Recent Dependency Law Cases

Family Law (Through 11/20/2025)
By:  Julie A. McCormick, CWLS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Auther’s note is italicized.

In re A.M – filed 9/18/25; Second Appellate Dist., Div. Eight
Docket No. B343879; 114 Cal.App.5th 627
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B343879.PDF

Where Father Had Made a Suitable Plan for the Child, the Juvenile Court Erred in Removing the Child Because Father Was Incarcerated.

In a prior dependency case, the juvenile court removed A.M. from mother due to mother’s substance abuse.  The court placed A.M. with her father and terminated its jurisdiction. Father and A.M. lived with paternal aunt, Martha, for six years.  Just before A.M. turned seven, father was arrested for drug possession and incarcerated. Before going to prison he arranged for Martha to care for A.M. – he gave Martha educational and medical documents and a notarized letter establishing temporary custody.  This situation remained stable until mother picked up A.M. for a visit and refused to return her to Martha’s care.  Mother neglected A.M. by using drugs, failing to get A.M. to school, and fighting with residents in her apartment complex.  When mother was arrested for driving a stolen car, the agency filed a petition and placed A.M. back in Martha’s care. The Department alleged that father’s criminal conduct placed A.M. at risk of harm. The court sustained a petition against mother and father. At the dispositional phase, both father and A.M.’s counsel argued for A.M. to be released to father under a plan of care with Martha.  The court removed from mother and father.  A.M. filed a notice of appeal.

Reversed.  Section 361(d) governs removal of a child from the custody of a parent with whom the child did not reside at the time of the petition. There is no go-to-jail-lose-your-child rule in California.  No substantial evidence supported the finding of the removal of A.M. from father’s care because father’s plan was satisfactory. When evaluating the appropriateness of the plan, the court looks to the parent’s ability at the time of the hearing.  A.M. had lived with father for most of her life.  Father’s criminal history alone did not support jurisdiction or removal and there was no evidence that A.M. was present or affected by father’s criminal conduct.  Furthermore, there was no evidence that Martha’s care posed any danger to A.M.  Father’s plan at the time of jurisdiction was the same plan put forward by the county and adopted by the court – A.M. to be in Martha’s care.  “If the court had not removed A.M. from the father, she would be in exactly the same situation as she is currently.” (Emphasis in original.)

Adoption of X.D. – filed 09/29/2025; Second Appellate Dist., Div. Eight
Docket No. B343632; 114 Cal.App.5th 812
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B343632.PDF

[1] AS WITH ANY OTHER WRITING, SCREENSHOTS OF TEXTS CAN BE AUTHENTICATED AND RENDERED ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT THE AUTHOR’S TESTIMONY; [2] KELSEY S. DOES NOT PROTECT FATHERS WHOSE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HAS INTERFERED WITH THEIR ASSUMPTION OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES.

Mother placed child X.D. for adoption on the day he was born. Prospective adoptive parents filed for adoption and asked the juvenile court to terminate biological father’s parental rights. Upon receiving notice, father opposed the adoption on the grounds that he qualified as a Kelsey S. father and that his efforts to assume parental responsibilities had been thwarted by mother. At trial, parties presented evidence of physical and verbal abuse against mother by father before and after X.D.’s birth, including while mother was pregnant, causing her to flee to a domestic violence shelter and cut off contact with father. Prospective adoptive parents attempted to introduce screenshots of threatening texts father’s sister had sent to mother – texts allegedly from father – but the court deemed them inadmissible due to hearsay, a lack of authentication, and undue prejudice. Reasoning that mother deliberately misled both father and the adoption agency to prevent him from asserting his parental rights, the court ruled that father qualified as a Kelsey S. father. Prospective adoptive parents, mother, and X.D. appealed.

Reversed. [1] The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the screenshots of father’s texts. While the trial court erroneously required father’s sister’s testimony to authenticate the screenshots, the Evidence Code allows for a variety of means via which a writing can be authenticated. All that is required is a prima facie case that the writing is what it purports to be. Father admitted that the phone number in the screenshots was his and mother testified to their provenance and contents. Once authenticated, the screenshots were admissible as both a non-hearsay statement regarding mother’s state of mind and a hearsay statement of a party opponent: father. Lastly, the risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. [2] Taking the erroneously excluded evidence into account, substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that father qualified as a Kelsey S. father. From the moment he learned of the pregnancy, father made no meaningful efforts to investigate or assert his parental rights. The evidence of domestic violence shows that father was far from the emotionally supportive partner Kelsey S. requires, and in fact his actions put both mother and their unborn child at risk of harm. To the degree that circumstances interfered with his assumption of parental duties, they were of his own making.

In re Claudia R. – filed 10/9/25; Second Appellate Dist., Div. Seven
Docket No. B344660; 115 Cal. App. 5th 76
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B344660.PDF

ICWA Inquiry With the Parents, Maternal and Paternal Grandmothers, Aunt, and an Unrelated Caretaker—while Other Reasonably Available Extended Family Members Who Could Provide Missing Information Remain Uncontacted—does Not Satisfy the Agency’s Duty.

At the initial hearing, mother filed a notification of Indian status (ICWA-020) form stating that none of the listed factors indicating Native American ancestry applied. At the jurisdictional hearing, the court ordered the agency to inquire of all known relatives regarding ancestry and notify any applicable tribes. The social worker contacted mother who denied again any ancestry but suggested they contact maternal grandmother (MGM) and mentioned that her brother resided with MGM. MGM emphatically denied any ancestry. Soon thereafter, maternal aunt (MA) contacted the social worker asking for placement, but when the social worker responded, MA failed to reply. Father, who was in federal prison, also denied ancestry and filed an ICWA-020 form indicating none. The social worker asked father for paternal grandmother (PGM)’s contact information; in response, a prison official advised, “Here is the only contact info [father] has,” and provided paternal aunt (PA)’s information. The social worker never asked for paternal grandfather (PGF)’s information. PA, in turn, denied any ancestry in the family and provided PGM’s information. PGM denied any ancestry “on our side of the family.” The NREFM caretaker also denied knowledge of any ancestry, but she did not know the father. At the WIC 366.26 hearing, mother told the court that she had no further information regarding the children’s Indian ancestry. The court noted the social worker had inquired with PA and PGM. Rather than ordering the agency to provide an update as to the other family members regarding ancestry, the court found it had no reason to know the children were Indian children and terminated parental rights. Mother appealed based on noncompliance with inquiry requirements under federal and California ICWA.

Conditionally reversed. ICWA inquiry with the parents, MGM, PGM, PA, and an unrelated caretaker—while other reasonably available extended family members who could provide missing information remain uncontacted— does not satisfy the duty of inquiry. The Supreme Court in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112 recognized that agencies are already tasked with the duty to locate relatives pursuant to WIC 309(e)(1) when a child is detained; to ask about Indian ancestry during this process would be a “slight and swift” undertaking. Where the agency makes a good faith effort to locate an extended family member but is unsuccessful, WIC 224.2 does not require additional steps to locate them if there are other reasonably available family members with sufficient information on the children’s potential ancestry. As the court in Dezi C. noted, the agency is not required to cast about to find relatives or interested persons to ask about the child’s Indian ancestry. The “operative concept” is to ask those who are “reasonably available” to help with the agency’s ICWA investigation. Here, the agency failed to attempt to inquire of the MGF, MA, MU—all of whom were reasonably available. Likewise, inquiry with PGF could have been swift had the agency simply asked father or PGM for his information. Importantly, the maternal and paternal grandfathers could supply missing information on two important branches of the family’s ancestry—mother’s and father’s paternal sides.

In re R.L. – filed 10/14/25; Second Dist.; Div. Eight
Docket No. B341295; 115 Cal. App. 5th 221
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B341295.PDF

A One-time Incident of Drunk Driving With an Infant Unsecured in the Vehicle Does Not Mandate Dependency Jurisdiction.

The agency filed a section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b) petition after father crashed the car while mother held 10-month-old R.L. in her lap, without a child safety seat. Father failed field sobriety tests, had slurred speech, smelled of alcohol, and had red, watery eyes. R.L. suffered a frontal bone fracture with no intracranial hemorrhage and was discharged from the hospital after three days. Father was arrested. While mother and R.L. had lived with father following R.L.’s birth, after six months, mother and R.L. moved in with maternal grandparents. On the day of the accident, mother and father drank together before father drove mother and R.L. home. Mother initially reported she drank “two Trulys” but denied being drunk. She later said she only had a sip and was unaware of father’s sobriety, as she fell asleep. Her blood alcohol level was 0.211 percent. According to mother, this was the only time R.L. was without a car seat. Maternal grandfather usually transported mother and R.L., and he had a car seat for the child. Maternal grandmother had no concerns about mother. R.L. had “multiple supports in the home who are attentive and appropriate,” the social worker opined. Mother was remorseful, stating that, “We put him in danger. I take full responsibility for what happened.” Due to the criminal charges, father did not want to discuss the accident with the agency. However, he told the social worker he “need[ed] to stop messing up,” and that he felt like a “horrible parent for what he did.” Father had only occasional contact with R.L. The juvenile court dismissed the petition, stating this was a one-time incident and that parents were “likely scared straight.” The agency timely appealed dismissal of the section 300, subdivision (b) counts; it did not appeal dismissal of the subdivision (a) count.

Affirmed. A one-time incident generally cannot support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), without evidence the conduct is likely to recur. In addition to considering the nature of the endangering conduct, the court should assess present circumstances, including the parent’s insight and remedial efforts. Here, there was no evidence of historical alcohol abuse. Furthermore, parents were remorseful, R.L. and mother resided with relatives, maternal grandfather was R.L.’s primary driver, and father would likely attend a substance abuse program for his criminal case. The juvenile court properly considered the factors discussed in In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010—in which the Court of Appeal reversed jurisdictional findings based on a one-time incident of drunk driving—and In re M.R. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 101—in which the Court affirmed jurisdiction based on a single drunk driving incident. The agency’s argument that this was not a one-time incident was unavailing. Despite evidence that father was also under the influence while driving earlier in the day, it was the only day on which he drove while intoxicated. As such, the evidence did not compel a finding that R.L. was at substantial risk of harm at the time of the adjudication hearing.