1236 do not prescribe when the declarant must testify relative to the admission of the prior consistent statement; rather, under Evidence Code section 320, the trial court has discretion to regulate the order of proof.

As to the testimony of attorney Glass, who had jointly represented the brothers and the partnership entities, the court held there was no attorney-client privilege under Evidence Code section 962, which provides that when two or more clients jointly retain a lawyer, neither may claim a privilege as to communications made during that representation in litigation between the joint clients. The court further held that a prior appellate order disqualifying Glass from “assisting” Shashi in the litigation barred Glass from acting in his capacity as a lawyer, but did not preclude him from testifying as a percipient witness when subpoenaed. Defendants forfeited their challenge to specific portions of Glass’s testimony by failing to object at trial on confidentiality or duty-of-loyalty grounds to any particular question or answer. The court observed that since at least 1889, California courts have recognized that either joint client “can compel [the attorney] to testify against the other as to their negotiations.”

As to the adverse inference instructions, the court upheld the trial court’s evidentiary rulings permitting testimony about defendants’ failure to produce pre-2011 documents as ordered and the giving of CACI No. 204 (willful suppression of evidence). Two prior discovery orders required production of all requested documents, including pre-2011 records. At trial, the court did not relitigate the scope of those orders but permitted questioning about defendants’ noncompliance. The court held these rulings were not one-sided and did not amount to de facto issue or evidentiary sanctions.

However, the court found error in the admission of the undisclosed expert opinion regarding lost investment profits and ordered a remittitur reducing economic damages.