Recent Family Law Cases

Family Law (Through 1/21/2026)
By:  Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s note is italicized.

N.D. v. Superior Court (E.F.)
1/20/26 CA 4/3: G066061 – J. Scott
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G066061.PDF

The Court of Appeal imposed $25,000 in sanctions against an attorney for filing a frivolous writ petition containing serious accusations against the trial court without any supporting evidence in the record, holding that lawyers may not make assertions in court that lack factual support—regardless of h99 ow much the lawyer or client “earnestly believes” them—and that disparaging a trial judge without concrete evidence is sanctionable.

An attorney filed a writ petition on behalf of N.D. asking the Court of Appeal to order the trial court to refer a statement of disqualification to a different judge. The petition contained only one exhibit—the trial court’s order striking the statement—and did not include the statement of disqualification itself or any evidence supporting the allegations. The petition made serious accusations against the trial court, including that the court “actively retaliates” against N.D., “systematically discriminates” against her, “act[s] in concert” with her opponents, and “openly and notoriously” champions her opponents’ cause. It further accused the court of issuing “fake” and “forged” orders.

The Court of Appeal denied the petition and issued an order to show cause why the attorney should not be sanctioned. In his opposition, Phillips largely conceded there was no evidence in the record to support the accusations, instead arguing that the allegations were his and his client’s “earnest belief.” The court found this insufficient. An attorney cannot raise a claim in court based solely on the sincerity of an unsupported belief; concrete evidence is needed before levying serious accusations against a trial judge. The court emphasized that the law “is not one of those professions” where one may write solely to express a client’s sentiments—lawyers must exercise professional judgment and, at times, tell the client “no.”

The court found the petition frivolous because any reasonable attorney would agree it was totally devoid of merit, given the absence of supporting evidence. The court also found unreasonable violations of the California Rules of Court for failing to provide an adequate record and failing to support factual contentions with citations. It imposed $25,000 in sanctions payable to the clerk and directed both Phillips and the clerk to forward a copy of the opinion to the State Bar.

R.R., II v. C.R.
1/20/26 CA 2/4: B339866 – J. Collins
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B339866A.PDF

The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of a DVRO request, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard that focused on whether the respondent intended to threaten or intimidate the petitioner, rather than considering the full range of abusive conduct defined in Family Code section 6320—including stalking, harassment, and conduct that disturbs the peace of the other party. The court remanded with directions to enter the DVRO.

Father sought a DVRO against his ex-wife based on escalating conduct over six months, including: sitting in her car outside his home for hours and ringing his doorbell incessantly while refusing to leave; following him and the parties’ child in her car, including onto the freeway while driving erratically; entering his home and car without permission and refusing to leave; relentless calling and texting; and threatening to harass his employer and parents. Father testified this conduct scared him and the child. Mother did not dispute most of the conduct but testified her motive was to check on the child’s safety due to past abuse allegations.

The trial court acknowledged Father had presented evidence of “clearly obsessive behavior” and conduct that “may well constitute stalking,” and found the conduct “sufficiently alarming” to order professional monitoring for Mother’s visitation. Nevertheless, the court denied the DVRO, finding that Father had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence “that the stalking via following on the freeway was an intentional attempt to threaten or otherwise intimidate” him. The court also focused on whether Mother’s conduct was caused by her mental health condition.

The Court of Appeal reversed. Relying on its recent decision in G.G. v. G.S. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 413, the court held that the trial court employed an impermissibly narrow focus on intent that prevented it from properly exercising its discretion under the DVPA. The court emphasized that the trial court’s own findings undermined its denial: the trial court had found Father presented “evidence that may well constitute stalking” and “clearly obsessive behavior,” had largely found Father credible, and had determined the conduct was “sufficiently alarming” to require monitored visitation. Moreover, the evidence was largely uncontradicted—Mother did not dispute most of the alleged conduct—and was corroborated by text messages, phone logs showing missed calls, and photos and videos. Father was not required to show Mother intended to threaten him; the DVPA permits issuance of a restraining order “upon reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (Fam. Code, § 6300.) Given the trial court’s own factual findings and the substantial corroborating evidence, the Court of Appeal concluded that only one reasonable conclusion was permitted—Father met his burden of proof.

Author’s Note: This case reaffirms that courts cannot require a petitioner to prove the respondent’s malicious intent when issuing a DVRO. Stalking, monitoring, and other controlling behaviors cause psychological harm in their own right and fall squarely within the DVPA’s broad protective purpose, regardless of the respondent’s subjective intent or the status of their mental health.

McDonald v. Zargaryan
12/22/25 CA 2/8: B329565, B331191 – J. Wiley
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B329565.PDF

The Court of Appeal vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting a plaintiff to present surprise expert testimony where there was no reasonable justification for the delay in disclosing the expert.

Seven days before trial in this personal injury matter, plaintiff’s counsel emailed defense counsel a report from a new expert—a spine surgeon who recommended spinal surgery costing between $380,000 and $480,000. No emergency or extraordinary development justified this disclosure. Plaintiff did not file a motion for leave to augment his witness list as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.610, subdivision (a)(1). The defense moved in limine to exclude the expert. The trial court denied the motion on the condition that the expert be immediately deposed. The jury returned a substantial verdict, including $1.87 million in future medical expenses and $12 million in pain and suffering.

The Court of Appeal reversed. The court explained that California’s expert disclosure scheme exists to avoid surprise at trial—which is both unfair and inefficient. The court emphasized that surprise undermines settlement: when both sides know exactly what evidence trial will produce, they have a better chance of agreeing on the case’s true value; but “cards up the sleeve” make settlement less likely because the concealing side may think its trial odds are better than the other side realizes, and may demand more to settle than the uninformed opponent believes the case is worth. Settlement, the court observed, “is efficient. It saves the resources of the parties, the judicial system, and the jurors.”

The court further explained that surprise experts are “tremendously abusive” because experts can be powerful witnesses requiring extensive preparation to cross-examine—including immersion in publications, mastery of arcane concepts, and consultation with counter-experts, all leading up to a critical deposition. The court held that where a party fails to file the mandatory motion for leave to augment the expert witness list, and the opposing party promptly moves to exclude the tardy expert under section 2034.300, the trial court abuses its discretion by permitting the expert to testify absent a reasonable justification for the delay. Neither a hasty deposition nor the absence of bad faith substitutes for a valid explanation. The court also rejected harmlessness, finding it reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendants absent the surprise expert’s testimony recommending expensive, risky spinal surgeries.

The court did point out a few instances where a late designation would be appropriate, writing that “[l]ong-designated experts may suddenly become unavailable: death, illness, incapacitation, and other serious and uncontrollable events can create an understandable need for replacements. The world’s supply of unexpected and unfortunate events is varied and unlimited.”

Author’s Note: This case is a big deal: late-designated experts require leave of court and simply allowing a late deposition is an abuse of discretion absent a genuine reasonable justification reason for the delay.

In re Marriage of Patel
12/19/25 CA 4/3: G064218 – J. Sanchez
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064218.PDF

The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of Wife’s petition for legal separation, holding that under Family Code section 2345, a court may not render a judgment of legal separation without the consent of both parties, and that the trial court has inherent authority to dismiss a petition for legal separation when the required consent is clearly unobtainable.

Husband filed a declaration stating he would not consent to legal separation. Wife argued the statute only bars the rendering of a judgment of legal separation but does not authorize dismissal of the petition. The Court of Appeal disagreed, reasoning that by creating a condition to rendering a judgment (mutual consent), section 2345 impliedly authorizes dismissal if that condition cannot be met. The court cited its inherent power to dismiss an action “shown to be sham, fictitious[,] or without merit in order to prevent abuse of the judicial process.”

The Court of Appeal also noted that Wife could have amended her legal separation petition to seek dissolution once she met the six-month residency requirement (Fam. Code, § 2320), but the appellate record did not reveal whether she raised this argument.

Hoang Long Ngoc Pham v. Nozomi Kon
12/16/25 CA 4/3: G065471 – J. Gooding (certified for partial publication)
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G065471.PDF

In this case of first impression, the Court of Appeal held that where parties have entered into a valid contract specifying how frozen embryos shall be treated in the event of divorce or legal separation, the contractual approach governs, and the court will enforce the parties’ agreement.

During their marriage, the parties underwent IVF and signed an agreement specifying that in the event of legal separation or divorce, the frozen embryos would be “made available to the partner if he/she wishes.” The husband sought to have the embryos discarded upon divorce; the wife wished to use them to attempt to bear a child. The trial court found the IVF Agreement valid and unambiguous and awarded the embryos to the wife.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Reviewing three competing approaches reviewing courts from other states have adopted—contractual, balancing, and contemporaneous mutual consent—the court adopted the contractual approach. It concluded that preexisting agreements in in vitro fertilization promote serious discussions and provide certainty for progenitors and clinics, which would minimize misunderstandings and litigation. This approach aligns with California’s public policy under Health and Safety Code section 125315(b), which requires fertility treatment providers to provide advanced written directives regarding embryo disposition.

The court held that the phrase “made available to the partner if he/she wishes” was unambiguous and meant the embryos should be made available to the wife so she may use them for the stated purpose of the IVF Agreement—to attempt to obtain a pregnancy. The husband’s alternative interpretation—that the clause only permitted the wife to take custody for safekeeping—was not reasonable.

Vergara v. Ouse
12/12/25 CA 6: H052022 – J. Bromberg
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/H052022.PDF

The Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for a licensed marriage and family therapist who served as a supervised visitation monitor, holding that quasi-judicial immunity bars claims against a child visitation supervisor for suspending supervised visitation.

Father sued the court-appointed visitation supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional distress after she suspended his therapeutic supervised visitation.

The court held that issuing orders concerning visitation is a judicial function, and the California Standards of Judicial Administration delegate to supervised visitation providers the authority to terminate visits under specified circumstances. Further, when a trial court delegates judicial authority, the delegate is cloaked with the same immunity available to the delegating judge.

Author’s note: This case confirms broad immunity protection for supervised visitation providers exercising their delegated authority. Litigants unhappy with a supervisor’s decisions should seek relief through the family court—such as a motion to resume visitation or appoint a new supervisor—rather than through civil litigation against the supervisor.

Houser v. Superior Court (Larsen)
12/12/25 CA 4/3: G065315 – J. Sanchez
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G065315.PDF

The Court of Appeal granted a writ of certiorari and annulled a contempt judgment, holding that the underlying custody orders lacked the specificity required to support a finding of contempt for the mother’s unilateral decisions regarding the child’s extracurricular activities and orthodontic braces.

Mother was found in contempt on five counts: signing the 17-year-old up for mountain bike and ski team events that interfered with Father’s parenting time, unilaterally deciding the child could join ski team and basketball team, and moving forward with braces treatment. The trial court fined Mother $10,000 ($2,000 per count).

The Court of Appeal reversed. At issue was a scheduling order that prohibited a parent from scheduling an event “during the other’s time without approval.” Regarding the scheduling order violations, the court held that “authorizing” a child to join a team is not the same as “scheduling” a specific practice or event—Mother did not personally set the dates and times; the school and coaches did. Further, any violation was cured by withdrawing the child from the event as soon as the other parent objected.

Regarding the joint legal custody violations permitting the child to join the ski team, the basketball team, and authorizing braces, the Court of Appeal noted that the order simply stated the parties “shall share joint legal custody” without specifying circumstances requiring mutual consent. Under Family Code section 3083, where an order fails to specify such circumstances, “either parent acting alone may exercise legal control of the child.”

Author’s note: Contempt is a quasi-criminal proceeding requiring strict construction of the underlying order. A general joint legal custody order—without specified consent requirements—does not prohibit unilateral decision-making on extracurricular activities or routine medical care. Practitioners seeking to require mutual consent for such decisions must ensure the custody order contains explicit language to that effect.

In re Marriage of M.P. and M.C.
12/9/25 CA 4/3: G064023 – J. Bancroft
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064023.PDF

In this DVRO case involving sexual abuse allegations against a stepparent, the Court of Appeal held that the child dependency hearsay exception applies to DVPA restraining order hearings involving the sexual abuse of a minor, allowing otherwise reliable out-of-court statements made by the minor to be admitted for their truth.

Wife sought a DVRO based on her older daughter K.R.’s statements describing sexual abuse by Husband (who was not K.R.’s biological father). Wife testified about K.R.’s statements at the evidentiary hearing; K.R. did not testify. The trial court admitted the statements, found Wife credible, and issued a DVRO protecting Wife and all three children. As a condition, the court limited Husband’s supervised visitation with his biological daughter S.R. to once per month because S.R. only spoke Spanish and the court was concerned monitors could not understand conversations.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the DVRO issuance but reversed the visitation limitation. Relying on In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, the court reasoned that the same policy considerations supporting the child dependency hearsay exception—the difficulty of proving child sexual abuse, limited abilities of child victims, and children’s reluctance to testify against family members—apply equally in DVPA proceedings. There are three prerequisites to allow the trial court to consider such statements. First, “the time, content, and circumstances of the statement must provide sufficient indicia of reliability.” The child’s “consistent statements on different dates, in different settings, and to different people” met the reliability requirement.  Next, “the minor must either be available for cross examination or there must be some evidence which corroborates the statements made by the child.” Here, there was “no evidence in the record [the child] was unavailable to testify.” Finally, “the opposing party must have had adequate notice that the statements would be introduced at the hearing.” Husband “had ample notice the statements would be utilized as the basis for the restraining order” as set forth in her application filed a year before the hearing.

The Court of Appeal noted that DVPA does not impose heightened pleading or proof requirements and permits issuance of a restraining order “solely on the affidavit or testimony of the person requesting the restraining order.” (Fam. Code, § 6300.) It noted further that in “enacting the DVPA, the Legislature was less concerned with strict procedural and evidentiary constraints and, instead, was focused on giving trial courts liberal discretion when deciding whether to issue a restraining order.”

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court’s stated reason for admitting the testimony, under the state of mind hearsay exception, was error. Wife’s state of mind was not relevant “unless the court accepted the statements for the truth of what they asserted.” For these statements to be “admissible for their truth, there must have been an exception to the hearsay rule” that would allow that statement into evidence for its truth (e.g. statement of a party opponent). But the state of mind hearsay exception is admissible only to establish the effect on the listener.

The Court of Appeal also concluded that the trial court incorrectly interpreted  Family Code section 6306 to mean it could consider a pending criminal complaint for sexual abuse against Husband. That statute, however, is limited to convictions, not unproven allegations. However, since this error was not prejudicial, the Court of Appeal did not disturb the restraining order.

The Court of Appeal, however, did conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting visitation because Husband and the child spoke Spanish. Since Family Code section 3200.5 requires a professional monitor to “be able to speak the language of the party being supervised and of the child, or the [monitor] must provide a neutral interpreter,” The court’s concern that monitors could not understand Spanish conversations was based on an erroneous understanding of the law.

Rodriguez v. WNT, Inc.
12/4/25 CA 4/1: D084642 – J. Buchanan
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D084642.PDF

The Court of Appeal affirmed terminating sanctions for discovery abuse, holding that the mandatory relief provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) applies to an order granting an unopposed motion to dismiss as a terminating sanction, but the plaintiff failed to establish entitlement to relief because his own conduct contributed to the dismissal and his counsel’s failures were deliberate rather than the result of mistake or inadvertence.

Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b) requires a trial court to vacate a “default judgment or dismissal” entered against a party if the Court finds that the party’s attorney’s “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect” caused the default judgment or dismissal.  Since an unopposed order for terminating sanctions was the procedural equivalent to a default, it was considered a dismissal under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(b).

Plaintiff’s counsel failed to respond to discovery for months, failed to oppose motions to compel, failed to appear at a hearing, and violated a court order to provide discovery responses. The Court of Appeal concluded that counsel’s conduct amounted to a “deliberate failure to respond to discovery or oppose discovery motions,” not mere mistake or inadvertence. The Court of Appeal also held that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing his own fault did not cause the discovery violations because he provided no explanation for why he ceased communicating with his counsel.

Shayan v. Shakib
12/1/25 CA 2/1: B337559, B339376 – P.J. Rothschild
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B337559.PDF

The Court of Appeal granted a motion to strike appellant’s opening brief and imposed $7,500 in monetary sanctions against appellant’s counsel, holding that filing a brief containing fabricated quotations—whether the result of AI “hallucinations” or other drafting failures—constitutes an unreasonable violation of the Rules of Court subjecting the signing attorney to sanctions.

Respondent’s counsel identified numerous fabricated case citations in appellant’s opening brief. Appellant’s counsel denied using AI but explained that he provided “placeholder” paraphrases to staff with instructions to replace them with actual case language. The court found this process “involves an inherent risk that the staff will provide inaccurate language” and supports an inference of knowing and unreasonable violation of the rules.

The court found three types of fabrications: (1) language using words from the cited decision but assembled differently; (2) paraphrases falsely presented as quotations; and (3) language going beyond anything in the cited decision. The court noted that the signing attorney is responsible for the content of the brief regardless of whether inaccuracies are the result of AI tools or other drafting processes.

The court ordered counsel to pay $7,500 in sanctions, struck the brief, directed appellant to file a corrected brief, and directed the clerk to serve a copy of the order on the State Bar. The Court, however, refused to dismiss the appeal because that sanction should only be imposed “in extreme situations, such as where the conduct was clear and deliberate and no lesser sanction would remedy the situation.” It concluded that the sanctions it applied were sufficient to remedy the situation.

In re Marriage of Strong
11/24/25 CA 2/1: B345843 – P.J. Rothschild
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B345843.PDF

In this post-judgment enforcement case, the Court of Appeal affirmed an order compelling Husband to assign his copyright to a receiver, holding that under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, all property of a judgment debtor—including copyrights—is subject to enforcement of a money judgment absent a statutory exception.

Wife was owed approximately $2 million in unpaid spousal and child support. Husband’s sole asset was a copyright on certain works titled “The Collected Works of Jackson-Strong Alliance.” Wife moved to appoint a receiver and compel assignment of the copyright for monetization. Husband argued no legal authority permits forced assignment of a copyright.

The Court of Appeal disagreed. The court noted that Code of Civil Procedure section 708.510’s listing of “payments due from a patent or copyright” as assignable does not exclude the intellectual property itself—the statute’s “including but not limited to” proviso confirms the list is not exclusive. The court cited cases dating to the 19th century upholding forced assignment of patents to satisfy judgments, and found no reason copyrights should be treated differently.

County of Los Angeles v. Lugo
11/21/25 CA 2/1: B344575 – J. M. Kim
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B344575.PDF

The Court of Appeal reversed an order denying a motion to set aside a voluntary declaration of paternity (VDOP), holding that if a VDOP was filed before January 1, 2020, a request to set it aside may be timely filed within the time permitted by former Family Code section 7575, subdivision (c)(1)—i.e., within a reasonable time, not exceeding six months, after a court makes an initial order for custody, visitation, or child support based on the VDOP.

Father signed a VDOP in 2015 but later obtained DNA test results showing he was not the biological father. When the County sued to establish child support in 2023, Father filed a motion to set aside the VDOP. The trial court denied the motion as untimely, reasoning that the current version of Family Code section 7576 requires challenges within two years of the VDOP’s filing.

The Court of Appeal reversed. Giving appropriate deference to the Judicial Council’s interpretation of statutes in adopting forms FL-280 and FL-281, the court held that under Family Code section 4, subdivision (e)—which provides that the validity of an order made before a new law’s operative date is governed by old law—the deadline in former section 7575, subdivision (c)(1) applies to VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020.