Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law
Competition: FALL 2022, Vol 32, No. 2
Content
- An Economic Analysis of the Self-preferencing Debate
- Antitrust and Unfair Competition Law Section
- Big Stakes Antitrust Trial: In re Capacitors Antitrust Litigation
- Diversity In the Antitrust Bar: Is It Truly a Pipeline Problem?
- Epic V. Apple: Amicus Brief of the State of California In Support of Neither Party
- Executive Committee
- Increasing Private Equity Investments In Healthcare Raise Antitrust and Unfair Business Practice Concerns
- Message From the Chair
- Message From the Editor
- Table of Contents
- THE OTHER "QUICK LOOK"
- The Price of Free
- Practical Challenges Confronting Merger Reviews of Labor Markets
PRACTICAL CHALLENGES CONFRONTING MERGER REVIEWS OF LABOR MARKETS
Written by Joshua Holian and Nitesh Daryanani1
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 7 of the Clayton Act ("Section 7") prohibits mergers and acquisitions that are substantially likely to lessen competition, or that tend to create a monopoly.2
When reviewing mergers for potential Section 7 violations, the United States Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division ("DOJ") and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC," and collectively, the "Agencies") historically have focused their analyses on the probable effects that the merger in question will have on consumer welfare. Through decades of case law and enforcement practice, the Agencies have established a relatively well-understood path for connecting product market concentration to anticompetitive effects that—under the right conditions—would negatively impact consumers with higher prices, reduced quality, or lower investments in innovation. The precise boundaries of when a specific merger is substantially likely to lessen competition will of course be heavily contested in any given merger review, but the analytical frames (and areas for debate) are relatively well defined.