Recent Family Law Cases

Family Law (Through 11/20/2025)
By:  Andrew Botros, CFLS, CALS
The precise holdings in a given case are bolded. Author’s note is italicized.

Schlichter v. Kennedy
11/17/25 CA 4/2: E083744 – J. Menetrez
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E083744.PDF

The Court of Appeal sanctioned appellant’s counsel $1,750 for submitting briefs containing fabricated case citations generated by artificial intelligence, including multiple nonexistent cases with false volume and page numbers.

This is case is not much different than the two cases in the prior months that involved AI generated citations except for one part: the offending attorney did not admit that the briefs he submitted contained hallucinated citations produced by generative AI. He maintained that “the four spurious citations resulted from clerical error” and that he intended to cite “actually existing cases.” The Court of Appeal did not find his claims to be credible. The fabricated citations were not simple transpositional mistakes: the cases they were intended to cite to according to the attorney were entirely different. He also offered shifting and contradictory explanations that made little sense. He also claimed he verified the citations, but of course, if he had, he would have learned they were incorrect.

Author’s note: Three months. Three cases concerning hallucinated citations generated by AI. This is, clearly, a serious problem. I suspect there will be more to come in the future until the hallucinated citations stop.

Dan W. Baer v. David H. Tedder
11/10/25 CA 4/3: G063642, G063784 – J. Sanchez
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G063642.PDF

In this post judgment discovery-sanctions fight, the Court of Appeal largely affirmed an order awarding over $100,000 in appellate attorney’s fees to plaintiff Baer after he successfully defended a prior sanctions appeal brought by defendant Tedder and his attorney Kent. The original sanctions were $10,475 under Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) for misuse of discovery and an unjustified opposition to a motion to compel. Baer then moved for his fees to defend that sanctions order on appeal and obtained a $113,532.50 fee award in the trial court—initially against Tedder alone.

The Court of Appeal held that sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize recovery of appellate attorney’s fees incurred in successfully defending a discovery sanctions order. The court emphasized that these provisions are compensatory, cost-shifting statutes: monetary “sanctions” are meant to reimburse the innocent party for all reasonable expenses “incurred as a result of” discovery misuse, and that necessarily includes fees to fend off an appeal attacking the sanctions. The panel analogized to other fee-shifting schemes (anti-SLAPP, subpoena fees) where appellate fees are routinely allowed and clarified that the “substantial justification” limitation looks to the underlying discovery conduct, not to whether the appeal itself was justified.

On amount, Baer’s counsel claimed roughly 148.3 hours at rates between $550 and $975, yielding the $113,532.50 lodestar. The court largely upheld the hours and rates as reasonable—particularly the 116.9 hours spent reconstructing the record and briefing against Tedder and Kent’s 68-page, “kitchen sink” opening brief—and confirmed that courts may award market rates even when counsel actually billed the client at a steep discount. Detailed billing, attorney declarations, and the trial judge’s own knowledge of local market rates sufficed; no expert was required. The panel did, however, find the 31.9 hours billed for the fee motion excessive, trimmed that to 25 hours, and adjusted the rate used for that work, reducing the fee award by $11,727.50 (from $113,532.50 to $101,805).

The court also held that both Tedder and Kent are jointly and severally liable for the appellate fees. Because the original $10,475 sanctions were imposed jointly and severally, each had an independent right to appeal; Kent was not “forced” to join Tedder’s appeal and voluntarily chose to do so, thereby helping to generate Baer’s appellate fees. The trial court therefore erred in limiting the fee award to Tedder alone. The Court of Appeal modified the order so Tedder and Kent became jointly and severally liable for the full $101,805. The court declined Baer’s request to impose additional sanctions for a frivolous appeal, finding that although some arguments were weak, the appeal was not “totally and completely without merit.”

Author’s note: From a practice standpoint, Baer is a strong reminder that discovery “sanctions” operate as full cost-shifting: if you lose a sanctions appeal, expect to pay the other side’s appellate fees on top of the original award. Counsel who are themselves sanctioned and choose to appeal can be personally on the hook, jointly and severally with the client. But an equally important holding is that discounted billing does not cap exposure—courts look to reasonable market rates, not what the client actually paid. A lot family law attorneys “grandfather” their clients in at their older rates. This case allows you to seek sanctions at an attorney’s current market rate, even if they actually billed the client for less.

Chinese Theater, LLC v. Starline Tours USA, Inc.
11/6/25 CA 2/8: B333047 – J. Viramontes
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B333047.PDF

The Court of Appeal reversed denial of a motion to vacate a $232,670.36 default judgment, holding that substituted service on a bus washer employed by a related entity was improper under Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20.

“Apparently in Charge” Requires More Than Physical Presence at Business Location

The Court of Appeal held that the phrase “apparently in charge” in Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20 cannot be read to validate service on any employee found at a business location; there must be some indication the employee is someone apparently in charge and reasonably likely to deliver the service documents to the intended recipient. Service on Roberto Molina, a bus washer employed by a related entity operating from the same address, did not satisfy this requirement.

Author’s note: This rejects an overly broad interpretation that would have allowed service on any person present at a business address, preserving the statutory requirement’s meaning.

Rebuttable Presumption Overcome by Evidence of Non-Employee Status

The Court held that proof of service declarations must include facts showing compliance with statutory requirements, not merely conclusory statements that someone is “in charge.” The process server’s declaration stating only “Person in Charge” without describing Molina’s location, job title, or relationship to the defendant was insufficient.

The Court noted further that the rebuttable presumption of proper service under Evidence Code section 647 is merely a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that disappears once contrary evidence is introduced. It is “merely a preliminary assumption in the absence of contrary evidence.” Here, once Starline produced evidence that the person served was a bus washer employed by a different entity, the burden was meaningless. Once Starline introduced evidence that Molina was not employed by Starline but by a related entity as a bus washer—not someone who worked in the office or would reasonably have a relationship with Farhadi—the presumption disappeared and the trial court was required to “determine the existence or nonexistence of the presumed fact from the evidence and without regard to the presumption.”

The Court found that once the presumption vanished, Chinese Theater “was unable to produce any additional evidence that warranted a finding that a bus washer employed by a separate but related entity operating from the same business address was reasonably deemed to be ‘apparently in charge’ of Farhadi’s business office within the meaning of section 415.20.”

Helen Lee v. Yan
10/31/2025 – CA 2/8: B340352 – J. Wiley
https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B340352.PDF

In this judgment enforcement case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d), rejecting a defendant’s challenge to substitute service at her “usual place of business.”

Helen Lee sued Charlene Yan on an unrepaid loan and obtained a default judgment after substituted service at McSen Realty Corp. in Irvine, where the process server tried five times, always speaking with the office administrator, who repeatedly said Yan “was not in at this time.” On the fifth attempt, the server left the papers with the administrator and mailed a copy, satisfying Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b). Years later—after Lee levied four of Yan’s bank accounts—Yan moved to vacate the default as void, insisting McSen was not her usual place of business in 2020.

Yan’s first declaration flatly stated she “had no position with McSen Realty” and “did not participate in that business.” In response, Lee produced Department of Real Estate records showing Yan had been licensed since 2016 with McSen as her responsible broker, plus a 2023 Statement of Information listing Yan as McSen’s CEO. Yan then pivoted: in a supplemental declaration she admitted the broker relationship and later CEO role but claimed that, during the narrow window when service occurred, she had separated from her husband, left McSen, and was working independently from home, receiving no mail at the office.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial court could reasonably find McSen was her “usual place of business” for substituted service. The panel emphasized Yan’s inconsistent, “about-face” declarations and the unexplained gaps in her story (when did she leave McSen, when did she return, how did she become CEO?) as grounds to defer to the trial court’s credibility finding. Because the default was not void for lack of personal jurisdiction, section 473(d) relief was unavailable.

In re Marriage of Nelson
10/30/2025 – CA 4/3: G064256 – J. Moore (certified for partial publication)
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/G064256.PDF

This long-term marriage dissolution involves two issues of broad interest: (1) whether Family Code section 4360 (security for spousal support) conflicts with section 4337 (support terminates at death), and (2) when it is “just and reasonable” to require a wealthy, elderly payor to fund a substantial support trust.

Glen (78) and Kathy (64) Nelson were married for more than 36 years, subject to a premarital agreement that left Glen with a separate-property estate of roughly $\25 million and very little community property beyond a partial interest in the Newport Beach family home. Kathy, a CPA by training, had largely been a stay-at-home spouse and caregiver (including through Glen’s cancer surgeries and open-heart surgery). At trial, the court found a marital standard of living of about $29,635 per month, ordered permanent spousal support of $20,000 per month, and then went further: it ordered Glen to establish and fund a trust with at least $3 million in assets to secure Kathy’s support in the event of his death.

The Court of Appeal held that section 4360 does not “violate” or conflict with section 4337; instead, the statutes operate together—support obligations still terminate at death, but a trial court may, as part of a support order, require an annuity, life insurance, or a trust “so that the supported spouse will not be left without means of support” if the obligor dies. The security device is created while the obligor is alive and does not impose a new, independent support obligation on the estate.

The court further held that substantial evidence supported the $3 million support trust: Glen was a frail, two-time cancer survivor living in assisted care with caregivers 16 hours per day; Kathy was nearly 65, had been out of the full-time workforce for decades, had limited earning capacity, and held only about $1.2 million in investments and a $127,000 IRA. Given the extreme disparity in net worth and life expectancy, ordering security for support was “just and reasonable in view of the circumstances of the parties” under section 4360.

Glen also argued that section 4360 is a “rare, drastic, and unusual remedy” requiring special findings. The court rejected that framing, holding there is no heightened standard beyond the statutory requirement that security be “just and reasonable in view of the circumstances of the parties.” The relative paucity of published cases does not create extra elements.

Author’s note: For support litigators, Nelson is a big green light for using section 4360 when you have an older, high-net-worth obligor and a dependent spouse with long-term need and little earning capacity—especially where life insurance is impractical. Make a robust record on the section 4320 factors, relative life expectancy, and the (small) size of the community estate if you want a security order. On the flip side, payors should recognize that a well-supported 4360 request can result in a large trust obligation, not just maintenance of existing insurance.

Hart v. Hart
10/27/2025 – CA 2/2: B338817 – P.J. Lui
https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B338817.PDF

Under the DVPA, does the trial court have the authority to “split the difference” and renew a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) for less than five years? No, it does not.

Wife obtained a DVRO against Husband in 2023 for nine months. Just before expiration, she sought renewal. After a full evidentiary hearing in May 2024, the family court found she had a reasonable apprehension of future abuse and granted renewal—but only for another nine months, expressing that it was “not inclined to have a long duration.” Wife’s counsel argued that Family Code section 6345(a) requires a minimum five-year renewal. The court disagreed and exercised what it believed was its discretion to order a shorter period.

The Court of Appeal held that, once a protected party meets the renewal standard under section 6345(a), the court has no discretion to renew a DVRO for less than five years. The statute provides that a DVRO “may be renewed, upon the request of a party, either for five or more years, or permanently, at the discretion of the court,” and legislative history confirms that “at the discretion of the court” modifies the choice among five years, more than five years, or permanent—not the minimum floor.

Relying on Avalos v. Perez and SB 935’s committee analyses, the court emphasized that the Legislature extended the minimum renewal term from three to five years specifically to spare survivors the “harrowing ordeal” of repeatedly returning to court to renew the orders. A renewal for any period shorter than five years is simply not among the options the statute allows.

The panel therefore reversed the duration portion of the order and remanded with directions to modify the DVRO to run for five years from the May 9, 2024 hearing date (i.e., through May 9, 2029). The court also noted that section 6345(a) separately allows later termination or modification of a renewed DVRO on stipulation or motion, preserving flexibility if circumstances materially change.